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1 V
Summary.
In recent years defence and disarmament issues became of 
major political importance in Britain, and occupied the 
centre stage in the international arena as a whole. This 
thesis examines how those issues were reported on British 
television news, against the background of broadcasting 
journalism’s claims of impartiality*, ’objectivity’ and 
neutrality1, and in relation to factors involved in the 
social process of news production: the attitudes and 
assumptions of journalists; constraints on routine 
newsgathering; and the news management practices of the 
participants in the defence and disarmament debate.
The basic methodology employed in the study is that of 
large-scale content analysis, but data gained by this means 
is supplemented with the views of journalists gained in 
interviews conducted by the author.
The first two chapters of the thesis are introductory. 
Chapter 1 explains the aims and methodology of the work. It 
sets out the reasons for the choice of ’defence and 
disarmament’ as a case study, and outlines the range of 
themes and issues contained within this category. Chapter 2 
contains a review of the defence and disarmament debate as it 
was being conducted around the research period. Chapter 3 
presents the first in a series of content analytical case 
studies with an examination of British television news 
coverage of the Soviet Union. Chapter 4 then looks at the 
case of the Korean Airline disaster of September 1983, and 
news coverage of the propaganda war which accompanied it.
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 examine in turn what are identified
Vas three 'axes' of the defence and disarmament debate:
Chapter 5 is concerned with the superpower negotiations on 
arms control; Chapter 6 with the debate between the British 
Government (and the NATO defence establishment) and the anti- 
nuclear protest movement; and Chapter 7 ends the thesis with 
an examination of television news coverage of the 1983 
General Election, in which defence and disarmament issues 
played a central role in the party political debate.
A brief conclusion brings together the findings and 
observations of the preceding chapters.
Finally, a note on the presentation of the thesis. 
References are cited in the body of the text by author's name 
and date of publication. Footnotes are reserved for 
explanatory or supplementary points. A full bibliography is 
given at the end. The thesis includes a number of appendices, 
containing transcripts of news texts, lists of reported 
statements and journalistic references in various content 
categories. All appendices are placed at the end of the 
chapter to which they refer.
Part I . Introductions
1
onapter une 
A Vital Engine of this Great Democracy...
If we tell the truth, without fear or favour, the
BBC can hold its head high as a vital engine of
this great democracy. (George Howard, Chairman of
the BBC, May 1982)Cl]
ITN*s impartiality is a matter of public record.
(ITN*s director of News and Current Affairs)[2]
The proclaimed impartiality1, *objectivity* and 
Neutrality* of British television news has been a major 
focus of interest for several years[3l: the New Right in the 
Conservative Party has accused the broadcasting institutions, 
and the BBC in particular, of left-wing bias; the Liberal
Social-Democratic Alliance has accused the BBC of bias in
favour of the two established parties, while the Labour Party 
and the trade unions have frequently complained about right- 
wing bias. Academic studies such as those by the Glasgow 
University Media Group (1976), and Schlesinger et al (1983), 
have sought to establish bias by empirical means while 
others, such as Hetherington (1985), Harrison (1985) and 
Anderson and sharrock (1982) have attempted to refute their 
findings.
This research approaches the problem of news *bias* by 
combining, in a limited fashion, two methodologies which have 
tended hitherto to be applied in isolation: large-scale 
content analysis, and production studies. These methodologies 
are applied to a study of television news coverage of the 
defence and disarmament debate which dominated British 
political life in the early 1980s.
The content analysis which forms the bulk of the work is
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informed by the views of journalists who report defence and 
disarmament issues, as presented in interviews conducted with 
correspondents by the author during an extended period of 
research in Moscow, and also with journalists based in 
London. By incorporating the views of journalists the 
research attempts to situate a detailed analysis of the news- 
text in the context of factors involved in the social process 
of news production: the attitudes and assumptions of the news 
producers; the constraints faced by journalists in the 
newsgathering process, and the effects of news management and 
news input.
The choice of the defence and disarmament debate as a case 
study was determined by the fact that when the work began the 
dominant political issues in Britain were those of defence 
policy - nuclear weapons, the arms race, and East-West 
relations. These issues had become the site of intense 
ideological and political conflict, along three ’axes1, and 
in which several perspectives, or interpretative frameworks 
competed to define the main issues.
Firstly, a deep crisis developed between the United 
States/NATO (including Britain) and the USSR/Warsaw Pact 
leading to the breakdown of detente and the onset of a new 
cold war. East-West relations were thrust into the forefront 
of political debate.
Secondly, and partly as a result of the perceived dangers 
of this conflict amongst the population the British 
government experienced a major domestic challenge to the
3
legitimacy or national security policies hitherto regarded as 
consensual. When the Glasgow Media Group produced its 1976 
study political debate in Britain centred on the problems of 
industry. By the early 1980s it was concentrated much more on 
issues surrounding defence policy.
Along a third ’axis1, the established political parties 
competed for the right to determine British defence policy.
By the 1983 General Election, the subject of Chapter 7 below, 
only one party supported the replacement of Britain’s 
independent nuclear deterrent with the Trident system. The 
main opposition party fought that election on a defence 
platform which included the removal of all US nuclear bases 
from British territory and the adoption of a non-nuclear 
defence strategy for Britain. Defence had clearly become a 
site of challenge to the political ’consensus’ in Britain in 
the early 1980s.
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1. The M ethod.
There are three key areas of study in the sociology of 
news media, focussing on different moments of the news 
process. These are productionT effects, and content. This 
section discusses how these approaches and the methodologies 
they have generated relate to the research presented here.
a . Production Studies.
Production studies, as the term implies, examines the 
production process of news, and the constraints faced by the 
news producers participating in that process. These 
constraints exist at the level of routine practices in the 
newsroom, such as the restricting influence of strict 
deadlines on the preparation of stories. In certain news- 
gathering situations there are wider constraints, such as the 
military censorship experienced by journalists covering the 
Falklands War, which have real effects on news output (see 
Hanrahan and Fox, 1982).
Production studies are also concerned with the input of 
information into the news process and the techniques of news 
management employed by various interest groups as they 
attempt to use news to their own advantage.
Major published examples of production studies are 
contained in Schlesingerfs account of the workings of the BBC 
newsroom (1978), and in Cockerell et al!s examination of news 
management (1984).
If the importance of production studies is clear, hitherto 
they have tended to be neglected by content analysts. Apart
5
from a brief look !Inside the BBC Newsroom* published in the 
Glasgow Media Group’s Bad News study (1976) there has been 
very little work combining the methodologies of content 
analysis and production studies.
Constraints involved in the social process of news 
production has tended to be neglected, if not wholly ignored 
in content analytical studies, partly because many 
journalists are unwilling to cooperate with sociologists 
whose motives they suspect and whose results they resent, and 
partly too, because some content analysts have approached 
news from within an overly conspiratorial and simplistic 
framework of media *bias*. This latter tends to militate 
against the study of news production and the problems faced 
by journalists, since an account of these factors often 
produces a more complicated picture than the crude *bias* 
framework can accomodate.
The neglect of production studies has led to the 
criticism that many content analytical findings are 
unreliable, because they have been reached without 
consideration of the constraints working on journalists. 
Findings of *bias*, it is argued, are undervalued if it is 
not known how they relate to the constraints built into the 
*social process* of news production.
The identification of *bias* in news content remains a 
central concern of media research in a society where the 
impartiality and neutrality of broadcast news plays such a 
major role in legitimising wider notions of democracy and 
pluralism. It is also an essential starting point for any
subsequent attempts to account for 'bias1 or to assess the
effects of news output on the audience.
However, the pursuit of content analysis in isolation from 
production studies has increasingly exposed the findings of 
the former to criticism. Consequently, in the present work 
the analysis of content in defence and disarmament news has 
been supplemented by a study of the constraints faced by the 
journalists who produce it. This material is not presented as 
a major production study (which would easily occupy a thesis 
by itself), but it does allow the research to take into 
account the views of a body of journalists who have not been 
canvassed in this way before.
Images of the Soviet Union on British television are a
central concern of this thesis, and it is in this area that
constraints on news-gathering and questions of news input are 
most relevant. Thus, it is in this field that the views of 
journalists were sought.
To carry out the study the author conducted interviews 
with television journalists from both BBC and ITN based in 
London who regularly report on Soviet and East European 
affairs. In addition, lengthy interviews were conducted in 
Moscow with the BBC's radio and television correspondents 
based there (at the time of the visit, ITN had no permanent 
presence in the Soviet capital).
In Moscow the author also took the opportunity to 
speak with a number of British press correspondents. While 
the experiences of broadcasting journalists in Moscow were
7
ujLiierent m  some ways irom tnose reported by the press 
correspondents, interviews revealed that they shared many 
constraints. Press coverage of the USSR is not the object of 
analysis in this study, but much of what the press 
correspondents had to say was clearly of relevance.
The purpose of the interviews was to establish the 
existence of constraints on news coverage of the Soviet Union 
which could not be ascribed to subjective factors on the part 
of the journalists themselves, but which might help to 
account for some of the observed features of coverage.
It was considered important, for example, to know if there 
were any physical limitations on the work of Moscow 
correspondents, such as travel restrictions, difficulty in 
gaining access to Soviet sources, or simply at the level of 
filming and interviewing Soviet citizens, which could explain 
the relative absence or presence of certain categories of 
news story about the USSR.
If what follows is a critique of public service 
broadcasting's impartiality, neutrality, and objectivity* in 
coverage of East-West issues, by speaking with some of the 
journalists concerned it was intended to isolate any external 
constraints on the coverage so that these could be taken into 
account in the overall analysis.
Another line of questioning in the interviews addressed 
the issue of news input. It was considered important to know, 
for example in the analysis of coverage of the Korean Airline 
disaster presented in Chapter 4 below, to what extent 
observeable features of coverage could be related to Soviet
news management or the lack thereof; and conversely, to the 
relatively skilled news management practices employed by the 
Reagan Administration during the period of the study.
Interviews were also conducted in Moscow with a number of 
Soviet journalists and media specialists. These helped to 
assess the extent and significance of recent changes in 
Soviet news management practices.
b. The Question of Effects.
A second research area, effects analysis, focusses on 
the response of the receiver to the communications process: 
the moment of decoding. This thesis avoids speculating on the 
effects of television news coverage of defence and 
disarmament issues on the audience, but debates within this 
area of research have relevance for ways of looking at and 
analysing content.
Originally inspired by the perceived effects of wartime 
propaganda and commercial advertising early effects analysis 
was ’’primarily concerned with studies of the relative power 
of various kinds of communication to change attitudes, 
opinions and actions in the very short term” (Dexter and 
White, 1964, p521). A positivist framework ’’for the analysis 
of short term effects” (Curran et al, 1977,p3) dominated 
early research. This framework was recognised to be 
inadequate as it became clear that the ’effects’ of a media 
message could not easily be isolated. What Morley describes 
as the ’normative paradigm* of message-effect-behaviour was 
recognised to contain a number of unacceptable a priori
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assumptions: "implicit nere was a 'hypodermic1 model of the 
media, having the power to inject repressive ideology 
directly into the consciousness of the masses” (1980, p1).
Confronted with this problem, and following a number of 
unsuccessful attempts to resolve it, Bernard Berelson was 
prematurely led to announce the ’end* of communications 
research as a fruitful area for sociological analysis (1948, 
p172). Others, however, attempted to develop the model of a 
media-effeet. Dexter and White suggested that ”in general 
sociologists have thought of the media as having a direct 
impact upon the hearer or listener, much as a baseball bat or 
billiard ball have when they hit something. Accordingly, most 
sociological interpretations and reports about the mass media 
have been unduly simple" (1964, p29).
The ’billiard-ball* effects model was replaced with the 
notion of the mediated-limited effect, in which the 
researcher viewed the media message as only one input into 
the general ideological milieu of the individual receiver. 
Klapper describes this development as
in essence a shift away from the tendency to regard 
mass communication as a necessary and sufficient 
cause of audience effects, towards a view of the 
media as influences working amid other influences, 
in a total situation. The old quest of specific 
effects stemming from the communication has given 
way to the observation of existing conditions and 
changes, followed by an inquiry into the factors, 
including mass communication, which produced those 
conditions and changes , and the roles which these 
factors played relative to each other (1966, p476).
Adopting this perspective complicated attempts to measure 
effects, as did theoretical developments in the concept of 
language pioneered by De Saussure (1974). With semiology came
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the concepts of variable or differential encoding and 
decoding.
De Saussure's discovery stated that language was a system 
of arbitrary conventions - signs with no necessary 
relationship to the objects they signified. From this 
perspective the media message took on the characteristics of 
a complex linguistic sign, the meaning of which was related 
to the particular social and ideological framework within 
which it was decoded. Linguistic signifiers (such as the word 
freedom1 or the phrase Thuman rights1) could mean different 
things according to the cultural context in which they were 
received. As the social context of communication varied, so 
too did the meaning of the message, and therefore the effect 
it might be hypothesised to have. An early exponent of this 
model of language, Charles E. Osgood, argued that
in human communication, be it via linguistic, 
aesthetic or other channels, meaning is critically 
involved at both the initiation (the intentions 
being encoded by the source) and the termination 
(the significance decoded by the receiver) of any 
communicative act (1966, p476).
Eco summarised the semiological conception of language 
thus:
The existence of various codes and subcodes, the 
variety of sociocultural circumstances in which a 
message is emitted (where the codes of the 
addressee can be different from those of the 
sender) and the rate of initiative displayed by the 
addressee in making presuppositions and abductions 
- all result in making a message an empty form to 
which various possible senses can be attributed (1981, 
p5) .
Effects analysis now had to accomodate the concept of
11
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quantify the specific effect of a given message in relation 
to other influences upon the individual. Attempts have been 
made, notably in the work of Morley (1980) to develop 
research in the area of effects, but empirical work has been 
able to add little to Berelson*s wry observation that "some 
kinds of communication on some kinds of issues, brought to 
the attention of some some kinds of people under some kinds 
of conditions, have some kinds of effects" (1948).
c . Content analysis.
However, the theoretical developments in models of effect 
and language clearly had important implications for content 
analysis, which in its early variants had been over-reliant 
on positivist methodologies for the quantitative assessment 
of media output. The basic assumption of early content 
analytical approaches had been that "inferences from content 
data [could] be inferred from the frequency with which 
symbols or themes appeared in the text" (Holsti, 1981, p222). 
Berelson insisted that "content analysis must deal with 
relatively denotative materials and not with relatively 
connotative materials" (1966, p265).
The contribution of semiology in content analysis was to 
introduce the notion that meaning - the meaning of words, 
pictures, and signs of all kinds - was variable rather than 
constant, related to their context and structuring. Semiology 
implied that statements about meaning could not be made 
simply on the basis of positivist counting methods.
In the area of news coverage, by way of illustration, this
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development implied that partiality or impartiality could not 
be established by purely statistical means. In a recent 
content analytical study, Cumberbatch (1986) notes that 
although Arthur Scargill appeared on news coverage of the 
1984 miners* strike more frequently than Ian McGregor this 
did not mean that TV news was partial in favour of his views. 
Mr Scargill tended to experience more aggressive interviewing 
techniques, permitting the conclusion that his views were 
granted less legitimacy than those of his opponent in the 
debate . An exclusively positivist analysis of content based 
on counting the number of appearances on the news by both 
actors would not reveal this.
The break with a ’pre-structuralist* view of language thus 
implied a shift from quantitative to qualitative content 
analysis, as Becker puts it, looking for ’’the contextual 
significance of the notions, symbols and arguments used in 
the text” (1983, p44). The content analyst was now concerned 
with meaning at the manifest/denotative and the 
latent/connotative content levels.
Quantitative measures retained the important role of 
supporting qualitative analyses but were not in themselves 
sufficient bases for inference: ’’the reduction of text 
reality to mathematical connections of numbers is suitable 
[only] as a structuring aid for a qualitative and ideology 
critical analysis”, partly because ’’any text explicitly 
contains only a part of what it wants to express. What the 
author regards as ideologically self-evident is left out” 
(Ibid., p47).
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Morley describes this development in research as a shift 
from the norm ative paradigmT with its emphasis on 
quantitative/positivist methodology, to an interpretative 
paradigm, the focus on content at the level of "definitions 
and agendas of issues". In this framework the television news 
message takes on the characteristics of a complex sign, in 
which "a preferred reading has been inscribed, but which 
retains the potential, if decoded in a manner different from 
the way in which it has been encoded, of communicating a 
different meaning" (1980, p10).
Thus, no claims are made here about how news coverage of 
the defence debate has been perceived by the television 
audience. The possibility of differential decoding is clearly 
recognised, since the complexity of language ensures a 
variety of possible interpretations of a given text. The 
extent to which these exist depend on the individuals access 
to alternative sources of knowledge, and other factors over 
which the news producers have no control.
However, the semiotic conception of language implies that 
work is done by the encoder in order to communicate the 
desired meaning to the audience, to construct a dominant1 
or 'preferred* meaning in the text. As Hall puts it in his 
seminal 'Encoding/Decoding' article:
in speaking of dominant meanings, we are not talking 
about a one-sided process which governs how all events 
will be signified. It consists of the 'work* required to 
enforce, win plausibility for and command as legitimate 
a decoding of the event within the limit of dominant 
definitions in which it has been consistently signified 
(1981, p.135).
14
j-'jr w n t u i  j -k i i i ig  u u c  a x i  i/y u i  i i i c d i ix i i^ s  w i i j .c n  uiJLgnu ue
drawn from a single text, semiotics necessarily raises the 
question of how meaning is contructed by those who produce 
the message: of how ’empty form* becomes preferred reading1; 
of how, while always noting the possibility of differential 
decoding, the inherent plurality of the media message is 
reduced to what Davis and Walton callna set of simple 
formulations or frames of reference” (1983,p47). This 
research attempts to reconstruct the preferred readings1 of 
defence and disarmament news.
Graham Murdock, among others, has criticised that "highly 
asymmetric analysis in which an elaborate anatomy of symbolic 
forms sits alongside a schematic and incomplete account of 
social process” (1982, p690). Paul Hirsch has argued that 
’’semiotic efforts towards analysing television content often 
make heroic assumptions about how cultural themes are 
perceived by a mass audience” (1981, p196). This content 
analysis does not make Theroic assumptions* about effects, 
and it tries to avoid the *assymmetry* of some content 
analyses. Its aim, simply put, is to show what versions of 
events, if any, come to dominate in news, and the means by 
which that dominance is achieved: to show how the complex 
sign of the news text and its various levels of meaning are 
’’structured in dominance”.
To do this, quantitative methods of organising and making 
sense of data have been combined with an interpretative 
analysis of the news text. Content categories and sub­
categories have been developed to facilitate the analysis of 
large quantities of news text on a wide-ranging and complex
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set of issues. In some of these categories, nthe counting of 
symbols and themes" was considered relevant. For example, in 
news about the Soviet Union, the analysis includes counts of 
how many items in the sample related to Soviet internal 
affairs, and how many to foreign. With news about Soviet 
internal affairs, items are again broken down into themes, 
such as coverage of dissidence.
In relation to the British peace movement, there are 
accounts of ’who got on’ the news at crucial moments in 
coverage of major peace movement events, such as the Easter 
demonstrations of 1983. Likewise, the study of news coverage 
of the deaths of Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko inludes a 
count of those ’primary definers’, East and West, given 
access to TV news at these times.
In these and other cases, it is clear that quantitative 
assessments give some indication, important in the overall 
analysis, of news-values and the unstated assumptions of the 
news-producers, although they are not adequate for an 
understanding of the construction of meaning in the news text 
as a whole. This latter requires an account of the context in 
which appearances and statements are made.
Thus, quantitative approaches are combined with 
qualitative analyses of the news-texts and the ways in which 
specific themes and issues are presented. A descriptive 
account of how the debate was reflected on the news is 
combined with an interpretative analysis of the various 
themes that arose in the coverage. It is one thing to note, 
for example, that the CND Chairperson received X amount of
16
uuverage ana tne tsntisn uerence secretary 1, but quite 
another to assess the manner in which their respective 
viewpoints were presented.
The study of peace movement news does not merely count the 
number of appearances made by actors in the debate, but looks 
at the varying interview techniques applied to them, the 
structuring of items in relation to bulletins as a whole, and 
other features of coverage not amenable to quantification but 
which contribute to the construction of meaning.
Likewise, the comparative study of coverage of US and 
Soviet arms proposals was concerned not merely with the 
num bers of items devoted to each, as if this could give 
an assessment of the impartiality of news coverage, but 
with the manner in which items were structured to favour 
particular readings of the positions of the two sides.
The analysis is mainly concerned with the verbal component 
of news language. However, visual signs are also carriers of 
meaning and throughout the text reference is made to visual 
aspects of coverage. Where these are considered to be 
particularly effective in the construction of meaning in the 
text as a whole, still photographs are reproduced.
d . Content analysis: criticisms and responses.
A number of criticisms of content analytical methodology 
have been made. Some have argued that the content analysis of 
British television news frequently overestimates the 
significance of the strictures of Neutrality* adhered to by 
the news producers. Anderson and Sharrock argue: "the claim
17
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only be assessed relative to the claims which the media 
themselves actually make concerning impartiality” (1980,
p368).
We would agree with this assertion: the analysis of news 
content should take account of the claims made for output by 
the news producers. As already pointed out, however, these 
claims emphasise not only the neutrality and objectivity of 
broadcast news but the fact that these qualities are crucial 
component parts of the British democratic tradition.
Elsewhere, Anderson and Sharrock modify their position to 
accomodate what they concede to be 'partiality* in television 
news, by arguing that partiality should not be equated with 
'bias'. Partiality, they suggest, is expected by the 
audience.
The presumption of neutrality which is assigned to 
those simple-minded readers and viewers who figure 
in many media studies should in our view be seen as 
rather more sophisticated than it is usually 
allowed to be, a neutrality specified by 
relevances, not a notional universal impartiality 
(Ibid., p371).
The audience is not neutral and does not expect 
broadcasting to be, they imply. How indeed, could one take up 
a position of neutrality as regards ”bombers, scroungers, 
paedophiles, child pornographers, sociologists, Provos, etc”? 
According to this analysis, partiality represents the 
essentially democratic expression of the national 
consciousness.
The Swedish researcher Rosengren takes a similar position.
18
The news reporting in a country must be partial in 
a way reflecting the basic values and actual 
sympathies of the population. The reason for this 
is that otherwise the credibility of the media will 
disappear ( 1980, p258) .
News media, it is suggested here, Mirror1 the values and 
sympathies of a population.
There are at least two points at which such a view can be 
challenged. Firstly, it assumes that the media accurately 
represent National consciousness!(given a real set of 
Tvalues and sympathies1 which could be described as 
1 nationalT).
Secondly, and more importantly, such a view ignores 
the existence of competing values and sympathies and the 
possibility that the media plays an active role in 
differentially promoting these to the audience. This research 
asks if the information produced by television news on an 
issue of major political importance, rather than "allowing 
the audience to make up their minds for themselves", as the 
producers claim it does, tends to favours particular readings 
of that issue in which certain viewpoints are favoured above 
others.
Anderson and Sharrock make a further criticism of the 
findings of content analysis, relating to the basic 
methodology employed. In their view,
the claim that the media are biased usually means 
that the media men do not support the preferred 
sociological theories of the media researcher
(1 980 ,  p 36 1) .
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'Radical* media sociologists, by their classification, 
define bias as the absence of their own, ideologipally- 
grounded preferred readings1. They are as selective and 
'biased* in their criticisms as the media institutions they 
attack.
Critical media sociologists seem rather more 
concerned to reveal that the news is biased in 
regard to the class struggle, against extra- 
parliamentary left-wingers, trade unionists, and so 
forth (Ibid., p368) .
These authors wish to draw a distinction between 
insignificant bias which is permitted (against "scroungers, 
bombers...etc”) and significant bias which, they concede, 
would be undesireable. 'Insignificant* bias, they argue, 
against left-wingers, trade unionists, etc., can be 
discounted (Anderson and Sharrock, as members of the academic 
New Right believe that such views are beyond the pale). Those 
who claim significant bias are refuted on the following 
grounds.
Significant bias is not to be found by identifying 
some under-represented viewpoint. Nor can it be 
established by reference to the validity and 
accuracy of what is reported since these are 
practical matters governed by, and recognised to be 
governed by, limitations... Whatever they do 
promise, media men are treated as if they have 
signed up to be professional sociologists and have 
fallen down on the job. They are alleged to distort 
events (if not reality itself) in their reports, 
where the measure of distortion is precisely the 
extent of discrepancy between their account and 
that given by the favoured sociological theories of 
the media scholars... In effect then, charges of 
distortion and bias could equally well be 
reformulated as statements that the media men 
disagree with their sociologically minded 
critics (Ibid., p369) .
Anderson and Sharrock correctly state that the critique of 
broadcasting's 'impartiality' should be based on criteria
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which are not dependent for their legitimacy on the 
acceptance of particular ideological frameworks. The grounds 
for criticism of industrial news coverage should be 
acceptable beyond the ideological framework of left-wing 
trade unionism, while the findings of this study of defence 
and disarmament news should as far as possible be independent 
from views on the debate itself.
Rosengren attempts to resolve this methodological problem 
by distinguishing two sets of data in content analysis: 
intra-media data on the one hand, gathered from analysis of 
media output, and extra-media data on the other, brought to 
the research from outside in order to verify the findings: 
nthe study of news reporting... should to advantage be 
regarded as the study of a relation, the relation between 
reality (as far as it is known) and the picture of reality 
offered by the news media” (1980, p250).
For Anderson and Sharrock the foriginal sin1 of the 
Radical* content analysts is their over-emphasis on intra­
media data, i.e. the content of the news-text, in isolation 
from the extra-media reality. The weakness of the methodology 
lies in its self-enclosed comparison of intra-media data with 
the researcher's view of what 'reality1 should be.
This criticism, where applicable, is justified, but a 
number of content analytical studies, notably by the Glasgow 
University Media Group, have attempted to avoid this 
methodological deficiency and have achieved considerable 
support for their findings precisely because of their success 
in doing so. In their study of industrial news the GUMG
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tested their findings against ’’the background of public 
debate... statistical material emanating from government 
about industrial conditions as well as whole areas of 
university research on management, workers and industry” 
(1976, p40).
Our method was to look at the possible 
explanations, then to see which of these occured in 
news coverage and which were excluded. Secondly, we 
examined how some explanations were featured 
prominently and others downgraded (1982, p19).C4]
This methodology does not juxtapose one ’false’ account of 
reality with another ’true’ account, but identifies a 
plurality of competing accounts against which the media’s 
account can be compared. Schlesinger et al apply the method 
to their content analysis of television images of terrorism 
(1983), and it is applied in the following research to the 
range of issues and events encapsulated within ’the defence 
debate’.
In so doing, this study proceeds from the basic 
methodological principle that content analysis ’’presupposes 
knowledge of the phenomena with which communication 
deals” (Varis, 1983, p.52).
For this reason, the interview materials and analyses 
of content are preceded by a brief review of the defence 
debate, setting out the main lines of contention, based on 
background material from a wide range of academic, political 
and military sources.
The availability of these sources reflected the topicality 
of the defence debate during the research period. They
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included the publications of independent research institutes 
such as the International Institute of Strategic Studies and 
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
published articles by present and past leaders of the Western 
politico-military command structure such as those by Robert 
McFarlane in the US journal Foreign Affairs and by NATO 
Secretary General Lord Carrington in NATO ReviewT as well as 
British, American and Soviet defence documents. In addition, 
throughout the research period television documentaries and 
current affairs programmes provided sources of information on 
the events being reported on the news. Programmes by the 
Horizon and Panorama documentary teams discussed, at various 
times, the Soviet defence budget, the strategic significance 
of the Cruise and Pershing II missile deployments, and the 
arms control policies of the Reagan Administration. 
Journalists produced material on such themes as The Cold War 
Game and The Truth Game.
These diverse sources, culled from all sides of the 
defence debate, are the starting point for the research 
which follows. They, and not the favoured sociological 
theories of the researcher, have determined the various 
interpretative frameworks available to television news 
in its coverage of the defence and disarmament debate 
during the period under discussion.
To sum up, this study draws on three types of data to 
mount a quantitative and qualitative analysis of television 
news coverage of the major political issue of recent years.
A large sample of news texts forms the main data base.
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This is combined with data drawn from interviews with 
journalists engaged in the production of those texts. 
Thirdly, the study makes extensive reference to a range of 
extra-media sources on the substantive issues of the defence 
debate.
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2. The Categories of coverage.
While the broad theme of this study was decided at the 
outset it was not possible when the work began in 1 982 to 
anticipate how the defence debate would develop and how it 
would be reflected, quantitatively and qualitatively, on the 
news. Thus, an approach to sampling was adopted which would 
enable the research to incorporate the several ’axes’ or 
levels of the debate, and the differing time frames of the 
newsworthy events to which it gave rise.
Interest focussed initially on three themes in coverage.
It was clear that the defence debate was, first and foremost, 
a debate about the nature of the USSR. Different approaches 
to this question seemed to underly all views on policy 
matters. Thus it was decided to study television news 
coverage of the USSR - Soviet news.
Soviet news appeared in two forms. In a given sample of 
television news, coverage of the Soviet Union would occupy a 
given proportion of news time - X number of items. This was 
categorised as routine Soviet news. The object of analysis of 
routine Soviet news was to establish the existence of 
patterns and tendencies in coverage of the USSR.
But the death of Leonid Brezhnev in November 1982 allowed 
for an extension to this project. It became possible to 
generate a category of in-depth Soviet newsT by virtue of the 
large quantities of news devoted to this single event.
Routine Soviet news items were generally brief and 
insubstantial. By contrast coverage of Brezhnevfs death was 
substantial and detailed, amounting to many hours of
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Konstantin Chernenko were recorded by the author and 
are discussed in Chapter 3 below.
A second theme of coverage was the peace movement, from 
which a content category labelled peace movem ent news was 
identified. As we noted above, conflict between the anti- 
nuclear protest movement and NATO was one of the three ’axes* 
of the nuclear debate. Peace movement news became a 
significant quantitative category on television. Again, a 
sub-category of routine peace movement news was identified, 
from the routine, day to day coverage of the movement’s 
activities, while specific events such as the Easter 
demonstrations of 1983 produced in-depth coverage of the 
peace movement.
A third theme of coverage concerned the superpower arms 
control dialogue - disarmam ent news. Disarmament news 
reported major events in the US-Soviet dialogue between 1981 
and 1983. By a fortunate coincidence, the news samples from 
which Soviet and peace movement coverage was extracted also 
contained some of the most important events in the superpower 
dialogue, such as the Zero Option and START proposals, and 
the Soviet freeze and no-first-use proposals.
In September 1983, a ’special case’ of superpower dialogue 
exploded around the Korean airline disaster. This was 
propaganda warfare at its most bitter, and it was decided on 
the spot to record television coverage of the event. Two 
weeks of news coinciding with the incident’s peak 
newsworthiness were recorded.
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Finally, as it became clear that the 1983 General 
Election, announced on May 9th, would be a Nuclear1 election 
largely fought around the issues of defence and disarmament, 
it was decided to record as much of its coverage on 
television as practically possible. This generated a category 
of election-defence news, which reported on the party 
political debate, with some limited reference to the peace 
movements participation in the campaign.
The need for these content categories, and the variability 
of the sampling methods needed to generate workable 
quantities of them, reflects the scope and intensity of a 
debate which continues to occupy the centre stage of British 
and world politics.
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1. This comment was made during the Falklands conflict when 
the BBC found itself on the defensive, somewhat unusually, 
for being excessively impartial. A substantial lobby of 
opinion was mobilised against the claims of the BBC that it 
had the right and duty to be objective in reporting the 
conflict. On May 4th the Daily Mail reported complaints by 
Tory MPs that BBC news had been ’’unacceptably evenhanded” in 
contrast to ITN’s ’’consistently less sceptical and more 
supportive stance”. On May 7th, the national press widely 
reported Mrs Thatcher remark that ”1 understand there are 
times when it seems that we and the Argentinians are almost 
being treated as equals and almost on a neutral basis”. On 
May 11th, following the controversial Panorama programme in 
which the Conservatives’ Falklands policy was scrutinised, 
the Prime Minister again addressed the House on the subject 
of the BBC’s excessive impartiality.
I know how strongly many people feel that the case 
for our boys is not being put with sufficient 
vigour on certain - I do not say all - BBC 
programmes. The Chairman of the BBC has assured 
us, and has said in vigorous terms, that the BBC is 
not neutral on this point, and I hope that his 
words will be heeded by the many who have 
responsibilities for standing up for our task 
force, our boys, our people and the cause of 
democracy.(Hansard, no.1234, p.598)
2. A remark made during the 1984 miners’ strike in reply 
to accusations of television news bias.
3. British broadcasting produces a form of news which 
’’presents itself as a merely factual report of events in the 
world”(Schlesinger et al, 1983, p36). The Broadcasting Act, 
1981 legally obliges the IBA companies to ensure that ’’due 
impartiality is preserved as respects matters of political or 
industrial controversy or relating to current public policy”. 
The British Broadcasting Corporation is regulated by the 
provisions of the Royal Charter under which it was 
established. This means in practice, as former Director- 
General Howard Newby put it for the BBC, that
news and current affairs are broadcast in a way 
designed not to impose any view or foster any kind 
of attitude, but to put everyone in possession of 
the information that allows them to make up their 
minds for themselves (1977, p11).
Hugh Carleton-Greene, when DirectorGeneral, identified 
one of the BBC’s main characteristics to be its ’’impartial 
reflection of all kinds of controversies” (1970, p4) and the 
Corporation advertises its news services with the claim that
the BBC does not campaign. It is in the business of 
reporting, not crusading. It has no leader columns 
for the airing of its editorial views, for it has 
none to air. And it does not address itself to one
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nation is its audience and the readers of every 
kind of newspaper watch or listen to its bulletins 
(BBC General Advisory Council, 1976)*
4. In the article cited above Anderson and Sharrock 
criticise the GUMG project for attempting to resolve 
precisely the problems they raise.
The authors of Bad News seek to reveal the bias of 
TV news by comparing its reports with those which 
are found in M anagement Today and the Financial 
Times. These last are taken as reporting 
objectively fwhat happened* in order that the 
television report may be shown to have been 
selective. It appears then that media scholars are 
in practice apt to adopt the same piecemeal 
approach to the media as it is likely that most 
readers and viewers do.
However, the aim of a methodology which compares 
intra with extra media data on a particular content 
category is not to contrast *objectivity* with 
*selectivity* but to establish which accounts of 
reality, out of all those available, are selected and 
presented on the news.
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Chapter Two
The Nuclear Debate and the end of deterrence.
During the 1970s defence policy was not a matter of deep 
political controversy. This chapter gives a brief account of 
how it became so in the 80s, who was involved in the debate, 
and what their basic positions were.
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1. The Death of Detente and the Rise of the Nuclear Debate.
Mary Kaldor observes that until 1981 "there was very 
little coverage of military issues and what coverage there 
was tended to be along orthodox lines”( 1982a). She suggests 
that "lack of coverage reflected lack of public debate”. In a 
sample of television news recorded by the Glasgow Media Group 
in 1975 a content profile found that less than \% of newstime 
was devoted to defence issues(1976, p.43).
During this period defence debates centred on forthodoxf 
intra-service disputes. Major strategic issues were not up 
for discussion. Indeed, the Labour Government under Jim 
Callaghan was able to make decisions of great importance - 
such as the deployment of the Chevaline warhead on Polaris 
submarines - without informing its own Cabinet, let alone 
Parliament or the country as a whole.
The low political profile of the defence issue reflected 
the relative stability and improved international atmosphere 
of the period we characterise as detente1. In the 1970s the 
conflict-ridden years of the cold war had given way to an era 
of coexistence between the superpowers. Arms control, 
economic and cultural links, the acceptance by each 
superpower of the legitimate interests1 of the other, were 
all features of detente. Throughout these years the anti- 
nuclear protest movement, which had been a significant 
political force in the 1950s and 60s, remained a fringe 
group. The breaking down of the 'consensus of silence1 and 
the development of the current nuclear debate were responses 
to events which undermined and reversed these comforting
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a new arms race.
President Carter, as early as 1976, had begun to move 
United States foreign policy away from the detente of the 
Nixon-Ford Administrations. It was he who in 1980 made the 
first large-scale increases in defence spending and initiated 
what Noam Chomsky calls "one of the most remarkable 
propaganda campaigns in recent history... the human rights 
crusade" directed against the USSR(1982, p.32)[1], It was 
President Carter who sought permission from Western European 
governments to deploy neutron weapons on their territories, 
and on December 12th, 1979 NATO under the leadership of Jimmy 
Carter took the decision to modernise American long range 
theatre nuclear weapons with Cruise and Pershing II missiles. 
These trends away from detente in US foreign policy were 
evident before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or the 
Iranian hostage crisis, although these events accelerated the 
process.
But the onset of what has been called !the new cold war1, 
and the present nuclear debate began in earnest with the 
coming to power in Britain and the United States of 
politicians who themselves broke most decisively with the 
consensus of the 1970s. Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan and 
the political forces which they represented initiated a 
qualitative leap in defence thinking.
Subsequently, a fiercely-contested public debate developed 
in the NATO countries, and particularly in those which, like 
Britain, were to be recipients of the new Cruise and Pershing
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weapons. The debate produced three very broadly-defined 
groups, whom we shall label the conservatives, the 
pragmatists, and the disarmers. These groups and the 
frameworks within which they argued were not new to the 
period under discussion, but the late 1970s and early 1980s 
saw a major realignment between them.
The era of detente can be seen as one in which the 
pragmatists held sway, while the conservatives and the 
disarmers remained on the political sidelines. The passing of 
detente saw the pragmatists ejected from office and replaced 
by radically conservative governments on both sides of the 
Atlantic: in Britain, decades of 'consensus* gave way to 
Thatcherism; in the United States Ronald Reagan became 
President, scornful of both his Democratic and Republican 
predecessors.
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The conservatives are referred to variously (and refer to 
themselves) as the ideologues1, the New Right and the 
radical right. In Britain the term TdriesT is sometimes used 
to distinguish a conservative Conservative from the more 
pragmatic variety. These labels proclaim their bearers to be 
confident, assertive champions of the capitalist system, as 
compared with the much-reviled fliberals* or Twetsf. In the 
sphere of defence and foreign policy the conservatives have 
argued that the years of detente and coexistence between NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact were a disaster for the West, for two 
reasons.
Firstly, it was argued that while NATO had shown restraint 
in military spending, the Soviet Union had engaged in a huge 
military build-up. Arms control agreements such as SALT I and 
II were castigated for permitting the USSR to catch up with 
and even overtake the West militarily. It was suggested that 
as Soviet confidence in its own military superiority grew, so 
would the risk of confrontation and war.
Secondly, the conservatives argued that while the West had 
shown restraint in the sphere of foreign intervention, the 
USSR had continued to intervene in foreign conflicts and had 
increased its influence in the Third World. The examples of 
Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia were invoked to illustrate 
the consequences of a detente which inhibited the US from 
pursuing its interests in the world while allowing the USSR 
to do what it liked. The conservatives1 attitude to detente 
was summed up in a speech made by President Reagan on January
34
O u o n , i ? u I •
So far detente's been a one-way street which the Soviet 
Union has used to pursue its own aims. I know of no 
leader of the Soviet Union, since the Revolution and 
including the present leadership, that has not more than 
once repeated their determination that their goal must 
be the promotion of world revolution and a one-world 
socialist or communist state. Now as long as they do 
that and as long as they, at the same time, have openly 
and publicly declared that they only morality they 
recognise is what will further their cause, meaning they 
reserve the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat 
in order to obtain it, I think that when you do business 
with them - even in detente - you keep that in mind.
The feeling that America (and by extension the West, 
freedom, democracy, etc) had been Ttaken for a ride1 by 
detente characterised the conservative view and made it 
deeply suspicious of any form of cooperation or coexistence 
that resembled it.
Two main lines of policy were derived from this framework. 
On the one hand, the United States required a vast 
modernisation and expansion of its military capability. The 
conservatives did not publicly dispute the theory of nuclear 
deterrence - although some were openly advocating the 
adoption of a nuclear war-fighting strategy[2] - but argued 
that Effective1 deterrence involved fcatching up' with the 
USSR.
Secondly, because of the perceived global consequences of 
detente for US and Western interests, the US and its allies 
had to engage in open military and ideological struggle with 
the Soviet Union and its proxies1 in the Third World. "It is 
a question of whether or not you compete politically with 
your opponent and do so in a way which deals with morality, 
with values, with natures of systems, and we are going to
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engage in that with a good deal of vigour, and we hope with a 
certain amount of spirit", as US State Department official 
Mark Palmer put it on Jonathan Dimbleby's documentary The 
Eagle and the Bear.
The main objective of these policies was to reverse what 
was perceived to be a dangerous decline in the strength and 
prestige of American capitalism. Strong leadership - which 
Ronald Reagan promised to provide - and increased defence 
budgets were the means by which the decline could be halted 
and the damage made good. The experience of Vietnam was 
positively redefined.
The corollary of these developments was a revived anti- 
Sovietism. Nixon, Ford, and Carter had always been anti­
communist. They tended however, to forego rhetorical 
denunciations and to engage in 'normal' diplomatic relations. 
Each met Soviet leaders. Reagan by contrast denounced the 
Soviet Union as an 'evil empire* and expressed his hope to 
"leave Marxism-Leninism on the ashheap of history".
Unlike all post-war Republican and Democratic Presidents, 
Reagan refused any contact with his Soviet counterpart during 
his first term of office. During the research period his only 
meeting with a Soviet leader took place with Foreign 
Secretary Gromyko a few days before the Presidential election 
of November 1984. He met Gorbachev for the first time in 
November 1985.
In most respects the British conservatives in government 
followed the Reagan Administration in these policies, 
although disagreements were in evidence when Britain's own
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interests were transparently ignored. During the US invasion 
of Grenada and the US boycott of the Soviet gas pipeline 
project, both of which directly infringed British 
sovereignty, friction was evident between the two powers.
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Both the pragmatists and the disarmers opposed the 
conservatives* approach to defence and foreign policy. Many 
of their reasons for doing so were similar, while in other 
respects they differed significantly.
The pragmatists, in power and in opposition to the 
conservatives, believed in the natural superiority of the 
capitalist system and tended in general to perceive the 
Soviet Union as an enemy. But where Reagan, Thatcher, and the 
conservatives believed that Soviet gains could be reversed by 
military, political, economic and ideological struggle the 
pragmatists argued that the new global balance of power - the 
*rough equivalence* codified by the SALT agreements - 
precluded such a strategy. Confrontation and conflict, they 
argued, could not in the era of nuclear weapons be considered 
as a practical solution to the historic antagonism between 
East and West, since it would mean the destruction of both. A 
leading exponent of pragmatism in this sense was Admiral Noel 
Gaylor, the former Commander in Chief of the United States 
Pacific Forces. On October 4th 1982 he appeared on Channel 
4*s ’access* programme Comm ent. Taking the nuclear issue as 
his theme, he appealed for a "pragmatic” approach to the 
East-West debate.
The Soviets and the West have in fact two common 
overriding objectives: that we not be destroyed in 
nuclear war, and that we not see nuclear weapons 
scattered around the world. On these two overriding 
needs we can build a general nuclear settlement. We can, 
together with the Soviets, stop the pointless and 
threatening language we use towards each other. We can 
develop a realistic and pragmatic respect for the 
security and vital interests of each country.
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In NATO Review the former British Foreign Secretary and 
now NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington attacked what he 
called the "megaphone diplomacy" of some Western leaders.
The notion that we should face the Soviets down in a 
silent war of nerves, broken only by bursts of megaphone 
diplomacy, is based on a misconception of our own 
values, of Soviet behaviour, and of the anxious 
aspirations of our own people. We should talk frankly 
and insistently to the Russians at every level of the 
imperative for peace (1983).
The pragmatists criticised several aspects of NATO policy. 
Although sharing with the conservatives a fundamental belief 
in the value of and need for NATO, they disagreed on 
questions of strategy and tactics. Admiral Gaylor on Comm ent 
disputed the wisdom of NATO's policy of first-use - the 
threat to use nuclear weapons first in the event of a Soviet 
conventional attack.
There is no longer any sensible military use for nuclear 
weapons, whether we call them tactical weapons, or 
theatre weapons, or strategic weapons. Both sides are 
now equally armed. Any threat to use nuclear weapons is 
an empty bluff, for any attempted use would recoil 
terribly on the user.
A similar argument was employed by the former US Defence 
Secretary Robert McNamara in the American journal Foreign 
Affairs.
Having spent seven years as Secretary of Defence dealing 
with the problems unleashed by the initial nuclear chain 
reaction 40 years ago, I do not believe we can avoid 
serious and unacceptable risk of nuclear war until we 
recognise that nuclear weapons serve no military purpose 
whatsoever. They are totally useless.[his emphasis](Vol 
62, no.1)
During the 1983 General Election Enoch Powell formulated a 
pragmatic1 critique of the British government's policy of
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nuclear deterrence - the threatened use of Britain's 
independent nuclear weapons against the USSR in the event of 
a Soviet attack. The speech was published in the Guardian of 
June 1st, 1 983.
Nobody disputes that our nuclear weaponry is negligible 
in comparison with that of Russia - if we could destroy 
16 Russian cities she could destroy practically every 
vestige of life on these islands several times over. For 
us to use the weapon would therefore be equivalent to 
more than suicide - it would be genocide. An officer may 
in the hour of his countryfs defeat and disgrace commit 
suicide honestly and rationally with his service 
revolver. But in any collective context the choice of 
non-existence, of the obliteration of all future hope, 
is insanity. Whatever it is, who can call it defence?
The pragmatists argued that self-preservation be the 
guiding principle of superpower relations. Peace in their 
view was a practical necessity based on the realities of 
nuclear warfare. The disarmers, however, mounted a more 
fundamental critique of the conservatives1 position.
The rise of the disarmament lobby was the most visible 
indicator of the breakdown of ’consensus* around defence. Its 
members were both numerous and diverse in their social and 
political backgrounds. They included groups with names such 
as Tories Against Cruise and Trident, the Christian Campaign 
for Nuclear Disarmament, and the Medical Campaign for the 
Prevention of Nuclear War.
The disarmers consequently had many different reasons for 
opposing nuclear defence, and differed also in their 
practical suggestions as to how 'disarmament* should proceed. 
The Labour Party, for example, opposed Cruise and Trident 
missiles, was somewhat ambiguous about the future of Polaris,
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nuclear weapons absolutely in the British context. They 
suggested unilateralism in Britain as the first step in a 
longer process of multilateral disarmament, and campaigned 
for Britain*s withdrawal from NATO.
Many of the pragmatic arguments were welcomed and used by 
the disarmers. By the same token, it was partly the 
campaigning activities of the peace movement which led many 
who had previously accepted NATO strategies to *break ranks* 
and dissent in public. The difference between the disarmers 
and the pragmatists lay not so much in the content of their 
positions as in their style. The disarmers campaigned in 
massive demonstrations throughout the NATO countries, 
translating pragmatic concerns for the future into a potent 
social protest movement. The women of Greenham Common 
exemplified this phenomenon, capturing the imagination of the 
world with their vigil at the US Cruise missile base.
The range of public debate around defence policy during 
the period of the study signified that the consensus of the 
1970s on defence policy had been shattered. A radical shift 
in NAT0*s stance, accompanied by an upsurge in popular 
demands for arms control made the issue the key one of the 
decade. The defence establishment was split between those 
currently in power who advocated the new assertiveness of the 
West and those - like Denis Healey, Robert McNamara, Admiral 
Gaylor - who called for an alternative approach. Millions of 
ordinary people gathered in political demonstrations against 
NATO policy.
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nature of the Soviet Union, and it is to that subject which, 
briefly, we now turn.
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In 1983 the British Governments Central Office of 
Information produced a video pack for use in British schools. 
It was called The Peace Game, and dealt with the subject of 
the Soviet Union and Britainfs defence needs. It typifies 
conservative attitudes on the issue.
As early as 1949 Russia was plainly showing her belief 
that Soviet ideology must dominate the world, and her 
readiness to use military force to achieve that. In that 
year Russia put paid to the last hope of stopping an 
arms race before it started - she tested her first 
atomic bomb.
A war-weary West had seen this coming and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation was our response: a 
defensive alliance, today of 16 countries, which would 
treat an attack on one as an attack on all. And the need 
for NATO has been increasingly clear. By 1971 Russia was 
already outstripping America as the world’s biggest arms 
spender, and her arsenal today, nuclear and 
conventional, is many times greater than anything she 
could ever need for defence. So NATO too is forced to 
keep both a nuclear and a conventional deterrent.
Firstly to show the Russians that they can gain nothing 
by attacking us, and secondly to encourage them to keep 
talking towards world nuclear disarmament, because 
Russia has shown time and time again that she w o n ’t 
negotiate seriously with military weaklings.
Soviet military powers
The conservatives argued that the Soviet Union was 
approaching or had already attained a position of military 
superiority vis a vis the NATO alliance. The United States 
Defence Department expressed the new mood when it stated in 
1983 that ’’the facts leave no doubt as to the USSR’s 
dedication to achieving military superiority in all 
fields”(1983, p.3). In May 1983 General Bernard Rogers, the 
Supreme NATO commander in Europe, told a journalist on 
Channel 4 that,
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by the Warsaw Pact at a minimum of two to one and 
usually up to three or four to one. When I talk about 
the widening gap, in a year we will field 500 modern 
tanks in NATO. The Warsaw Pact will field 2000. We!ll 
field 400 modern aircraft, theyfll field a thousand 
third generation aircraft.
New developments in weapons technology and strategic 
doctrine were portrayed to the citizens of the NATO countries 
as a response to Soviet superiority. The NATO defence 
ministers who took the decision on December 12th, 1979 to 
deploy a new generation of American nuclear weapons in Europe 
explained their action as being a response to ’’unilateral 
Soviet theatre nuclear force deployments”, namely the SS-20 
and Backfire bomber systems. In this case the Soviet threat 
was described as a build-up in a particular category of 
weapon which could ’’directly threaten Western Europe”. As the 
ministers explained in their historic communique:
Soviet superiority in theatre nuclear systems could 
undermine the stability achieved in intercontinental 
systems and cast doubt on the credibility of the 
Alliance’s deterrent strategy by highlighting the gap in 
the spectrum of NATO’s available nuclear response to 
aggression.
The assertion of Soviet military superiority in areas of 
’’strategic significance for the Alliance in Europe” remained 
the key legitimating argument for these controversial weapons 
until and after the deployments themselves. The Soviets were 
also argued to have conventional military superiority in 
Europe. General Rogers, again on Channel 4:
I say to you that with respect to the size, the 
magnitude of the material resources that they have 
available, not only the quantity but the quality of 
these resources today, which match anything we have 
here, and use is based upon technology which they’ve 
gotten from us anyway, I would prefer to have in many
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instances tneir Kina or quality and quantity than not to 
have it.
The conservatives argued that Soviet military superiority 
derived from a defence budget which far outstripped that of 
any NATO country, including the United States. The following 
presentation by the US Defence Department was typical.
In recent years, the military has absorbed 15 per cent 
of the Gross National Product as compared to less than 
seven percent for the United States - and if curent 
trends continue, the Soviet military!s share of the GNP 
will approach 20 per cent by the late 1980s. The 
cumulative dollar costs of Soviet investment for the 
decade were 80 per cent higher than US investment 
outlays. The estimated dollar costs for the Soviets were 
more than twice the US outlays in the mid 1 970s( 1 983, 
p.74).
The British Government echoed this figure in its 1983 
Defence Estimates.
The Soviet military build-up in recent years is well- 
illustrated by the steady increase in military 
expenditure. NATOfs current estimate is that since 1970 
this has risen by an average of 4 per cent a year in 
real terms, while NATO expenditure during the 1970s 
showed an overall slight decline. Soviet defence 
expenditure now accounts for some 14-16 percent of GNP 
in current prices, over twice the level of any NATO 
country(p.1).
Official Soviet statistics claimed that defence spending 
accounted for a mere 6.2 per cent of budget spending in 1979 
- a sum of 17.2 billion dollars (see Hutchings, 1983, p115). 
So which side was right on this crucial issue? Evidence 
suggests that the real extent of Soviet defence spending lies 
somewhere in between these two extremes.
Two methods of assessing Soviet defence spending are 
commonly used in the West. The first of these is to take the 
official Soviet figure (as quoted above) and add to it
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certain other categories in the Soviet budget which are known 
but not acknowledged by the Soviets to encompass military 
production. One such budget category is Machine Building and 
Metal W orking. The difficulty here lies in the uncertainty 
surrounding the categories, and the fractions within them 
which should be counted as ’defence spending1.
A more commonly-used method involves the quantification of 
Soviet military hardware and other items of expenditure, and 
their subsequent translation into ’dollar costs’. This was 
the method used by the CIA, whose figures the US Defence 
Department, the British Government and NATO as a whole 
subsequently adopted as authoritative. But there were a 
number of objections to this method.
Firstly, it made no allowance for the unreliability of 
estimating the extent of Soviet military hardware. US 
satellites, for example, calculate the number of tanks in the 
Soviet armoury by photographing the number of Soviet tank 
sheds. Cockburn points out that these estimates are always 
exaggerated since planners assume that each tank shed is full 
of tanks ’ready to go’, when in reality many are not in 
working order(1983, p19)C33-
More importantly, the CIA’s rouble-to-dollar ratio, on 
which estimated dollar costs are based, is not an absolute 
quantity. It simply measures how much a given item of Soviet 
military equipment would cost an American military planner at 
current comm ercial American prices. As the BBC Horizon 
documentary Race to Ruin explained:
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would cost them to produce a tank to the specifications 
of the Russian model, and they cost out each Russian 
serviceman as if he were paid an American salary, thatTs 
between 17 and $20,000 a man. So they end up with a high 
value for the things that are cheap and plentiful in the 
Soviet Union: men and tanks. They*ve concluded that the 
Soviets have been outspending by 50 per cent all these 
years, a figure that*s grossly inflated.
Thus, if an American GI received a pay rise, the CIA 
increased its estimate of Soviet defence spending. One 
American author estimates that compared to the American 
serviceman*s salary of $700 dollars a month, the Soviet 
soldier earns only $6. American government sources 
nevertheless count the cost of the Soviet soldier as 
equivalent.
In addition, by estimating the cost of a given quantity of 
military equipment in American dollars the CIA was making an 
assumption about the efficiency of Soviet industry and the 
productivity of Soviet labour-power. Consequently, should it 
be decided that Soviet industry is less efficient than was 
previously thought, this appears as a massive increase in 
Soviet defence spending. This was precisely what happened in 
1976 when, under pressure from the Committee on the Present 
Danger (a powerful conservative alliance whose members 
included Ronald Reagan), the CIA raised its estimate of 
Soviet defence spending "from approximately 25 billion 
roubles to 50-60 billion, and from 6-8 percent of GNP to 11- 
13 pereentn(Holloway, 1983, p.115). Though on paper this 
suggested a doubling of Soviet defence spending the new 
figure represented no real increase in Soviet military 
capability.
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m e  unreiiauiiity 01 tnese j h k i u iigures was c o m  irmea on 
February 19th 1984 when The Observer reported a nmajor 
downward reassessment of Soviet defence spending by the CIA", 
and noted that "estimating Soviet defence spending is an 
imprecise science”.
Russia’s defence spending has been increasing at less 
than half the rate previously thought, according to a 
confidential NATO study. It says that a change took 
place in 1976 [the very year when the figures were 
revised upwardlT since when growth in defence spending 
has been lower than than the current annual increases in 
defence spending by the United States, Britain and a 
number of other NATO countries.
A further objection to the CIA figures argued that by 
expressing defence spending as a proportion of GNP the CIA 
failed to take into account the relative productive 
capacities of each country. By NATO’s own admission, 12-14 
per cent of GNP amounted in 1982 to $107.3 billion, while the 
5 percent of United States’ GNP devoted to defence that year 
represented a sum of $111.2 billion. The Soviet economy 
produces only half as much as the American.
In addition, the figures failed to compare Warsaw Pact 
spending as a whole with that of NATO as a whole. Jacobsen 
(1983) cites the Western commercial banks mean estimates of 
Soviet defence spending in 1982 ($94.6 billion) which 
combines with spending in the rest of the Warsaw Pact ($20.66 
billion) to give a total of $115.26 billion. The United 
States in 1982 spent $215.9 billion, which combined with the 
other NATO countries* spending of $106,144 billion to give a 
NATO total of $322,044 billion, approximately $207 billion 
dollars in excess of Warsaw Pact spending that year, figures 
indicate that in 1982 alone NATO’s defence spending exceeded
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that of the Warsaw Pact by $202 billion. The US Senate 
Committee on Armed Services pointed out that
of the sixteen nations with the largest defence budgets
as of 1978, seven are members of NATO, one (Japan) has a 
bilateral defence treaty with the United States, and 
three (China, Saudi Arabia and Israel) are strongly 
anti-Soviet or pro-Western in orientation. Only three of 
these countries (USSR, East Germany, and Poland) are
members of the Warsaw Pact (1981, p.25).
The figures produced by the US and British governments 
showing NATO behind the Warsaw Pact in defence expenditure 
were debatable, and indeed, ultimately recognised as such by 
NATO itself (although not until after the period for which we 
have analysed media coverage). Independent studies suggest 
that even at the lowpoint of United States and Western 
defence expenditure - the mid to late 1970s - NATO military 
spending exceeded that of the Warsaw Pact. As for the future, 
according to the SIPRI Yearbook 1Q83t ”the picture [for the 
Warsaw Pact] is of a steady, not particularly rapid, upward 
trend”. The United States for its part embarked with Ronald 
Reagan on a defence programme which if followed through would 
mean that ”by 1988 military spending in the United States 
would have almost doubled in volume within a decade”( 1983a, 
p.135).
b . The Technology Gap.
A common justification for increases in Western military 
power has been that the Soviet Union has a lead in particular 
- and crucial - technologies. In the 1940s speculation 
centred on particle accelerators; in the 1950s ballistic 
missiles, and most recently President Reagan personally
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championed the theory that the Soviet Union had gained a 
significant lead in laser technology. Historically, such 
claims have preceded US efforts to ^atch up1 with the USSR, 
although there has been no instance in which they were 
verified. The Boston Study Group, a US thinktank set up to 
investigate American defence needs, noted:
Dire warnings about Soviet military advances are not 
without precedent. In 1955 the American public was 
warned by defence analysts and government authorities of 
a fbomber gap*, in which the United States was believed 
to be falling behind the Soviet Union. Five years later, 
in 1960, when the United States had produced four times 
as many long-range bombers and twice as many medium- 
range ones the same individuals, now accompanied by 
Presidential candidate John F. Kennedy, warned of a non­
existent fmissile gap*. In the late 1960s, there were 
comparable allegations of a Soviet threat for a first 
strike capability and for a formidable anti-missile 
defence. All these past errors, believed at the time by 
most of the public, were subsequently proved to be 
false. Moreover, throughout this period the United 
States maintained a preponderance of military 
power(1979, p.39).
US military preponderance continues, as the US Defence 
Department concedes when it states that !lthe US continues to 
lead the Soviets in most basic technologies, such as the 
militarily critical area of electronics”( 1983, p.3). SIPRI 
cites a US study which corroborates this claim.
While the Soviet Union has numerical superiority, it is 
inferior in advanced military technology. US weapons 
designers conducted a comparative analysis of US and 
Soviet design practices over the past 40 years. In 
electronics - the key component of Western technological 
superiority in weaponry - the study found that the 
initial Soviet utilisation of different generations of 
electronic components lagged behind that of the United 
states by 10-15 years(1983b, p.150).
As of 1 982 it was estimated by Holloway that "as much as 
30 per cent of American military technology was beyond the 
technological capacity of the Soviet Union to
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produce”(p.130). 
c . Soviet Conventional Forces■
General Rogers, in his interview for Channel 4 defended 
his call for increased spending on conventional weapons with 
the argument that if attacked conventionally, "we cannot 
sustain ourselves for very long with manpower, ammunition, 
and war reserve stock”. NAT0*s long-term objective in Europe, 
he continued, should ”by the end of this decade to have 
developed a conventional capability that bolsters our 
deterrent by providing a reasonable prospect of defeating a 
conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact”.
Claims that the Soviet Union has military superiority are 
most often directed at the conventional weapons armoury, and 
in particular to the European theatre1. Attention has been 
drawn, for example, to Warsaw Pact superiority in tanks and 
manpower, but as more than one author on this subject has 
noted, such comparisons generally ignore the fact that Warsaw 
Pact equipment is older than and technologically inferior to 
that of the USA and NATO.
On the specific issue of tanks the assertion of Soviet 
superiority is only possible if one downplays NATOfs historic 
and deliberate emphasis for its defence on anti-tank weapons, 
in which it enjoys a huge superiority over the USSR. In 
short, it is possible to distort the actual balance of 
conventional forces by including quantitative measures which 
point to Soviet superiority, and excluding qualitative 
measures which tip the balance in favour of NATO.
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Another example of this number-juggling concerns the 
debate about troop numbers in Europe. US Defence Department 
figures show an impressive Warsaw Pact superiority of 
1,400>000 (1983, p.63)[4]. But this number does not show that 
Warsaw Pact figures for troop deployments include 1,000,000 
personell in non-combat roles (construction workers engaged 
in military projects and members of the internal security 
services in the Warsaw Pact countries). NATO’s estimate of 
its own troop deployments, on the other hand, excludes French 
forces, an omission once legitimised on the grounds that 
French forces would not be available for use by NATO in a 
conflict. Now however, this rationale is greatly weakened, as 
The Financial Times noted on May 3rd, 1983.
General Bernard Rogers, NATO’s top commander, caused a 
little embarassment in Paris the other day at a public 
function when he warmly praised the ’extremely close 
cooperation and coordination that now exists with the 
French military forces.
Mary Kaldor concludes that Soviet conventional 
superiority has been overstated. Even in Europe, she 
suggests, where Soviet military power is at its strongest,
”by no stretch of the imagination could the Soviet Union win 
a war against NATO forcesn(1982b, p.33).
Qualifications of this kind are applicable to conservative 
assessments in many areas of Soviet conventional weaponry. 
Numerical considerations alone may indicate Soviet leads but 
qualitative indicators usually tell a different story. The 
text of the following advertisement, placed by the Bath Iron 
Works Corporation in the American journal Foreign Affairs 
shows how frightening images of Soviet military power can be
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constructed with figures.
One look at the statistics tells the story: in 1982, the 
Soviet fleet numbered 2,249 ships; the American fleet, 
514. The Cuban blockade twenty years ago taught the 
Soviets the value of a strong navy and triggered a 
programme that continues to this day (Vol61, no5).
Assuming that the numbers are correct they fail to reveal 
that US tonnage is substantially larger than that of the 
Soviet Union. Neither do they show the composition of the 
Soviet navy. In 1983, when the advert appeared the US had 90 
nuclear-powered submarines to the USSRfs 70; the US had four 
nuclear and eight conventionally-powered aircraft carriers, 
while the Soviets had none[5]. 635 of the Soviet ships are 
small vessels of less than 500 tons, compared to only 92 
American ships of the same class. NATO Secretary General 
Joseph Luns wrote in NATO Review of February 1982 that 
Soviet naval power was "still limited". According to Kaldor, 
it should remain so in the future, given that "the Soviet 
Union has only twelve major ships under construction compared 
with forty-two for the United States"( 1983b, p.33).
There is evidence to support the view that the Soviet 
conventional capability, though numerically significant, 
remains qualitatively, and technologically inferior to that 
of NATO.
d . Soviet Nuclear forces.
For several years the Soviet Union was engaged in what it 
saw as catching up with the United States in the field of 
nuclear weapons. By the early 1970s it claimed to have done 
so. From a position of clear nuclear inferiority the USSR
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achieved what it regarded as a suitable balance*. This was 
not taken to mean that the Soviet Union had achieved strict 
equality with the US, but signified its perceived ability to 
deter a nuclear strike by the United States. This state of 
nuclear balance came to be known as 'parity*.
The conservatives, in opposition and in power after 1980, 
challenged this concept, redefining parity to mean 'Soviet 
strategic superiority*. Figures were produced to substantiate 
the claim (such as the predominance of Soviet land-based 
ICBMs, or the fact that Soviet 'megatonnage' was larger than 
that of the US nuclear force). President Carter was attacked 
for 'going soft* on the Soviets by agreeing to the terms of 
SALT II, and indeed he was eventually compelled, as re- 
election time drew near, to reject SALT II.
Initially however, Carter defended the basis of SALT II.
He argued that parity did not in any way deprive the United 
States of its historic military superiority. In a speech 
delivered on February 8th, 1977, and reproduced in The SALT 
Handbook, President Carter stated:
At the present time, my judgment is that we have 
superior nuclear capability. The Soviet Union has more 
throw-weight, larger missiles, larger warheads; we have 
more missiles, a much higher degree of accuracy, and 
also, we have three different mechanisms which are each 
independently adequate to deliver atomic weapons - 
airplanes, submarines and intercontinental ballistic 
missiles. I think that we are roughly equivalent, even 
though I think we are superior, in that either the 
Soviet Union or we could destroy a major part of the 
other nation if a major strike was made (Labrie, 1979, 
p.419).
In this speech he pointed to the one-sided nature of 
Soviet strategic forces, identifying the Soviet superiority
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in land-based missiles as a disadvantage. According to this 
view, talk of superiority at such massive levels of overkill 
was absurd. 'Parity1 was all that each side could hope to 
achieve, and parity did not deprive the USA of its 
technological lead (still in the order of five to ten years 
for the introduction of new strategic systems). Henry 
Kissinger put it this way to the US Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations when Secretary of State in the Nixon 
Administration.
It is of course very difficult to assess what 
superiority is when you are dealing with weapons for 
which there is no operational experience and which are 
so difficult to relate to political objectives. I think
there is, however, common agreement that at no time in
the post-war period has the Soviet Union had any 
military superiority over the United States in the 
strategic field of any significant category. This 
condition obtains today as well.
One of the difficulties in assessing the strategic 
equation is that the weapons of the two sides are so 
different that they become extremely hard to compare... 
This makes the problem of comparing the forces of both
sides almost a problem of comparing apples and
oranges.
As in conventional armaments the evidence suggests that 
Soviet strategic forces are still technologically inferior 
and relatively vulnerable, as a few basic indicators show: 
Soviet ICBMs still use notoriously unreliable liquid fuels as 
opposdd to the more advanced solid fuel systems of the 
Americans; on average Soviet missiles have only a tenth of 
the accuracy of comparable American weapons (see SIPRI 1983a, 
p56); their submarines are frequently detected by NATO 
patrols, while no NATO nuclear submarine has ever been 
'caught1 on patrol.
The nuclear debate in the period of the study was largely
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about the need for new nuclear weapons in the European 
theatre. As noted above, the NATO dual-track decision of 
December 1979 was based upon the assertion of the 
*strategically-significant superiority* of Soviet nuclear 
forces in Europe - their *theatre* weapons, the SS-20 and 
Backfire bomber. NATO argued that it had no match for these 
weapons, which constituted a qualitatively new threat. The 
USA, went the argument, would be unlikely to respond to a 
conventional or nuclear attack on Europe by escalating to 
all-out strategic nuclear war, Sacrificing Chicago for 
Dusseldorf*. The Soviet Union would be able to blackmail the 
West into submission in this Strategically significant* area 
for the Western alliance by exploiting the *credibility gap* 
in NATO defences.
The *Soviet Threat* logic of the dual-track decision was 
criticised on several grounds.
Some argued that while there were no precise equivalents 
of the SS-20 in NATOS European forces, there were the 
British and French nuclear forces targetted on the USSR. In 
addition several hundred nuclear capable US aircraft and 
other nuclear weapons capable of striking the USSR were 
deployed in Europe.
Opinion also varied about the real extent of the threat 
posed by the SS-20 missile. The North Atlantic Assembly’s 
Report of the Special Committee on Nuclear Weapons (a NATO 
thinktank) reported that opponents of the dual-track decision
disputed that the SS-20 alters the military balance in 
any practical way. They point out that because of the
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Europe would cause appalling damage, no matter what the 
accuracy, and inevitably initiate a more general nuclear 
conflict. Under these conditions, it is difficult to 
understand how this new capability would give the Soviet 
Union a useable weapon, either in a military or 
political sense(Cartwright and Critchley, 1982,p. 15).
Following transmission on December 10th, 1983 of the 
feature film The Dav After, ITV broadcast a debate which 
included Robert McNamara, the former US Defence Secretary. He 
argued that:
There was no military requirement for the Soviets to 
introduce the SS-20s. After they did so it did not 
change the nuclear balance between the powers. It 
changed the numbers in Europe, but it did not change the 
balance in any way. There was no military requirement 
for NATO to introduce Pershing IIs and Cruise missiles 
into Europe.
Ex-Chancellor Schmidt of West Germany, the individual 
leader most closely associated with the invitation to the 
Americans to deploy their new weapons in Europe, eventually 
conceded that they were introduced for political, rather than 
military reasons. The North Atlantic Assembly agreed that the 
dual-track decision was ’’influenced heavily by political 
considerations, notably that deployments should be land-based 
and visible to ensure coupling between the United States and 
Europe”(Ibid.).
On October 16th 1983, on the very eve of the Cruise and 
Pershing II deployments, the Observer reported a story which 
suggested a different reason for the employment of the Soviet 
Threat rationale.
The Americans, correctly predicting the rise of the 
peace movement, hoped to avoid the hostile protest which 
had greeted the plans for the neutron bomb.
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In this same article David Owen, Foreign Secretary at a 
crucial period leading up to the dual-track decision, was 
reported as saying that !,it was never part of our belief that 
the new weapons had to match the SS-20s. Later, it began to 
get political. If you take the view, as I do, that there is 
such an excess anyhow, you are not worried about the numbers 
game”[6].
e . Soviet Foreign Policy.
A further bone of contention concerned the nature of the 
Soviet role in the world. The conservatives* portrayed the 
Soviet Union as an expansionist, imperialistic power with 
ambitions of global domination. The International Institute 
for Strategic Studies reported in its 1983-84 Strategic 
survey that such opinions were now entrenched in the top 
echelons of NATO*s government.
The most eloquent exponent of Reagan*s world view, 
National Security Council Soviet expert Richard Pipes, 
believed that the Soviet Union was not only militarily 
superior to the US, but was also driven by a domestic 
system that inherently generated aggressive outward 
drives(p.54).
President Reagan himself, in his speech to the United 
Nations Second Special Session on Disarmament on June 17th, 
1982, explained why "we are so concerned about Soviet 
conduct” .
Since the Second World War, the record of tyranny has 
included Soviet violation of the Yalta agreements 
leading to domination of Eastern Europe, symbolised by 
the Berlin Wall - a grim, grey monument to repression 
that I visited just a week ago. It includes the 
takeovers of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Afghanistan and 
the ruthless repression of the proud people of Poland. 
Soviet-sponsored guerrillas are at work in Central and
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oouiin America, m  Airica, tne niaaie tasi, in trie 
Caribbean and in Europe, violating human rights and 
unnerving the world with violence. Communist atrocities 
in South East Asia, Afghanistan and elsewhere continue 
to shock the free world as refugees escape to tell of 
their horror.
Underpinning the fear of Soviet military strength and 
Soviet expansionism, was a conservative moral repugnance of 
socialism as a system, typically expressed in a speech made 
by Ronald Reagan in March 1983.
Let us pray for the salvation of all those who live in 
that totalitarian darkness, pray they will discover the 
joy of knowing God - but until they do let us be aware 
that while they preach the supremacy of the state... 
they are the focus of evil in the world.
The Soviet threat, as invoked by the conservative leaders 
of the NATO alliance, was not only military but moral. NATO 
was said to be defending not merely a collection of national 
state boundaries, but civilisation itself, from the 
’’totalitarian darkness” of socialism. These views were 
however, widely challenged. As reported in the Times of 
August 12th, 1983, academics at Lancaster University counted 
the number of foreign interventions made by various countries 
between 1945 and 1976, and concluded the following.
One study showed that the Western countries intervened 
in 64 wars, while the Soviet Union and its allies took 
part in six. A different analysis looked at foreign 
intervention in 641 post-war conflicts (defined more 
broadly this time to include coups and large civil 
disturbances as well as wars). Western nations 
intervened on 243 occasions and the communist countries, 
including North Vietnam, Cuba, China and the Warsaw Pact 
nations, only on 20.
Fred Halliday, of the Institute of Policy Studies, 
challenged the conservative analysis of specific 
international problems, for example, that the Soviet role in
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the Middle East - one of the main hotspots1 of recent years 
- had been or was now an aggressive, expansionary one.
They [the USSR] were among the first to recognise the 
state of Israel... they have never denied Israel's right 
to exist...Soviet arms supplies have never been such as 
to give the Arab states overall military superiority... 
they have never acceded to Arab requests fornuclear 
weapons, despite the fact that Israel is known to have 
an almost immediate nuclear capacity(1983, p.73).
Jonathan Steele, foreign affairs correspondent for The 
Guardian, has noted that
contrary to the conventional wisdom in the West, the 
Kremlin has always tended to act in the Middle East with 
restraint... The Soviet Union discouraged the three 
recent Arab-Israeli wars and has imposed limits on its 
arms deliveries, often at the risk of incurring Arab 
displeasure. On the central aspect of the Arab-Israeli 
dispute, the existence of Israel, Moscow has 
consistently urged the Arabs to recognise the Jewish 
state (1983, p.180).
The extent to which one could identify a Soviet Threat to 
Western Europe was also disputed. NATO leaders themselves, 
while invoking the scale of the Soviet Threat at one moment, 
would concede that they had no reason to expect an attack. In 
his Channel 4 interview General Rogers stated that nmy 
concern is not an attack out of the blue, even though the 
military situation is against us today. The Soviet Union does 
not want war”.
The British Governments 1983 Defence Estimates, the 
annual assessment of Britain's defence needs, stated that 
"there is no evidence that the Soviet Union is planning any 
immediate attack on the Westn(p20).
On Channel 4Ts Comm ent Admiral Gaylor agreed that "there
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is no eviuenue wnaisoever vnau m e  narsaw racu is 
contemplating an attack on NATO. There are appalling risks 
from the standpoint of the USSR and no reasonable gain worth 
those risks”. Jonathan Steele suggested that
as long as peaceful relations between Western Europe and 
the Soviet Union remain good and detente continues, even 
in a modified form, it seems inconceivable that Moscow 
would prefer the unknown consequences of attack and the 
problems of occupation. It has found it hard to maintain 
control over Eastern Europe for almost forty years. To 
add another unwilling region appears to make no 
sense(1983, p79).
NATO’s former Director of Military Operations in Europe, 
Admiral Eugene Carroll, took a pragmatic view of the Soviet’s 
alleged desire to attack the West on BBC2!s Newsnight, and 
considered how the view might look from the Soviet side.
We sometimes tend to look at this problem only from our 
own point of view. We know what our intentions are, we 
know we’re good people, we’re not going to attack, but 
that view isn’t always accepted on the other side of the 
fence. They certainly see some potential for a NATO 
attack and as a result the fear level goes up, the 
pressure for improved forces goes up on both sides, and 
we’re in this very foolish, destructive and wasteful 
arms race to confront each other in Europe.
There were thus a consideable range of views on Soviet 
foreign policy being expressed in the debate. The dominant, 
conservative view of the Soviet Threat was widely contested, 
even by politicians of the right such as Enoch Powell MP. In 
in speech reported in the Guardian of October 10th, 1983, 
Powell referred to
a quintessentially American misunderstanding of Soviet 
Russia as an aggressive power, militaristically and 
ideologically bent on world domination... The notion has 
no basis in fact; it exists wholly in the realm of the 
imagination. While the United States, often with some of 
its allies, has fought two major wars in Asia and 
intervened with military force in Central America and
61
rixuuj.^ Lid o 1/ j ii v> uuooj.au ouauuo uvuaj an xu^u
beyond where they stood in 1948, with the one solitary 
exception that proves the rule - Afghanistan, where a 
backyard war is being fought with the same motives and 
prospects of failure as it was twice fought by the 
British empire in India. If Russia is bent on world 
domination, she has been remarkably slothful and 
remarkably unsuccessful.
To conclude, this chapter has tried to demonstrate the 
range of views on issues which form the background to news 
coverage analysed in subsequent chapters. Those views tend to 
the conclusion that the historical Western superiority in 
weapons of all kinds, if it has been narrowed in recent years 
by the Soviet Union, has not been eradicated. They indicate 
also that the dominant view of the Soviet Threat as expressed 
by the conservatives in power is far from being fconsensualf.
62
1. Chomsky argues that the objective of the human rights 
campaign was to regain popular support - seriously depleted 
by the fVietnam syndrome1 - for US intervention abroad. "An 
extraordinary campaign was executed with great skill, 
selecting targets of opportunity, at a time when everyone 
knew beyond doubt that the United States had committed major 
crimes in Cuba, Indochina, Chile and elsewhere".
2. Elements of this strategy ranged from the Tgive 'em enough 
shovels' philosophy of such as T.K. Jones, US Under Secretary 
of Defence (the view that the United States could survive a 
nuclear exchange with the Soviets given simple preparation), 
to the more sophisticated positions of such as Paul Nitze, 
the Reagan Administration's chief INF negotiator. In 1956 
Nitze wrote that "it is quite possible that in a general 
nuclear war one side or the other could 'win' decisively"
(see 'The Holocaust Lobby' by Charles Mann, in Sanity,
October 1983).
Mann notes that "after the 1980 election, Reagan installed 
no fewer than thirty two CPD (Committee on the Present 
Danger) officials in his administration" (p22), including one 
Colin Gray, appointed to serve as a consultant in the General 
Advisory Committee to the US Departments of Defence and 
State. Gray's view, quoted in the Mann article, is that full- 
scale nuclear war "is likely to be waged to coerce the Soviet 
Union to give up some recent gain. Thus, a president must 
have the ability not merely to end a war but to end it 
favourably".
3. Cockburn argues that inaccuracies are built into the 
methods of estimating Soviet military power.
Satellites can watch over enemy territory with an ease 
that would have been unimaginable before the Space Age, 
but they still cannot see through clouds. This is why, 
for example, the output from the tank factory at Kharkov 
in the Ukraine is regularly listed as 500 tanks a year 
in unclassified intelligence publications. Through a 
meteorological quirk, Kharkov is covered by clouds most 
of the time, rendering the specialists in watching 
Soviet tank production effectively blind to the scale of 
the plant's operations. 'That is why they give the 
figure of 500*, one former intelligence officer told me. 
It's the number they use when they don't know if it's
zero or 1000(1983, p19)-
4. The 1983 edition of Soviet Military Power claims that, as 
of 1981, Warsaw Pact ground forces in Europe numbered 173
divisions, or four million personell. NATO, according to this
comparison, had only 84 divisions with 2.6 million troops.
5. The Soviet Union had in service at this time three Kiev 
class conventionally-powered aircraft carriers. These are not 
comparable to the floating platforms for strategic aircraft 
which we in the West understand as an 'aircraft carrier*.
6. The question then arose, and was put most forcefully by
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response to the Soviet SS-20, what w ere they for? In the BBC 
Panorama documentary Bevond Deterrence journalists spoke to a 
number of scientists who had been employed by the United 
States government as consultants in this field. One, John 
Steinbruner, argued that Pershing II in particular was a 
qualitatively new weapon, not comparable to the SS-20 or the 
Pershing I which it replaced. The Pershing II was a strategic 
weapon, capable of hitting targets inside the Soviet Union 
from European soil.
It threatens their basic command structure with pre­
emptive attack... It does look as if it might enable us 
to undertake a first strike... from the Soviet point of 
view it is an extremely provocative weapon that not only 
deals with a limited capacity for the European theatre 
but their entire strategic operation.
NATO had argued that Pershing II was not a strategic 
missile because its range fell 12% short of the 100 or so 
strategic targets in and around Moscow. Another interviewee, 
Paul Brackner, replied to this by pointing out that nany 
competent staff of engineers in three or four months can make 
changes in that missile to make it increase its range by 
12%”. SIPRI observed that Pershing II missiles have ten times 
the accuracy of SS-20s.
The Cruise missile on the other hand, while extremely 
accurate, was not a first-strike weapon because of its slow 
flight time. It was, according to the American Brookings 
Institute, a second-strike weapon, useable only in the 
context of a protracted nuclear war. A Brookings Institute 
report titled Cruise M issiles, remarked that the presence of 
Cruise missiles would create a
psychological climate in which the Russians instinct to 
retaliate [to a US first strike] is tempered by the 
knowledge that the damage of the initial strikes, though 
significant, is limited, and that an excessive response 
would inevitably be met by escalation.(Betts, 1981, p.184)
Cruise missiles, the report continues, are more suited to 
nfollow on options when raid sizes are more likely to be 
larger, more targets are likely to be attacked, and the 
distinction between theatre and strategic use of Cruise 
missiles becomes blurred”. The term follow on option* can be 
considered as a euphemism for the second strike in a 
protracted nuclear war.
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unapter rnree 
Reporting the Soviet Union
Arguments about nuclear defence are closely linked with 
the concept of the Soviet threat. Perceptions of the Soviet 
Union inform the East-West debate, constituting a part of the 
cognitive framework within which individuals make sense of 
the issues. This chapter examines what television news 
reports about the USSR: televisions *image of the enemy*.
The analysis refers to two separate samples of *routine* 
Soviet news. The first sample included all news bulletins 
broadcast by the three then existing channels between May 1st 
and June 30th, 1982. The second included the main evening 
bulletins on four channels between May 10th and June 8th, 
1983. 75 items in the category of Soviet news were identified 
over this period (see table 3.1), excluding references to the 
Soviet Union in the context of arms control talks which are 
analysed in a subsequent chapter.
These items were concerned, on the one hand, with coverage 
of Soviet society (reportage on events going on inside the 
USSR, or comments on those events from outside the USSR 
itself), and on the other, coverage of Soviet foreign policy 
and events in which the USSR is reported as an actor on the 
world stage, including Soviet-British relations. Table 3.1 
lists the items by story. The chapter also looks at 
coverage recorded on the deaths between November 1982 and 
March 1985 of Soviet leaders Brezhnev, Andropov and 
Chernenko.
These *special* events saw the Soviet government pass
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tnrougri a period 01 rapid cnange. in a political system 
renowned and in some quarters reviled for its predictable 
stability , three state and Party leaders died in quick 
succession [1]. The deaths of Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov 
and Konstantin Chernenko saw the passing of one leadership 
generation in the USSR and the arrival of another. The 
leadership changes had an obvious and enormous impact on 
Soviet and world affairs they were also the occasion of a 
unique series of media events.
Until the death of Leonid Brezhnev television news had 
never been present at the state funeral of a Soviet leader. 
The television era arrived too late to record the death of 
Stalin in 1953, and nearly 30 years passed before another 
Soviet leader died in office. But following the death of 
Brezhnev, and indicative of how top-heavy with old men the 
Soviet leadership had become, his two successors survived for 
only 16 and 13 months respectively. Three times in less than 
three years Western journalists marked the passing of a 
Soviet leader. So used to it did they become that by the time 
of Konstantin Chernenkofs funeral on March 13th, 1985, they 
were describing the ceremony as ,!a well-practised ritual”(3 
2200 13/3/85) with well-established traditions.
Then once again, as tradition now dictates, the military 
parade began.(3 2200 13/3/85)
Had this study been able to include television coverage of 
one such change in the Soviet leadership it would have been 
fortuituous. That there were three within the period of the 
research was a somewhat bizarre coincidence, providing the 
opportunity to assemble a unique sample of ,in-deptht
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coverage of the USSR. This news was more than a simple 
reporting of the facts about the death of one leader and his 
succession by another. As background to the basic event 
journalists constructed long and detailed narratives about 
the Soviet Union. The discussion examines how these were 
constructed, and the images of the Soviet Union which they 
produced.
Table 3.1. Routine Soviet News for the sample periods Mav and 
June 1982. and Mav 1Oth - June 8th 1983.
Story Number of items
Moscow Peace Committee 1
Bella Korchnoi 1
Anatoly Scharansky 1
Andrei Sakharov 3
Alexander Solzhenitsyn 2
Moscow newsreader, 1983 3
Soviet space programme 5
1982 May Day Parade 1
Andropov promotion, 1982 1
Volga River disaster, 1983 6
The Russian system
Soviet involvement in Middle East,
1
June 1982.
Soviet involvement in Middle East,
3
June 1983 5
Soviet involvement in Afghanistan 7
Soviet involvement in the Falklands 13
European gas pipeline 2
US-Soviet grain deal 1
Defence White Paper,1982 5
Diplock Security Report, 1983 4
Geoffrey Prime Affair, 1983 8
Computer smuggling, 1983 2
Total 75
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a . Inside the USSR.
The selection of news about the Soviet Union is determined 
to some extent by a routine structure of newsvalues. This 
means that, for example, disasters in the USSR when they 
become known are usually reported on British television: 
events such as that in June 1 983 when a passenger ship at 
Ulyanov on the Volga River was involved in an accident in 
which more than one hundred people died. Six items of 
television news covered the story[2].
Major state occasions such as the May Day and November Red 
Square parades are regularly covered. Being the nearest the 
Soviets come to pomp and ceremony, they attract the 
broadcasters as spectacle. Nowadays, Soviet television 
supplies live pictures of these events to Western 
broadcasters through the Eurovision network[3].
Less televisual aspects of Soviet political life are 
reported. On May 24th, 1982 Yuri Andropov was appointed 
Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. There was 
speculation in the press that Mr Andropov was now the leading 
contender for the succession to President Brezhnev, then 
ailing rapidly. Although ITN did not cover the story, BBC 
reported it on one bulletin, noting (correctly, as it 
transpired) that ,!it*s one of the most important appointments 
in the Kremlin for yearsn(1 2100 24/5/82).
The Soviet space programme is a consistently newsworthy 
theme. Space travel is still sufficiently rare to qualify as
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Western European expertise. And, like Red Square parades, 
space missions provide good pictures. They are usually 
covered as straight Science1 stories, although political 
themes are occasionally introduced. BBC*s coverage of a joint 
Soviet-French spacemission in 1982 reported the French 
assurance that the venture was "purely scientific without 
political significance"(1 2100 24/6/82).
A major theme in coverage of the USSR during the sample 
period was that of dissent - the activities and experiences 
of groups and individuals opposed to the Soviet system inside 
the USSR itself (dissidents) and outside (defectors and 
exiles). This theme occupied the largest proportion of the 
total news output about Soviet society during the sample (11 
items). Table 3.2 shows the Soviet and ex-Soviet citizens who 
appeared on the news during the sample period. With the 
exception of political leaders, all the names are those of 
dissidents, exiles, or emigres.
The following items give a flavour of this coverage during 
the sample. On June 9th 1982 ITN reported that the family of 
a Soviet exile, former chess champion Victor Korchnoi, had 
received exit visas to join him in the West, to where he had 
defected six years previously.
The wife of Victor Korchnoi, the former Russian chess 
grand master, says shefs been granted an exit visa to 
join her husband in the West. Mrs Bella Korchnoi said in 
Moscow that she and her son Igor had been told that they 
should leave the country in three weeks time. Victor 
Korchnoi decided to stay in the West six years ago and 
has been trying to get his family out of Russia ever 
since. (3 2200 9/6/82)
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May-June 1982 May 10th - June 8th 1983
President Brezhnev 
Yuri Andropov 
Ten young people 
Victor Korchnoi 
Bella Korchnoi 
Igor Korchnoi
Anatoly Scharansky
Scharansky's wife
Scharansky!s mother
Alexander Solzhenitsyn
Andrei Sakharov
Elena Bonner
Sergei Kodorovich
Vladimir Danchev
Yuri Andropov
Soviet Government 
spokesman
Konstantin Chernenko
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AnoLner item reported on tne iormation 01 an urioi 110iaj. 
peace committee in Moscow. nA group of ten young people”, it 
began, ”have taken a rather brave step”.
They*ve set up an unofficial peace committee. It's to 
petition their government and the United States to work 
harder for nuclear disarmament. They!ve already appealed 
to the Soviet President Mr Brezhnev asking that he spend 
less time criticising American peace proposals and more 
time looking for practical ways to stop the arms race. 
And they say the message applies equally well to 
President Reagan. (2 2245 4/6/82)
Many of these stories concern the dissidents and emigres 
who have become particularly well-known in the West. In the 
sample three bulletins carried news about Andrei Sakharov, 
the dissident Soviet physicist. One reported that he had been 
refused permission to leave the USSR, "because he knows state 
secrets”, and two were based on press conferences given by 
Sakharov's wife in Moscow.
The announcement came from the Soviet news agency TASS 
apparently to coincide with the return to Moscow of 
Sakharov's wife. There had been reports that Sakharov 
would be offered a university post in Austria but today 
his wife Elena Bonner said she doubted whether he would 
ever be allowed to go free.O 2100 11/5/83)
On the eve of his 62nd birthday Andrei Sakharov is ill 
and alone in Gorky, his wife said today. She'd come to 
Moscow to try to get both of them admitted to the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences clinic but it's refused to admit 
Sakharov who's had two heart attacks his wife said.(3 
2200 20/5/83)
On May 10th 1983 ITN reported that Alexander Solzhenitsyn 
was in London to receive the Templeton Religious Prize. 
Solzhenitsyn is probably the best known of all Soviet 
dissenters and has appeared frequently in the media. In this 
case, as ITN reported, Mr Solzhenitsyn was warning the West 
about the Soviet threat. First however, ITN reported on the
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campaign to free dissident Anatoly Scharansky from jail in 
the USSR. Two Conservative MPs had visited the Soviet Embassy 
in London where,
Journalist: the two were told that he was a spy and 
would stay in his Soviet jail.
Conservative MP: I was bitterly disappointed because we 
didn*t even get the basic question of human rights 
allowing correspondence between his wife and his mother 
who lives in Russia to be allowed.
Correspondent: Sir Hugh, you've had dealings before with 
these people. Were they colder today than in the past, 
was there any indication of a change of heart?
Sir Hugh Fraser: We got into the Embassy and were told 
nyet, nyet, nyet on every point.(3 2200 10/5/83)
Then Solzhenitsyn1s speech was reported.
Solzhenitsyn said the world was facing catastrophe 
because man had forgotten God. He said Russia was 
determined to annihilate religion by force while the 
West had turned to materialism. He said nuclear weapons 
gave a false sense of security.(3 2200 10/5/83)
BBC conducted an interview with Solzhenitsyn on May 11th. 
Like ITN, his comments about the Soviet Union were linked to 
a story about dissidence.
The Soviet news agency TASS said today that Andrei 
Sakharov, the dissident scientist and human rights 
campaigner, can't leave the Soviet Union because he 
knows too many state and military secrets. Sakharov's 
wife said earlier this week that he would emigrate to 
the West from his present internal exile in Russia if 
the authorities granted him a visa.
Today, in an exclusive interview for Newsnight 
Russia's most celebrated exile, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, 
spoke out about the evil Soviet communism represents and 
about the West's failure to combat it morally and 
spiritually. Solzhenitsyn also spoke out in defence of 
Sergei Kodorovich, arrested on April 7th this year in 
Moscow for acting as distributor of a fund for prisoners 
and their families. The fund, run under the jurisdiction
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editions of Solzhenityn's classic The Gulag Archipelago. 
This morning Solzhenitsyn said that Kodorovich's arrest 
showed that charity in the USSR is taken as treason 
against the state.(2 Newsnight 11/5/83)[4]
The emphasis on dissent as a theme in news coverage of the 
Soviet Union deserves comment. Soviet dissent is a form of 
political activity with little visible support from the 
general public. Soviet dissident Roy Medvedev, a man who has 
himself experienced harassment from the Soviet state, writes 
that in the USSR "socialism as a system claims the consensus 
of practically the entire population... beyond all doubt the 
vast majority of the population endorses the Soviet Communist 
Party"(1980,p51). The American Sovietologist Marshall Shatz 
notes that "Soviet dissent is confined to relatively isolated 
individuals and circles within the urban educated 
elite"(1980,p178).
Peter Ruff, Moscow correspondent for BBC radio, remarks 
that: "it's interesting to see just how high a percentage of 
the people appear to support the leadership"[5].
Unlike Poland or South Africa, the dissident movement in 
the USSR is not, and has never been a mass movement. And if 
the treatment of Soviet dissenters at the hands of the state 
may be harsh and sometimes brutal, this and worse is the case 
with some countries which receive very little human rights 
coverage. Britain has itself been found guilty of human 
rights violations in Northern Ireland by the European Court 
of Human Rights. As Hartley notes however, dissidents in 
Britain tend to be defined differently in the media:
Of course there are groups and individuals in 'our'
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they are not seen as dissidents: they are seen as 
deviants... The terms used to characterise strikes, 
direct action and other expressions of dissent 
concentrate on notions of irresponsibility, 
irrationality and other mindlessness or bloody- 
mindedness; there is always the implication of violence 
(1984, p.84).
It is in this context that the particular newsworthiness 
of Soviet dissidence is significant. In his study of the 
North American press, Herman identifies a pattern to the 
coverage of dissidence and human rights. The quantity of news 
coverage given to dissidence in any given country, he argues, 
is generally unrelated to the scale of the event or to the 
severity of the official response. Furthermore, the quality 
of coverage, the manner in which dissent is ’made to mean1, 
depends on the political context within which dissent is 
expressed, rather than factors such as its scale or 
motivation. Herman argues that the dissident who opposes the 
social system of an ideological enemy tends to be more 
newsworthy and will be covered more sympathetically than s/he 
who opposes the social system of an ideological ally.
The point is strikingly evident in the case of fmartial 
law1 in Poland, which dominated the headlines and 
aroused the mass media and political leadership to a 
state of frenzy in early 1981 and 1982. In 
contrast, martial law imposed in Turkey in 1981-82, 
accompanied by mass arrests, torture and executions 
(which threatened to engulf a good part of the trade 
union leadership by early 1982) aroused little attention 
and no indignation. rFrightful abuse’ in the enemy 
sphere equals a ’return to stability1 in the client 
state(1982, p.144).
The Glasgow Media Group refer to an example from BBC’s 9 
0f Clock News of May 19th, 1980, of coverage of the Turkish 
military coup that year which nicely illustrates Herman’s 
point:
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Turkey has a long border with the Soviet Union on the 
southern flank of NATO, and the West have been watching 
with gloom the trouble building up there. So putting 
aside a few crocodile tears about democracy, most 
Western observers are quietly pleased that the region 
looks that much more stable tonight than it did last 
night(1985,p.7)[6].
In this case the imposition of martial law by an 
ideological ally was defined on television news as *that much 
more stability*.
The important point to note here is not that television 
news covers dissent in the Soviet Union. Rather, it is the 
extent to which dissent dominates the definition of Soviet 
*reality* which the news constructs. Television news tends to 
*speak* about Soviet society from the perspective of the 
dissident or the emigre, and to ignore or downplay the 
experiences of ordinary Soviets. Events of little intrinsic 
newsvalue in the international arena, such as the granting of 
a visa, are routinely defined as newsworthy if they involve 
an element of Soviet dissent. On the other hand, during the 
sample period there was no coverage of the presence of human 
rights as defined by the Soviets themselves. Such themes as 
the state*s commitment to full employment, the prioritising 
of health care and education, or the maintenance of low basic 
prices are rarely reported, even in items which are 
specifically addressed to describing Soviet society.
To illustrate this, we will refer to an example from the 
routine news sample. The childrens news programme Newsround 
marked President Reagan*s European visit of June 1982 with a 
special item which set out to show 11 what life is like on
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focussed on the city of Berlin, the eastern part of which, if 
not part of the Soviet Union, was unambiguously labelled as 
’’the Russian system”. Firstly, President Reagan’s visit to 
Europe was defined in terms of America’s ’’vital role” as 
protector of the Western countries.
President Reagan’s visit is important because since the 
Second World War America has plaved a. vital role of 
backing countries on the West of the Iron Curtain. 
Countries in the East look to the Soviet Union - Russia
- for support. America and the West say there’s no 
freedom under the Russian system. The people can’t speak 
out against the government and there are no elections. 
But the Russians say that under their system - communism
- everyone is equal. The difference between the two is 
clear in Germany.
The account which follows juxtaposes positive images of 
the West with negative images of the East and ’communism*. 
For example, both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces occupy Berlin. 
They have done so since 1945 for complex historical reasons. 
As this is explained to the audience the journalist makes an 
important distinction between the military forces on both 
sides.
West Berlin is still an occupied city, under the control 
of the allied forces of Britain, France and America. And 
once a year they put on a huge military parade. It’s a 
show of force, a reminder to the Russians on the other 
side of the Wall, and a. w&X p£ assuring the West 
Berliners who turn up. to en j_px the parade that they a r e  
well protected.
In West Berlin military occupation protects and assures 
people against ’’the Russians on the other side”. They ’’enjoy” 
the military presence. East Berlin, however,
is still as much an occupied city as West Berlin. In 
theory no East German troops are allowed inside the city 
boundary. Here, it’s the Russians who rule.
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The differences in language are not merely semantic. To 
protect* from 'the Russians1 is one thing, to ’rule' over 
the Germans is another. The view that the Soviets or the East 
Berliners might feel themselves in any need of protection is 
foreclosed. Their forces threaten, while ours protect.
This account can be compared with another, taken from the 
more overtly authorial form of the television documentary. 
Documentaries do not claim the neutrality of news journalism, 
and their authorship - in this case by Jonathan Dimbleby - is 
often a major attraction of the programme. Nevertheless, 
Dimbleby's examination of life in East and West Germany 
illustrates what m ight be said in a comparison. In Taking 
SidesT Part 1 of Dimbleby's series, The Cold War Game, he 
employs the symbol of the military parade to comment on the 
'human rights1 issue. In the course of this account, the 
construction of meaning around the image of the military 
parade is significantly different from that of 
Newsround.
In Berlin the Western allies parade their military might 
to approval, and to disgust from a small group which 
turns its back in silence on a military extravaganza 
which a growing number of young West Germans detest. And 
then, in a city which is said to be a symbol of Western 
democracy, the police move in.
On camera we see the protesters beaten and dragged away as 
Dimbleby observes that:
In the cold war game it's only the authorities on the 
other side who treat their dissidents thus. This was not 
a question of 'human rights', but a 'minor incident* 
that was swiftly dealt with.
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Without taking sides, this account challenges tne 
absoluteness of the concepts of human rights and dissidence, 
directing the audience to the possibility of differing 
interpretations of the terms. The implied suggestion is that 
if communists do not have a monopoly on brutality and 
repression, the West does not have a monopoly on democracy 
and human rights.
Newsround's account of life on either side of the Wall 
presented an image of West Berlin as a place of gaiety and 
affluence.
West Berlin is like an island of Western life in a 
communist country. The city*s main street, the 
Kurfurstendamm, is busy and lively, full of cafes and 
luxury hotels. The shops are expensive and they sell the 
same range of goods as any other Western city.
In East Berlin by contrast:
what they couldn*t get away from were the same problems 
and shortages which dog the other East bloc nations. The 
goods may look alright in the windows but they are 
expensive, the choice is highly restricted, and the 
quality doesn*t match up to the West.
Such an account is internally contradictory. There are 
expensive shops on both sides, according to the journalist, 
but only in the East are they defined negatively. One might 
infer that in the East there are no cafes or luxury hotels, 
and that in the West there are no shortages or problems. 
Western problems like unemployment and poverty (from which 
West Berlin is not exempt) are omitted from the comparison, 
as are advantages of Communism* such as full employment and 
low basic prices for the necessities of life. Throughout the 
account economic indicators which might construct a negative
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excluded, as were those which might have constructed a 
positive image of *the East*, such as the fact that with 17 
million people East Germany was at this time higher in the 
league of industrial producers than Britain. It was noted 
that:
East Germany is a rigidly-controlled society. There*s no 
choice of schooling but it is strongly competitive and 
for those who don*t fit in the possibilities are 
limited.
There were no references to the 20 million unemployed in 
Western Europe at this time,whose possibilities, from some 
perspectives, might be regarded as at least equally limited.
Television news is not, of course, a medium with the space 
to provide a meticulous comparison of every aspect of life in 
East and West, and no-one would expect it to do so. 
Nevertheless, the selective, comparative approach adopted in 
this example consistently led to the presentation of rthe 
Russian system1 negatively, and the West as 'an island of 
life and luxury1.
Dimbleby's report, to which we have already referred, 
illustrates some of the things that could have been said in 
an account of life in East Germany. He, for example, 
presents an East German family, whom he describes as average, 
working and living apparently formal* lives. They watch 
television, drink beer, and go holidays. For a three bedroom 
flat they pay:
20 marks weekly, or roughly £5 from a family income of 
£100. Food, which is heavily subsidised, costs them 
about £25 a week. The price of basics like bread, meat,
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potatoes and milk has been frozen for twenty years; like 
fares, gas and electricity. After paying for all their 
necessities they save the equivalent of £25 a week which 
they put in the bank. The family give an appearance of 
genuine contentment.
Dimbleby’s account presents a society "where there’s no 
freedom” from another perspective. From a different 
perspective an alternative image can be constructed. In 
Newsround, only the problems of the system and the dislikes 
of its inhabitants are newsworthy.
If you asked an East German what he disliked most about 
his country, heTd probably tell you the restrictions on 
travel abroad... the shortage of housing is serious.
No East German was asked what he liked most about his 
country, nor were there any references to a serious shortage 
of housing in West Berlin. There were no amendments to the 
simple East/West, bad/good juxtaposition being constructed in 
the account. We are presented with an image of socialist 
society as seen from the limited perspective of free market 
values.
Similar points emerged in coverage of the deaths of 
Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko (see Appendix 3.1 for texts 
of whole items). For example, references to the Soviet 
economy in these items (see Appendix 3.2 for a list of all 
references) mentioned only its negative aspects.
The crisis which erupted in Poland in 1980 leading to 
the emergence of Solidarity revealed the chronic 
econom ic ills of the entire Soviet system.(Channel 4 
1900 11/ 11/82)
While the Polish crisis of the early 80s was reported to 
be symptomatic of *chronic illness1 in ’the entire Soviet
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system1, there were no references to the positive experience 
of countries like East Germany and Hungary. The Soviet 
economy was defined only as a series of immense problems.
Whoever makes it to the top will have to cope with the 
immense economic problems, which is one legacy Mr 
Brezhnev has left to his countryfs workers. His policies 
of rigid control have made this year’s growth rate the 
worst since the war, while the harvest has been the 
fourth bad one in a row - worse than in Czarist times.
(1 2100 11/11/82)
there’s a flagging economy and a perennial grain 
shortage...in a flagging economy there’s zero economic 
growth.(3 2200 11/11/82)
The day to day probems [Andropov] inherited were 
ingrained in Soviet life. Queues, shoddy goods, erratic 
deliveries, bad planning, inefficiency, but most 
ingrained and insidious of all, corruption and 
exploitation of privilege, something his predecessor Mr 
Brezhnev had been renowned for. (4 1900 10/2/84)
Some variations appeared in accounts of how successful 
Yuri Andropov had been in his well-publicised if short-lived 
drive to improve the functioning of the Soviet economy. Three 
different journalistic assessments of Andropov’s achievement 
were presented. BBC news stated that ’’bosses were fired”:
there was limited success.(1 2100 10/2/84)
Channel 4 news was more generous in its assessment, 
reporting:
impressive signs of progress in the first few months of 
his leadership...last year official figures showed a 
four percent increase in national output.(4 1900 
10/2/84)
This was the only reference to the Soviet economy in any 
of the coverage which could be described as ’positive’. News
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au xen, m  contrast, maintainea tnat:
Andropov was too ill in his sixteen months to. change 
anything in the Soviet Union. He left to his successor 
all the legacies, the ambitions and the problems he 
inherited. (3 2200 10/2/84)
The Soviet economy, of course, has many problems. Compared 
to the advanced capitalist economies it remains relatively 
undeveloped. Labour productivity is low. Shortages of labour 
and materials lead to bottlenecks and the inefficient use of 
resources. These problems are compounded by corruption and 
slow-moving bureaucratic machinery.
But the Soviet economy also has a number of positive 
features. Even by the standards of success of Western 
governments - which are not the only proclaimed goals of a 
centralised socialist economy - the Soviet Union has not 
performed disastrously. The prices of basic items are low and 
stable. Inflation is zero, ’booms and slumps1 are unknown, 
growth is constant, there is full unemployment and an 
extensive social welfare system, and standards of living have 
increased continuously since World War II. Such claims could 
not be made of the British economy. Martin Walker, Moscow 
correspondent for the GuardianT comments on his own surprise 
at arriving in the USSR and finding his accepted image of 
Soviet economic life challenged.
Staying and working here, it’s plain that the dominant 
theme of most Western analyses of the Soviet Union in 
the 70*s and early 80fs - that this place is 
economically a basket-case, that itfs collapsing - is 
just not true.
It’s not collapsing. It’s a very stable society. It’s 
one which delivers the goods to its people. Their living 
standards get a little better every year. Sure there are 
shortages, gross inefficiencies, gross examples of waste 
and incompetence, but anybody who knows Scotland or the
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America knows that we’re living in a glass house, and 
we’ve got to be careful about the kind of stones we’re 
throwing. I think that came as a shock to me - to 
discover that the system was not only working better 
than I had read it was, but it also seemed to be capable 
of change and improvement within its own terms.
Television news, to the extent that it dealt with the 
Soviet economy as a theme during the periods discussed, 
tended to reinforce the ’economic basket-case’ image.
Coverage of other aspects of Soviet life during the 
Brezhnev/Andropov/Chernenko sample also focussed on 
’problems’. ITN defined the Soviet Union as a ’’huge political 
and administrative headache”(3 2200 11/11/82), where:
the Russians themselves are about to become the 
minority. There are 260 million Soviet citizens. Just 
159 million of them live in the Russian republic. The 
big population explosion is out in Muslim Asia, among 
the Uzbheks and Kazhaks. That is why the Soviet Union 
went into Afghanistan.
In addition to the Islamic problem (asserted without 
substantiation to be the reason for Soviet involvement in 
Afghanistan), ’’growing urban problems familiar to the West”, 
were also noted in this item, such as ’’hooliganism and 
alcoholism”. There was a reference to the problem of the ’’new 
class” in Soviet society.
They are privately contemptuous of the political system 
that deprives them of more than material things. In the 
history of revolutions it is those who are better off 
who are the most dangerous.
The images of crisis and impending doom constructed by 
such comments is an example of a type of reporting criticised 
by Patrick Cockburn, Moscow correspondent of the Financial. 
Times in the following terms.
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Journalists tend to have an attitude towards this 
country. Often if you look at a headline it says 
’Soviets face crisis1. It’s usually not true. This whole 
system was designed to avoid crisis. Take Central Asia. 
There are some indications that there’s been a greater 
popularity of Islamic belief and worship, but there isn’t 
much evidence. There’s no evidence at all that the 
Soviets face a crisis because of the Islamic revolution. 
If you examine any country and see every crack as 
indicating a current or potential earthquake, you’ll 
produce this caricature. There’s a tendency for 
journalists to dramatise things, but particularly here.
b . The Soviets in the World.
A recurring theme of news about the Soviet Union in recent 
years has been the war in Afghanistan. In the routine sample 
discussed here, seven items covered the conflict. Jonathan 
Steele’s experience as a journalist in Kabul leads him to 
write that Western journalists covering the war are 
excessively reliant on Western o r .pro-Western sources, 
usually diplomatic, for their information. In the Guardian of 
March 10th, 1986, Steele criticises what he calls none-sided 
coverage”, based on journalists1 uncritical acceptance of 
anti-Soviet, pro-Mujahideen accounts of the conflict. “When 
the enemy is the Soviet Union”, he writes, ’’distinctions 
between hard news, soft news, and outright propaganda seem to 
lose all validity”.
The result is that week after week the Western world is 
being fed a story of mujaheddin success and Soviet 
discomfiture which may be far from the truth. The only 
beneficiaries, at least in the short term, are the 
mujaheddin and their political and military backers.
British television news coverage of the conflict also 
tends to rely on these sources, as the following examples 
illustrate.
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Reports from Afghanistan say Muslim rebels have killed 
200 members of a crack commando unit on the Soviet- 
backed Kabul regime. The reports say the fighting 
happened in the Baktia province last month. The American 
government now estimates the Russians themselves have 
had 15,000 casualties since their invasion.(1 2100 
7/6/83)
In Afghanistan the Soviet Union along with Afghan 
government forces has killed thousands of civilians in 
two bombing offensives according to Western diplomats in 
Kabul. The campaigns are said to have ended earlier this 
month. The diplomats say the raids involving up to 50 
planes a day over a two-week period were centred on the 
Western city of Harat and in the Shamali valley north of 
the capital Kabul. Half of Harat was said to have been 
destroyed.(3 2200 10/5/83)
It is necessary to recognise the distinction between 
choosing to use Western sources in such a story, and being 
compelled by the objective constraints operating in the 
particular news-gathering situation, as we shall see later 
on. However, Steele argues that alternatives to official 
Western sources are available, but tend to be downgraded in 
coverage.
In coverage of areas where the Soviet Union is not 
directly involved militarily, such as the Middle East or 
Central America, it is frequently mentioned as an factor!. 
Here, accounts and interpretations of the Soviet role tend to 
favour dominant Western definitions of the problem. The 
Middle East crisis of May 1983 illustrates this.
One year following its invasion of the Lebanon, Israel was 
anxious to withdraw its troops, for pressing domestic 
reasons. The Americans suggested that this could be achieved 
equitably by Israel and Syria both removing their troops. 
Syria refused, and a confrontation with Israel began to
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develop. In our sample, five items of news covered the crisis 
(the full texts of these items are reproduced in Appendix 
3.3).
To see how the US definition of this problem was 
reproduced as a privileged definition on television news, one 
has first to note that there were competing approaches 
available at this time. The US government held that the 
problem was related to Soviet influence in the region, in 
line with the general tendency of the Reagan Administration 
to make sense of world affairs in terms of *Soviet 
expansionism1. In particular, the Soviets were alleged to be 
building-up their military forces in Syria, and urging the 
Syrian government to reject the US peace plan.
A different perspective on the crisis, and on the Middle 
East situation in general, appeared in an article by Robert 
Fisk of the Times on May 13th. Fisk reported that Soviet 
military supplies to Syria were for defensive purposes only. 
He agreed that "there are 3,000 Soviet military advisers 
training the Syrian army. But there are no combat troops in 
Syria... In Lebanon, no independent witness has yet 
identified Soviet troops". Fisk went on to point out that 
Soviet military power in the region was a great deal less 
impressive than that of NATO.
The multinational force is not made up of United Nations 
peacekeepers but of troops from the United States, 
France, Italy and Britain. Beirut has over the past 
eight months been transformed into what is in effect a 
NATO base, complete with all the logistics and 
intelligence apparatus that the Western allies choose to 
place at its disposal. The waters off Beirut have 
become, quite literally, a [US] Sixth Fleet anchorage.
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view that Syria and the Soviets were working closely 
together.
President Assad is no Soviet lackey...[his] government 
spends more of its time talking to the American Embassy 
than to officials from the Soviet mission.
This view was reported once during the sample, on Channel 
4 news during an interview with a Middle East expert, Dr. 
Adeed Dawisha.
Dr Adeed Dawisha: The relation between the Syrians and 
the Soviet Union is one really of equal allies. This is 
something which people do not seem to appreciate. The 
Syrians are not clients of the Soviet Union. They have 
shown in the past, repeatedly, to be taking independent 
actions which the Soviets themselves have not agreed 
to.(4 1900 17/5/83)
However, in the rest of the coverage there was no 
reference to this view, or to the view of the military 
balance in the region presented by Fisk. On the other hand, a 
number of statements of the US view d id appear. The US view 
also formed the basis of the interpretative frameworks within 
which journalists chose to make sense of the crisis.
There were two reported statements by US political 
leaders, both asserting a belligerent Soviet role in the 
crisis, and neither of which were balanced with statements of 
competing interpretations.
Today Mr Schultz [the US Secretary of State] called on 
the Soviet Union to get on the side of peace in Lebanon 
and to support AmericaTs attempts to get all foreign 
troops out.(3 2200 10/5/83)[6]
The American Defence Secretary Mr Casper Weinberger said 
in New York that the Soviet build-up in Syria made 
agreem ent more difficult and increased the danger of wan
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Journalists’ linked "Syrian war-cries" with actual, or 
implied Soviet support.
Syria has again talked about a new war with Israel over 
Lebanon. Syria, which is armed and backed bv Russia 
turned down the deal for Israeli troop withdrawal from 
Lebanon negotiated by the American Secretary of State Mr 
George Schultz last week. (3 2200 10/5/83)
Syria’s war-like noises over Lebanon are probably 
designed to show the Arab world she is a force to be 
reckoned with again and to try and make life difficult 
for the Israelis who desperately want to get their 
troops home from Lebanon. But even with her new Russian 
support it’s unlikely Syria really wants another war. (3 
2200 13/5/83)
Syrian war-cries are backed bv an enormous influx of 
Soviet m ilitary equipment, hundreds of T-72 battletanks, 
artillery pieces and aircraft have replaced the losses 
of last year’s conflict with Israel. (1 2100 16/5/83)
An item about US military aid to Israel, by contrast, was 
couched in very different terms. On May 19th, it was reported 
that President Reagan "says he’s going to announce in the 
next few days that America will sell 75 F-15 bombers to 
Israel"(3 2200 19/5/83). Here there were no references to ’an 
enormous influx of military equipment’. On the contrary, this 
sale of weapons (to a country which one year before had used 
similar equipment to kill an estimated 30,000 civilians in 
Beirut) was explained by a statement of the official view.
The US Defence Secretary is worried about the Soviet 
military build-up in Syria.(3 2200 19/5/83)
While Soviet supplies to Syria were reported on the news 
as the cause of conflict, those from the US to Israel were 
reported as a response to Soviet build-up. US definitions of
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The tendency for television news to prefer certain account 
over others in coverage of Soviet-related issues was also 
shown during coverage of the deaths of Brezhnev, Andropov and 
Chernenko. To illustrate this we will discuss coverage of two 
themes repeatedly raised in the background narratives which 
made up much of this coverage: Soviet military power, and 
East-West relations.
c . Soviet military power.
Chapter 2 showed that authoritative Western opinion varies 
on the nature and extent of the Soviet military threat. 
Television news accounts of Soviet military power tended to 
reflect those views which maximise the Soviet threat and 
assume 'worst-case* assessments of Soviet capabilities to be 
true (a list of references to Soviet military power over the 
sample is given in Appendix 3.4).
BBC, for example, referred to Soviet military expansion 
in recent years as "the biggest military build-up the world 
has ever seen”, using this assertion to qualify an image of 
President Brezhnev as an advocate of disarmament.
President Brezhnev*s place in history is assured. The 
man who advocated disarmament yet presided over the 
biggest military build-up the world has ever seen.(1 
2100 11/1 1 / 8 2
A bigger military build-up, one might wrongly infer from 
this statement, than that initiated by President Reagan after 
he came to power in 1 980. Elsewhere in the same bulletin it 
was noted that:
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In Brezhnev's final years the Soviet military build-up 
continued, outstripping NATO in a number of areas.
The item contained no information as to the areas in 
which NATO is surpassed by the USSR, or their relevance to 
the overall military balance, or the areas in which NATO 
outstripped the Soviet Union. There were no references to a 
NATO military build-up in the narrative, although by November 
1982 President Reagan was well advanced in his defence 
programme. All these factors are important if the viewer is 
to make an informed appraisal of the leaning1 of the term 
!Soviet military build-up1.
BBC coverage of the Brezhnev funeral picked out Soviet 
Defence Minister Marshal Ustinov from the leaders standing on 
the Lenin Mausoleum and identified him as the man who had 
"presided over an unprecedented military build-up"(1 2100 
15/11/82).
BBC then, presented the viewer with an unqualified, 
uncontextualised image of a Soviet military build-up which is 
'unprecedented1, 'the biggest the world has ever seen*, and 
'outstripping NATO in many areas*.
Channel 4 news coverage of Brezhnev's death, referring to 
the SALT II arms limitation treaty, stated that it had been 
signed "only after five long years of haggling"
and Russia's military might grew alarmingly.(4 1900
11/11/8 2)
Soviet military power grew during the 1970s, as did that
of the United States. That it grew "alarmingly" is a question
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News at Ten referred twice to Soviet defence spending, 
entering a debate which, as we have seen, occupies a crucial 
place in the overall debate about the Soviet threat. ITN's 
account of this issue reinforced 'worst-case' assessments of 
Soviet defence spending.
It was shown in Chapter 2 that the extent of Soviet 
defence spending, like Soviet military power in general, can 
be guessed, calculated, assessed, but not known as a fact. 
Assessments vary. The 'worst-case' assessment, contained in 
the British Government's 1982-83 Defence Estimates, was that
Soviet defence expenditure now accounts for some 14-16 
percent of GNP in current prices, overtwice the level of 
any NATO country(p20).
In 1984 NATO acknowledged this estimate to be exaggerated 
by a factor of two. On television news it appeared without 
qualification or identification of its source in both of 
ITN's references to Soviet defence spending.
President Brezhnev was an enthusiastic supporter of 
detente with the West but under his leadership there was 
no let up in Soviet military spending. Russia has 
consistently spent over one eighth of its national 
income on defence, that's about twice the proportion of 
most Western countries.
in a flagging economy there's zero economic growth, 
lagging technology, and 15. percent of production spent 
on defence.(3 2200 1 1/1 1/82)
The source or status of these assessments was not 
indicated to the viewer, for example by the preface that 'the 
British Government claims' or 'the CIA estimates'. There was 
no indication that the figure of '14-16 percent' was a
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disputed estimate. There was no reference to the relevant 
consideration that Soviet GNP is approximately 50 percent 
that of the United States (850 billion as against 1700 
billion dollars in 1976), and that for this reason figures 
for defence spending as a percentage of GNP have to be 
qualified. The phrase *spends twice as much as Western 
countries* is particularly evocative, but could be qualified 
by the fact that in hard cash, according to Western bankers, 
NATO spent 220 billion dollars more than the Warsaw Pact in 
1982.
As in the earlier BBC example, the information is 
presented in such a way as to qualify Brezhnev*s policy of 
detente: *President Brezhnev supported detente but...1. We
might reasonably reconstruct the meaning of the statement in 
the following way - detente is nice in theory but you can*t 
trust him because he spends over twice the amount of Western 
countries on defence.
These assessments of Soviet defence spending - one eighth 
or 15% of GNP, twice the proportion of most Western countries 
- are the same as those found in the official sources quoted 
in Chapter 2 above. They were originally produced by the CIA 
for the US Defence Department under pressure from the 
conservative Committee on the Present Danger.
Throughout this coverage, there were only two occasions 
when journalists contextualised images of Soviet military 
power in terms of Western superiority. In the first example a 
reference to Soviet military inferiority is included as a 
brief addendum to an account of what is described as a
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"revolution” in Soviet military technology.
Under the leadership of Brezhnev RussiaTs armed forces 
have undergone a technological revolution in recent 
years. Soviet ground forces in Europe have been 
considerably strengthened by new weapons like the T-72 
tanks on display last week in Moscow, and Russia spent 
vast sums of money on the development of new weapons in 
space. Large numbers of navigation and communication 
satellites have been launched, and new radar satellites 
which can track NATO ships at sea. And in the past 
decade the Soviet navy has expanded dramatically, with a 
new ability to project power worldwide.(3 2200 1 1/1 1/82)
These images of "dramatic" expansion were contextualised 
by the observation that Soviet military forces remain 
inferior to those of the United States.
Russia*s purpose with all this technology is to try to 
catch up with the Americans.
A second counter-example accompanied coverage of 
Chernenko!s death, on the eve of a new round of Geneva arms 
control talks. One of the major issues at these talks would 
be the United States planned TStar Wars1 project, the 
Strategic Defence Initiative. One bulletin presented this 
account of the military balance in space weapons.
The Russians already have killer satellites to knock out 
American military satellites, and plans for space 
stations like this which could serve a number of 
purposes in war. But by and large the Russians1 space 
technology lags far behind the Americans.(4 1900 
11/3/85)
d . East-West relations.
A second major theme of coverage was the state of East- 
West relations. Journalists tended to concentrate their 
accounts on two aspects of the problem: the poor state of 
relations in general, and the fact that no progress had been
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made in the area of arms control.
Statements on these issues fell into three categories: 
those which described the state of East-West relations or 
anticipated how they would develop; those which ascribed or 
implied blame for the deterioration of East-West relations to 
one side or the other; and those which reported the 
statements of Soviet and Western leaders about East-West 
relations (a list of all statements is given in Appendix 
3.5). An analysis of these statements reveals the 
journalists* tendency to reproduce dominant (Western) 
explanations of the East-West *problem*, i.e., that it is 
essentially a problem located in some aspect or other of 
Soviet behaviour.
Statements in the first category reflected the changes in 
East-West relations taking place throughout the period of the 
sample. On the death of Brezhnev there was a consensus that 
relations, already at their coolest for many years, would not 
improve in the near future. As BBC news put it:
any remnants of the old policy of detente will either 
disappear or go into deep freeze, and the strategic arms 
reduction talks are hardly likely to produce muchO 2100 
11/11/8 2).
Sixteen months later BBC reflected that "when Brezhnev 
died neither President Reagan nor Mrs Thatcher went to 
Moscow, the chill in East-West relations was already too 
strong for that, and it was to get worse"(1 2100 10/2/84). 
ITN*s coverage of Andropov*s death emphasised "how bad 
Soviet-American relations have become" adding, by way of 
substantiation:
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Since Vice-President Bush flew to Brezhnev's funeral and 
he and Secretary of State George Schultz talked with Mr 
Andropov sixteen months ago thereTs been effectively no 
contact with the Soviet leadership.(3 2200 10/2/84)
With the passing of another thirteen months, and another 
change in leadership, it seemed that the new cold war was 
thawing out. Television news was able to report that 
"relations are greatly improved since the last such death in 
the Soviet family”(3 2200 11/3/85). What one journalist had 
called "the winter of superpower relations” seemed to be 
giving way to a mild rapprochement.
However, in going beyond the identification of an East- 
West problem and seeking to explain it journalists emphasised 
what we shall call Soviet-induced factors. References to the 
breakdown of detente and the onset of the new cold war tended 
to focus blame on Soviet actions and Soviet policies.
With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan American-Soviet 
relations went into irreversible decline.(4 1900 
11/11/8 2)
The SALT II treaty was never ratified by Congress. East- 
West relations were moving into a difficult period, not 
helped by allegations of Soviet maltreatment of 
dissidents.(1 2100 11/1 1/82)
They shot [the Korean airliner] out of the sky, bringing 
world-wide condemnation down on the Kremlin. East-West 
contacts were shattered.(1 2100 10/2/84)
These were significant events, but were not in themselves 
the cause of deteriorating East-West relations. In some 
respects they were a consequence of that deterioration. The 
reason given publicly by Presidents Carter and Reagan for the 
ultimate failure of the SALT II negotiations made no
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reference to "Soviet maltreatment of dissidents" but alleged 
that SALT II would codify Soviet strategic superiority. 
Similarly, the Korean airline disaster did not "shatter" 
East-West contacts, but confirmed in the view of some 
commentators the dangers of a situation where high-level 
contacts were virtually non-existent.
Other statements blamed individual Soviet leaders for the 
crisis. Brezhnev, one journalist remarked, "never quite 
managed to convince President Reagan*s America that the old 
men in the Kremlin were genuinely interested in peace, 
cooperation and detente"(4 1900 11/11/82).
BBC news wondered if Andropov!s successor would make "any 
real effort to get the arms talks going again"(1 2100 
10/2/84). The implication that Andropov had not made such an 
effort took no account of the views of those such as Denis 
Healey, who argued after the death of Andropov that:
It's fair to say that Andropov tried very hard to 
improve relations both with China and with the West. He 
failed because neither took the hand offered out. (3 
2200 10/2/84)
One bulletin reported that under Chernenko:
the United States remained in Soviet-imposed quarantine 
and Mr Reagan in his pre-election campaign could do no 
right.
In these accounts blame for the East-West problem* is 
attributed to aspects of Soviet behaviour - Soviet policies, 
Soviet leaders. This explanatory framework was exemplified in 
the following account.
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detente, despite Mr Brezhnev*s harsh words last w eek, 
the Administration will probably send its second-highest 
ranking member Vice-President Bush [to the funeral].(3 
2200 11/11/8 2)
The United States, we are told, "deeply wants detente", 
despite what are described as Mr Brezhnev*s "harsh words" 
(which were not reported). The Presidents refusal to go to 
the Brezhnev funeral, and his dispatch of the Vice-President 
instead are presented as evidence of his sincerity.
Mr ReaganS attitudes to the USSR were not a secret. 
Nowhere in these bulletins was it noted that Mr Reagan was 
the first United States* President in 40 years not to meet 
his Soviet counterpart, or that his first meeting with any 
member of the Soviet Government had been with Andrei Gromyko 
only weeks before the Presidential election of 1984. On the 
contrary, it was the Soviets who had "imposed quarantine".
Statements about East-West relations which appeared after 
Andropov*s death reinforced the argument advanced by the 
Reagan Administration for the fact that relations had not 
advanced during his brief tenure in office, i.e., that he was 
unfit and an invalid.
The feeling in Washington is that with the uncertainty 
over Mr Andropov*s health now over, a major obstacle to 
ending the present freeze in relations between the two 
superpowers may have been cleared away.(4 1900 10/2/84)
Inside and outside of the Administration there*s a sense 
here of a new opening and opportunity for dialogue with 
the Soviet Union. And whether or not the President goes 
to Moscow he*s likely to grasp at it.(1 2100 10/2/84)
The US Administration is said to be *grasping* at the 
opportunity to open a dialogue. Western demands for
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improvements1 in Soviet behaviour were reported 
uncritically, as in the following examples.
the United States will be looking to the new leadership 
for some signal of a willingness to ease the present 
tension.(1 2100 1 1/1 1/82)
Some Western leaders are starting to demand some kind of. 
sign from the Kremlin about its promised goodwill...Mrs 
Thatcher is likely to call for genuine evidence that the 
Russians are serious about multilateral disarmament.(1 
2100 15/11/82)
In the context of the East-West debate it is to be 
expected that Western leaders should have made such 
statements and attempted to present themselves to their own 
citizens as sincere peacemakers. Television news assumed the 
sincerity of these claims, although alternative analyses, in 
which the Western role would not have been perceived in such 
a positive way, were available.
Consider the following accounts taken from coverage of the 
death of Leonid Brezhnev.
For President Reagan the hope of a new start for East- 
West relations.(1 2100 1 1/1 1/82)
Mr Andropov said he wanted relations based on full 
equality, non-interference, mutual respect and what he 
called a revitalising of the international atmosphere.(3 
2200 15/11/82)
Both statements contain expressions of a desire for 
improved East-West relations. Both are typical examples of 
the diplomatic style. But there is a subtle difference in 
their presentation. The first statement presents a fact - 
President Reagan hopes for a new start. There is no 
suggestion that this might be public relations.
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Mr Andropov, on the other hand, is reported as saving that 
he wants improvement, a statement which can be *read* in a 
number of ways, according to wider assumptions about the 
credibility of Soviet views. The assumption of good 
intentions on the part of the US Administration is reinforced 
by the media presentation.
Consider too the following account of Mikhail Gorbachev^ 
speech at the funeral of Konstantin Chernenko.
Mr Gorbachev repeated the well-oiled formula about 
Russia*s readiness to maintain neighbourly relations 
with all countries.(4 1900 13/1 1/85)
There were, by contrast, no references to Twell-oiled 
formulae* in the statements of Western leaders such as Mr 
Reagan or Mrs Thatcher. Their statements of a desire for 
detente, of a hope for improved relations with the USSR, were 
never *made sense* of in this manner.
We noted that as Gorbachev followed Chernenko, relations 
were improving. Coverage accounted for the change in terms of 
the "new, younger man in the Kremlin1*.
The West will be hoping that in time the fact that 
there*s a younger man in charge now in Moscow, hopefully 
one who*s more receptive to new ideas, and with the 
prospect of 20 years or more at the top with which to 
carry them out, that that will all lead to a significant 
improvement in East-West relations.(3 2200 13/1 1/85)
Despite the optimistic tone, and references to **the
man with new ideas”, the dominant interpretative framework 
remains. Western leaders are assumed to be *hoping for a 
significant improvement* in relations, an improvement which
100
is assumed to have been thwarted by recent Soviet 
leaderships.
Throughout the sample there were only two references to 
what we shall call W estern-induced causes in the 
deterioration of East-West relations. The first of these 
occurred in the context of Channel 4*s interview with the 
Soviet commentator Vladimir Dunaev, who was asked if he 
thought that following the death of Brezhnev
the rather tough sounding statements and the tough 
stance of President Reagan and the cold war sentiments 
of his Adm inistration [would] increase the likelihood 
that a hardliner will emerge to combat this policy of 
the Americans?(4 1900 15/11/82)
Clearly, the politics of the Reagan Administration are 
recognised in this question to be a factor in East-west 
relations, but they were referred to in this context at only 
one other point in coverage. This came in ITNfs account of 
Brezhnev's political career.
Relations with the United States had gone from good to 
bad under the Carter Administration. When Ronald Reagan 
got to the White House they went from bad to worse. 
Brezhnev now faced a man who was also conservative, who 
also kept his guard up, and who believed that in 
economic and military competition it would be the Soviet 
system that failed.(3 2200 1 1/1 1/82)
The account acknowledges a US role in making East-West 
relations go from 'good to bad and from bad to worse1. The 
same item also stated that "Brezhnev did not want an arms 
race with the United States". In so far as these references 
did not blame Soviet-induced factors for the new cold war 
they qualified the general tendency of television news to 
reinforce the dominant Western account of the East-West
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problem.
e . The Enemv Within.
We turn finally to a special category of coverage: that 
which reports Soviet relations with Britain. The routine 
sample contained 34 items in this sub-category (13 
concerned with Soviet attitudes to the Falklands conflict). 
Generally, the USSR appears in this type of item as a 
protagonist, a threat or an enemy, often in the context of 
official statements such as that of June 22nd 1982 when the 
Conservative Government published its annual defence White 
Paper, setting out the priorities of UK defence policy for 
the coming year. Following as it did so soon after the 
conclusion of the Falklands War the 1982 Paper was expected 
to be controversial. Would there be, for example, a review of 
the govenment’s already announced decision to cut the Navy, 
given its successes in the South Atlantic? Would there be a 
greater emphasis in the future on conventional as opposed to 
nuclear weapons? The principal conclusion of the 1982 Defence 
Paper, nothwithstanding these debates, was that "the main 
threat to the security of the United Kingdom is from the 
nuclear and conventional forces of the Soviet Union and her 
Warsaw Pact allies".
The White Paper was reported on five bulletins, and while 
there was some reference to the intra-service debate about 
the role of the Navy, there was no media discussion of this 
statement of the threat[8].
The Governments White Paper still treats the Soviet 
Union as the main threat to Britain.(1 1740 22/6/82)
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Todayfs White Paper reasserts the Governments view that 
the main threat to British security still comes from 
Russia and her Warsaw Pact allies.(3 1715 22/6/82)
On May 20th, 1982, the Diplock Commission^ report on 
internal security was published. Its conclusions identified 
"left-wing" and Soviet subversion as the main internal 
threats to national security. Reported on four bulletins 
throughout the day, the Commission^ conclusions escaped 
analysis or discussion. The following was typical of their 
presentation.
BritainTs democratic institutions are under challenge 
from new subversive groups, mainly on the extreme left, 
according to the report of the Diplock Commission on 
security. The report says that at the same time the 
threat from the Soviet bloc intelligence services 
remains strong. (3 1745 20/5/82)
Another kind of story in which the USSR regularly appears 
is the *spy scandal1. Sometimes Soviets working in Britain 
are accused of spying and expelled (see Chapter 6 below) and 
sometimes this news is concerned with British citizens 
alleged to be working for the Soviets or their allies. These 
stories, even if they do not refer to the Soviet Union 
directly, usually construct images of a threat.
A variant on the spy theme concerns coverage of industrial 
espionage. In June 1983 ITN carried two special reports on 
the illegal export of computers to COMECON countries. Items 
reported a "pattern of successful hi-tech smuggling 
undertaken by Soviet bloc intelligence services"(4 1900 
1/6/83), and a "complex fraud to smuggle computers into the 
Soviet bloc"(4 1900 8/6/83).
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lac urijLy exceptions to tnese images m  tne sample appeared 
in the context of news about British-Soviet trade. In June 
1982 the British and American governments fell out over the 
US ban on contracts for the Soviet gas pipeline then under 
construction. The ban threatened to affect companies working 
in Britain, and was rejected by the Thatcher Government.
The British Government said today that the American ban 
exports of high technology for the Soviet gas pipeline is 
unacceptable, so it will protect British companies 
engaged in such sales. The Trade Minister Mr. Peter Rees 
is in Washington to tell the Americans about the damage 
theyTre causing.(3 2200 30/6/82)
Such stories, when they appear, arguably qualify images of 
the USSR as a threat by presenting instead a country with 
whom Britain can work and trade. During the sample there were 
two items of this kind.
During the Falklands conflict, there were a number of news 
items concerned with Soviet attitudes (13, between May 1st 
and June 30th)[9]. These generally took the form of 
speculation as to the existence and extent of Soviet aid to 
the Argentine junta. The available evidence on this question 
suggested that while the Soviets supported the Argentine 
sovereignty claim, in accordance with UN Resolution 2065, 
they were not giving financial or military assistance to 
Galtieri!s strongly anti-Soviet, anti-communist government.
On May 19th the Financial Times noted that:
Soviet geographical maps recognised the existence of an 
Argentinian claim to the Falkland Islands long before 
the Argentine invasion of the islands six weeks ago but 
at no stage in the dispute has the Soviet Union endorsed 
ArgentinaTs original invasion of the islands.
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Thus far the Soviet Union has taken a strongly anti- 
British and anti-US line over the Falklands and coupled 
this with general expressions of support for Latin 
America, the Third World at large, and the Argentinian 
people. At no stage however, has it endorsed the 
Galtieri regime and might indeed be embarassed if the 
Right-wing military regime made an open request for 
Soviet arms.
Following the US embargo on grain sales to the USSR as a 
protest against Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the 
Soviets had turned to Argentina for grain imports. In 1981 15 
million tons were purchased from this source. On May 24th the 
Daily Telegraph reported:
an unexplained halt in Soviet grain purchases abroad... 
Soviet grain purchases from Argentina totalled 15 
million tons last year. But so far Moscow has only 
bought eight million tons from Argentina this year, and 
has not made a major move in world grain markets for 
more than a month.
On June 4th the Financial Times observed that:
The decision to halt further Soviet grain orders at the 
outset of the Falkland Islands dispute contrasts with 
the strongly pro-Argentine position taken by Soviet 
spokesmen and the media.
Several television news items were devoted to speculation 
about the forms and extent of aid to the junta, but none 
reported this evidence. On May 19th, when the Finacial Times 
had reported "no endorsement” by the Soviets of the invasion, 
Newsnight presented an item in which the Soviet role in 
support of Argentina was said to Mirror* US support for 
Britain. The report elevated the conflict to the status of a 
superpower confrontation in the following manner.
Well as the crisis apparently inches closer to a major
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it may suck in other countries, even the superpowers, 
with American support for Britain mirrored by Soviet 
support for Argentina.(2 Newsnight 19/5/82)
There was no evidence at the time that such an escalation 
of the conflict was imminent, or that the Soviets were 
Mirroring* US support for Britain in their relations with 
Argentina. The obvious lack of Soviet support for Argentina 
was defined as ’’conspicuous restraint”.
Now so far the Soviet Union appears to have been 
conspicuously restrained, for whatever reason, and it is 
still not known how much military intelligence the 
Argentines are receiving from Moscow. But this week 
another communications satellite was launched which 
could be used for intelligence-gathering over the South 
Atlantic.
The observed ’restraint’ of the USSR does not prevent 
the journalist from implying that Argentina is receiving some 
kind of military aid - ”it’s still not known how much” - via 
a Soviet satellite monitoring the conflict.
The USSR monitored the conflict by satellites and other 
means, in this respect sharing an interest with the USA. The 
Falklands war was the first post-war conflict fought at sea, 
with many new weapons and tactics on display. Both 
superpowers attended as spectators,and several news items 
took this as their theme.
The launching of a Soviet satellite referred to in the 
Newsnight example above was also covered by ITN. ITN’s 
coverage initially placed the Soviet satellite in the context 
of similar monitoring activity by the USA.
This latest launch matches the American Big Bird spy 
satellite put up. last Wednesday, by the US a^r. force at a
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cost of 80 million dollars to keep watch on the 
Argentine fleet. The Americans have also just changed 
the orbits of two top secret Keyhole 11 satellites 
operated by the CIA so that they can cross the Falklands 
twice a day when the sun is low on the horizon.(3 1300 
17/5/82)
There was however a distinct change of emphasis in a later 
item that day. Gone were references to the US Big Bird 
satellites, to their cost and to the fact that they preceded 
the Soviet satellite in their stationing above the Falklands. 
M0ne of the [Soviets’] biggest satellites” became ”a giant 
spy satellite...that... passes low right over the Falkland 
Islands twice a day”(3 17^5 17/5/82) (see figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1. ”A giant spy satellite... passes low right over 
the Falkland Islands twice a dav”( 3 1745 17/5/82)
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2. Making Soviet News.
A number of factors shape the images of the Soviet Union 
which Western media tend to produce. One is the set of 
attitudes and ideological assumptions which some journalists 
bring to their work. As Patrick Cockburn puts it, ’’it’s 
evident that there’s an ideological bias amongst journalists. 
That’s quite obvious”. He refers specifically to journalists 
working in Moscow, but the point is equally valid for those 
based in Britain who report on Soviet affairs. Cockburn 
continues:
There are people who think that it’s a deeply evil 
society. When you go back to England or America what is 
deeply shocking is the demonology about the USSR.
BBC news’ Moscow correspondent, Brian Hanrahan, remarks: 
’’the impression I’ve always had in the past is that people 
who’ve written about the Soviet Union have done so with undue 
suspicion”. Peter Ruff, his colleague, acknowledges that "a 
lot of journalists come here with the feeling that this is
somewhere special, it’s dangerous, it’s a threat, and that it
must be taken very seriously indeed”.
The presence of ’ideological bias* amongst some television
journalists is clearly shown in the language they employ to 
describe and make sense of the Soviet Union.
In BBC’s coverage of the 1982 May Day parade it was 
reported that the Party slogans carried by the participants 
were announced ’’weeks in advance every year, and every year 
they duly and ritualistically appear”. The phrase ’’duly and 
ritualistically” would not appear in coverage of a British 
state occasion, such as the Queen’s Speech. Journalists would
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not be likely to report that *the words are written by the 
Government weeks in advance, and every year they duly and 
ritualistically appear in the mouth of the Queen*.
BBC*s coverage of the death of Leonid Brezhnev described 
him as:
the ruler of Russia...arguably the most powerful man in 
the world...a man who*s dominated the communist world 
for so long...the man who embraced detente, but made 
sure democratic stirrings in his own empire were 
crushed. (1 2100 11/11/82)
ITN*s newscaster stated that Brezhnev "kept the Soviet 
Union a garrison state. Under him there was no Russian 
spring.He had only one answer to the change that threatened 
his system. Stop it!”(3 2200 11/11/82).
In ITN*s coverage of the state funeral of Leonid Brezhnev 
the newscaster gave an account of meetings which took place 
after the funeral between George Bush, Francis Pym (then 
British Foreign Secretary), and Yuri Andropov, the new 
General Secretary of the CPSU. There was, he said, "a long 
receiving line in the Kremlin, of 32 heads of state, 15 prime 
ministers, and just about every foreign minister who could 
get theren(3 2200 15/11/82). Then, over Soviet-supplied film 
of the funeral procession and the ceremonies afterwards, the 
following commentary was given:
Intent on being there were the Polish puppet General 
Jaruzelski, who was among those who queued patiently for 
their handshake. And also Cuba*s bearded Fidel Castro. 
Their new m aster was holding a party. One of the few 
non-communist faces Soviet viewers would recognise was 
Mrs Gandhi, with Afghanistan on her mind. And she bowed 
to Brezhnev*s picture.
They came to Red Square today to bury Brezhnev, and 
not particularly to praise him. All who were there were
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die. Others were there by orders.
His old friend had come, Indira Gandhi who spoke her 
mind, and the clients who didnTt - Jaruzelski from 
Poland. Castro from Cuba and Yasser Arafat.
And his widow Victoria, his daughter and his son said 
goodbye in an older ritual than the atheistic state 
allowed.
The terms used to describe the principal actors in this 
performance reflect anti-Soviet, anti-communist stereotypes. 
As to the validity of these labels, Fidel Castro, explicitly 
identified as Ta client who doesn!t speak his mind1, has 
frequently adopted an independent foreign policy line vis a 
vis the Soviet Union. Indeed, he boycotted the later funeral 
of Konstantin Chernenko because, according to Channel 4 news 
at the time, "relations with Moscow" were "strained over 
Central America"(4 1900 13/3/85). Yasser Arafat, also 
reportedly fa client who doesnTt speak his mindT, is not even 
a communist, nor is the PLO a communist organisation. On the 
contrary, the greatest proportion of PLO funds come from the 
oil-rich, pro-Western Arab states.
In coverage of the funeral of Yuri Andropov, BBC2Ts 
Newsnight reported, in voice-over to shots of the Kremlin 
reception, that "after the funeral, Mr Chernenko held court, 
receiving first his European satraps Kadar of Hungary, 
Jaruzselski of Poland and the others"(2 Newsnight 14/2/84)
When Andropov died he was described as "a hardman as far 
back as 1956" and "a former secret police chief"(1 2100 
10/2/84). In another bulletin:
the KGB hardman...no friend to dissidents.(4 1900 
10/2/84)
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President George Bush who has never, as far as is known, been 
described on British television news as Tthe CIA hardmanf, 
although he was director of the CIA during the Ford 
Administration. Such language Tmakes sense' of the relations 
between the USSR and its allies in terms which might be taken 
for granted in Conservative Central Office, but are far from 
being a 'neutral* discourse.
However, the employment of ideologically-loaded language 
in news coverage of the USSR is not universal. ITN's coverage 
of the Andropov funeral eschewed negative descriptive labels.
Pride of place went to the Communist leaders of Eastern 
Europe, with Kadar of Hungary, Jaruszelski of Poland, 
Caesesceau of Romania well to the fore. And then 
Russia's allies around the world like Fidel Castro.(3 
2200 14/2/84)
In this example, the language of 'clients', 'dictators', 
'puppets' and 'masters' was replaced by distinctly less 
evocative terms such as 'allies*. Many journalists appear to 
reject the use of cold war terminology.
However, the attitudes and assumptions of journalists - 
their ideological 'biases' - are not the only factor in 
shaping negative 'images of the enemy*. Many journalists 
acknowledge that themes which are absent from Soviet news in 
general are of legitimate interest to their viewers and 
readers. They agree, for example, that the lifestyle and 
habits of the ordinary Soviet citizen, in addition to the 
dissident/refusenik/dissenter, are newsworthy and should be 
reported, but that there are constraints affecting their 
ability to do so. One such journalist is Brian Hanrahan, who
considers his job as a Moscow correspondent for the BBC to 
contain two aspects. The first is:
the political reporting, the stuff you*d get out of any 
society but that's important here because you're dealing 
with a country which has a big effect on the world. So 
thereTs that, and all the things that have a direct 
bearing on that,like the economy.
However, a second aspect of Hanrahan's job, as he sees it:
is the unknown factor. We don't know a lot about this 
country, but because it has a big effect on everybody 
there's a lot of interest in knowing about it. People 
want to know a lot about Soviet life, because it's a 
completely different system in every way: the fact that 
there are a lot of different cultures here, how they run 
things, how they make things work, is all a challenge to 
the rest of the world. Finding out how they do it, how 
their social organisation works, how advanced they are, 
is all of interest just by itself.
Peter Ruff believes that a part of his job is Mto try and 
describe to people in the West what life is like here,and to 
explain Soviet policy”. Patrick Cockburn finds that:
Western people are interested in Soviet life. If you go 
anywhere in Britain, people do not want a very long 
conversation about the Soviet attitude to Star Wars. 
They are interested in what the Soviets get paid, what 
their houses are like, what they wear, if they have 
difficulty in getting clothes, what their education is 
like, what is it like when they go to a doctor? People 
in the West are interested in hearing how people live 
here, and that's an interest correspondents should be 
able to satisfy.
Why then, are such themes neglected?. Many of the 
correspondents argue that they are constrained by factors 
over which they have no control, which confront them as 
'givens' in the work of gathering news about the Soviet 
Union. Brian Hanrahan claims that his ability to produce 
human interest or 'life-style' pieces about the Soviet Union
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pictures without getting official permission.
What you get at the end of the day in terms of human 
interest is what the Soviet government deems suitable.
So your view of the Soviet Union can be controlled very 
easily. If I go to a factory,I have no idea whether it!s 
a typical factory or not.
He adds:
When I have asked officially if I can go somewhere and 
film something the answer is no, you have no permission 
to do this. A typical Soviet house is not on the agenda, 
because they think it will reflect badly on their 
society, it might not look well to people in the West 
who are used to a different standard.
The Soviet reluctance to deal with Western journalists in 
general has contributed, Hanrahan believes, to the negative 
coverage it has received over the years.
In some ways I don't think the Soviet Union gives 
itself a fair press. It cuts itself off so much from the 
world. It doesn't tell about the characteristics of 
Soviet society that might make it attractive to 
outsiders. It leaves itself open to all this critical 
reporting because it wonft allow people to come in and 
see it as it is, with the pluses and the minuses.
In addition, feature-type, human interest stories about 
the USSR are more difficult for broadcasting journalists than 
their press colleagues. The technology and grammar of 
television (and to a lesser extent radio) demands material 
which the Moscow correspondent cannot always provide.
Hanrahan stresses:
To do human interest stories I must have co-operation, I 
must have help from the Soviet authorities. On the other 
hand, I can do politics, whatever happens, with or 
without co-operation. The story comes out of your head 
and you can illustrate it with visual material from some 
other source, but human interest stories must come out 
of a camera. I can do politics without help, I canft do
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According to some journalists the existence of these 
constraints are at least partly responsible for the tendency 
of Western media coverage to focus on the themes of 
dissidence and dissent. "If there was greater access", says 
John Tusa of the BBC, "coverage would be better". By 
creating an information gapT in the 1970s and early 1980s 
refuseniks, dissidents and other opponents of the Soviet 
state - almost by default, the argument goes - filled the 
space. Patrick Cockburn explains it this way:
The Soviets complain that in the late 70s and afterwards 
the foreign media here were obsessed with dissidents and 
refuseniks and so forth. To some extent there’s some 
merit in that. You could say that the amount of 
reporting of these themes gives an exaggerated opinion 
of the numbers involved in these movements. On the 
other hand they do exist, and secondly, in a political 
vacumn this was the only type of activity going on. If 
you have a wholly inert political leadership the 
spotlight falls on the only signs of activity.
By placing these obstacles all they’ve done in the 
past is to ensure that correspondents often rely on 
dissidents or whoever for opinions. If you take those 
blocks [where the journalists, diplomats and others in 
the foreign community live] an ordinary Russian can’t 
walk into them without being stopped by the militiaman. 
The people who have absolutely no fear of coming in are 
people who are dissident, because theyTve got nothing to 
lose. Ordinary Soviets or members of the Party will not 
want to come here, so automatically it’s much easier to 
have someone who’s outwith the ordinary anyway come to 
the office or the flat. That’s the way it works.
Martin Walker of The Guardian makes a similar point.
I think coverage in the past has been inadequate, and I 
think a lot of that’s been the Soviets fault. They were 
such a closed society for so long that in the 70s 
coverage became dominated by dissidents.
Thus, journalists who are concerned to construct what they 
believe to be a more balanced image of the USSR, to address
114
bureaucratic obstructionism and other constraints imposed by 
the Soviets over which they have no control. Nik Gowing, 
ITN’s Soviet correspondent described his negotiations with 
the Soviet authorities for access to the USSR at the time of 
the 27th Congress as an "enormously long, tortuous path. In 
true Soviet-style", he added, "everything has to be done in 
advance". He said that stories which involved travelling 
outside of Moscow could take up to nine months to organise.
Peter Ruff argues that the organisation of Soviet society 
makes it difficult for him to check stories and verify their 
accuracy.
You can’t check facts with Soviet people. First of all, 
because they don’t know them as well as you do.
Secondly, they’re told to be very careful of foreigners, 
and Westerners in particular. There are always stories 
in the media about Western secret service infiltration 
of the foreign communityt10]. There!s also a new law 
which makes it illegal for a foreigner to be given any 
official information. The state determines what is 
official information. The law is now established in the 
criminal code - you don’t pass on any information or 
give any help to foreigners without official permission.
The potential of this law for limiting the freedom of 
journalists to gather news is considerable, a point also made 
by Hanrahan:
There’s a limited area you can gather news from. A lot 
of the things you can do elsewhere you can’t do here.
You read the morning papers, you read the evening 
papers, you watch Vremva [the main television news 
programme in the USSR], you take notes on what is said, 
and it all comes from officially-controlled sources. You 
very rarely get any first-hand information. Here there 
is almost nothing as an alternative to government 
sources. If you go out to try and cross-check stories, 
you’re getting into the realm of espionage.
On the other hand, neither Ruff nor Hanrahan, like many
115
Western journalists in the USSR, speak Russian, which must be 
considered a self-imposed constraint of no small 
significance. The BBC, like many Western news organisations 
in Moscow, only functions by employing Russian interpreters 
to monitor the Soviet press every day. In addition, the 
Soviet news agency TASS produces English texts of all major 
stories.
Western journalists are also isolated by the fact that 
they are required by the Soviet authorities to reside, 
together with diplomats, in special apartment blocks, 
separated from the Soviet population both physically and in 
their life-styles.
The degree to which these kinds of constraints affect the 
journalist clearly depends on the individuals ability and 
inclination to establish the kinds of contacts necessary for 
journalistic work in general. Some correspondents learn 
Russian and acquire a sufficient number of Soviet contacts to 
construct reasonably accurate and reliable stories. 
Inevitably, however, some journalists are better at this 
TroutineT task than others.
There are further bureaucratic and diplomatic constraints 
affecting journalists in the Soviet Union which do not exist 
for foreign correspondents in other countries. The BBC, for 
example, is tightly restricted in the number of personnell it 
can have in Moscow. As a consequence, journalistic staff are 
heavily involved in the day-to-day running of the bureau. 
Peter Ruff explains.
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administrator, psychiatrist, personell officer, . 
accountant and everything else,as well as being a 
journalist. This directs a lot of time away from pure 
journalism and researching stories.
Other bureaucratic constraints include the requirement 
that journalists, if they wish to travel more than forty 
kilometres from the centre of Moscow in order to do a story, 
must ask for permission two days in advance. "And when you 
get there", says Ruff, "whatever you do will be monitored by 
Foreign Ministry binders1, as we call them".
On a working trip they insist on going with you, and 
have a sort of veto on what you do and how you do it - 
not necessarily a political one, but it means that you 
can only do what they allow you to do. You have to plan 
a trip weeks in advance, and when the date comes for 
going there may well be another story keeping you in 
Moscow.
There are technical constraints which inhibit broadcasting 
journalists in Moscow. They are, for example, denied the use 
of direct-dial telephones, which means that calls have to be 
booked in advance, often on poor-quality lines. While this is 
not an insurmountable problem in Moscow, outside the centre 
it may take, according to Ruff, several days for a call to be 
put through, which obviously plays havoc with deadlines and 
schedules back home. This is one important respect in which 
broadcasting journalists are worse off than their press 
colleagues since they cannot, unlike the latter, substitute 
telephones with telexes. The voice of the broadcasting 
journalist must always be heard on the air.
Access to locations for filming and news-sources in 
general can also be problematic, although the experiences of
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travelled to the USSR in order to cover the 27th Congress of 
the CPSU, gave his view that access to Soviet citizens for 
interviewing purposes was relatively easy, provided that they 
themselves were willing to be questioned. John Tusa of the 
BBC, on the other hand, who also went to Moscow for the 27th 
Congress, stated that "you need permission for everything you 
do” .
The extent to which journalists are constrained from 
gathering news on the subject of their choice appears to 
depend on the nature of the request, and on the timing. Most 
of the journalists interviewed agreed that during the 27th 
Congress facilities for news-gathering were relatively good 
by comparison with normal Soviet practice. Here again 
however, the press correspondent enjoys an advantage. He or 
she does not require film with which to illustrate stories, 
in contrast to the needs of the broadcasters. Permission to 
film is more difficult to obtain than permission to do 'vox 
popr or TstickT interviews on the streets of Moscow, and is 
rarely given inside public buildings and a range of other 
locations which might be of interest to television news.
We have already referred to Cultural isolation* as a 
constraint on gathering Soviet news, and its contribution to 
the journalistic tendency to overemphasis the theme of 
dissent. Another possible consequence of cultural isolation 
is a routine reliance on Western diplomatic sources, who thus 
become privileged definers of newsworthy Soviet-related 
events. Martin Walker of The Guardian observes that
118
11C411JT  ^A III J  *A %- *  ^ w* *  ^ _ w — — — W w . -, — j
close to their own Embassies as news-sources, 
particularly as commentary sources, and the embassies - 
certainly the British Embassy these days - tend to 
follow slavishly the American line , the Reagan-Thatcher 
line. The dominant mood amongst the British and the 
Americans is - this is the enemy, you can't trust these 
guys an inch, whatever they're up to it's a trap.
While emphasising that on technical issues Embassy sources 
were frequently valuable and reliable sources of information, 
Walker believes that their political commentaries are 
predictable and biased.
Before I telephone the British Embassy for a comment, I 
know what that commentary is going to be. I can almost 
write it.
The extent to which Western journalists rely on Western 
diplomatic sources for commentary and background to stories 
is clearly a factor in shaping coverage. This reliance may be 
a matter of the journalists1 choice, in which case it 
reflects a form of 'bias' towards some sources rather than 
others. However, it may also be a consequence of constraints 
placed in the path of the journalist by the Soviet 
authorities. This brings us to another important factor in 
the shaping of the content of news about the Soviet Union: 
Soviet information policy and news management.
At the April Plenum of 1 985, the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union first formulated the new information policy 
summarised by the slogan of broad publicity (shirokaya 
glasnost). Recognising that the traditional Soviet reluctance 
to deal with the Western media was counter-productive to the 
objective of having Soviet views reported fairly in the West, 
one of the policyTs aims was to improve the flow of
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The new approach was partly the result of the contribution 
of the Soviet 'Americanists', such as Georgi Arbatov, who 
have studied Western media and understand how it works.
Alexei Pankin, a Western media specialist at the USA-Canada 
Institute, of which Arbatov is the director, says, "we have 
managed to persuade the Foreign Ministry and the other bodies 
that it is important to work with the Western media, to 
inform them, to fill the information-void. We said, if we 
don't do it, somebody else willn. Pankin continues:
In the post-Revolutionary period, the Cold War and 
after, there was very great suspicion of the Western 
media. A great number of Soviets wrote them off,not 
without reason. But people without information try to 
guess things. Now these people realise the importance of 
giving information, and they discuss things in public 
that were never dicussed before.
Izvestia correspondent Stanislav Kondrashov argues:
It's a permanent change. It's the result of a conscious 
decision to give more information. Both to our own 
people and to the West. This is also the principle of 
publicity. The slogan is being put into practice. Of 
course, much must be changed so that there really is 
this broad publicity, because unfortunately the 
bureaucratic habit of closing off information has.formed. 
Nevertheless things are changing, if not so quickly as 
one would like.
In line with the new policy the Soviet authorities 
instituted a system of on-the-record news conferences for 
foreign journalists in Moscow. By contrast, briefings and 
news conferences at the British and American embassies in 
Moscow tend to be off-the-record, and thus non-attributable. 
Peter Ruff of the BBC has noticed a significant change in 
Soviet public relations.
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Andropov decided that the Soviet Union could improve its 
image by using publicity. Gorbachov is really only 
taking that one stage further. Gorbachov saw that the 
only way to tackle the Western propaganda machine, as he 
would put it, was to tackle it head on. You decide what 
your policy is, you announce it officially, you brief on 
it officially. And you could argue that his policy has 
worked. People in the West are now more aware of what 
Soviet policy is, particularly on arms control, than 
they have ever been before, and that*s partly because 
the Soviet Union decided that it was not getting itTs 
message across, quite apart from the rights and wrongs 
of the policy. It is still solid Communist policy, but 
theyTre presenting it differently.
They!ve accepted that the Western media have to be 
drip-fed a certain amount of information.
John Tusa argues that "they tried out [the new information 
policy] at Helsinki [the European Conference on Human 
Rights], the Geneva summit, and discovered that they could 
compete with the Americans. Gorbachev is a man they can 
project, and they understand that they will have a fuller 
presentation of their case if they cooperate with the Western 
media”. Around the 27th Congress, he claimed, "the Soviets 
were very helpful. There was a definite change of policy”.
Nik Gowing, however, argued that there had been "no 
significant change in the approach of the Soviet public 
relations machine to Western correspondents, and accounted 
for the increased q.u an t ± t x of Soviet news in late 85 and 
early 86 by recourse to normal journalistic newsvalues:
"there is so much going on in the Soviet Union at the moment, 
and thus so much more to report”.
As a consequence of these changes the Soviet viewpoint has 
apparently become more attractive as a news source to Western 
journalists, to the extent that the US Embassy in Moscow has 
become seriously concerned. According to Ruff:
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Soviet spokesmen are constantly on the record. They can 
be quoted. The Americans meanwhile, and to some extent 
the British, are clinging on to the old idea of 
background briefings. When you put sets of information 
up against each other, a set of information that has a 
name to it is always better than this weird formula of 
TI understand1 or ’sources tell m e 1, or ’a senior 
diplomat saidT. So the Americans have taken to attacking 
Western correspondents, including their own, for 
reporting the Soviet spokesmen, and that is a serious 
problem behind the scenes.
One illustration of the impact of the new policy can be 
seen in the response of VJestern journalists to Mikhail 
Gorbachev. In sharp contrast to some of the negative images 
of Soviet leaders discussed earlier, the main theme of 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s introduction to the British television 
viewer was his reforming zeal, his youth and his ’’lively 
flexible manner...firm but not at all unreasonable”( 1 2100 
11/3/85) .
Gorbachev was presented on television as a refreshing 
change from the septagenerians who preceded him, although he 
was recognised to be a strict Marxist-Leninist in ideological 
terms, like all Soviet leaders before him.
Gorbachov is still a strict orthodox marxist. In so 
sense has he shown himself to be a liberal. The Soviet 
Union chooses strong leaders to protect Soviet interests 
and Soviet idoleogy, and that’s the man in the Kremlin 
tonight. (4 1900 13/3/85)
Why then, was he not portrayed as ’the new master’, the 
’hardman’, the ’dictator’ ,the ’emperor’ or any of the other 
epithets applied to his predecessors in television news? One 
reason is that Gorbachev looked better than his predecessors, 
but more importantly he understood the Western media in a way 
that they did not. Martin Walker puts it this way:
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Senior Soviet officials are very frank about the sense 
of shame they felt at the succession of elderly invalids 
in the Kremlin. They couldnTt read a speech without 
losing their way, couldn’t stand up without being 
helped, and they think that now they’ve got a reasonably 
attractive, energetic, younger leader, and that changes 
are coming. They’re learning the ropes of the modern 
media age, and to understand that you just have to see 
how Gorbachev appears on TV. There’s never been a 
Soviet leader quite like him in his sense of relaxation 
and readiness.
Patrick Cockburn believes that ’’what’s made 10% of the 
difference, the Soviet leader appears to be a human guy, 
prepared to discuss problems and handle questions, not 
somebody who looks and behaves like a member of the mafia”. 
Gorbachev’s coverage on British television, as elsewhere, 
shows that Soviet news management has an effect on 
television’s ’image of the enemy’. Ironically, one 
journalist’s praise for Gorbachev revealed something of the 
nature of the assumptions, stereotypes and biases which 
underly much Soviet news coverage. Gorbachev was different, 
said this journalist, from ’’the old, grey, predictable style 
of Kremlin leadership”( 1 2100 1 1/3/85).
Just before Christmas when he paid a visit to Britain he 
established himself as a man who was human, when we 
rather expected Soviet leaders to be tough and brutal, 
and capable of cracking jokes when we expected them to 
be humourless...He helped to change our prejudices.
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3_s_ Access to Soviet News.
A large part of television news’ information about the 
Soviet Union is presented in the form of reported statements 
by extra-media sources called upon to comment on the issues.
The importance of such sources lies in their power, by 
virtue of their access to the media, to become prim ary 
definers of events and issues. Their views become privileged 
views. As Hall et al discuss in their Policing the Crisis 
(1978), the routine structures of news media tend to favour 
the powerful in society, representatives of the establishment 
who are assumed to be credible and authoritative sources of 
information.
The primary definers of Soviet news tend to be drawn from 
the political establishment on the one hand, and the academic 
community on the other - the Sovietologists, or 
’Kremlinologists’, who specialise in reading the secretive, 
elaborate codes of Soviet political life. While these experts 
are often authoritative, it cannot be assumed that they 
always are. From his experience as a Moscow correspondent 
Patrick Cockburn argues that "Soviet high politics are 
difficult to report, and Kremlinology - who’s doing what to 
whom in the Kremlin - is impossible".
There’s a journalistic tradition in reporting the Soviet 
Union of not doing the things that are feasible - such 
as reporting how the society works and what are the 
various political balances - but instead concentrating 
on Kremlinology, which really isn’t feasible if the 
information isn’t there. You don’t know enough about 
the personalities, and the strengths of the people in 
the Politburo, or in the apparatus, or in the Central 
Committee, and most of this Kremlinology is absurd 
because the sources of information are wholly 
inadequate.
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long theories based on such inadequate information. When 
you look back at them, you see that most of itfs a load 
of baloney. If you take any straw in the wind, then you 
can produce a sort of fantasy construction of life here, 
but it doesnTt have much meaning.
The 'absurdity* of much Kremlinology in Western journalism 
is sometimes evident in British television news, as the 
following example, taken from our 'routine* news sample, 
illustrates.
On May 24th, 1983 Vladimir Danchev, a Radio Moscow 
newscaster, in the course of a routine English-language 
broadcast, "branded Soviet troops [in Afghanistan] as 
aggressors and praised the Afghan guerrilla forces for their 
activity against Soviet forces"(4 1900 24/5/83). According to 
the Channel 4 correspondent, "the mystifying broadcasts are 
short. They started when newsreader Vladimir Danchev made a
single unprecedended announcement. Tribal leaders, he said, 
were appealing for increased anti-Soviet activity". Excerpts 
from Mr Danchev's broadcasts were played on the news, such as 
the following:
Reports from Kabul say that tribes living in the eastern 
provinces Nangahar and Baktia have joined the struggle 
against the Soviet invaders. A decision to give an armed 
rebuff to the bandits was given at the tribes1 meeting.
The correspondent noted that it was "extraordinary" for
the Kremlin's personal mouthpiece to the world to admit 
publicly that the Russians had invaded Afghanistan...And 
it wasn't just a slip of the tongue... it could surely 
not have been a mistake or personal deviation.
The report ended by posing the following choice:
was it a mistake, was it Mr Danchev daydreaming as he
i
I
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propaganda broadcasts?
BBC1 reported that "the propaganda voice of the Kremlin 
has gone haywire"(1 2100 24/5/83). The correspondent asked if 
it was "a signal from the KGB that a change in policy on 
Afghanistan was coming?. Hardly", opined the correspondent. 
"The Kremlin would never approve words so shocking to Soviet 
ears" .
All the more surprising then, that ITN should have allowed 
Soviet 'expert* Leo Babedz to make sense of the event in 
terms of a Kremlin power struggle. News at Ten that evening 
began:
A series of Moscow Radio broadcasts praising the Afghan 
rebels who are fighting Russian troops are thought 
tonight to indicate a power struggle in the Kremlin(3 
2200 24/5/83).
The evidence for this interpretation came from "experts on 
Soviet affairs" who "have ruled out an unofficial protest. 
Instead they put it down to disagreement between Soviet 
leader Mr Andropov and Mr Chernenko, the man he beat for 
Brezhnev's job". It was not made clear how Danchev's 
statements could have been of help to a Soviet leader 
involved in a "power struggle", and there was no evidence 
presented for a connection between Danchev and "the Kremlin". 
The 'power struggle* theory became nevertheless, the favoured 
explanation.
Correspondent: Are you saying that this is some kind of 
back-stabbing operation?
Leo Babedz (Soviet expert): It looks like it, but of 
course we don't know who is the person who is going to 
be blamed for it, and whether it has a really high
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Correspondent: Presumeably it is quite high, otherwise 
it wouldn't be allowed to happen?
Leo Babedz: Otherwise it wouldn't be allowed to go out, 
of course.
The journalist has taken on the expert's definition of the 
problem without question.
The story was never followed up on television news. Three 
years later the correspondent who covered the story for ITN 
told the author that Danchev had reportedly been re-employed 
by Radio Moscow after a brief spell of recuperation in a 
psychiatric ward. While this explanation was recognised as a 
possibility in News at Ten's coverage at the time, it was 
written off in favour of the elaborate conspiracy theory 
outlined by Babedz which became, for all its lurid 
Archeresque quality, the dominant explanation of the event.
Coverage of the deaths of the Soviet leaders provides an 
oportunity to examine the structure of access to Soviet news 
in some detail. Table 3.3 shows who appeared as 'definers* 
during this coverage. The great majority were members of the 
political establishment, and in particular the political 
establishment of the United States. Of the 20 individuals who 
appeared on the sampled main evening news bulletins (and 
several of these appeared on more than one occasion within a 
single bulletin) nine were past or present members of the 
American government, and eight of the British political 
establishment (see table 3.3a).
There were a further three appearances: one by an American 
academic on the issue of Star Wars; one by the American
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industrialist Armand Hammer who spoke about meeting Brezhnev; 
and one by a Soviet politician.
This structure of access was also apparent on the minority 
audience programmes (see table 3.3b) although the views of 
political leaders were supplemented to a greater degree by 
academics and other specialist commentators.
The statements of Western political leaders contained 
condolences, calls for better behaviour from the Soviet 
leadership in future, and statements of sincere Western 
interest in improved relations - reflecting as one would 
expect, the currently dominant view on the problem as being 
one induced by the USSR. However, the tone of statements 
changed with the fluctuating state of East-West relations.
Mrs Thatcher for example, who did not attend the Brezhnev 
funeral, was reported on that occasion as "being likely to 
call for genuine evidence that the Russians are serious about 
multilateral disarmaments 1 2100 1 1/1 1/82). In Moscow for the 
Andropov funeral her comments were noticeably less combative, 
while comments made after her meeting with Gorbachev at the 
Chernenko funeral were made in a tone which could almost have 
been described as affectionate.
Journalist: Do you still like Gorbachev?
Thatcher: Of course. I respect him. He's very able, and 
on that basis, yes, we can do business.(1 2100 13/3/85)
Former members of the political establishment were asked 
to give their views on the personalities of the dead leader, 
on the succession, and also to give their prognoses for 
future East-West relations. Harold Wilson spoke of how
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Brezhnev had been a "moderate man", while David Owen said 
that "no-one should think he was a moderate man". Former 
President Richard Nixon was reported on two main evening 
bulletins, without any apparent sense of irony.
As a Russian he said Hr Brezhnev was warm, effusive, 
ebullient. As a communist, he was a ruthless schemer and 
a relentless aggressor.(1 2100 11/1 1/82)
Table 3.3a A ppearances on news, coverage o£ the deaths of 
Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko.
Main news.
Name Status Number of
appearances
Ronald Reagan President, USA 6
Margaret Thatcher Prime Minister, UK 5
George Bush Vice President, USA 3
George Schultz US Secretary of State 2
Geoffrey Howe UK Foreign Secretary 2
Edward Djeripan US State Dep Spokesman 1
Richard Burt US Ass Sec of State 1
Jimmy Carter Ex President, USA 2
Henry Kissinger Ex Sec of State, USA 3
Zbigniew Brzezinski Ex National Security Adviser 1
James Callaghan Ex Prime Minister, UK 2
Harold Wilson Ex Prime Minister, UK 1
Neil Kinnock Opposition leader 3
David Owen Ex Foreign Secretary, UK 4
David Steel Leader, Liberal Party 1
Denis Healey Ex Foreign Secretary, UK 1
Vladimir Scherbitsky Politburo Member, CPSU 1
Professor Henry Kendall Mass. Institute of Technology 1
Armand Hammer Head, Occidental Petroleum 1
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Name Status Number of
Appearances
Ronald Reagan US President
Henry Kissinger Ex Sec of State, USA 
Arkady Shevchenko Soviet Defector
Karen Dawisha Sovietologist
James Callaghan Ex PM, UK
Vladimir Dunaev Soviet commentator
Zhores Medvedev Emigre
Alex Pravda Sovietologist
Neil Kinnock Labour leader
Francis Pym Foreign Sec
Denis Healey Ex Defence Sec
David Steel Liberal leader
David Owen Ex Foreign Sec
Z. Brzezinski Ex Nat Sec adviser
Paul Warnke SALT II negotiator
George Schultz US Sec of State
John Berryman Academic
Peter Frank Soviet expert
Sam Donaldson Washington correspondent, ABC news
Soviet speaker CPSU CC member
Clayborne Pell US Senator
Michael Kaser Sovietologist
Geoffrey Stern Sovietologist
Archie Brown Sovietologist
Dimitri Simes Soviet emigre
Sir Curtis Keeble Ex UK Ambassador
George Walden MP
Nathaniel Davis EX US Diplomat
Vladimir Posner Soviet commentator
3
4
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
2
2
3
1
2
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
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nr creznnev was a rutmess scnemer wno wanted tne world 
but did not want war.(3 2200 1 1/11/82)
Coverage of Brezhnev‘s death included an interview with 
Armand Hammer, the American industrialist. His inclusion as 
an expert was explained in the following way.
Newscaster: Dr Hammer has been going to Russia since 
1921 when he persuaded Lenin to trade Russian furs for 
American grain. He was one of the very few outsiders to 
get a glimpse of President Brezhnev's private life, and 
he for one liked what he saw.
Hammer: He was a warm-hearted man. He was very human. I 
dined with him, I spent the weekend with him at Yalta, I 
came away with the impression that he was a great force 
for peace and that he would give his life for peace, as 
he told me with tears in his eyes.(3 2200 1 1/1 1/82)
Reported statements on the death of Chernenko revealed 
some consensus that Gorbachev was a significant departure 
from ‘the old style1 of Kremlin leader. Neil Kinnock who had 
met Gorbachev stated that he was "sharp, bright, and he 
enjoys an argument". David Owen spoke of a "pretty sharp 
intellect" and, as we have seen, even Mrs Thatcher had praise 
for him.
Former leaders also ‘advised1 current ones on how to 
proceed with the new Soviet administration. Following 
Brezhnev's death former US President Jimmy Carter warned the 
West that the Soviets would engage in a period of 
"propaganda" struggle to convince the world that it was they 
and not the United States who were interested in nuclear 
disarmament.
Some statements were clearly within the hawkish, 
conservative framework for understanding East-West relations, 
such as that made by Carter's former National Security
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Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who advised President Reagan not 
to go to the funeral of Yuri Andropov because "Andropov 
doesn't deserve it. He wasn't a major figure, he was a 
nominal figure. He was also involved in some rather 
unpleasant business and therefore the President should not 
go"(1 2100 10/2/84).
Other statements reflected what we identified in Chapter 2 
as the 'pragmatic* framework for understanding East-West 
relations. British Prime Minister James Callaghan advised the 
present NATO leaders to tread softly with the Soviet 
government in its period of transition and avoid the 
emergence of a "hardliner".
One reported statement from this group of past and present 
leaders represented the view that, contrary to the claims of 
Western governments, the West was at least partly responsible 
for the crisis. This point was made by Denis Healey, former 
British Defence Secretary, in relation to Yuri Andropov.
It's fair to say that Andropov tried very hard to 
improve relations both with China and with the West. He 
failed because neither took the hand offered out.(3 2200 
10/2/84)
On the minority-audience Newsnieht programme one of the 
academic commentators, Geoffrey Stern of the London School of 
Economics, echoed Denis Healey's interpretation of the 
Andropov period by suggesting that it had been the West and 
not the Soviet Union which had prevented the improvement of 
East-West relations. According to Stern:
There were- a whole proliferation of proposals on arms 
control. He warmed to the Chinese. There might have been
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when he came up against an intransigent world that he 
became intransigent too. There was no movement in the 
West, and therefore no movement in the East either.(2 
Newsnight 14/2/84).
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the structure of 
access to Soviet news is the relative exclusion of soviet 
sources. During the sample period main evening bulletins 
completely excluded Soviet opinion from news about Brezhnev, 
Andropov and Chernenko, with one exception which counts for 
the purposes of this analysis only in so far as a Soviet 
voice was heard to speak. Politburo member Vladimir 
Scherbitsky, head of a Soviet delegation visiting the United 
States when Konstantin Chernenko's death was announced, 
appeared in one bulletin in the following context.
Correspondent: Not many Russians make it to the Oval 
Office to talk to President Reagan but when Politburo 
member Vladimir Scherbitsky did last week his central 
message was reserved for Star Wars, as he told us 
afterwards.
Scherbitsky: We tried to prove that this is not 
worthwhile. (3 2200 11/3/85)
This was the only statement by a Soviet source to be 
broadcast on main evening news at any time during coverage of 
the deaths of the Soviet leaders. On the minority audience 
programmes two interviews with Soviet commentators were 
broadcast: one in ITN's Channel 4 studio with Vladimir Dunaev 
on the death of Brezhnev, and one with Vladimir Posner after 
the funeral of Chernenko, via satellite from Moscow.
The reasons for the relative lack of Soviet opinion in 
Soviet news can be related to two factors. One is the 
assumption that the Soviets are not legitimate sources of
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broadcasters during the Chernobyl crisis, when the appearance 
of Soviet commentators on television news coverage prompted 
the claim from certain political groups that it was not 
appropriate for these views to be allowed to take part in US 
political debate[11].
Another explanation focusses on the reluctance of the 
Soviet authorities to provide commentators as and when 
required by the broadcasters: in short, failures in Soviet 
news management. Questioned as to the reason for the relative 
lack of Soviet commentators at periods when their point of 
view might be of some importance to a fuller understanding of 
events, John Tusa of BBC news told the author that interviews 
with them take too long to "set up" on British television. 
They could, he said, take up to two days to arrange.
In so far as the non-availability of Soviet sources has 
affected television news coverage of the Soviet view it is 
clearly a factor over which the Soviets themselves have 
control. As we saw in the previous section the Soviets are 
becoming increasingly conscious of the negative effects of 
their traditional way of dealing with the Western media, and 
have begun to remedy the problem. From the period of the 1985 
Geneva summit viewers report that there are more Soviet 
commentators appearing on British television news, an 
observation perhaps related to the fact that more Soviet 
commentators are being made available in line with the new 
information policy which has accompanied the ascension of 
Mikhail Gorbachov to the leadership of the Party. Soviet 
sources may be gaining increasing access to Western media,
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including British television news, because of the new 
approach to public relations and news management. If this is 
so however, it remains largely confined to minority-audience 
programming. Furthermore, journalists retain the power to 
intervene, to mediate in the presentation of the Soviet view, 
as NewsnightTs interview with Vladimir Posner illustrates. 
Posner speaks fluent English with a disconcertingly accurate 
North American accent. He has appeared several times on 
Newsnight, and on this occasion was asked to comment on 
Gorbachov^ speech at the funeral. In the structuring of the 
question it can be seen that the definition of the issue 
provided by Western leaders is already a Tgiven* for the 
interviewer.
At this time NATO leaders were presenting the 
deterioration of East-West relations to a concerned Western 
public as a Soviet problem, and suggesting that the Soviet 
Union was to blame for the new cold war. As we have seen an 
alternative interpretation of the problem was available, 
articulated on the news by Denis Healey and Geoffrey Stern. 
They argued that Andropov had been responsible for f,a 
proliferation” of arms control proposals, that he had ”held 
out the hand of friendship”, but that the West had refused to 
accept it.
This alternative to the dominant interpretation of the 
problem was foreclosed in the structure of the Posner 
interview, which began with the interviewer inquiring of 
Posner if ”a more conciliatory approach” could be expected 
from the new leader. The journalist takes for granted what
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and attempts to have Posner answer from within this 
framework.
Journalist: I asked [Posner] if Mr Gorbachev's emphasis 
today on goodneighbourly relations [in his funeral 
oration to Konstantin Chernenko] meant that he would 
adopt a. m ore conciliatory approach to the W est than his 
predecessors have been doing?
The question assumes that a lack of conciliation on the 
Soviet side has been a feature of recent East-West relations, 
closing off alternative definitions of the issue. Posner, 
however, refuses to be restricted to this framework.
Posner: You know, I think that if you look back on the 
people you call his predecessors, to begin with Mr 
Brezhnev, during his period we had detente in the early 
70s, followed by Mr Andropov who was clearly interested 
in preserving detente and having good relations with the 
West, and of course Mr Chernenko who followed the same 
line. I don't think that what Mr Gorbachev said was 
anything sensational or surprising. This country, 
indeed, always wanted and very much desires good, 
normal, business-like relations with the West.(2 
Newsnight 13/3/85)
The experience of one group of Soviet experts recently 
invited to contribute to a British current affairs programme 
also shows that access is not the only factor in determining 
the presentation of the Soviet view.
On the eve of the 1985 Geneva summit BBCs Panorama 
programme invited some Soviet experts to discuss the issues. 
According to two of those experts, the programme-makers 
applied a questionable editing approach to the material. As 
Alexei Pankin, one of those interviewed for the programme, 
put it to the author in Moscow:
We think they did a very good job. It's just their
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they made us conform to their mindset. Our own 
impression is that the message we tried to give in 
numerous interviews was somewhat different from the 
message we gave on the air.
First of all we had each to give a short 
presentation, speaking for about ten minutes on the 
subject of the United States, speaking about our views 
on its values, its achievements, how we feel, and I 
would say we were very positive. But certainly, each of 
us also said something to balance that, some negative 
comments. They cut the positive comments in general, and 
put as background over our negative comments Soviet 
military parades in Red Square, Soviet troops entering 
Afghanistan,so that it formed a rather sinister 
impression - over pictures of Soviet troops entering 
Afghanistan we were heard speaking of America as a 
country of joblessness, of poverty, lack of spiritual 
values, and so on.
The routine structure of access to news about the Soviet 
Union favours establishment opinion and tends to exclude 
Soviet sources. However, minority-audience programmes are 
relatively open to competing viewpoints when compared with 
the main evening.bulletins, in the sense suggested by
Schlesinger et al when they note that "some types of 
programming are relatively closed. They operate mainly or 
wholly within the terms of reference set by the official 
perspective. But other forms are relatively open in the sense 
that they provide spaces in which the core assumptions of the 
official perspective can be interrogated and contested, and 
in which other perspectives can be presented and 
examined”( 1983, p.32). These authors refer to the entire 
range of televisual forms,including fictional ones, but a 
similar distinction can be made within news programming. We 
will have occasion to note this feature of coverage elsewhere 
in the study, and it can be illustrated here with two 
examples.
Channel 4's coverage of the death of Chernenko
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counterposed the views of two experts to construct a debate 
about the nature of the USSR. The journalist ’set up1 the 
debate by acknowledging that
In the West therefs often open disagreement about how 
the nature of the Soviet system should be perceived.
Firstly, the viewer heard the opinions of Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, a conservative and a firm believer in the basic 
illegitimacy and inevitable downfall of the Soviet E m p i r e 1.
Zbigniew Brzezinski: The Soviet system is in crisis... 
the Soviet empire is nearing the end of its days, and I 
think it behoves us to find ways of making that end 
gradual and peaceful rather than explosive.
Brzezinski’s views were tbalancedt with those of the 
British academic Peter Frank.
Peter Frank: The Soviet Union is not in a state of
crisis... it has very serious problems. I think,
however, the same could be said of any major power in 
the world.(4 1900 1 1/3/85)
Another example of a similary-structured item, in which 
negative perceptions of the Soviet Union were constructed as 
matters for debate rather than of fact, fell outside the main 
sample period.
On October 18th 1983, as the Geneva INF talks between the 
superpowers were entering their final and ultimately 
unproductive phase BBC’s Newsnight broadcast a report on the
debate about the Soviet Threat, and how this related to the
impending Cruise and Pershing deployments. The item concerned 
the publication of two new books about the Soviet Union which 
in different ways criticised perceptions of the Soviet
138
11X1 c a  vv \J i  -L \jl i u  w j kj j  u  v ^ /n a  i / i i a i i  k-» u  ^  j .  j  c t u u  1  x n i  v ^ a  u   ^ jr
Andrew Cockburn. Steeled book considered the extent of the 
Threat in terms of the nature of the constraints on and the 
history of Soviet foreign policy. CockburnTs work examined 
the technical and organisational limitations of the Soviet 
military. One author argued that Soviet intentions were not 
as aggressive as sometimes claimed; the other argued that the 
Soviet ability to carry aggressive intentions into practice 
was overstated. These works became the basis for an item in 
which "through the eyes of these authors and with the help of 
a Soviet general and a leading British expert on Russia, we 
explore the case for regarding the Russians as perhaps less 
of a threat than they*re sometimes made out to be".(2 
Newsnight 18/10/83).
The *leading British expert* was Professor John Erickson 
of Edinburgh University, and the Soviet general was Lt- 
General Mikhail Milstein, visiting Britain with the Soviet 
delegation to the Edinburgh Conversations of 1983.
The presenter began by outlining two competing views of 
the Soviet Union. First, "the current perception of the 
Soviet Union as depicted for us by those at present in charge 
in Washington and London".
a very massive and threatening military power, 
stretching from Central Europe to the extremes of Asia, 
poised to exploit any opportunities for expansion.
This view was contrasted with another, "looking from 
the inside outwards", and of which "we hear much less these 
days":
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Russia’s own internal problems and encircled by a whole 
range of external threats to their security. The Chinese 
in the east, the unsettled Muslims to the south, and the 
Afghans still unbeaten. Beyond that the Americans 
deploying massively in the Indian Ocean.To the west, 
beyond their own recalcitrant allies in eastern Europe, 
a whole ring of the West’s nuclear and conventional 
systems pointing at them from Turkey around to northern 
Norway.
The item proceeded with a critical examination of the 
views of "those at present in charge”. This was done firstly 
in relation to the specific theme of the INF debate. On the 
one hand, explained the journalist, "the first pictures of 
Cruise and Pershing missiles exercising, not in America as up 
to now but in Western Europe will be reckoned a victory of 
sorts by many Western dimplomats: a victory for NATO 
solidarity; a victory over the protesters; a victory over 
Soviet propaganda”. On the other, suggested John Erickson to 
the journalist, "this deployment marks a very serious change 
in the general East-West situation". Jonathan Steele gave an 
account of the Soviet response to the deployments: "I think 
they will feel that it shows the West is on the warpath 
against them rhetorically, diplomatically, economically and 
every other way... it will generally convince them that the 
West still cannot seem to understand their aims and 
intentions".
Journalist: And what about the political perception that 
the Soviets have and will have after this break of the 
West, when they hear the kind of thing that President 
Reagan and Mrs Thatcher say about their intentions?
Erickson: I think they will argue that all the talk 
about arms control and arms negotiation is hypocritical 
nonsense, or as Mr Andropov said, ’it’s prattle*. In 
other words we intend to go ahead unilaterally with a 
very considerable rearmament programme come what may. We 
will wriggle out of, ignore, deride or denounce what the 
Russians regard as serious arms control proposals. What
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are uney to maKe 01 t m s r  uoes it mean tnat negotiation 
is ruled out completely and that they must deal with 
ideologically implacable opponents?
These opinions were utilised in the construction of "a 
very different view” of Soviet military power (different from 
the dominant view). Soviet military power was contextualised 
in terms of Soviet history (the Second World War and the 
German invasion) and Soviet defence needs in the contemporary 
world.
Journalist: The first principle of Soviet security and
strategy is that noone ever again shall be allowed to 
inflict on Russia the disaster that HitlerTs armies 
inflicted in the last war. To those who take a 
sympathetic view of Soviet intentions, if it seems that 
theyfre rearming excessively and overinsuring against 
any conceivable attack this is partly an overreaction to 
their failure to stop the Germans sooner. The Kremlin is 
not going to be surprised again.
Jonathan Steele: They*re basically concerned with 
national security, meaning the defence of their own 
territory... if you look at history since Stalin died 
the Russians have hardly expanded anywhere, not by 
contrast with some of the things the West has done in 
the Third World. They actually are quite cautious, 
they*re quite restrained and they do draw a very clear 
distinction between the immediate geographical zone of 
their borders - Afghanistan is a border country - and 
the rest of the world which they see as much less 
interesting to them and of much less high priority in 
strategic terms.
Asked by the journalist if Western leaders "exaggerate 
Soviet military capability?" defence expert Andrew Cockburn, 
giving examples from the Soviet tank forces and navy, replied 
that "our general image of Soviet military power doesnTt 
really correspond to the reality when you look at it close 
up".
The item then moved on to an interview with the 
Conservative MP George Walden, who criticised the Thatcher
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think is rather lamentable is that it's about eight years 
since a serving British Prime Minister has been to Moscow”. 
The item ended by giving the Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe 
an opportunity to respond to the points which had gone 
before.
By accessing British and Soviet sources with views 
different to those of current political leaders, this item 
created a space in which the dominant Soviet threat framework 
for making sense of defence and disarmament issues could be 
contested.
It, and the other counter-examples referred to in this 
chapter, provide a clear demonstration that television news 
can be structured so as to be open to radically opposing 
viewpoints, even on the most basic Soviet threat assumptions. 
This does not necessitate the inclusion of Soviet sources, 
since there are many within the establishment who also 
challenge the perspective of current Western leaders. It 
merely requires a recognition that Currently dominant views1 
are open to question.
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1. Leonid Brezhnev died on November 10th, 1982. His death was 
reported on November 11th, his funeral on November 15th. Yuri 
Andropov died on February 10th, 1984, and his funeral took 
place on February 14th. Konstantin Chernenko died on March 
11th, 1985, and his funeral took place on March 13th.
2. In the Soviet context such stories often produce a 
secondary narrative about Soviet society. In the following 
examples the Volga River incident became a story about how 
”the Russians” respond to disasters (we will note here that 
the tendency in the West to say 'Russians1 when referring to 
the Soviets is also apparent in television news).
The fact that it was announced at all and so soon after 
the event suggests that it was a disaster of major 
proportions.(1 2100 6/6/83)
ITN also interpreted the seriousness of the incident in 
terms what was at that time, the Soviet policy of not 
reporting disasters. Soviet news agencies have traditionally 
been reluctant to report Tbad news1 in the form of disasters 
and misfortune. Some quite major catastrophes, such as an 
incident on the Moscow Metro in 1985 which killed several 
hundred people, have never been reported in the USSR. Airline 
crashes have been announced only if foreign citizens are 
among the casualties. Recently however, following pressure 
from Soviet public opinion heightened by the Chernobyl 
disaster, this policy has shown signs of change.
3. The commentaries which accompany this visual material 
often make sense of it in terms of currently topical 
political issues. BBC's coverage of the 1982 May Day parade 
used the event to construct a story about Soviet support for 
Argentina in the Falklands conflict, then the dominant news 
story in Britain. BBCI's lunchtime bulletin reported that 
"some hints about what the Russians think of the Falklands 
conflict emerged at the May Day parade in Moscow this 
morning”( 1250 1/5/82). Over Soviet-supplied film of the 
event, the Moscow correspondent gave the following 
commentary:
Whatever battles might or might not be going on in the 
Falklands, 'Peace to the World1 was one of the 84 
official slogans in today's Red Square parade. The 
Soviet Communist Party announces these slogans weeks in
advance every year and every year they duly and 
ritualistically appear as thousands of Russians march 
past the tomb of Lenin. From the top of the mausoleum as 
usual the members of the ruling Politburo watched the 
proceedings. The emphasis was on the power of the
workers, not, as in the November Red Square parade, on
military might.
With the Falklands crisis now in mind one of today's 
slogans had more immediate topicality perhaps than the 
PartyTs propagandists realised when they drafted it: 
'Warm greetings to the peoples of Latin America who are 
fighting against imperialism and reaction1. That's the
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Falklands crisis. Mrs Thatcher is accused of hysteria 
and of trying to save face. Britain is accused of trying 
to shore up the decrepit foundations of colonialism. 
BritainTs NATO allies are accused of supporting Britain 
in open economic and military blackmail. The Americans 
in particular are accused of furtively plotting to take 
control of the Falklands. But while Britain, America and 
NATO are painted as villains suggestions that the Soviet 
Union itself might be trying to take advantage of the 
Falklands conflict are dismissed as Absolutely 
groundless rumours1 and Anti-Soviet tales from 
Washington1.
The theme of Soviet support for Argentina dominated BBCA 
coverage of the event throughout the day, although the 
offending slogan, by the correspondentA own admission, was 
only one of 84 slogans, all of which had been drafted weeks 
before the invasion of the Falklands.
ITNA coverage of the parade adopted an entirely different 
newsangle. Over the film the newscaster reported that 
"President Brezhnev looked well despite recent speculation 
about his health. He smiled and waved throughout the 90 
minute parade". It was also noted that "for the third year 
running the celebrations were boycotted by most Western 
ambassadors as a protest against RussiaA involvement in 
Afghanistan"(3 2200 1/5/82).
4. In the interview which followed SolzhenitsynA remarks 
about Avil communism1, Appressed millions1, etc., pass 
without qualification by the journalist.
Journalist: Well I met Solzhenitsyn in his hotel room 
this morning. I asked him first if he agrees with 
President Reagan that the Soviet Union is a centre of 
evil.
Solzhenitsyn: One shouldn!t say simply the Soviet Union. 
First of all, in the Soviet Union there are millions of 
oppressed people. They dream only of getting rid of 
oppression. I t A  not the Soviet Union which is the 
centre of evil but the Politburo. There are as many 
centres of evil as there are centres of communism - 
Peking, Cuba, and with the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, 
thereA no less a degree of evil than in the Politburo.
Journalist: Was it a mistake for the West to rely so 
exclusively on the nuclear umbrella for its defence 
against the Soviet Union?
Solzhenitsyn: To understand this one has to go back. In 
the early 20s all educated Russians fled to the West. 
They spoke of incredible events, but the West paid no 
attention. No support was given to the Russian peopleA 
resistance. Then 50 years ago Soviet ships arrived here 
loaded with logs. Prisoners wrote on them in blood about 
Solovky camps. But you paid no attention - you used the 
logs and listened to Bernard Shaw. 40 years ago a new 
wave of immigrants came to the West. They told exactly
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tne same story, wo-one listened. tven worse, trie wesu 
betrayed and deported them, they were sent back to the 
Soviet Union and were massacred. 30 years ago Kravchenko 
went to Paris and published his revealing book. The West 
preferred to listen to Bertrand Russell. Seven to nine 
years ago I tried to give the West political advice. 
Nobody cared. I believe this political role of mine is 
over. You said, OK - weTll cover ourselves with this 
nuclear umbrella. Alright, in the 40s and 50s the 
umbrella covered you. Now you see what it*s turned into. 
ThereTs no more umbrella. It's out of your hands and you 
face an even stronger threat.
Journalist: What is your judgment of the peace movement 
in the West, with its response to this overwhelming fear 
of nuclear war?
Solzhenitsyn: I don't believe that demonstrators against 
nuclear weapons demonstrate exclusively against them. I 
believe they demonstrate against any struggle. They 
don't want a struggle at all. No service in the army. 
They don't want any burden. They've decided it's better 
to be red than dead. You think Russell was right.
ThereTs no alternative - red or dead. Actually red also 
means dead. Exactly like lobsters thrown into boiling 
water.
Journalist: Do you think that because Mr. Andropov has 
taken over the Soviet Union that there is any particular 
likelihood ofinternal change there?
Solzhenitsyn: The West's naive. It doesn't want to 
achieve peace through its own efforts. The West wants a 
miracle to happen - for example in the Kremlin. The 
newspapers are full of such guesses. First this one, 
then that. Hawks or doves? As long as the communists run 
the Soviet Union it doesn't matter. Pay no attention to 
names. It will always be the same. Is change possible? 
Yes it is, but as a result of a change in the spirit of 
the nation, not because one communist succeeds another.
5. All statements in the text attributed to journalists were 
obtained in interviews conducted by the author in Moscow and 
London, unless otherwise stated.
6. Unless otherwise stated, all emphases are the author's 
own.
7. One important development in the crisis was not covered on 
television news. The Guardian on May 30th reported that:
the danger of war between Syria and Israel receded 
yesterday after what many sources believed was Soviet 
intervention to stop the sabre-rattling by Damascus... 
because the Soviet Union was afraid that the 
confrontation with Israel was spiralling out of control.
The end of a crisis, with the possibility of a Soviet 
contribution to peace, was not newsworthy. The beginning of
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one, witn "Kussia" cast as arms supplier ana trouDiemaKer, 
w a s .
8. Coverage of the White Paper shows how, within certain 
limits, usually those defined as legitimate by the military- 
political establishment, existing defence policy can be 
challenged. Indeed, when a branch of the services feels 
itself to be under threat from the Government it positively 
encourages media debate. If however, arguments about cuts in 
the Navy or the design faults of new aircraft are present in 
news, challenges to the underlying concept of the Soviet 
threat are beyond discussion in the great proportion of 
television coverage - the Soviet threat exists in the realm 
of 'consensus'.
9. For a detailed analysis of television news coverage of 
the Falklands conflict, see War and Peace News by the Glasgow 
Media Group (1985).
10. An interesting footnote to this concerns the Soviet 
allegation that Tim Sebastian, Brian Hanrahan's predecessor 
as BBC correspondent in Moscow, worked for the CIA. the 
allegation came in a news conference given by Oleg Tumanov in 
Moscow.
Tumanov, until his 'redefection1 to the USSR, had been 
Editor of the Russian service of Freedom/Radio Free Europe, a 
station with major CIA connections. In the course of the news 
conference Tumanov claimed that Western journalists based in 
Moscow were working for the CIA. There was laughter in the 
hall, according to a report in the Soviet weekly New Times 
(no.1 9, 1986). Tumanov then asked the assembled foreign 
journalists:
Do you want me to name one of your Moscow colleagues with 
whom I was working at the radio station? Do you want me 
to?
They did, and he named one:
Tim Sebastian, the BBC correspondent. He visited our 
headquarters in Munich and gave us information. He 
received unreliable information from me personally and I, 
like all the operatives at Freedom/Radio Free Europe, 
was connected with the CIA.
Sebastian was expelled from the USSR in September 1985, 
along with other British journalists and diplomats.
11. ABC's Nightline in the United States, writes Christopher 
Hitchens in the Spectator of May 10th, 1986, "is particularly 
good at getting Russians on the air, a facility which has in 
the past enraged the White House. Vladimir Posner and Georgi 
Arbatov, says Pat Buchanan, are not fit participants in the 
American national debate".
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Appendix 3.1. Main news coverage of the death and funeral of 
Leonid Brezhnev on BBC 1 and ITV.
The following texts present full versions of main news 
items covering the death and funeral of Leonid Brezhnev. In 
form and structure they are representative of coverage of the 
deaths of all three Soviet leaders. Coverage comprised of a) 
accounts of the event itself, b) accounts of the dead 
leader’s career and significance as a world leader, c) 
accounts of international reaction, and d) speculation on the 
process of succession to the Soviet leadership. Around these 
themes journalists ’spoke’ to the viewer about Soviet society 
and life, and accessed a range of extra-media sources.
Items on November 11th, 1982, when Brezhnev’s death was 
announced, began with introductory sections which show this 
structure in outline.
BBC 1 2100 11/11/82
a) Introductions.
Newscaster:President Brezhnev, ruler of 
Russia for nearly two decades, is dead.
For the Soviet people tonight, five 
days of mourning begin.
For the leaders who have grown old in his 
shadow , the chance of ultimate power.
For President Reagan the hope of a new 
start for East-West relations.
Good evening. Tonight we’ll be reporting 
from Moscow, London and Washington on the 
death of a man w h o ’s dominated the 
communist world for so long. We examine 
his life and his legacy and ask, who will 
take over? Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, 
arguably the most powerful man in the 
world is dead. He’d ruled Russia for 18 
years. For most of that time he was 
undisputed leader of 260 million people 
in the Soviet Union and controlled the 
d e s t i n y  of 1 2 0  m i l l i o n  
others in Russia’s eastern empire. He 
held all the reins of power.
He was party leader, head of state, 
marshal of the Soviet Army. Despite 
declining health, his grip on power never 
weakened. Heoutlastedfive American 
presidents.
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He died at the age of 75 yesterday 
morning. He apparently had a heart attack 
as he got out of bed at his flat in 
central Moscow. The news of his death was 
delayed for more than 2 4 hours, then the 
official announcement said ’he would live 
for ever in the hearts of progressive 
mankind’. The state funeral will be on 
Monday.
President Brezhnev made his last 
appearance on Sunday at the traditional 
Red Square parade to mark the anniversary 
of the 1917 revolution. He had not looked 
well for several years but there was no 
indication his reign had less than three 
days left to run.
There is no single obvious successor. The 
posts held by Brezhnev are likely to be 
divided amongst the leading contenders. 
Meantime President Brezhnev’s place in 
history is assured. The man who advocated 
disarmament yet presided over the biggest 
military build-up the world has ever 
seen; the man who embraced detente, but 
made sure democratic stirrings in his own 
empire were crushed; our first report 
tonight from John Osman in Moscow.
Correspondent: Respectfully wearing a
dark suit, a television newsreader 
announced to the Soviet Union that 
President Brezhnev had died, a day after 
the event.
Soviet television announcer: The
Communist Party Central Committee, the 
Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Council 
of Ministers, deeply regret to announce 
the sudden death at 8.30am on the 10th of 
November, of Central Committee member 
secretary and President of the Soviet 
Presidium, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev. The 
name of Brezhnev, true continuer of 
Lenin’s great cause and ardent champion 
of peace and communism will live forever 
in the hearts of the Soviet people and 
all progressive mankind.
Crr: The fact of the death seemed to
take time to sink in. In Red Square 
people at first doubted that the man who 
had led this country for 20 years had 
gone. There was muted reaction and 
Western correspondents asking Russians 
questions about it were themselves 
greeted with questions.
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At factories and workplaces the communist 
party told the people what had happened, 
and slowly the i m p l i c a t i o n s  were 
absorbed. A member of the BBC’s Russian 
staff here was telephoned by her mother 
who had trudged miles through muddy 
country lanes to put in a call and ask: 
is it true?
Well it is,now there are plans on the 
grand scale for a state funeral. Mr 
Brezhnev will be buried in the shadow of 
the Kremlin walls on Monday and his 
remains will lie in state from tomorrow. 
Guns will be fired at the moment of the 
burial in all the capitals of the 15 
separate republics which form the Soviet 
Union. All work will stop for 5 minutes, 
and for 3 minutes factories, railway 
trains, ships and river vessels will 
sound sirens and hooters in a massive 
Soviet wail of mourning. Schools will be 
closed. Meanwhile the last uncompromising 
words of the dead leader delivered just 
last Sunday at a Kremlin reception have 
pointedly been repeated in a statement 
from the new leadership, including 
Brezhnev’s warning that this country was 
p r e p a r e d  to d e l i v e r  a c r u s h i n g  
retaliatory strike against any aggressor. 
It’s part of his legacy. In the same 
statement the Kremlin pledged itself to 
continue Soviet policies at home and 
abroad. This will depend on events and 
personalities.
Nc: To the Soviet people Brezhnev was a 
remote figure, known mainly through 
official photographs. Little was know or 
told about his private life. Our Europe 
correspondent Tim Sebastian looks back at 
what is known about him.
b) The career
Crr: Mr Brezhnev gave the Soviet Union
nearly 20 years of stable leadership and 
i n ternational clout. He w a s n ’t an 
innovator, his theme was control. His 
policies predictable, orthodox and 
uncompromising. Himself, remote and 
uncolourful. Brezhnev came from the 
Ukraine, a product of the Soviet 
revolutions, both industrial and 
political. He served in the Red Army as
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steadily through the civilian hierarchy. 
He himself ousted Nikita Kruschev in a 
Kremlin coup in 1964. Noone, including 
the victim, knew anything of the power 
struggle until it was over. Brezhnev had 
two vocabularies, the one championed the 
cause of detente, the other attacked what 
he called Western subversion. His policy 
of selective intervention became known as 
the Brezhnev doctrine.
Nothing showed this more clearly than the 
killing of the Prague Spring in 1968. 
Alexander Dubchek had tried to liberalise 
Czechoslovakia, he called it socialism 
with a human face.
But the face didn’t please anyone else in 
the bloc. Brezhnev himself warned that 
socialism was in danger and had to be 
defended.
The showdown was in August that year when 
Brezhnev came to order the Czech leaders 
to turn back. The friendship was for the 
cameras. Behind it lay a different 
reality.
A few days later Russian tanks ploughed 
across the frontier, a r e l u c t a n t  
Czechoslovakia was towed at gunpoint back 
into the Brezhnev fold. He said to have 
told Mr Dubceck, the invasion wolud have 
gone ahead, even at the risk of war in 
Europe.
Mr Brezhnev was later to concentrate his 
energies on the West. In 1973 he visited 
West Germany, marking a dramatic thaw in 
East-West relations.
This success took him on to America. 
Relations had improved with the White 
House after the Americans withdrew from 
Vietnam. Mr Nixon’s problems with 
W a t e r g a t e  d i d n ’t seem to c o n c e r n  
Brezhnev, in any case it wouldn’t have 
happened in Moscow. He had a simple 
message for the American people, valid 
then, some say now in doubt - the Cold 
War is over. Mr Brezhnev was then at the 
height of his political power. Only later 
did he and his machine appear to slow 
down and stagnate.
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But he still had some successes to go. He 
and President Ford signed a disarmament 
agreement in Vladivostock.
In 1975 he welcomed Prime Minister Harold 
Wilson and Mr Callaghan to Moscow. That 
was the time when Russian and British 
leaders still could joke with each other. 
His greatest achievement was at the 
European security conference in Helsinki.
He secured Western acceptance of the 
Soviet Union’s post-war boundaries. In 
the eyes of his people it brought him 
international respectability, something 
communist leaders strive to attain. But 
the event took its toll with Mr 
Brezhnev. From that point on his health 
deteriorated.
Brezhnev’s efforts at detente culminated 
in a meeting with President Carter in 
Vienna for final negotiations on the Salt 
2 treaty. It was aimed at limiting 
strategic weapons. But the treaty was 
never ratified by Congress, East-West 
relations were moving into a difficult 
period, not helped by allegations of 
Soviet maltreatment of dissidents.
The writer Alexander Solzenitsyn was 
harrassed then exiled abroad.
The Nobel Prize winner Andrei Sakharov 
exiled internally. Other dissidents were 
given long jail sentences under rigorous 
conditions. Systematically, opposition to 
Brezhnev was decimated.
In contrast Mr Brezhnev encouraged the 
pursuit of Soviet excellence. Continual 
advances in space travel and sporting 
achievement, the prestige symbols of 
communist society.
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became increasingly suspicious of his 
intentions. The Soviet military build-up 
continued, outstripping NATO in a number 
of areas.
The invasion of Afghanistan produced 
shock in the West but no Russian remorse. 
Soviet troops stayed where they were, 
fighting an increasingly bloody war.
Because of Afghanistan the Moscow 
Olympics were not the international 
spectacle the Russians had hoped for. 60 
countries stayed away in protest, but the 
games were useful propaganda,most of the 
world had after all, finally come to 
Moscow.
Poland is the major international problem 
that Brezhnev leaves his successor.
Despite the imposition of martial law the 
country remains unstable. It's there that 
his departure will be watched with some 
trepidation. Whoever succeeds him will 
want to assert himself quickly in that 
country.
c) International Reaction
Nc: Messages of condolence to the Kremlin 
have been sent from world leaders, 
including the Queen, Mrs Thatcher and 
Michael Foot. The first East European 
country to react was Poland. Its message 
described Mr Brezhnev as a great friend 
who understood Poland's problems. For 
American reaction, Martin Bell reports 
from Washington.
Crr: The Russians here are in mourning, 
their embassy flag at half mast, and 
there is no comfort for the Americans 
either in the news from Moscow.
It reached the White House on Veterans 
day, when the United States honours its 
servicemen and war dead, and at the White 
House ceremony President Reagan spoke of 
his plans for defence and his hopes for 
peace.
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*stable balance of forces, a mutual 
reduction of weapons and a better 
understanding between the Soviet Union, 
the United States and all nations. 
Earlier day we received word of the death 
of the Soviet President Brezhnev and I 
want to read to you if I might the letter 
that I've sent this morning to Vasily 
Kuznetsov, First Deputy Chairman of the 
Presidium in Moscow.
'Please accept my condolences on the 
death of President Leonid Ilyich 
Brezhnev. President Brezhnev was one of 
the world's most important figures for 
nearly two decades. May I ask you to
convey our sympathies to the President’s 
fmily. I would also like to convey, 
through you to the Soviet government and
people the strong desire of the United
States to work toward an improved
relationship with the Soviet Union. I 
look forward to conducting relations with 
the new leadership of the Soviet Union 
for the aim of expanding the areas where 
our nations can cooperate to mutual 
advantage.
Crr: That was the most cordial message 
from Washington to Moscow this year and 
the United States will looking to the new 
le a d ership for some signal of a 
willingness to start to ease the present 
tensions. There’s little immediate 
prospect of that, and former President 
Jimmy Carter said he thought a period of 
propaganda struggle lay ahead.
Carter: They’ll try to prove that the
Soviets are more committed to peace, more 
committed to nuclear arms control than we 
are, that they are the so-called heroes 
for the third world and we are the 
villains, and I think after a period, 
which may last a few weeks or a few 
months, we don't know yet, they might try 
to accomodate the United States in some 
of the negotiations.
Crr: And a parting word from former
President Richard Nixon. As a Russian he 
said Mr Brezhnev was warm, effusive, 
ebullient. As a communist, he was a 
ruthless schemer and a relentless 
aggressor.
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the other communist superpower China was 
reflected in the low key Chinese reaction 
to t o d a y ’s news. Our far East 
correspondent Jim Biddulph has been 
monitoring Peking’s coverage.
Crr: One of Leonid Brezhnev’s last aims 
was to heal the breach with the world’s 
biggest communist nation, the 1000 
million Chinese. Judging by tonight’s 
Chinese television news, Mr Brezhnev did 
not get very far. The announcement of his 
death was one of the last headlines in 
the bulletin. Anyone who was interested 
had then to wait through a long series of 
domestic reports about how well people 
were doing in Chinese industry and 
agriculture. The official announcement of 
Mr Brezhnev’s death was squeezed in as 
item number 15 after a report about 
silkworms. The item itself lasted about 
20 seconds and did nothing more than 
repeat the TASS news agency report about 
the Soviet leader’s death. There were no 
condolences.
d) The succession
Nc: The Soviet Communist Party has
formally pledged to continue President 
Brezhnev’s policies and has urged the 
Russian people to support them. In the 
West the interest has focussed on the 
Kremlin and who is likely to become its 
master. Here’s our diplomatic editor John 
Simpson.
Crr: The first phase of the succession in 
the Kremlin will in fact already have 
begun. Because Mr Brezhnev has been ill 
for so long his colleagues will have 
settled who’ll take over in the short 
run. It’s unlikely to be one man. The 
Soviet party bosses prefer their leaders 
to emerge gradually, with as little 
infighting as possible. So in phase 1 a 
two or three man group could well take 
power. A prime minister in charge of 
government, with the two jobs Mr Brezhnev 
held, the president which is purely 
ceremonial, and party secretary, the real 
power base, divided between two other 
men.
The contenders for the top job were 
assembled last Sunday in Red Square, at
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Tikhonov
public appearance. To give continuity to 
the succession Nikolai Tikhonov could 
well remain for a time as Prime Minister.
Chernenko
That would leave two front runners for 
the job of general secretary. Constantin 
Chernenko, who’s 65 was Mr Brezhnev’s 
personal aid doing everything from fixing 
senior appointments to checking how many 
cigarettes he was smoking. He can plainly 
operate the Kremlin system, but the top 
man may need more than that.
The other main cont e n d e r  is Yuri 
Andropov, until recently chairman of the 
KGB. More cultivated than the others, a 
collector of antique furniture and modern 
Western art he nevertheless suppressed 
the dissidents with great harshness and 
played a major role in crushing the 
Hungarian uprising in 56. In phase two of 
the succession the new party secretary, 
whoever he is, would inch ahead of the 
others as Brezhnev himself did, to become 
sole leader, but Andropov is 67, only 2 
years younger than Chernenko. Their time 
is short. It may well be that for the 
third phase of the succession, the long 
term we should look for men in their 
50’s, Vladimir Dolghik for instance the 
politbureau’s heavy industry expert, or 
M i c k a e l  G o r b a c h e v  in c h a r g e  of 
agriculture.
But whoever makes it to the top will have 
to cope with the immense economic 
problems, which is one legacy Mr Brezhnev 
has left to his country’s workers. His 
policies of rigid control from Moscow 
have made this year’s growth rate the 
worst since the war, while the harvest 
has been the fourth bad one in a row - 
worse than in Czarist times.
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share. Kruschev tried to cut the military 
budget, Mr Brezhnev never repeated the 
mistake, nor will his successors. But now 
he's gone Western statesmen are grateful 
for the relative stability he brought.
Callaghan: He was a great stabiliser,
we've had a great period of stability, 
let there be no doubt about that, in the 
Soviet Union even though they've made 
advances on the international front, and 
I think it will be succeeded by a rhythm 
of change in the Soviet Union and the 
question is, which influence is going to 
become dominant. We here in the West will 
have some kind of indirect influence on 
that by the tone we adopt in our rhetoric 
towards the Soviet Union so that I think 
Brezhnev and Suslov both having gone, 
there is going to be this new dialogue, 
and no single leader will be able to 
emerge who will be able to make 
compromises until he's secure internally, 
and so the nature of the compromise that 
will be required from them, as from the 
West, will naturally depend upon the way 
we talks about the future of our 
relations with the Soviet Union.
Crr: Most Western European governments
will take Mr Callaghan's point, arguing 
that W a s h i n g t o n  must resist the 
temptation to act tough while the 
succession in the Kremlin is being sorted 
out. But for all that Brezhnev's death 
means that any remnants of the old policy 
of detente will either disappear or go 
into deep freeze, and the strategic arms 
reduction talks between the superpowers 
are hardly likely to produce much. Until 
one man in the Kremlin emerges as overall 
undisputed leader nothing much will 
change in the Kremlin's approach. Things 
will still be run by much the same group 
of cautious elderly men as before. 
They'll continue to believe as Brezhnev 
did in a strong, perhaps an over strong 
defence, but in one way things will now 
start to be different. In Eastern Europe 
where Brezhnev twice smashed efforts to 
liberalise the communist system most of 
the men who ran their regimes by his 
favour are in or near their seventies. 
Change is always painfully slow in the 
communist bloc, but Mr Brezhnev's death 
means that a completely new era can now 
begin. But that could mean that the post- 
Brezhnev period could be even less secure
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Nc: John Simpson reporting on the impact 
on the West of President B r e z h n e v ’s 
death, announced at 8* 0 clock this 
morning.
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a) Introductions
Nc: Brezhnev is dead, the difference it 
may make.
Another funeral, another struggle to rule 
the Soviet Union.
President Reagan tells Moscow he wants a 
new start.
Lech Walesa, Brezhnev’s last victim, will 
soon be free.
Good evening. The death of Mr Brezhnev in 
the Soviet Union has brought the first 
stirrings in the West of trying to get on 
better with the next Soviet leader.
President Reagan in Washington has spoken 
of an improved relationship, better 
relations, an active dialogue, though 
noone is speaking of an early summit 
meeting yet.
The Polish communist government is 
speaking of releasing the Solidarity 
leader, Mr Lech Walesa, it was moving 
that way while Mr Brezhnev was still 
alive.
M o s c o w ’s orderly streets heard the 
official announcement this morning.
Moscow Radio announcer: The name of
Leonid Brezhnev, a staunch continuator of 
Lenin’s great cause, and an ardent 
fighter for peace aand communism will 
live for ever in the hearts of the Soviet 
people and the whole of progressive 
humanity.
Nc: Mr Brezhnev died of a heart attack.
He was 75. He’ll lie in state for three 
days and be buried on Monday near Lenin.
b) The career
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In the 18 years in which he ran the 
Soviet Union the West found him angry 
about war, cool in negotiation, and a man 
who liked fast cars and John Wayne films, 
who tried and failed often to cut down on 
his smoking. His public face he tried to 
keep impassive.
Leonid Brezhnev lingered at the top of 
the Soviet state. The party had been his 
life for more than 50 years. The business 
of power was his business, In return he 
liked attention and praise. He liked 
medals.
But as he faced the 26th Party Congress 
the idea grew that his day was passing. 
His was a slow cautious, conservative 
communism , in his Russia stability had 
become inertia. Beyond his borders he had 
only one answer to the change that 
threatened his system - stop it! He did 
so in Czechoslovakia, in Afghanistan and 
Poland.
At the end of 1979 he ordered the Afghan 
invasion. The Soviet leadership had 
learned from America’s impotence when 
militant Islam swept through Iran, they 
were determined it wouldn't happen in 
Afghanistan, especially as it might 
spread to the Soviet Union's own 
burgeoning Muslim population. So the 
tanks went in.
In Poland there was a bigger threat. The 
Poles had developed a form of social 
democracy that stripped the communists of 
much of their power. Lech Walesa's 
revolution had to be put down, and 
Brezhnev found Poles willing to do it.
Then early this year Mikhail Suslov died. 
He had been the kingmaker and with him
159
i t ^  11 ii v ^ a  o ^  u a n u  a L/ a.
loss. Suslov had nurtured the personality 
cult that surrounded Brezhnev and gave it 
ideological legitimacy. With Suslov dead 
this very cult became a weapon against 
him. It was openly suggested that the old 
man should step down.
He had arrived in 1964 as part of a 
collective leadership but that fiction 
was laid to rest 13 years later when he 
rewrote Stalin’s constitution and made 
himself president as well as party 
secretary.
He was born here in the Ukraine a decade 
before Lenin’s Bolshevik revolution and 
it was this man, Nikita Kruschev, who 
Brezhnev ousted, who guided his early 
career.
Brezhnev became Kruschev’s protege during 
the war, as a colonel in the Red Army’s 
political service. Increasingly Soviet 
publications had to dwell in detail on 
his war, one writer recounting how he 
fought the nazis with a machine gun as he 
sat in a pool of blood.
Brezhnev left noone in doubt in 1 968 when 
he sent his tanks into Prague to snuff 
out the Czech attempt at communism with a 
human face. His justification became 
known as the Brezhnev doctrine. Soviet 
troops would march in wherever Russian 
domination appeared threatened. Two years 
later, the Prague Spring long since 
withered, Brezhnev was naturally cheered 
on a visit to his friends.
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The end of the ’60’s saw the ideological 
split with the Chinese develop into 
something more serious. For a while the 
border skirmishes threatened to spread 
into outright war between the two giants 
of communism.
The middle east was also a running sore 
for him. In successive wars between 
Israel and the Arabs, massive quantities 
of Russian arms were destroyed or 
abandoned. Soviet influence all but 
evaporated.
But elsewhere Brezhnev did better, 
particularly in Cuba with Fidel Castro. 
The bearhug in 1974 sealed Soviet support 
for Cuba’s intervention in Angola.
Brezhnev with a flagging economy and a 
perennial grain shortage did not want an 
arms race with the United States. He 
seemed to like Richard Nixon, and was 
disappointed by his fall. Together they 
talked about arms control and about ideas 
for freedom of speech and thought, but it 
didn’t happen.
Still detente became a catchword and 
there were those like President Pompidou 
of France who found it convenient too. 
But Brezhnev himself seemed a man without 
the energy to bring it off. His instinct 
was to cling on.
In the spring of 1 978 he made his second 
trip to West Germany. There he saw Herr 
Willy Brandt and Chancellor Smidt. His 
health was now obviously poor and he had 
trouble with his speech. The very voice 
of communism seemed faltering.
But the axe of communism was forthright 
against dissidents. A troublemaker like 
Solzenitsyn was exiled to the West. 
Others were not so lucky. For them, 
mental hospitals or prison.
In 1980 the Olympic Games went to the 
Soviet Union without American athletes. 
Brezhnev insisted that the Games must go 
ahead and he got backing from the sports 
establishment in Western Europe. It was a 
propaganda success - an impression of a 
peaceful sporting Soviet Union without 
foreign involvement or economic worry.
Relations with the United States had gone
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administration.
When Ronald Reagan got to the White House 
they went from bad to worse. Brezhnev now 
faced a man who was also conservative, 
who also kept his guard up, and who 
believed that in economic and military 
competition it would be the Soviet system 
that failed.
Brezhnev was of the old guard. He took 
advantage where he could in the world, 
but to the very end, to his last 
appearance in Red Square on Sunday, he 
kept the Soviet Union a garrison state. 
Under him, there was no Russian Spring.
c) The succession
Therefs no official word yet on who will 
succeed Hr Brezhnev but there is 
speculation that the twin jobs of head of 
state and communist party general 
secretary will in future be separated. 
The key post is general secretary. Our 
diplomatic editor Michael Brunson has 
been looking at the most likely options.
Crr: Among the men around him, the battle 
to succeed Mr Brezhnev began months, if 
not years ago. Certainly by the time of 
that funeral of the old party chief 
Mikhail Suslov last January there were 4 
contenders. Yuri Andropov, then head of 
the KGB; Victor Grishin the Moscow party 
chief; Andrei Kirilenko in charge of 
party organisation, and Constantin 
Chernenko, the politbureau chief of 
staff. But as the year progressed and Mr 
Brezhnev became evermore frail the 
position altered. Illness and changing 
political fortunes meant that by the time 
Mr Brezhnev died there were just 2 
leading candidates.
First, Mr Chernenko. He has always been 
close to Mr Brezhnev, working with him in 
Moldavia in the '50Ts, though not joining 
the politbureau till 5 years ago. His 
age, 71 is, in Soviet terms not a serious
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much to Mr Brezhnev's personal patronage 
may be, if an anti-Brezhnev faction now 
emerges in the politbureau.
Mr Andropov the other front runner, first 
came to prominence as Soviet ambassador 
to Hungary during the 56 uprising. His 
influence grew enormously in the years 
since 67 when he became head of the KGB. 
He joined the politbureau in 1973 and 
he’s 68. And in May this year he left the 
KGB to take over Mr Suslov’s old job. A 
very definite promotion.
All the manouevring behind Mr Brezhnev’s 
back this year may mean that the 
politbureau have already decided among 
themselves who the new general secretary 
is, ready for the central committee, 
which had a meeting planned for Monday 
anyway, to approve that choice.
If it is Mr Chernenko, that increases the 
chance of very little change indeed in 
Soviet policy. Though he travelled to 
Paris this year he is not a man of wide 
horizons - a party apparitchik, a 
loyalist through and through, in charge 
of things like the politbureau agenda and 
party propaganda.
Mr Andropov by contrast, here speaking in 
the Kremlin, is a more sophisticated 
character, though as a former head of the 
KGB h e ’s no liberal. But he speaks 
English for example, likes to dress well, 
and is generally thought to be more 
flexible, more ready to consider new 
ideas.
Whoever takes over, and the Moscow party 
chief Mr Grishin also has a chance, is 
not going to make sudden changes.
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The Russians have already said that their 
policies on detente and disarmament will 
stay the same. The hard line against the 
Americans will be maintained, with the 
c o n t i n u e d  p r e s e n c e  of
Mr Gromyko, perhaps as president, 
ensuring that. The socalled Brezhnev 
doctrine, holding Eastern Europe in line 
will stay, perhaps to be tested first by 
General Jaruzelski’s releasing of Lech 
Walesa and the lifting of martial law. If 
change comes it will probably be seen 
first over internal affairs. Mr Andropov 
for example may decide to try new ideas 
for dealing with the Soviet Union’s very 
serious economic problems.
Under the ailing Mr Brezhnev there had to 
be a collective leadership anyway but to 
the last he held the p o l i t b u r e a u  
together, insisting on a consensus. As 
his influence fades we could begin to see 
some changes.
d) International reaction
Nc:President Reagan said today America 
wanted better relations, he said Mr 
Brezhnev had been one of the most 
important figures of the past 20 years, 
and all former American presidents had 
their say. Mr Nixon said Mr Brezhnev was 
a ruthless schemer and a relentless 
aggressor who wanted the world but did 
not want war. John Suchet is in 
Washington.
Crr: President Reagan was woken at half 
past three this morning with the news of 
Mr Brezhnev’s death though it’s thought 
here he knew about it unofficially before 
he went to bed. Today at a White House 
ceremony for veteran soldiers the 
President said he looked forward to 
cooperating with the contry’s new leaders 
and there were comments too from three 
former presidents and a former secretary 
of state.
Reagan: I’ve said for many years there
are fundamental differences between the
Hard fine with the Americans 
a *  be maintained
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the United States, but I believe our 
peoples, for all our differences share a 
desire and a dedication to peace.
Carter: I think there’ll be a struggle
t h r o ughout the We s t e r n  world and 
throughout the developing nations just 
for propaganda advantage. They'll try to 
prove that the Soviets are more committed 
to peace, more committed to nuclear arms 
control than we are, that they are the 
so-called heroes for the third world and 
we are the villains, and I think after 
this period, which may last for a few 
months or a few weeks, we don’t know yet, 
they’ll probably try to accomodate the 
U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  in s o m e  of the 
negotiations.
Kissinger: I believe that he wanted
peace, but I also think that he did not 
have enough imagination to know that 
peace required a major intellectual 
effort, and not simply minor adjustments 
in an existing direction. By the time I 
met him, which was when most of our 
people got to meet him, he was already 
exhausted from a lifetime of struggle.
Crr: The immediate diplomatic problem
facing the administration is, should 
President Reagan go to Mr Brezhnev’s 
funeral? The probable answer is no, but 
in order to stress how deeply the United 
States wants detente, d e s p i t e  Mr 
Brezhnev’s harsh words last week, the 
administration will probably send its 
second highest-ranking member, Vice- 
president George Bush.John Suchet, News 
at Ten in Washington.
Nc: The Queen and Mrs Thatcher have both 
sent messages of condolence to Moscow. 
Mrs Thatcher said Mr Brezhnev's wide- 
ranging and long experience would be a 
serious loss to the Soviet Union and the 
consequences of his death would be felt 
far beyond the frontiers of his own 
country. The foreign secretary Mr Pym 
said he didn’t expect sudden or major
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must recognise the Soviet Union had a 
great responsibility for international 
peace. The Labour leader Mr Foot also 
sent condolences. Sir Harold Wilson, the 
last British Prime Minister to meet Mr 
Brezhnev.
Wilson: I think he was essentially a
moderate. He had a very violent temper, 
as we heard from time to time exploding - 
he had a little explosion with me about 
something, I canft remember what it was - 
but he soon came round, and one wonders 
whether that temper did mean that 
sometimes he was gonna take a very hard 
line.
Owen: I t h i n k  he w a s  a t o u g h  and
d eterm i n e d  man. I think the way he 
masterminded the clampdown in Poland, 
which I believe the Soviet Union were 
behind throughout all its stages, showed 
a degree of sophistication and skill in 
the conduct of foreign policy but also, 
absolute determination, after all the 
Brezhnev doctrine was that he would not 
accept interference in any communist 
country in their sphere of influence, and 
he t h e n  w i d e n e d  t h a t  to c o v e r  
Afghanistan, so nobody should think he 
was a moderate man.
Callaghan: I would indicate very quietly 
to the Soviet Union, look, I ’d say to 
them, when things have settled down we’re 
ready to talk to your leaders. W e ’ve all 
got a lot to discuss about the future of 
the world, so let us know when you’re 
ready and meantime, I would drop some of 
the harsh rhetoric we’re hearing to as to 
give the opportunity for those who will 
be discussing what nature the new 
leadership should be to say, look, the 
West are ready to talk, and b), they are 
not using the language of destabilisation 
and aggression that they have been using. 
This is the best way I think, to make a 
new breakthrough.
Nc: In part two how Poland reacted to
Brezhnev’s death and the news that Lech 
Walesa is to be released. Also in this 
specially extended News at Ten, the arms 
race and what happens to detente now that 
Russia’s leader has gone...
In Poland the Solidarity leader Mr Lech 
Walesa, the man Brezhnev had imprisoned,
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held in isolation for 11 months since the 
military takeover. The Poles would not 
have let h im  go w i t h o u t  S o v i e t  
permission. They said today he no longer 
poses a threat to the internal security 
of the state. As Nick Gowing reports from 
Warsaw, the Poles took BrezhnevTs death 
in their stride.
Crr: There were few pictures, almost no 
outward signs of President Brezhnevfs 
death. Poles seemed indifferent to the 
news. Evening newspapers carried this 
brief obituary and a picture of a middle- 
aged Brezhnev. The flag flew at half-mast 
at the Soviet embassy. Senior government 
ministers, including Prime M i nister 
General Jaruzelski signed a book of 
condolence, but the flag was not lowered 
at t h e  P o l i s h  c o m m u n i s t  p a r t y  
headquarters. The authorities talked of 
sorrow at the loss of a friend. Whoever 
t a k es  ov e r f r o m  Mr B r e z h n e v  w i l l  
fundamentally affect the future direction 
of the Polish crisis. Since Solidarity 
was born two years ago Moscow has wielded 
great influence although the government 
boasts of its independence here. But was 
it Mr Brezhnev's say alone, or towards 
the end was it the say of the politburo 
men in Moscow now vying for power? If so 
observers here believe things will change 
little although one source told ITN that 
Mr B r e z h n e v ' s  d e a t h  w o u l d  be a 
destabilising factor here. Then tonight 
came the unexpected news of Lech WalesaTs 
release.
This is how he was last seen in public, 
in despair at Solidarity!s last national 
meeting 11 months ago, several hours 
before martial law was declared. He told 
colleagues that phones had been cut. This 
is how Poles remember him, the hero who 
led the shipyard strike that led to the 
creation of the Eastern blocTs first and 
only trade union, Solidarity. According 
to the g o ve rn m en t  press s p o k e s m e n  
tonight, when Lech Walesa is released 
he'll be just plain citizen Walesa. 
S o l i d a r i t y  is n o w  an i l l e g a l  
organisation, so he has no union to lead. 
Now the governemnt has released the text 
of a letter he wrote to Prime Minister 
General Jaruzelski three days ago.
Walesa says:” I think the time has come 
to explain certain things, and to start
meeting and a serious discussion on 
subjects of interest. Given goodwill, a 
solution will be found”. But tonight the 
government said his release guaranteed no 
meeting.
Tonight Mrs Walesa said in Gdansk she had 
not been officially told yet that her 
husband would be released. She said she 
does not believe it, and will only 
believe it when she sees him. What is 
really behind the decision to release 
Lech Walesa is unclear, is it a gamble to 
buy peace, to convince the new Soviet 
leader that Solidarity is dead, the 
problem solved. Or is it the first move 
over a long period to entice Solidarity 
leaders into the new less p o werful 
unions, the same unions over which people 
have struck and protested.
Nc: P r e s i d e n t  B r e z h n e v  w a s  an
enthusiastic supporter of detente with 
the West but under his leadership there 
w as no let up in S o v i e t  m i l i t a r y  
spending. Russia has consistently spent 
over 1/8 of its national income on 
d e f e n c e,  that's a bo ut  t w i c e  the 
proportion of most Western countries. 
Brezhnev hap hoped detente would reduce 
this economic burden but there now seems 
little prospect of a change. Here's our 
defence correspondent Geoffrey Archer.
Crr: The best indicator we have of future 
Soviet policy toward the West came two 
weeks ago when Mr Brezhnev himself. He 
was addressing a gathering of Soviet 
military leaders. He bitterly attacked 
America for unfolding an 'unprecedented 
arm race* and appeared to all but abandon 
hopes of arms control agreements with the 
USA. And diplomatic observers in the West 
expect that attitude from M o s c o w to 
persist in the months ahead. The zero 
option talks to stop deployment nextyear 
of new American missiles in Europe in 
exchange for Russia's dismantling of her 
SS-20s have been under way for a year in 
Geneva without success. The American and 
Russian negotiators cannot agree on what 
weapons should be included in the talks. 
Russia wants French and British missiles 
included but America refuses.And the US 
says Russia is now stalling the talks 
while trying to exploit divisions in the 
Western alliance. President Brezhnev's 
d e a t h  is u n l i k e l y  to l o o s e n  t ha t
Brezhnev, Russia*s armed forces have 
undergone a technological revolution in 
recent years. Soviet ground forces in 
E u r o p e  h a v e  b e e n  c o n s i d e r a b l y  
strengthened by new weapons like the T-72 
tanks on display last week in Moscow, and 
Russia spent vast sums of money on the 
development of new weapons in space. 
L a rg e  n u m b e r s  of n a v i g a t i o n  and 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  satellites have been 
launched, and new radar satellites which 
can track NATO ships at sea. And in the 
past decade, the Soviet navy has expanded 
dramatically, with a new ability to 
project power worldwide. Russia*s purpose 
with all this technology is to try to 
catch up with America. Russian technical 
specialists are increasingly taking top 
posts in the military high command. Their 
instinct may be to press forward with new 
more advanced weapons rather than make 
compromises over arms control. Before he 
died President Brezhnev a ck no w le d g e d 
those technocrats* views by announcing 
plans to increase Soviet combat readiness 
in all respects including technology. So 
the signs so far are that the East-West 
arms race will continue as before.
Nc: Certain Kremlin-watchers are saying 
tonight that because Mr Yuri Andropov, 
the former head of the KGB is organising 
the Brezhnev funeral, as Nikita Kruschev 
organised Stalin!s, that he*s now the 
favourite to succeed, but whoever wins 
the power, well, whoever gets the power, 
his first problem is not the Americans or 
the Bomb, or Poland, but the Soviet 
Union.
First, the very immensity of the land, 
stretching half-way around the world, 
eight and a half million square miles of 
it, a huge political and administrative 
headache.
Second, in this land the Russians 
t hemselves are about to b e co m e  the 
minority. There are 260 million Soviet 
citizens at the last census last year. 
Just 159 million of them live in the 
Russian republic. The big population 
explosion is out in muslim Asia, among 
the Uzbeks and Kazhaks, that is why the 
Soviet Union went into make sure of 
Afghanistan.
Third, the Soviet Union is increasingly
an uroan society, ine next census snouia 
find it 2/3 urban, only 1/3 rural. The 
shift off the land is unstoppable. It 
means growing urban problems familiar to 
the West, w i t h  h o o l i g a n i s m  and 
alcoholism, and in a flagging economy,
therefs zero economic growth, lagging 
technology, and 15% of production spent 
on defence, plus repeated grain harvest 
failures. Grain imports cost 4200 million 
pounds last year, and subsidies keep 
Poland, Cuba and other satellites alive.
Fourth, the Soviet city dwellers are 
well-educated, not just the scientists 
but the new industrial managers, the sons 
and daughters of the first post-war new 
class in communist society. They are 
privately increasingly contemptuous of 
the political system that deprives them 
of more than material things. In the 
history of revolutions it is those who 
are better off who are most dangerous, 
and that seems the real challenge for 
whoever is Brezhnev's real successor.
NC: One Westerner who knew President
B r e z h n e v  w e l l  w as  D o c t o r  A r m a n d  
Hammer,the head of Occidental Petroleum, 
one of the world's biggest oil companies. 
Doctor Hammer has been going to Russia 
since 1921 when he persuaded Lenin to 
trade Russian furs for American grain. He 
was oner of the very few outsiders to get 
a glimpse of President Brezhnev's private 
life, and he for one liked what he saw.
Hammer: I think he was a warm-hearted
man, he was very human. I dined with him, 
I spent the weekend with him at Yalta, 
and I came away with the impression that 
he was a great force for peace, and that 
he would give his life for peace, as he 
told me with tears in his eyes.
Crr: Did he have a lifestyle that was
inconsistent with the n ormal one of 
Soviet leaders? One hears that he had a 
fleet of cars for instance.Did he have an 
austere or a luxurious lifestyle by 
Soviet standards?
Hammer: Well he loved fast cars. He liked 
to drive fast cars, that was his hobby, 
but he lived comparatively simply. He had 
a fleet of limousines and he used the , 
for example, he placed the Czar's yacht
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at the disposal of Mrs Hammer and I when 
we were there, it was the same yacht that 
the Czar had used, but I d o n !t think 
Brezhnev used it very often, I think he 
used it to entertain heads of state. His 
home at Yalta, the place where he 
entertained me, was built by Stalin not 
by Brezhnev but it was adequate, very 
impressive, and of course there was 
plenty of food of all kinds and drink.
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Nc: Leonid Brezhnev, ruler of the Soviet 
empire for nearly two decades has been 
buried in Moscow’s Red Square. More than 
70 countries, East and West were 
represented but few Western leaders were 
there. Most sent their deputies or 
foreign ministers.
Still, the new Soviet party chief, Yuri 
Andropov took the opportunity for some 
hectic diplomatic contacts, once the 
burial was over. In public he met the 
American delegation led by Vice-President 
George Bush for just one minute, and the 
Chinese for three. The longer meetings 
came later.
The funeral ceremony itself was a blend 
of Soviet military pomp, communist 
ideology and Russian orthodox ritual. Our 
Moscow correspondent John Osman describes 
the scene.
Crr: From the moment when carefully-
marshalled crowds moved into position, it 
was obvious that this was going to be an 
impressively stage-managed event. From 
the lying in state the coffin was moved 
to Red Square, a quarter of a mile away. 
Huge wreaths were carried as well as Mr 
Brezhnev’s many honours borne by Soviet 
generals and admirals. The coffin was on
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Mr Brezhnev’s family followed behind, his 
widow Victoria dressed in black, his son 
Yuri, his daughter Galina.
Some members of the Kremlin ruling 
circle, the Politbureau, also joined the 
cortege on foot. In slow march time the 
procession moved up the hill towards Red 
Square where people held portraits of 
Brezhnev just as if they were icons. 
Promptly before midday the cortege 
arrived before Lenin’s tomb and the open 
coffin was placed before the mausoleum. 
The first speech came from Mr Andropov. 
He said the Soviet Union was ready to 
give a crushing rebuff to any attempt at 
aggression. A second keynote speech came 
from defence minister Dimitri Ustinov, 
underlining the military flavour and the 
political implications of the occasion. 
With the help of stalwart soldiers, Mr 
Brezhnev’s old Politbureau colleagues 
acted as pallbearers. In the shadow of 
the Kremlin wall where figures from 
history like Stalin lie buried the Soviet 
leaders looked on as Mr Brezhnev’s family 
said their last farewells.
It was a Russian ritual which has 
survived the centuries and the atheism of 
the Soviet state. It has an orthodox 
Christian tradition. At the moment of 
burial guns were fired in salute, and 
factory sirens sounded. Handfuls of soil 
were thrown into the grave in another 
immemorial gesture. The ceremony over, a 
brisk marchpast followed by the Moscow 
garrison.
At a Kremlin reception Mr Andropov 
received many of the foreign guests and 
had a notably cordial chat with the 
visiting Chinese foreign minister Huang 
Wa, the highest ranking Chinese official
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decades of bitterness between the two
great neighbouring countries. The chat 
lasted for 20 minutes, longer than any 
other diplomatic encounter in public. The 
gesture was presumably designed to 
demonstrate the Soviet desire to improve 
relations with China.
There was one aspect, small enough in 
itself which caught the eye of some 
Western observers at the reception there. 
For the first time since the less 
inhibited days of Nikita Kruschev Western 
journalists were allowed in to witness a 
major state occasion. Its possible that 
by inviting them Mr Andropov was trying 
to demonstrate that the atmosphere in the 
Kremlin has changed just a little towards 
the West.
If it has, then the half hour that 
American vice-president George Bush spent 
afterwards with Mr Andropov will have 
provided some more evidence of it. Mr 
Bush said later that the talks had been 
"cordial and substantive", which probably 
means they didn’t get anywhere in 
p a r t i c u l a r .  B ut T A S S  did sa y  
that Mr Andropov had spoken of "being 
prepared to build relations with the 
United States". Still, no sudden changes 
of policy are likely in the Kremlin.
And when Mr Andropov gave the funeral 
oration for his dead predecessor, 
warnings and promises seemed pretty 
evenly balanced. "In the complicated 
international situation" he said, " when 
the forces of imperialism are trying to 
push for military confrontation the party 
will firmly uphold the vital interests of 
our homeland and give a crushing rebuff 
to any attempt at aggression. But then we 
are always", said Mr Andropov, " ready 
for honest, equal and mutually beneficial 
cooperation with any state willing to 
cooperate".
His colleague Marshal Ustinov who as 
defence minister has presided over an 
unprecedented military build-up was also 
carefully even-handed. "The Soviet armed 
forces", he said, "will continue to be a 
mighty factor of peace and security. They 
are constantly ready to defend the 
inviolability of their borders and 
discharge their international duty".
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Well Western analysts faced on the one 
hand with offers of peace, and on the 
other with warnings that the Soviet Union 
will keep its guard up are trying to work 
out which approach is genuine and which 
is put in for the sake of form. The 
chances are that both are genuine because 
the Russians themselves donTt yet know 
what the American approach is going to 
be. At the moment then, the keynote is 
complete uncertainty, and several Western 
leaders are starting to demand some kind 
of sign from the K r e m l i n  about its 
promised goodwill. Among them is Mrs 
Thatcher.
She*s speaking in London tonight, at the 
Lord Mayorfs banquet at Guildhall, and 
she*ll be addressing the problem. Mrs 
Thatcher is likely to call for genuine 
evidence that the Russians are serious 
about multila t e r a l  disarma m e n t .  Her 
position is that if they come up with 
such signs the West's response will be 
welcome and quick.
The Americans for their part also want 
particular evidence of a new Soviet 
approach to Afghanistan and Poland. It's 
difficult. Afghanistan, where the Soviet 
military position is gradually improving 
at a great cost in human lives may not be 
the place to make gestures. But there was 
one figure in the lineup at t o d a y ’s 
funeral reception in the Kremlin, General 
Jaruzelski of Poland who may help the 
S o v i e t  U n i o n  t o  g i v e
precisely the kind of sign the Americans 
want. If he could deliver an end to 
martial law there soon, it could be the 
beginning of a whole new chapter in East- 
West relations.
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N c : Good evening. The new Soviet
Communist Party chief, Mr Yuri Andropov, 
met the United States’ Vice-president Mr 
George Bush in Moscow today after the 
funeral of President Brezhnev. Their talk 
lasted just half an hour. Mr Bush said it 
was ’’frank, cordial and substantive”. Mr 
Andropov said he wanted relations based 
on ’’full equality, non-interference, 
mutual respect and what he called a 
revitalising of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
atmosphere. Mr Andropov also spoke 
cordially to the Chinese and to Mrs 
Gandhi, and to the West German President 
Herr Karl Kastens. Other West Europeans 
were not quite so favoured.
The Foreign Secretary Mr Francis Pym was 
given half an hour with the Soviet 
Foreign Minister Mr Gromyko. There was a 
long receiving line in the Kremlin, of 32 
heads of state, 15 prime ministers and 
just about every foreign minister and 
ambassador who could get there.
Intent on being there were the Polish 
puppet General Jaruzelski, who was among 
those who queued patiently for their 
handshake. And also Cuba’s bearded Fidel 
Castro. Their new master was holding a 
party. One of the few non-communist faces 
Soviet viewers would recognise was Mrs 
Gandhi, with Afghanistan on her mind. And 
she bowed to Brezhnev’s picture. From the 
West Canada’s Prime Minister Mr Trudeau.
They came to Red Square today to bury 
Brezhnev, and not particularly to praise 
him. All who were there were there by 
official invitation. So it is when 
dictators die.
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Others were there by orders.
They carried him out from the House of 
Unions where he had lain in state.
They mourned him because for 18 years he 
had kept the Soviet system intact. His 
military funeral was meant to confirm his 
system.
A small armoured car drew the gun 
carriage with his coffin. It was a 
better-ordered funeral than Stalin's, and 
such grief as there was was probably 
genuine. And the military carried the 
medals he liked so much. So he came into 
Red Square, where so often he had been 
the man of power, only the third Soviet 
leader to be buried there.
The lid was taken off the coffin and he 
lay looking up almost symbolically at the 
new rulers who had succeeded him on 
Lenin's tomb, where he had been 8 days 
before. His old friend had come, Indira 
Gandhi who spoke her mind, and the 
clients who didn't - Jaruzelski from 
Poland, Castro from Cuba and Yasser
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the Prime Minister Tickonov carried the 
coffin. And his widow Victoria, his 
daughter and his son said goodbye in an 
older ritual than the atheistic state 
allowed, and his companions and friends 
and rivals watched, their last glimpse of 
him. They let him down into the grave of 
the Leninist Heroes quickly, an abrupt 
end to 18 years. And the sirens sounded 
over Moscow, over the Soviet Union. 
Grains of earth, and then shovelfuls of 
it. The Moscow garrison matched by. The 
infantry he had fought with came back 
into their own. It may be that the future 
w i l l  say that B r e z h n e v ’s c h i e f  
achievement was to create nothing but a 
Soviet navy.
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Appendix 3.2. References to the Soviet economy in main news 
coverage of the deaths of BrezhnevT Andropov and Chernenko.
BBC
Andropov's priority was Soviet industry, to make it 
efficient, tighten discipline, remove corruption. Bosses were 
fired, there was limited success
[Andropov had] limited success 
(1 2100 10/2/84)
the 1 984 harvest was the worst in a decade, and for once 
there was more to blame than the weather
Chernenko attacked inefficiency at all levels but his 
government, like others before it, had to spend its hard 
currency and buy its way out of a grain crisis 
(1 2100 11/3/85)
ITN
The crisis which erupted in Poland in 1980 revealed the 
chronic economic ills of the entire Soviet system.
(4 1900 11/11/82)
a flagging economy and a perennial grain shortage, 
very serious economic problems
a flagging economy, zero economic growth, lagging technology, 
repeated grain harvest failures.
grain imports cost £4,200 million last year, and subsidies 
keep Poland, Cuba and other satellites alive.
(3 2200 11/11/8 2)
day-to-day problems ingrained in Soviet life queues, shoddy 
goods, erratic deliveries, bad planning, inefficiency, but 
most ingrained and insiduous of all, corruption and 
exploitation of privilege.
endemic corruption
impressive signs of progress in the first few months [of 
Andropov's leadership].
a perceptible improvement.
last year official figures showed a 4% increase in national 
output.
(4 1900 10/2/84)
Andropov wanted to get rid of corruption and time-wasting and 
absenteeism. He sacked ministers and officials who built 
personal fortunes, and the police and the militia went into 
the shops to force the absentees back to work.
(3 2200 10/2/84)
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Gorbachev warned the Central Committee that much still has to 
be done to get the Soviet economy back on its feet.
agriculture has suffered from a hard winter and there's a 
great deal to do. Last year's grain harvest was less than 
previous years and of lower quality, and the lack of 
coordination between various economic sectors, poor 
management and rising costs have hit Soviet productivity all 
round.
(4 1900 11/3/85)
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1) 3 2200 10/5/83
Newscaster: Syria has again talked about a new war with 
Israel over Lebanon. Syria, which is armed and backed by 
Russia, turned down the deal for Israeli troop withdrawal 
from Lebanon negotiated by the American Secretary of State Mr 
George Schultz last week. That depended on simultaneous 
withdrawal of Syrian and PLO troops. Today Mr Schultz called 
on the Soviet Union to get on the side of peace in Lebanon 
and support AmericaTs attempts to get all foreign troops out.
Correspondent: The evacuation of Soviet diplomatic families 
from Beirut yesterday rang alarm bells in the Middle East.
The Russians had done the same thing in Damascus in 1 973, 
just before war broke out. The Soviets said it was just 
holiday time, but Israel sees it as Russia trying to 
pressurise the Lebanese government not to sign the agreement 
which America negotiated for the withdrawal of Israeli troops 
from Lebanon. If that agreement were carried out fully, and 
all foreign troops left Lebanese soil it would be seen as a 
major diplomatic victory for America and Russia wouldn't like 
that.
Syria has 40,000 troops in Lebanon and they will have to 
be withdrawn too if Israel is to remove her forces fully. 
During the Israeli invasion of Lebanon last year Syria's 
forces were crushed and humiliated. President Assad of Syria 
had failed to prevent the Palestinians from being defeated, 
but thanks to Russian aid worth up to $2 billion Syria's 
forces have been rebuilt, as this recent fly-past of new 
Soviet fighters over Damascus showed. Also President Assad 
has recently been reconciled with PLO leader Yasser Arafat 
and may have allowed some 2,000 Palestinian fighters to 
inflitrate back into Syrian-controlled parts of Lebanon to 
reinforce 10,000 or so Palestiniancs already there. President 
Assad was not involved in the negotiations over withdrawal 
from Lebanon, and national pride wouldn't let him accept what 
America's Mr Schultz presented, but Syria is genuinely 
worried about the continuing Israeli role in Lebanon that 
that agreement would permit. Syria's war-like noises over 
Lebanon are probably designed to show the Arab world she is a 
force to be reckoned with again and to try to make life 
dificult for the Israelis who desperately want to get their 
troops home from Lebanon. But even with her new Russian 
support it's unlikely Syria really wants another war.
2) 3 2200 13/5/83
Newscaster: In New York the American Defence Secretary Mr 
Weinberger said that the Soviet build-up in Syria made 
agreement more difficult and increased the danger of war 
between Syria and Israel.
3) 1 2100 16/5/83
Correspondent: The Syrian war cries are backed by an enormous 
influx of Soviet military equipment. Hundreds of T-72
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losses of last year's conflict with Israel. Whenever they 
take on the Israelis the Syrians lose, but itfs not deterred 
them before. The Israelis want out of Lebanon, but they won't 
leave the Syrians there and if pushed hard enough they may 
decide to give the Syrians a bloody nose. Their big guns are 
lined up along the Syrian border in range of Damascus. If 
they use them it could involve some of the 5,000 Russian 
advisers now attached to the Syrian army, and that might draw 
in the United States, already committed to maintaining the 
peace in Lebanon. Itfs a matter of opinion whether the war­
like noises now emanating from Syria and her PLO allies are 
just rhetoric or a build-up to war. The problem is that 
rhetoric can get out of hand.
4) 3 2200 19/5/83
Newscaster: President Reagan says hefs going to announce in 
the next few days that America will sell 75 F-15 bombers to 
Israel. He froze the sale when Israel invaded Lebanon last 
year but the block has been removed now Israel has signed the 
agreement to withdraw its forces. The American Defence 
Secretary Mr Casper Weinberger is worried about the Soviet 
military build-up in Syria.
* A transcript of the Channel 4 item of May 17th referred to 
above is not available.
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BBC
[Brezhnev] presided over the biggest military build-up the 
world has ever seen.
In Brezhnev's final years the Soviet military build-up 
continued, outstripping NATO in a number of areas.
(1 2100 11/11/82)
Marshal Ustinov as Defence Minister has presided over an 
unprecedented military build-up.
(1 2100 15/11/8 2)
Andropov was forced to enlarge the Soviet military machine as 
missile talks failed and East and West moved further apart.
There are Tomahawk Cruise missiles now in position in 
England, West Germany and Sicily. And Pershing II rockets 
capable of hitting targets deep inside Russia less than ten 
minutes after launch from West Germany have provoked a tough 
Soviet response. Russian missile submarines are now cruising 
just 400 miles from Americafs East coast. Washington too is 
only a few minutes away from a potential holocaust.
(1 2100 10/2/84)
the funeral over, Soviet [military] power was back in 
evidence and the stress was on continuity. Communism, as the 
slogans put it, would be marching on to victory.
(1 2100 13/3/8 5)
ITN
A second arms limitation treaty was only signed after five 
long years of haggling and Russiafs military might grew 
alarmingly.
(4 1900 11/11/82
Brezhnev was an enthusiastic supporter of detente with the 
West but under his leadership there was no let up in Soviet 
military spending. Russia has consistently spent over one 
eighth of its national income on defence, that!s about twice 
the proportion of most Western countries.
there's 15% of production spent on defence.
Under the leadership of Brezhnev Russia's armed forces have 
undergone a technological revolution in recent years. Soviet 
ground forces have been considerably strengthened by new 
weapons like the T-72 tanks on display last week in Moscow, 
and Russia spent vast sums of money on the development of new 
weapons in space. Large numbers of navigation and 
communication satellites have been launched, and new radar 
satellites which can track NATO ships at sea. And in the past 
decade the Soviet navy has expanded dramatically, with a new 
ability to project power worldwide. RussiaTs purpose with all 
this technology is to catch up with the Americans. Russian 
technical specialists are increasingly taking top posts in
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forward with new more advanced weapon rather than make 
compromises over arms control. Before he died President 
Brezhnev acknowledged these technocrats1 views by announcing 
plans to increase Soviet combat readiness in all respects 
including technology. So the signs are that the East-West 
arms race will continue as before.
(3 2200 11/11/82)
it may be that the future will say that Brezhnevfs chief 
achievement was the creation of a Soviet navy.
(3 2200 15/ 11/82)
as if to emphasise earlier what had been said about RussiaTs 
refusal to bow to outside threats the funeral proper ended 
with a show of military might, with row upon row of the 
Soviet armed forces parading before their new leader.
(3 2200 14/2/84)
the military parade reminds the world as a new leader takes 
over of the military power of the Soviet Union.
(3 2200 13/3/8 5)
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BBC1
for President Reagan, the hope of a new start for East-West 
relations.
The SALT II treaty was never ratified by Congress. East-West 
relations were moving into a difficult period, not helped by 
allegations of maltreatment of dissidents.
in 1973 [Brezhnev] visited West Germany, marking a dramatic 
thaw in East-West relations. Relations improved with the 
White House after the American withdrawal from Vietnam.
the United States will be looking forward to the new 
leadership for some signal of a willingness to start to ease 
the present tensions.
BrezhnevTs death means that any remnants of the old policy of 
detente will either disappear or go into deep freeze, and the 
strategic arms reduction talks between the two superpowers 
are hardly likely to produce much.
(1 2100 11/11/8 2)
some Western leaders are starting to demand some kind of sign 
from the Kremlin about its promised goodwill.
Mrs Thatcher is likely to call for genuine evidence that the 
Russians are serious about multilateral disarment.
'we are always1, said Mr Andropov, 'ready for honest, equal 
and mutually beneficial cooperation with any state willing to 
cooperate.
Western analysts faced with offers of peace on the one hand, 
and on the other with warnings are trying to work out which 
approach is genuine and which is for the sake of form. The 
chances are that both are genuine because the Russians don't 
yet know what the American approach is going to be.
if General Jaruzselski could deliver an end to martial law 
[in Poland] soon it could be the start of a whole new 
chapterin East-West relations. (1 2100 15/11/82)
the Americans say, we want to talk constructively.
it's thought several Western leaders will use the funeral to 
make contact with the possible successors and try to improve 
relations between East and West which have been so cold for 
so long now.
Western leaders are hoping for an improvement in relations 
with the Eastern bloc.
[Mrs Thatcher] spoke of the need for new confidence between 
East and West.
When Mr Brezhnev died neither President Reagan nor Mrs
already too strong for that, and it was to get worse. But Mrs 
Thatcher [has] already set out on her own policy of detente 
with the Eastern bloc.
East-West contacts were shattered [because of the Korean 
airline disaster].
Yuri Andropov [left] East-West relations at a crucial and 
dangerous phase.
The key question he*ll have to deal with is what to do about 
the nuclear arms race, whether he*ll make any real effort to 
get the talks going again.
Inside and outside of the Administration there*s a sense here 
of a new opening and a new opportunity for dialogue with the 
Soviet Union... the Presidents likely to grasp at it.
(1 2100 10/2/84)
In relations with capitalist countries [Gorbachev said] *we 
will always respond to goodwill with goodwill*.
Chernenko [signalled] that Moscow*s door was not yet closed 
but he himself was to do little to open it further. Contacts 
with Britain continued but the United States remained in 
Soviet-imposed quarantine and Mr Reagan in his pre-election 
campaign could do no right.
(1 2100 11/3/85)
During the funeral oration Mr Gorbachev spoke of his desire 
for good neighbourliness with the rest of the world.
The Western leaders return home tonight apparently encouraged 
by their talks. There is a new optimism. Dialogue it*s felt 
will be easier.
(1 2100 13/3/85)
ITN
Mr Brezhnev never quite managed to convince President 
Reagan*s America that the old men in the Kremlin were 
genuinely interested in peace, cooperation and detente.
Will the rather tough sounding statements and the tough 
stance of President Reagan and the cold war sentiments of his 
Administration increase the likelihood that a hard liner will 
emerge to combat the policy of the Americans? (interview 
question)
With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan American-Soviet 
relations went into irreversible decline.
(4 1900 11/11/82)
the death of Mr Brezhnev has brought the first signs in the 
West of trying to get on better with the next Soviet leader. 
President Reagan has spoken of an improved relationship, 
better relations, an active dialogue, though no-one’s 
speaking of an early summit yet.
186
Brezhnev did not want an arms race with the United States.
Relations with the United States had gone from good to bad 
under the Carter Administration. When Ronald Reagan got to 
the White House they went from bad to worse. Brezhnev now 
faced a man who was also conservative, who also kept his 
guard up, and who believed that in economic and military 
competition it would be the system that failed.
In order to stress how deeply the United States wants 
detente, despite Mr Brezhnev!s harsh words last week, the 
Administration will probably send its second-highest rankin 
member, Vice-President George Bush.
there now seems little prospect of a change.
so the signs so far are that the East-West arms race will 
continue as before.
(3 2200 11/11/82)
might Mr Andropov make any new overtures in pursuit of better 
relations with the West? (interview question)
(4 1900 15/11/82)
Mr Andropov said he wanted relations based on full equality, 
non-interference, mutual respect and what he called a 
revitalising of the international atmosphere.
(3 2200 15/11/82)
The feeling in Washington is that with the uncertainty over 
Mr AndropovTs health now over, a major obstacle to ending the 
present freeze in relations between the two superpowers may 
have been cleared away.
[there's now] renewed prospect of an agreement on missile 
deployment.
East and West were at daggers drawn over [the Korean Airline 
disaster] and the deployment of missiles in Western Europe.
The question of whether President Reagan should now try for a 
warmer relationship with Moscow is the immediate problems 
facing politicians in Washington.
State department officials are cautiously optimistic. Mr 
George Schults spoke of a new opportunity.
(4 1900 10/2/84)
That the Americans learnt so late [about Andropov!s death] 
underlines how bad Soviet-American relations have become.
since Bush flew to Brezhnev's funeral and he and Secretary of 
State George Schultz talked with Mr Andropov 16 months ago 
there's been effectively no direct American contact with-the 
Soviet leadership.
(3 2200 10/2/84)
Mrs Thatcher has told the new Soviet leader it's time for a
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Mrs Thatcher asks for broader understanding.
Soviet leaders told the thousands of mourners gathered in Red 
Square that Russia was ready for talks with the West but 
would not respond to threats.
Russia is ready for realistic dialogue on the basis of equal 
security which means no concessions on present or future 
plans for nuclear deployment.
Mr Gromyko criticised the United States for not responding to 
what he called the Soviet Unionfs major initiatives for 
peace.
there!s no guarantee that there!ll be any radical change of 
policy which will immediately reduce the present tension 
between East and West (3 2200 14/2/84)
Gorbachev hinted that he wanted to improve relations with 
China, and as far as the capitalist countries of the West are 
concerned he spoke of a policy of peace and coexistence on 
the basis of mutual trust.
[there!s British] determination to improve relations with 
Russia in all areas.
relations are greatly improved since the last such death in 
the Soviet family.
America is much more optimistic about life with Mr Gorbachev 
than ever it was about life with either of his predecessors.
Is he really a different Russian, ready to take a softline 
with the West? The answer is without doubt no... he still 
sticks to familiar Soviet themes, deep distrust of the 
Americans chief among them.
The West will be hoping that in time, the fact that therefs a 
younger man in charge now in Moscow, hopefully one who!s more 
receptive to new ideas, and with the prospect of 20 years or 
more at the top in which to carry them out, that that will 
all lead to a very significant improvement in East West 
relations.
Mr Gorbachev repeated the well-oiled formula about Russiafs 
readiness to maintain neighbourly relations with all 
countries on the basis of peaceful coexistence.
(4 1900 13/3/85)
compared with previous speeches this was a conciliatory and 
polished performance.
The West, as Mrs Thatcher predicted, already seems to be 
finding it a little easier to do business with the Kremlin.
Today President Reagan said he looked forward to cooperating 
with the country's new leaders.
Then the military parade began. It reminds the world as a new 
leader takes over of the military power of the Soviet Union, 
this underlying the tension between East and West over the 
arms race.
(3 2200 13/3/8 5)
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Chapter Four
"Russia Condemned": The Korean Airline Disaster.
Journalist: Could I ask you for the BBC, what do you 
think of the way that the Western press has been 
handling all of this?
Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko: Essentially not 
objective.
Journalist: Do you think the situation will be cleared 
up soon?
Gromyko: I think it is clear now.
Journalist: And do you think the world will just forget 
about the incident soon?
Gromyko: We are sure that you will forget, now facts are 
at the disposal of the people.(BBC1 2100 7/9/83)
In time the Korean airliner disaster was forgotten, as the 
Soviet foreign minister predicted at the Madrid Security 
Conference. Like all such tragedies, it exploded upon the 
world for a brief period and was then no longer news, 
replaced by other more pressing concerns. The Korean airline 
disaster was newsworthy for approximately two weeks. Yet the 
destruction of KAL 007 was perhaps the single most 
controversial East-West incident since the Cuban missile 
crisis.Those two short weeks were the occasion of a bitter 
propaganda war between the West led by the Reagan 
Administration, and the Soviet Union, centred on the deaths 
of 269 civilian passengers and crew. The following analysis 
examines how the competing views of the Soviet and United 
States1 governments were reported on British television news.
As a major media event, commanding many hours of 
television coverage in its initial phase, the KAL tragedy 
provided a classic opportunity to examine the role of 
broadcasting journalism in propaganda warfare between the
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superpowers. There will, it is certain, be further incidents 
of this kind in the future, and it is of more than passing 
interest to understand how broadcast news is likely to cover 
them.
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East-West relations were already at a low point in 
September 1983, and the Korean airline disaster plunged them 
even deeper into gloom. A little more than two weeks later, 
President Reagan would succeed in obtaining from a hitherto 
reluctant Congress approval on increased defence spending, 
the manufacture of chemical and nerve gas weapons, and 
funding for the MX missile system. Few observers doubted that 
the Korean airline disaster was a factor in smoothing the 
paths of these controversial programmes. In Europe the Geneva 
arms control talks were in their final, unproductive phase 
leading up to their breakdown with the arrival of Cruise and 
Pershing II missiles in December. Western negotiators did not 
deny that the Korean airline incident affected their approach 
to the negotiations. Nicholas Ashford in The Times of 
September 10th, 1983, expressed clearly the likely effects of 
the incident when he wrote: "the sheer horror of the Russian 
action will undermine those critics who have accused Reagan 
of following belligerently interventionist foreign and 
defence policies. For instance, who now will resist the 
Presidents plans to deploy the MX missile and modernise the 
US nuclear weapons when the adversary has shown itself 
capable of such cynical brutality?" These words were to prove 
prophetic.
The stark horror of the Korean airline disaster, and the 
central facts - that 269 civilian passengers and crew died 
when their aircraft was shot down by Soviet fighters - were 
established at an early stage in the crisis. The Soviet news 
agency TASS first referred to the loss of human life on
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over the loss of human life” and there was no denial in any 
subsequent statement that actions by Soviet defence forces 
had led to the aircraft!s destruction. The ensuing 
controversy was concerned not with what had happened to the 
airliner but with the question of whv the tragedy had 
occurred, and who was to blame. In the official United States 
version of events the aircraft had accidentally strayed into 
Soviet airspace on a routine commercial flight, where it had 
been shot down without warning by Soviet fighters. The 
principal evidence to support this allegation were tape 
recorded conversations between Soviet fighter pilots 
monitored by US and Japanese intelligence services in the 
region. These tapes formed the basis of the first major 
statement on the incident by the US Secretary of State,
George Schultz, as reported by The Times on September 2nd:
At approximately 1600 hours GMT [September 1st] , the 
aircraft came to the attention of the Soviet radar. It 
was tracked by the Soviets from that time. The aircraft 
strayed into Soviet airspace over the Kamchatka 
Peninsula and over the Sea of Okhotsk and over the 
Sakhalin Islands. The Soviets tracked the commercial 
airliner for some two and a half hours.
A Soviet pilot recorded visual contact with the 
aircraft at 1812 hours. The Soviet plane was, we know, 
in constant contact with its ground control. At 1821 
hours the Korean aircraft was reported by the pilot at 
10000 metres. At 1826 hours the Soviet pilot reported 
that he fired a missile and the target was destroyed.
It was further alleged that the Soviet fighters had been 
close enough to the airliner to identify it as a civilian 
plane, and that the Soviet defence forces had been in 
possession of this knowledge when they attacked. US officials 
suggested that the incident proved it was now Soviet policy 
to shoot down civilian airliners that strayed into Soviet
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airspace. This version of events was personally championed by 
the President of the United States, and accepted by US allies 
and friends around the world.
The Soviet Unionfs defence became clear by September 2nd. 
A TASS statement issued that day argued:
The intrusion into the airspace by the mentioned plane 
cannot be regarded in any other way than as a pre­
planned act. It was obviously thought possible to attain 
special intelligence aims without hindrance by using 
civilian planes as a cover (English translation from 
Soviet News, no.6189).
The !spy-planef theory first advanced by the Soviets on 
September 2nd, and to which they adhered thereafter, rested 
on circumstantial evidence. Gaps in the US account of events, 
and a number of remarkable coincidences led the Soviets to 
conclude that the aircraft!s flight-path had not been 
accidental, and to claim that they had genuinely 
misidentified the Boeing 747 for a US reconnaisance plane.
The Soviet authorities asked why, for example, 
if US intelligence had been able to monitor the progress of 
the KAL flight for several hours, it had not attempted to 
prevent the disaster taking place by warning the pilot?
The American side cites data which indicate that the 
relevant US services followed the flight throughout its 
duration in the most attentive manner. So one may ask 
that if it were an ordinary flight of a civil aircraft 
which was under continuous observation, then why were no 
steps taken from the American side to end the gross 
violation of the airspace of the USSR and to get the 
plane back to an international flight route? Why did the 
American authorities not try to establish contact with 
the Soviet side and provide it with the necessary data 
about this flight? Neither was done, though there was 
ample time for this.
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reprinted in Soviet News no. 6189, claimed further evidence 
for the !spyplane theory1 in the fact that a United States 
reconnaisance plane, the RC-135, had flown "in the same area 
on the same altitude" as the Korean airliner. This statement 
also noted that the airlinerTs flight had taken it over 
sensitive military areas, including one site where a missile 
test was scheduled for the next day. It was claimed that the 
airliner had flown without navigation lights in the dark, and 
had failed to respond to warnings and internationally agreed 
procedures for such incidents. For all these reasons, it was 
claimed, "the anti-aircraft forces of the area arrived at the 
conclusion that a reconnaisance aircraft was in the airspace 
of the USSR".
At the major news conference of September 9th in Moscow 
Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, General Chief of Staff of the Soviet 
Armed Forces, alleged that the Korean airliner had been 
acting in concert with the RC-135 in a mission designed to 
test the Soviet defence system:
The Pentagons spokesman officially admitted that an RC- 
135 reconnaisance plane was in the area of the violation 
of Soviet airspace by the South Korean plane with the 
aim to test the capabilities of the Soviet air defence 
system. We believe that that was not the only aim. Both 
planes acted concertedly. Their flights were performed 
so as to complicate the air situation and to confuse our 
air defence systems. In addition, the RC-135 must have 
been controlling the initial stage of the flight of the 
Boeing 747 and keeping track of the actions of our air 
defence at that time (English translation from Soviet 
News., no. 6190).
During the period of the propaganda war analysed below, 
these were the 'facts' as both sides presented them. In the 
United States version the Korean airliner had been an
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innocent straggler: the Soviet authorities had known 
precisely what they were doing when they shot it down in an 
act of cold-blooded Tmurder!. The Soviet government continued 
to insist that an ’unprecedented accident* had occurred. In 
this account responsibility lay with the United States 
intelligence services and ultimately, with the US government 
itself.
When the Korean airliner crisis had disappeared from the 
headlines and the war of words was no longer news the 
arguments continued between commentators and analysts. As 
time passed the Soviet version began to win support in the 
West. On September 20th, 1983, an article was published in 
Pravda which gave details of a more elaborate intelligence 
operation than had previously been alleged. The author of the 
article, Marshal Pyotr Kirsonov, stated that:
It has been established beyond any doubt that the Boeing 
747 had taken off from Anchorage in Alaska 40 minutes 
behind the regular schedule. The airline representative 
explained the delay by 'the need for an additional 
checking of the onboard equipment1, although no 
malfunctions had been found. But another thing has now 
come to light. The delay was needed in order to strictly 
synchronise in time the plane's approach to the coasts 
of Kamchatka and Sakhalin with the flight of the 
American intelligence satellite Ferret-D.
The article alleged that the times of the satellite's 
passing over Soviet territory coincided exactly with the 
Korean airliner's two separate entrances into Soviet 
airspace:
The Ferret appeared at 20 hours 24 minutes over the 
Soviet Union, ie precisely at the moment of the 
intrusion of the trespasser plane into Soviet 
airspace... It was natural that the violation of the air 
border had forced a doubling of the intensiveness of the
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what the organisers of the provocative flight had 
counted on in their plan. All this was being registered 
by the Ferret spy satellite.
The next orbit of the Ferret satellite coincided with 
absolute accuracy with the Boeing 747*3 flight over 
Sakhalin. No fortuity can be invoked to explain such an 
accurate and repeated coincidence. It is without doubt 
that the moment of penetration by the intruder plane had 
been carefully planned in advance so as to assure the 
gathering of maximum information by the US Ferret 
intelligence satellite.
This expanded version of the spyplane theory received 
support in an article in the British publication Defence 
Attache. 'P.Q.Mann', a pseudonym for an anonymous, but 
reportedly authoritative defence analyst, agreed with the 
detailed timings of the Pravda article and on the alleged 
role played by the RC-135 aircraft. The article introduced 
new speculation about a possible role in the operation by the 
US space shuttle Challenger. Andrew Wilson, defence 
correspondent of the Observer, reported on June 17th, 1984 
that the article:
claims to offer new evidence that the civil jet was 
steered deliberately into Soviet airspace in order to 
provoke radar and electronic signals that were picked up 
by a simultaneously orbiting Ferret spy satellite and 
the space shuttle Challenger. The Russians themselves 
drew attention to the Ferret's orbiting pattern at the 
time, but the magazine goes much further. It says the 
coincident flight of KAL 007 with a US aircraft of 
similar profile - an RC-135 - within range of Soviet 
radars less than half an hour before was 'a dummy 
selling tactic, creating the possibility that a military 
aircraft was flying in to cross the borders of the 
Soviet Union.
Alain Jacob, discussing P.Q. Mann's theory in The Guardian 
Weekly of September 23rd, 1984, noted that ,fthe space shuttle 
Challenger, which was fired from Cape Canaveral on August 
30th, 1983 made three sweeps over the far eastern part of the 
USSR during and after 007's flight over Kamchatka, the Sea of
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Okhotsk, and Sakhalin Island".
If the launch had not been held up for 17 minutes on 
account of bad weather, the sweeps would have coincided 
even more closely with the various stages of the flight.
The basic facts around which this precise and detailed 
theory was contructed were never at any stage refuted by the 
United States government. Other facts emerged.
Boeing 747Ts are equipped with the Inertial Navigation 
System. This fall-but infallible1 system, as Murray Sayle 
described it in The Sunday Times of May 27th, 1984, operates 
by means of three independently functioning computers, which 
are routinely checked and cross-checked. How then had the 
aircraft strayed off course by more than 300 miles? This 
question was never resolved. Human error was also considered, 
and seemed a more likely explanation, although this implied 
that a major and basic error had been compounded by all three 
members of the crew, two of whom were experienced military 
pilots. The captainTs reputation for attention to safety and 
detail when flying earned him the nickname TMr Computer1.
Two of the pilots, including the captain, were known to 
have had links with the CIA. KAL 007 had carried 18 extra 
crew members (29 instead of the usual 11) who were not named 
in the official list of those lost. The Soviet Union alleged 
that these had been military personell involved in the 
intelligence mission. Passengers on previous KAL 007 flights 
reported that they had been ordered to close their curtains 
and dim lights for long periods of their journey, 
strengthening the possibility that the Korean airliner could
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In isolation these points were hardly conclusive, but 
together they detracted from the official US position that 
the spyplane theory was !preposterous!. Former director of 
the CIA Stansfield Turner had revealed on Channel 4 news on 
September 2nd, 1983 that civilian planes could be and were 
used on military missions by both the USA and the USSR. R.W. 
Johnson noted in The Guardian Weekly of December 25th, 1983, 
that Korean Airlines is closely linked to the Korean CIA,
"set up by the CIA in 1982” and that "in 1978 a KAL airliner 
overflew the great Soviet naval base at Murmansk and was 
fired on by Soviet fighters"[1]. The spyplane theory was 
further supported by the fact that, as Andrew Wilson put it 
in the article cited above, "the Soviet electronic activity 
provoked by Flight 007*3 intrusion provided Western 
intelligence with its biggest coup for many years". Whether 
planned or not, there was no doubt that US intelligence 
services had reaped a rich harvest of information about 
Soviet defences from the Korean airliner incident.
In July 1984 the accumulation of evidence supporting the 
spy plane theory prompted the TV Eye current affairs 
programme to produce a special investigation of the disaster. 
The presenters opening comments acknowledged that the 
evidence he was about to present had first been revealed by 
the Soviet Union. They also indicated this journalises 
inclination to dismiss 'the Russians' as a reliable source of 
information.
Predictably, it was the Russians who first made the 
charge that Korean Airlines flight 007 was part of a 
spying mission, but as TV Eye's investigation has
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as propaganda.
The half-hour TV Eye investigation brought together much 
of the evidence and interviewed several analysts and former 
military personell. The lawyer representing the relatives of 
the dead passengers, Aaron Broder, set the context of the 
investigation by explaining that he and his clients were far 
from satisfied with the US government's account:
My clients all feel that there has been a cover-up of 
the real culprits here. My clients feel that there was 
an intelligence-gathering mission... and that there is a 
great deal more here than a sheer coincidence that an 
airliner was 450 miles off course and that it was just 
by sheer accident over that area of the Russian defence 
network[2].
Retired US diplomat John Kepple,announcing his intention 
to call for a special Congressional Hearing which would have 
access to the US government's classified material on the 
incident, gave his reasons:
If you look at the mechanics of the flight you cannot 
believe that it was not intentional... there is some 
kind of stretching of the mind here because its 
incredible to use a full airplane full of innocent 
people who'd paid their money and wanted to go somewhere 
but I can't personally believe that the flight was not 
intentional.
Here the presenter interjected with the observation that: 
"the unthinkable, that lives were deliberately put at risk 
and lost, is being thought..."
The programme contained detailed interviews with various 
experts on specific points. Lufthansa pilot Rudolf Braunberg 
who had flown the KAL 007 route many times testified that in 
his opinion it was "impossible" for three such experienced
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former operative on board RC-135s confirmed that it would 
have been possible for the aircraft in the area on August 
31st to have contacted KAL 007 and warned it out of Soviet 
airspace. He also maintained that it was possible for the RC- 
135 to report directly to Washington if need be. Ernest 
Volkman, an American intelligence analyst, outlined the 
nature of the intelligence bonanza1 spoken of in the 
P.Q.Mann article:
the tragic incident managed to turn on just about every 
single Soviet electro-magnetic transmission over a 
period of about four hours and an area of approximately 
7000 square miles... a Christmas tree lit up, everything 
you could ever hope for. Now admittedly that's a cynical 
statement, but we're talking about a cynical business 
here.
The TV Eye programme added to a growing list of articles 
and publications which contradicted the picture of the 
Korean airline disaster initially presented by the US 
government. By July 1984 the principal points of the Soviet 
account had been substantiated by numerous independent 
sources, weakening correspondingly the view that the disaster 
had been an act of pre-meditated, cold-blooded murder. One 
year almost to the day after the disaster the official stance 
of the Reagan Administration itself changed, as The Guardian 
reported on September 1st, 1984:
A senior Administration official has said that he 
believes the Russians shot down the Korean airlines 
flight 007 a year ago because they were genuinely 
convinced it was on an intelligence mission. The 
comments by one of the State Department's senior Soviet 
experts on the Soviet Union went further in publicly 
acknowledging an honest error by the Soviet Union than 
the Administration has gone in the past.
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Union’s justification for its actions had been conceded by 
the same authorities who had at first been so adamant in 
their condemnations: that the aircraft had been confused with 
an RC-135. Indeed, according to a Newsnight report of 
September 10th 1986, this fact was known to the US Government 
in the first week of the crisis.
The item contained an interview with Seymour Hersch, an 
American journalist and author of a book about the incident. 
On the programme Hersch stated that "there’s agreement inside 
the [US] intelligence community that the Russians made a 
wrong ID. It’s unanimous". According to the correspondent:
The raw intelligence was available early and 
persuasively to show that the Russians did not knowingly 
shoot down a civilian airliner. They did not identify 
the plane as Korean Airline 747 but confused its track 
with that of the earlier reconnaisance flight. Within 
the Pentagon there was one group, Airforce Intelligence, 
which reported accurately that the Russians did not know 
they were shooting down an airliner.
Hersch argued that "between day two to day seven of the 
crisis, we began to get a firm hold on the fact that the 
Soviets had done nothing other than make a terrible ghastly 
mistake". "Why then", asked the correspondent, "were these 
views dicounted?" Why did the Americans insist, "against the 
best evidence they had, that the Russians had knowingly shot 
down a civilian airliner?".
By then the Americans were already embarked on a 
propaganda offensive. To the Administration’s ideologues 
it was the classic case of the evil empire in action.
In Hersch’s view, "the Soviet-haters are here at the top 
of this government, they truly are, and they went public with
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the hardest story they could”.
During the period of the propaganda war the US government 
made statements of revulsion and outrage, launching a 
campaign of denunciation in which it sought to ostracise the 
Soviet Union from the international community as a *state 
based on the dual principles of callousness and mendacity*. 
President Reagan and his advisers presented the incident as 
"clear justification of their view of the Soviet Union as an 
evil empire”(2 Newsnight 8/9/86).
The Administration sought and received backing from its 
allies in imposing sanctions on cultural and commercial 
exchanges (though as quickly became clear, relations between 
the USA and the USSR were already so poor that little could 
be practically done to make them worse: banning Aeroflot was 
suggested, for example, until it was pointed out that 
Aeroflot had no flying rights in the United States). The 
Soviet Union was unambiguously condemned by the European 
Parliament, NATO, and professional bodies such as the 
International Federation of Airline Pilots* Associations.
The US governments main objective during the crisis was 
to portray the incident as being entirely consistent with 
Soviet behaviour. The Korean airline incident was not 
perceived in this account as an extraordinary incident, but 
one wholly consistent with normal Soviet behaviour. Such a 
*heinous act of barbarism*, as President Reagan described it 
on September 2nd, was a measure of Soviet brutality, a 
graphic manifestation of the Soviet Threat.
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Korean airline disaster were clear. As Senator Robert Byrd 
put it, on BBC news of September 4th:
I would hope that our West European friends would take 
very close note of this. If they are willing to shoot 
down an unarmed commercial plane theyTre certainly 
willing to shoot down an unarmed European city, one that 
can't respond.
The linkage drawn between the incident and the nuclear 
debate in America was not lost on the pro-nuclear lobby in 
Britain. A Times editorial of September 6th noted that:
This callous regime, which shoots first and asks 
questions afterwards, has served a timely reminder on 
the members of the Atlantic Alliance that if they do not 
hang together they may be hanged separately.
The timeliness1 of the Korean airliner crisis lay in the 
scheduled arrival of new American nuclear missiles in Europe 
by December that year, a controversial deployment which was 
creating serious political problems for NATO. Western 
governments used the Korean airline disaster to legitimise 
the new deployments and to justify their tough' negotiating 
stance at the INF talks in Geneva.
The likelihood that Western negotiators would take a 
tougher stand at the INF talks, because of the incident, was 
noted in an ITN report:
As the two sides met for the first time for two months 
the atmosphere didn't seem to have worsened. But inside 
there was little doubt that the actual talks will be 
even more difficult.(3 2200 6/9/83)
The reason for this was said to be that:
The Americans can hardly make any fresh concessions now.
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On September 12th the US Congress reconvened in its first 
session after the Korean airliner incident. ITN reported 
that:
As a result of the Korean airline incident Congress is 
now more likely to approve President Reagan’s planned 
increase in defence spending, including the deployment 
of the controversial MX missile.(3 2200 12/9/83)
The very real effects of the Korean airliner incident on 
East-West relations and on the arms control process were thus 
shown to be an escalation of the United States1 rearmament 
programme, unfettered by the need to ’’make fresh concessions 
now” .
The Soviets also linked the incident to the coming of 
Cruise and Pershing II, and the ongoing INF negotiations at 
Geneva. In the Soviet view the incident was deliberately 
being exploited in order to discredit the Soviet negotiating 
position at the Geneva talks. The Soviets went further and 
suggested that lives had knowingly been put at risk on the 
Korean airliner with the propaganda potential of the incident 
in mind. The USSR was ’’contemptuous of American hypocrisy, 
insisting that the 7^7 was on a spying mission and had 
deliberately strayed off course"(2 Newsnight 8/9/86). A 
Soviet government statement of September 6th, reproduced in 
Soviet News no. 6189, claimed that:
The plan was to carry out without hitch the intelligence 
operation but if it was foiled, to turn all this into a 
major political provocation against the Soviet Union. 
This conclusion is confirmed by all subsequent actions 
of the US Administration. Its leaders, including the US 
President in person, launched a malicious and hostile 
anti-Soviet campaign over a very short time, clearly 
using a pre-arranged script. Its essence has been
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speech of the US President Ronald Reagan on September 
5th - to try and blacken the image of the Soviet Union 
and discredit its social system, to provoke a feeling of 
hatred towards the Soviet people, to present the aims of 
the foreign policy of the USSR in a distorted 
perspective, and to detract attention from its peace 
initiatives.
Before discussing the way in which television news 
reported this "battle of words” it is important to draw 
attention to the different approaches of the two countries to 
information and propaganda1. A significant factor in 
determining how the Americans on the one hand, and the 
Soviets on the other were presented on television news was 
the inability or refusal of the latter to present its case 
with the same sensitivity to Western public opinion as the 
Americans. As suggested in the previous chapter, news 
management and news input have effects on coverage of East- 
West issues. Coverage of the Korean Airliner tragedy cannot 
be adequately understood without taking this factor into 
account.
The United States* view of the Korean airline disaster was 
immediately communicated to the world, through the mass 
media, in televised Presidential addresses, news conferences, 
dramatic presentations of evidence to the United Nations, and 
a steady flow of commentary which ensured that the US account 
was highly visible. By contrast the Soviets released only 
three short TASS statements in the first seven days. The 
first came on September 1st.
An unidentified plane entered the airspace of the Soviet 
Union over Kamchatka Peninsula from the direction of the 
Pacific Ocean and then for the second time violated the 
airspace of the USSR over Sakhalin Island on the night 
from August 31st to September 1st. The plane did not
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did not enter into contact with the dispatched service. 
Fighters of the anti-aircraft defence, which were sent 
aloft towards the intruder plane, tried to give it 
assistance in directing it to the nearest airfield. But 
the intruder plane did not react to the signals and 
warnings from the Soviet fighters and continued its 
flight in the direction of the Sea of Japan.
Given the scale of human tragedy involved in the disaster 
this statement was simply inadequate. It said nothing about 
casualties and failed to confirm that Soviet fighters had 
shot the aircraft down. These omissions left a gap in Soviet 
propaganda. Although the next statement, on September 2nd, 
saw the first exposition of a consistent, credible and 
increasingly detailed Soviet view, the damage was done in so 
far as a framework for understanding the incident as ’Soviet 
brutality1 had already been established in the media. Peter 
Ruff was the BBC correspondent in Moscow at the time of the 
crisis.
The Korean airliner threw the whole Soviet 
propaganda/military machine into total chaos. For 
several days they didn’t know what to say. They had no 
idea. First of all, they wouldn’t admit that it had 
happened, and then it all came out in bits and pieces.
Some Western analysts who later accepted that the incident 
itself was explicable without recourse to the concept of 
Soviet barabarism were nevertheless highly critical of what 
they interpreted as confusion and indecision on the part of 
the Soviet authorities in the ensuing propaganda war. One 
such was Geoffrey Stern, who argued on BBC’s Newsnight of 
February 2nd, 1984, that:
It’s quite conceivable that any government would have 
shot down an alien intruder that flies over the most 
sensitive of all your equipment you have. After all, 
this whole region contains three extremely sensitive
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happened, there being no communication between the 
United States and the Soviet Union the plane would have 
been shot down. The Israelis shot down a civilian plane 
when they thought that it constituted a danger to their 
vital interests. However, I think that the way it was 
handled after that betrays the way in which things were 
going in the Kremlin at the moment. They could have been 
handled in a very different way.
On the same programme, Dr Dimitri Simes of the Carnegie 
Institute in Washington stated that:
The Korean airliner was shot because of standard 
operational procedures. The Soviets honestly were 
confused, they though that this was an American spyplane 
but their air defence system did not function well, they 
did not have much time before the Korean airliner left 
Soviet airspace. Where I believe the Soviets could 
handle it differently was not before shooting the plane 
but after. They performed miserably. It looked like 
nobody was in control, one man did not know what the 
other was saying, and if Mr Andropov was in better 
health I assume that the Soviets could put together a 
more credible show.
In the first few days of intense media coverage there were 
no direct statements or appearances by Soviet leaders. It was 
not until the TASS statement of September 6th that the 
destruction of the airliner was officially confirmed. Things 
began to improve on September 7th when the Soviet Foreign 
minister addressed the Madrid Conference on European Security 
and Cooperation, the first time that a member of the Soviet 
government had spoken on the incident and on September 9th 
the Soviet authorities mounted a special news conference for 
Soviet and Western journalists in which they gave a detailed 
account of what they claimed had happened to the Korean 
airliner. In the view of BBC!s Peter Ruff:
I think a policy decision was taken at the time that 
someone was going to have to account for this. I equally 
believe that someone said, why donft we have a full­
blown press conference. The decision was taken that it
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would have to be the military so you suddenly had 
Ogarkov appearing coast-to-coast live on television. And 
in their terms it was probably judged a success. In a 
sense, the Soviet state decided to confront the thing 
head on, which was something they'd never done before. 
After an initial period of confusion and obvious 
political infighting, it was decided that they would 
take on the world and justify what they'd done.
Soviet delay in 'confronting the thing head on* 
undoubtedly contributed to the way in which television 
journalists reported the propaganda war. Had the Soviet 
authorities paid more attention at an early stage to the 
mechanics of an information war fought on the Western media 
it is possible that the Soviet version of why the tragedy 
occured would have been received differently. On the other 
hand, it is significant that quantitative media coverage of 
the incident fell away sharply after the Moscow news 
conference of September 9th, as it became increasingly likely 
that the Soviet Union had a credible case to put. As the idea 
of Soviet 'barbarism' began to lose its legitimacy, western 
journalists in general seemed to lose interest in the affair.
However, it is the contention of this chapter that the 
Soviets were putting a case after September 1st. The 
following analysis shows how it was received, vis a vis the 
admittedly slicker, but no more 'truthful' account of the 
Korean Airline disaster offered by the Reagan Administration 
and its Western allies.
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2. The American View.
The first day of the sample period, Friday September 2nd, 
established the explanatory framework which would dominate 
coverage during the sample. BBC news dispensed with headlines 
and led with an excerpt from the statement made by President 
Reagan in California that day.
Ronald Reagan: What can we think of a regime that so 
broadly trumpets its vision of peace and global 
disarmament, and yet so callously and quickly commits a 
terrorist act to sacrifice the lives of innocent human 
beings?
Newscaster: President Reagan, condemning the Soviet 
Union for shooting down the Korean airliner. Tonight 
Moscow apologised, and changed its version. The fighters 
did open fire, but the Jumbo was spying. (1 2100 2/9/83)
This introduction was typical of the pattern of privileged 
access extended to the US Government account of the disaster 
throughout the sample period. In the section of the speech 
chosen for transmission the President did not state a fact, 
or make an announcement, or express an opinion. Rather, he 
posed a rhetorical question: what can we think of such a 
regime? His assumption that a terrorist act had been 
committed and innocent lives sacrificed by the Soviet Union 
was allowed to set the agenda immediately, while at the same 
time instructing the audience to make the link between this 
behaviour and Soviet intentions on arms control. This 
definition of the event was legitimised thus:
tonight Moscow apologised, and changed its version.
Although the implication of the journalist’s comment is 
that the Soviet Union has conceded responsibility and changed 
its story neither the statement of September 1st nor that of
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evening bulletin retained headlines:
Mr Andropov regrets the deaths in the Korean airliner.
Mr Reagan says - how can you trust such people?(3 2200 
2/9/83).
From the way in which the respective positions of the two 
sides are set out a framework for understanding the issue is 
established which shares the basic assumptions inherent in 
the Presidents statement. No indication is given to the 
viewer that assumptions are being made, or what these are. By 
the nature of introductory presentations it is difficult to 
portray the complexity of the issue,but in the lengthier 
reports which followed on both bulletins the same assumptions 
were present. The President's interpretation of the Korean 
airline disaster set the terms of the propaganda war from the 
outset of the crisis, quickly becoming the preferred reading 
of the incident on television news.
President Reagan's speech on September 2nd was open to 
varying interpretations. In general terms the assumptions 
made in it, and its linking of the Korean airliner incident 
to wider issues of East-West relations, were an obvious 
extension of his conception of the Soviet threat.
Reagan: In the wake of the barbaric act commited 
yesterday by the Soviet regime against a commercial jet 
liner, the United States and many other countries of the 
world made clear and compelling statements that 
expressed not only our outrage but also our demand for a 
truthful accounting of the facts. Our first emotions are 
anger, disbelief and profound sadness.
While events in Afghanistan and elsewhere have left 
few illusions about the willingness of the Soviet Union 
to advance its interests through violence and 
intimidation all of us had hoped that certain 
irreducible standards of civilised behaviour nonetheless
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people everywhere. The tradition in the civilised world 
has always been to offer help to mariners and pilots who 
are lost or in distress on the sea or in the air. Where 
human life is valued, extraordinary efforts are extended 
to preserve and protect it, and its essential that as 
civilised societies we ask searching questions about the 
nature of regimes where such standards do not apply.
Beyond these emotions the world notes the stark 
contrast that exists between Soviet words and deeds.
What can we think of a regime that so broadly trumpets 
its vision of peace and global disarmament and yet so 
callously and quickly commits a terrorist act to 
sacrifice the lives of human beings? What can be said 
about Soviet credibility when they so flagrantly lie 
about such a heinous act? What can be the scope of 
legitimate mutual discourse with a state whose values 
permit such atrocities? And what are we to make of a 
regime which establishes one set of standards for 
itself, and another for the rest of humankind?
We've joined in the call for an urgent Security 
Council meeting today. The brutality of this act should 
not be compounded through silence or the cynical 
distortion of the evidence now at hand. Tonight I will 
be meeting with my advisers to conduct a formal review 
of this matter, and this weekend I shall be meeting with 
the Congressional leadership. To the families of all 
those on the ill-fated aircraft we send our deepest 
sympathies and I hope they know our prayers are with 
them all.(1 2100 2/9/83)
As is clear, the speech does not focus on the airliner 
incident itself, but concentrates on drawing out appropriate 
lessons. The language of the speech - 'flagrant liars', 
'barbarism', 'atrocities' - seeks to expose the Soviet Union 
as a regime with whom there can be no 'legitimate mutual 
discourse', whose arms control proposals are by implication 
bogus, which is capable of horrendous acts of violence. It is 
taken for granted not only that an act of barbarism has been 
committed but that this is a normal expression of Soviet 
values. These claims had ideological roots in the 
conservatism of the Reagan Administration, yet correspondents 
on television news at no point challenged them and indeed 
reinforced them by their own commentaries.
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world against the Soviet Threat, whenever and wherever it 
occurred:
When the Soviets act in a way which angers the Western 
world, as in Poland or Afghanistan, that world turns to 
the United States to carry the banner of protest, and it 
is precisely to discuss the options open to him that the 
President is returning to the White House.(3 2200 
2/9/83)
Having informed the viewer that a) the West is angry with 
the Soviet Union, b) the Korean airliner incident is just 
like Poland and Afghanistan, the reporter concludes that c) 
the United States carries the 'banner of protest* for us all. 
The first of these assertions could be described as a fact. 
The others express only the opinion of the journalist that 
President Reagan had in this case both right and might on his 
side. Subsequent discussions of options open to the President 
underlined the extent to which the US account of the incident 
had already been established as the 'consensus*. ITN's report 
ended with speculation on the dilemma facing the President. 
How could he make them pay?
Whatever sanctions President Reagan takes against the 
Soviet Union, sooner or later he will have to lift them, 
and the Soviet slate will in a sense be wiped clean and 
so the President is certain to ensure that the memory of 
what the Soviet Union has done lives long beyond 
whatever action he takes against them.
By this stage in the bulletin no evidence of any kind had 
been presented to confirm or deny what precisely it was that 
the Soviets had done. Journalists nevertheless assumed that 
the Soviet Union was capable of and had in fact deliberately 
destroyed a civilian airliner. President Reagan's speech was 
taken as the starting point for an 'impartial* account of the
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incident, rather than being seen as itself part of the 
propaganda war and the Tbattle of words’ which was 
developing. The only controversy systematically analysed in 
subsequent discussion was the question of the severity of 
sanctions.
BBC news followed its report of President Reagan’s speech 
with a report from the United Nations building in New York 
where an emergency session of the Security Council was about 
to begin. In the course of the item one Senator questioned 
the value of the United Nations, challenging it to respond 
’effectively’ to this latest instance of Soviet barbarism:
Senator Alphonse D’Amato: It’s about time that the free
world came together. We’ve had too much rhetoric, not 
enough action, we’ve had condemnations in the past, 
we’ve had allies not act in concert. Number one we 
should convene the world body, the UN, let's see if it 
is more than a debating society.
The speaker assumes that the Korean airline incident is a 
matter for ’action’ as opposed to ’rhetoric’, and states his 
belief that action against the Soviet Union is long overdue. 
The correspondent follows on with a commentary on the role of 
the United Nations which takes on Mr D'Amato’s remarks and 
appears to accept their basic validity:
Journalist: There are many people of course who do 
regard the United Nations as little more than a debating 
society. Even if enough delegates voted for a resolution 
to condemn the Russians the Soviet Union still has a 
right of veto. It is at best a safety valve, an 
opportunity to express indignation without getting any 
really tangible results.
This commentary is informed by a particular reading of the 
Korean airline disaster, that of right-wingers in the US
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interpretative framework used by journalists to make sense of 
the incident, while the question of what actually happened to 
the airliner and who was responsible was bypassed.
This pattern was evident throughout the sample period. 
Speakers appeared on the news, presented the US account of 
the incident as fact and proceeded to condemn the Soviet 
Union accordingly.
Journalist: American officials insist that the action 
was not just a simple and terrible mistake.
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt: This was 
certainly not the action of a rogue fighter pilot. We 
know for a fact that this fighter pilot was in 
continuous contact with his ground control and that 
ground control exercised authority over his actions. We 
have yet to find any convincing evidence that that 
airliner received any warning from the Soviets.
Journalist: Though Congress is not sitting the toughest 
demands for retaliatory action of some kind have come 
from Capitol Hill where there’s outrage particularly at 
the death of Congressman Larry Macdonald, an arch­
conservative from Georgia.
Senator Daniel P.Moynihan: First of all the President 
should call the Congress back into session to let the 
world and the Soviet Union know how serious this is they 
have murdered an American Congressman. Two, we should go 
to the Security Council. Three we should go to the World 
Court and ask every other country in the world who is 
signatory to the Chicago Civil Air Convention of which 
the Soviets are a party to go to the court with us and 
get damages and a condemnation.(1 2100 2/9/83)
The uncritical reporting of statements which agreed with 
the dominant interpretation of the crisis became a typical 
feature of news coverage.
Henry Kissinger: The first thing I would do now is to 
suspend the meeting between Gromyko and Secretary of 
State Schultz until there is a satisfactory explanation.
Zbigniew Brzezinski: Thus we mustn’t make it into an 
American-Soviet affair. The United States should joivn
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community will react equally strongly, in condemning the 
Soviet Union.(3 2200 2/9/83)
Even after September 4th, when major gaps in the 
Administration's evidence began to be noted by such figures 
as Democratic Congressional leader Jim Wright, challenges to 
the dominant interpretation of events were limited to two 
items, both on BBC2's Newsnight, and both written by Charles 
Wheeler, the BBC!s Washington correspondent at that time.
By September 4th it was becoming clear not only that the 
United States' account was curiously silent on major points - 
such as the failure of US and Japanese monitoring facilities 
to warn KAL 007 of impending disaster - but that some of the 
Soviet assertions were true. BBCI's main news that day 
reported a claim by Soviet General Romanov that "the Jumbo 
looked like an American reconnaisance plane, the RC-135. He 
said the Jumbo was flying without any lights, and the outline 
resembled that of the RC-135, a military version of the 
Boeing 707. American officials admitted tonight that there 
was an American spyplane in the vicinity of the Korean 
Airlines flight".
Some evidence strengthening the Soviet account emerged 
from a Presidential briefing session on September 4th. The 
Democratic Congressional leader Jim Wright, who was present 
at the briefing, told reporters that from the evidence of the 
tapes of the incident made by US and Japanese intelligence it 
was not clear that the Soviet fighter pilot had recognised 
KAL 007 to be a civilian airliner, contrary to the assurances 
of the Reagan Administration. In fact, said the congressman,
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an RC-135.
On September 5th ITN reported a statement by Congressman 
Wright that, according to his hearing of the Administrations 
tapes of the incident "there wasn’t any clear definition of 
the aircraft [by the Soviet pilot]. It was referred to on 
those tapes as ’it' or ’the plane* or *the target*. The 
question arises as to how high was the level of understanding 
that this was an unarmed commercial civilian airplane*’(3 2200 
5/9/83).
Main evening bulletins never developed the implications 
of this statement, which clearly undermined the 
Administrations position that there was no possibility of a 
mistake being made. Indeed, main evening bulletins 
constructed no critical, or sceptical readings of the 
Administrations account at any time during their coverage. 
Only one journalist - Charles Wheeler of Newsnight - 
developed the available evidence and drew conclusions which 
seriously challenged the US account.
We reproduce at some length here one of Wheeler*s report, 
in which the evidence about the RC-135 was employed to 
legitimise the Soviet account. Broadcast by Newsnight on 
September 5th, the item began by pointing out ’undue 
selectivity* in the American account of the incident.
Journalist: In advance of the President’s speech [a 
reference to the September 6th speech discussed below] 
what chiefly intrigues people here is how Mr Reagan will 
handle the accidental disclosure yesterday of a possible 
pertinent fact that the Administration was keeping to 
itself, that an American military reconnaisance was 
flying just outside Soviet airspace but in the same area
217
airliner they later shot down. In the minds of some this 
revelation not only reinforces what seems to be shaping 
up as the Soviet case for the defence - that the Russian 
fighter pilots mistook the 747 for an American spyplane 
- it also suggests that Washington is being unduly 
selective in its presentation of the evidence.
The story of the American reconnaisance plane, an RC- 
135, surfaced on Sunday morning when half a dozen 
leaders of both houses of Congress went to the White 
House for what one of those veterans called !the most 
detailed and helpful briefing we’ve ever had from a 
President1. Mr Reagan had assembled his senior cabinet 
members, and the briefing included a playback of tapes 
recorded by Japanese intelligence of radio reports by 
two Soviet fighter pilots to their controllers on the 
ground. Afterwards the Congressional leaders talked to 
us in the White House garden, among them the Democratic 
Party leader in the House, Jim Wright.
Jim Wright: We do not know for sure whether or not the
Russian pilots were able correctly to identify that it
was a commercial, a civilian aircraft a opposed to an
RC-135.
US Journalist: But you say they continually referred to 
it as an RC-135.
Jim Wright: They referred to it twice in those terms. On
one occasion they referred to it as an RC-135 or
unidentifiable target.
US Journalist: Was there any reason given to you as to 
why they might have thought it was an RC-135?
Jim Wright: Because of the fact that they have tracked
RC-135s which routinely fly outside, just outside their 
zone, they do not intrude into Russian airspace and they 
are familiar with the fact that we do maintain 
reconnaisance flights in our RC-135s which are US
reconnaisance aircraft and I suppose also because they
tend to be somewhat paranoid.
Journalist: Congressman Wright’s disclosure touched off 
a barrage of questions at a White House briefing within 
the hour. And eventually a reluctant White House 
spokesman Larry Speakes conceded that yes, there was 
evidence that the Russians at one time thought they were 
tracking an RC-135 and yes, a plane of that type had 
been flying a mission over Soviet territory. The RC-135
is a military version of the Boeing 707. It has a
specially extended nose. It is far smaller than a 747.
It does not have that characteristic Jumbo hump and a 
competent Soviet pilot ought to be able to tell one from 
the other, especially in the light of a three-quarter 
moon. But the presence of not one but two unidentified 
planes, one of them just outside and the other well 
inside Soviet airspace may well have created confusion 
and should surely have been disclosed along with all the
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claim that nobody has ever raised the question of 
American aircraft. They did.
While Congressional leaders were being briefed in the 
Cabinet Room the man in charge of the crisis management 
team at the State Department, Assistant Secretary of 
State Richard Burt, was appearing live on the CBS 
programme Face the Nation where a chance to fill out the 
record soon presented itself.
Face the Nation presenter: There have been several 
stories in the last couple of days quoting intelligence 
officials some saying that the Soviets may have indeed 
thought that they were on the track of a spyplane but I 
take it you say they saw strobelights, what is your view 
on that, do you think that this is a case of mistaken 
identity?
Richard Burt: Not at all, I think it!s preposterous to 
think that the Soviets concluded that was a spyplane. We 
carry out normal military reconnaisance missions in 
international airspace in that area as do the Soviets 
and other countries. These operations are sometimes 
connected with what we call national-technical means of 
verification. The United States and the Soviet Union 
have agreed on procedures for monitoring arms control 
agreements, but the point is, that we do not violate 
Soviet airspace on such operations and I would remind 
you that we know that the Soviets tracked this aircraft 
for two and a half hours as it went in and out of Soviet 
airspace and before destroying the aircraft the Soviet 
pilot had established visual contact with the aircraft 
so it just doesnft wash that this could have been seen 
by the Soviets as a spyplane or a military aircraft.
Journalist: Nobody here is condoning the shooting 
down of that Korean aircraft but there is criticism of 
the way the Reagan Administration has handled the 
crisis.
The item now leads into an interview with Dimitri Simes, 
an emigre Soviet academic at the Carnegie Institute, 
Washington, and consultant to the US Government on Soviet 
affairs.
Do you regard it as significant that there was an 
American reconnaisance plane, an RC-135 in the area?
Dimitri Simes: Definitely significant because it adds at 
least some element of credibility to the first Soviet 
explanation... it does not look like a flagrant lie as 
it appeared after the statement was issued and totally 
rejected by the State Department.
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This example illustrates the nature of the questions being 
asked of the United States1 account even at this early stage, 
and the availability of an alternative account of the 
incident. The item raises the possibility that the Soviet 
version is not, after all, a 'flagrant lie*. This alternative 
framework is arrived at by the simple device of examining the 
available evidence, including Congressman Wright's testimony 
that, according to the US tape of the incident, the Soviet 
fighter pilot who shot down KAL 007 actually referred to an 
RC-135 on two occasions. On main bulletins the disclosure of 
the presence in the area of an RC-135 was reported by 
journalists, in line with American claims, as coincidence.
American officials admitted tonight that there was an 
American spyplane in the vicinity of the Korean Airlines 
flight but it was well outside Soviet airspace and one 
and a half hours before the airliner was shot down. The 
spyplane was on a routine reconnaisance flight, they 
say, and by the time the Jumbo was shot down the Soviet 
pilots should have known without a doubt that it was a 
civilian plane.(1 2000 4/9/83)
The next day, September 6th, President Reagan gave a major 
televised statement on the incident which was covered 
extensively on British television news. By this stage in the 
propaganda war it was being openly speculated that there 
would be no "serious sanctionsn(ITN 2200 5/9/83). The reasons 
for this, it was reported, were disagreement amongst the 
allies as to the effectiveness of sanctions, and the 
disclosure that in line with the Soviet account there had 
indeed been an American RC-135 spyplane in the vicinity of 
the Korean airliner. This had emerged on Sunday September 
4th, after a briefing session between President Reagan and 
Congressional leaders at the White House, and was reported on
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television news on September 5th.
Partly for this reason, it was predicted that there would 
be a drawing back from the "tough line against the Russians". 
Reports of the speech portrayed it as moderate. "A mild 
speech", one journalist called it (ITN 2200 6/9/83). 
"President Reagan failed to apply any strong sanctions", 
remarked another on the same bulletin, "and the White House 
today received scores of telegrams protesting at the lack of 
real action". BBC reported the Presidents own description of 
his sanctions as "a calm and measured response"(BBC1 2100 
6/9/83). The same section of the speech was transmitted on 
both main evening bulletins.
Reagan: Here is a brief segment of the tape which we're 
going to play in its entirety at the United Nations 
security council tomorrow - (The navigation lights are 
on...Roger I'm at 7500 course 230, closing on the 
target... I have executed the launch, target is 
destroyed, breaking off attack). Those were the voices 
of the Soviet pilots. In this tape the pilot who fired 
the missiles describes his search for what he calls the 
target. He reports he has it in sight, indeed he pulls 
up to within about a mile of the Korean plane, he 
mentions its flashing strobe light and that its 
navigation lights are on. He then reports he!s reducing 
speed to get behind the airliner, gives his distance 
from the plane at various points in this manouevre, and 
finally announces what can only be called the Korean 
Airline Massacre.
Alternatives to the view that the speech was a "calm and 
measured response" were not reported on main evening 
bulletins. Again, however, Charles Wheeler on Newsnight 
challenged this reading. Appendix 4.1 is a transcript of this 
counter-example (broadcast on September 6th) in its entirety. 
Here we reproduce two sections of the journalists 
commentary. In the first, the Reagan speech is employed as an
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and the journalist uses it to comment on the reasons for his 
popularity.
The people who still wonder how it was that the actor 
Ronald Reagan became President of the United States, and 
for those who wonder if he’ll be reelected if next year 
he runs for a second term, his speech last night 
provides the answer. America found in Reagan a leader 
with a simple comprehensible philosophy, and an 
exceptional ability to put his case across. He was 
always good at television. Last night he was matchless. 
Three years in office has made Reagan the master of his 
role. His popularity and his power have given his 
actorfs talent an edge that wasn!t there before. He was 
helped of course by the nature of the issue. A civil 
airliner packed with innocent people sent to their 
deaths by a Soviet missile. A simple case, he said, not 
merely of murder. As though it were a feature film he 
gave the tragedy a title - the Korean Airline Massacre, 
and he called it that five times.
After a lengthy excerpt from the Presidents speech, the 
journalist comes back in to contextualise it, not as a calm 
and measured response, but as ’demagogery*.
President Reagan addressing the nation. Reactions here 
vary widely. From the left to the political centre there 
is clearly relief that the actions the President has 
called for are strictly limited. ’The White House avoids 
flamboyance* says the New York Times, and from CBS, ’the 
speech of a statesman*. At the other end of the 
political spectrum, the far Right, it is being called a 
’namby-pamby speech that won’t wash with the American 
people because it is too soft’ and that has been the 
reaction clearly anticipated by the President’s aides.
At a White House briefing they stressed that the 
restraint he showed does not mean any softening in his 
attitude to the Russians, and in private conversations 
duly put into print today they added that the appearance 
of restraint was crucial to Mr Reagan for foreign and 
political reasons. Well restraint it seems is in the eye 
of the beholder. Perhaps it can be said that in this 
observer’s view Mr Reagan came closer last night than 
John Kennedy, or Lyndon Johnson, or Richard Nixon ever 
did, to being a demagogue.
In this example the Reagan Administration’s viewpoint is 
reported as ’propaganda*. The President is not presented here
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measured response to grave provocation, but as an 'actor1, a 
'demagogue', complimented on his ability to manipulate 
emotions with 'simple, comprehensible philosophies'. This 
reading of the speech, or of the official US viewpoint 
throughout the crisis, was never echoed on main evening 
bulletins.
It was not only the Reagan Administration which publicly 
professed its outrage at Soviet 'terrorism'. The majority of 
NATO governments joined in the condemnations. They too 
received uncritical coverage. The British Foreign Secretary 
for example, remarked on September 2nd that:
the world is bound to reflect on what kind of government 
and what kind of society it is that allows this kind of 
thing to happen.(BBC1 2100 2/9/83)
Echoing closely the sentiments expressed earlier in the 
day by President Reagan, the central asumption was again one 
of Soviet barbarism. The journalist reported the statement as 
moderate and conciliatory, under the circumstances:
But in spite of all this condemnation it's been 
noticeable today that noone in power has actually 
suggested cutting off any links with the Russians. Quite 
the opposite, in fact. Sir Geoffrey, like the State 
Department in Washington, is saying that the real need 
is to keep on talking to the Russians, to persuade them 
that they shouldn't behave like this.
The Administration's account of the incident had been 
established as reasonable and consensual, although no such 
assumption could have been made on the evidence alone.
At the end of the sample period the British Defence 
Secretary visited Washington. As the Foreign Secretary had
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done, Michael Heseltine used the Korean airline incident to 
portray himself as moderate and conciliatory in the context 
of the Soviet threat. These elements were neatly merged in 
his support for a policy of "negotiating from strengthn(ITN 
2200 14/9/83). Mr Heseltinefs visit to Washington was closely 
linked to the impending arrival of cruise missiles in 
Britain, and his statements during the visit illustrate how 
Western politicians frequently used the Korean airline 
disaster to justify and legitimate their defence policies in 
terms of the Soviet Threat. Of particular interest here is 
the extent to which this use of the tragedy was reported by 
television news.
Mr Heseltine has told the Americans that the shooting 
down of the Korean plane reinforced the need for the 
West to pursue arms control talks. The incident, he 
said, said nothing new about Russian behaviour but 
because the Soviet Union was capable of such acts it was 
imperative to go on talking to them about nuclear 
weapons.(1 2100 14/9/83)
The opinion that there was fnothing new1 in the Korean 
airline disaster appeared without qualification or comment, 
as it did in ITNfs report:
the Defence Secretary Mr Heseltine has said the Korean 
jet incident has made arms talks with Russia even more 
important. He said in Washington the West must still 
look for a dialogue simply because the Soviets are 
capable of doing such things, and he warned against a 
rhetoric of confrontation.(3 2200 14/9/83)
This was followed with news of more criticism of the USSR 
from President Reagan: "but President Reagan kept up his 
fierce criticism of Moscow tonight. He said we cannot allow 
such a brutal regime to militarily dominate this planet".
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regime out to militarily dominate this planet1: they 
frequently reinforced those images by sharing the assumption 
on which such rhetoric was based. This was borne out on one 
of the few occasions when a view which dissented from the 
dominant interpretation (other than those from Soviet 
sources) was reported.
On the 12th of September a summit meeting of the foreign 
ministers of the European Economic Community was held in 
Athens, under the chairmanship of the Greek Foreign Minister. 
An attempt was made at the meeting to secure a resounding 
condemnation of the Soviet Union for shooting down the Korean 
airliner. The Greeks however, disagreed with this approach. 
ITN reported that:
Nine of the Common Market countries are angry with the 
tenth, Greece, for blocking a united condemnation of the 
Soviet Union. The community foreign ministers could only 
agree to issue a statement simply regretting the loss of 
life.(3 2200 12/9/83)
The language of the report - they could TonlyT issue a 
statement,d imply1 regretting the loss of life - reveals the 
underlying assumption that more should have been said. As the 
report continues it becomes clear that Greece is held 
responsible for "a weak compromise cobbled together” which 
"merely expressed deep emotion and agreed to a full 
investigation”. There is no obvious reason why expressions of 
regret and calls for a full investigation should be dismissed 
as a fweak compromise1, unless the assumption had already 
been made that no investigation was required. The BBC report 
took a similarly dim view of the Greeks:
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Europe’s foreign ministers failed to show a united front 
today.(1 2100 12/9/83)
The journalist’s description of the foreign ministers' 
statement was remarkably similar to that of the ITN report.
Eventually there was a bland, compromise statement 
expressing sympathy for the victims of the disaster, but 
the Greek foreign minister was still the most unpopular 
man at his own meeting and the statement did not condemn 
the Russians.
In so far as the statement failed to condemn ’the 
Russians' it was a "bland compromise". In neither bulletin 
was any attempt made to view the "bland compromise" position 
from the Greek perspective, and to explain why the Greeks 
felt it to be valid. The viewer however, was reminded that 
Greece had a "left-wing government". The story was followed 
up three days later when the European Parliament met in 
Strasbourg. There was no 'weak, bland compromise’ here, as 
BBC reported:
Brutal and despicable. That was how the European 
Parliament condemned the shooting down of the South 
Korean airliner when it met in Strasbourg today. In its 
resolution the Parliament spoke of its deep indignation 
at the incident calling it cold-blooded murder, 
assasination and execution, but it wasn't only the 
Russians who came in for criticism. The Greek government 
was censured for refusing earlier this week to agree to 
an outright condemnation of the Soviet attack.(1 2100 
14/9/83).
With its accusations of cold-blooded murder, assasination 
and execution, this statement received a distinctly more 
sympathetic response than had the earlier 'compromise'. It 
was quickly endorsed by the correspondent as redressing the 
perceived inadequacies of the Athens statement.
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collective act. Fourteen days before it bypassed its own 
bureaucracy and condemned Russia’s attack. This was the 
day the sleeping Parliament in Strasbourg woke up, with 
Greece in its sights.
While congratulating the Parliament for at last pulling 
together, we were offered a belated and brief account of why. 
the Greek representatives had behaved in the way that they 
did:
The Greeks said their stand had been prompted by a need 
to preserve detente and not risk peace, but that 
argument was rejected by others who voted to condemn 
Russia by name.
In this manner, those who challenged the official reading 
of the Korean airline disaster were implicitly censured by 
journalists. On the opening day of the 1983 TUC conference in 
Blackpool BBC reported that the General Council had passed an 
emergency motion condemning the Soviet Union. This was 
followed by the news that:
Tonight Tony Benn in a wide-ranging speech attacking the 
West said the truth hadn’t come out in the first 
instance, that there was a reconnaisance plane 
accompanying the Korean airliner over Soviet 
territory.(1 2100 5/9/83)
Mr Benn’s statement that the Reagan Administration had 
been withholding important information from the public was 
contextualised by the qualification that he was ’attacking 
the West’. This hardly seems relevant to the subject of the 
Korean airliner unless to connect in the eyes of the audience 
Mr Benn’s views on the subject to an ’anti-West* position.
227
Coverage of the American view is also the key to how 
Soviet propaganda in the crisis was reported. As Table 1 
indicates Soviet accounts of the circumstances surrounding 
the incident were not ignored (30 reported statements of the 
Soviet position in all), but they were consistently reported 
within a framework which interpreted the spyplane theory as a 
*cover-up* rather than a credible explanation.
Soviet statements were reported on television news on five 
days throughout the sample. Two of these were TASS 
statements, one was delivered by the Soviet Foreign Minister 
at the Madrid Security Conference, one by a commentator on 
Soviet television news, and one was presented at a news 
conference in Moscow given for foreign and Soviet 
journalists. The assumption of Soviet culpability structured 
coverage throughout. The first reported Soviet statement was 
the TASS release of September 2nd:
Half an hour after President Reagan had spoken the 
Russians admitted for the first time that their fighters 
had opened fire but only, they said, with warning shots. 
Most significantly though the TASS statement said they 
were authorised to express the regret of what they 
called the Soviet Union*s leading circles... But all day 
leaders in non-communist capitals throughout the world 
have been telling Soviet diplomats that their version of 
events is inadequate.(1 2100 2/9/83)
Good evening. The Soviet Union says it did fire what it 
calls Twarning tracer shots* at the South Korean 
airliner. Moscow television said it was Authorised to 
state that the leading circles of the Soviet Union 
expressed their regret about the victims*. It*s thought 
that means President Andropov. But Moscow still claims 
the plane was masquerading as a civil aircraft.
President Reagan in California said the Soviets had 
flagrantly lied about the plane.(ITN 2200 2/9/83)
As the propaganda war developed Soviet statements were
228
responsibility for the civilian deaths was blamed by the USSR 
throughout on the United States. At the same time, the main 
case for the Soviet defence, that the aircraft had been 
mistaken for a spyplane was routinely juxtaposed with 
*balancing* statements by representatives of Western 
governments. Statements from these sources were not subject 
to critical analysis or challenge by journalists, and when 
used to balance* the debate they tended to be juxtaposed as 
*truth* to Soviet p r o p a g a n d a 1.
As we saw the initial statement made by President Reagan 
received uncritical coverage. The speech set the tone and 
established the interpretative framework which dominated 
subsequent coverage. Soviet statements reported at this time 
were immediately contradicted by reference to the Reagan 
speech and by the opinions of privileged *others*. BBC!s 
statement that *non-communiSt leaders say the Soviet version 
is inadequate* was followed by a lengthy list of 
condemnations:
The Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe summoned the Soviet 
ambassador to the Foreign Office and told him of 
Britain*s horror and revulsion. Other nations West and 
East have spoken too. France called the incident *cruel 
and intolerable*. West Germany, *despicable, brutal and 
unparalleled*. Italy called it a *mad gesture of war*. 
China said she was shocked. So too did the Pope.
ITN balanced the Soviet statement with President Reagan*s 
accusation of *flagrant lying*. Then:
America insists that a Soviet fighter shot the plane 
down, killing the 269 people on board.
As noted in the introduction, Soviet statements initially
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failed to confirm the fact that the aircraft had been 
destroyed by a Soviet fighter. But the September 2nd 
statement, expressing Regret1 over the loss of life and 
condemning those who *allowed*it was not a denial of that 
fact. In the above report of the propaganda exchange it is 
implied that such a denial has taken place. The Soviets are 
implied to be covering up, while the US State Department and 
President Reagan is staunchly insisting on the *truth*. The 
debate at this point was not about whether the aircraft had 
been shot down or not, but whv. Was it the consequence of a 
typical act of Soviet brutality or the accidental byproduct 
of a US intelligence operation? The statements released by 
both sides on September 2nd made this clear. On television 
news the debate was shifted onto different terrain, away from 
the doubts surrounding the American account of the incident.
The TASS statement was also interpreted by journalists as 
a *coming clean1 or a movement *in the direction demanded by 
Western governments*, although it was a clear condemnation, 
both of the United States for causing the tragedy, and
Western leaders in general for exploiting it. That the
statement did not contain an admission of responsibility for
the deaths was clear from news* accounts, and explained by
one journalist as being due to the fact that *the Soviet 
Union never apologises*.
The Foreign Secretary summoned the Soviet ambassador, 
told him the earlier Soviet explanation was totally 
inadequate and presented him with a list of demands...
Tonight the Russians have moved a little of the way 
in the direction Sir Geoffrey and the Americans are 
demanding. It came like this on Moscow Radio*s account 
of the affair, broadcast in English and it was brief in 
the extreme.[Radio Moscow broadcast follows]
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can only be the political leadership in the Kremlin, 
headed by President Andropov. It’s a less than half 
acceptance of responsibility and a less than half 
apology, but in the usual way the Soviet Union never 
apologises for what it does and is even less willing to 
admit it was wrong than most Western countries are and 
that brief sentence dropped into an elaborate defence of 
what happened must represent the minimum of what Mr 
Andropov and his colleagues feel that the West will 
accept.(1 2100 2/9/83)
Coverage of the September 2nd TASS statement illustrated a 
number of contradictory themes. On the one hand, the Soviets 
were reported to be coming clean in response to Western 
condemnation; on the other that they were engaged in a cover- 
up to deny the obvious fact that they had shot down a 
civilian airliner; the Soviet exposition of the spy plane 
theory was contextualised as part of this cover-up, and 
discreditted accordingly.
These contradictions continued to appear in coverage. On 
September 5th British television news picked up on a Soviet 
television commentators remarks about the incident, which 
were almost as vitriolic in their attack on the United States 
as Mr ReaganTs comments about the Soviet Union had been.
BBC’s report began by pointing to some Movement1 in the 
Soviet position.
Tonight the Russians came the closest they’ve come yet 
to admitting responsibility. A Soviet commentator said 
on television their defence forces had fulfilled their 
duty in protecting the country’s security. But there was 
no apology from Moscow tonight. The television 
commentator accused the Americans of being ’worse than 
the Nazis, sacrificing lives for their own ends’.(1 2100 
5/9/83).
On Soviet television’s main news tonight the commentator 
said the incident was all part of an American plan to 
gain nuclear superiority in Europe. He said the innocent 
passengers on the plane had been sacrificed just as 
Hitler’s troops forced women and children to go in front
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admitting that Soviet fighters shot down the plane(3 
2200 5/9/83)
To say that one has fulfilled one's duty1 is not the same 
thing as admitting responsibility. A major TASS statement was 
released the next day which expanded further on the statement 
of September 2nd and referred directly to the RC-135 
spyplane. The statement also contained the first official 
reference to the destruction of the airliner by Soviet 
fighters and was interpreted by journalists as the admission 
of guilt 'everyone has been waiting for*.
Good evening. Six days after the destruction of the 
Korean airliner the Soviet Government have finally owned 
up...That admission came less than 24 hours after 
President Reagan had gone on television to appeal for 
international action against the Soviet Union.
This statement, carrying with it the full authority 
of the Soviet leadership is an admission that a Soviet 
interceptor brought down the Jumbo jet. Coming as it 
does with the full authority of the Kremlin this is the 
acknowledgment that everyone has been waiting for.(1 
2100 6/9/83)
ITN interpreted the statement as a response to President 
Reagan's 'mild speech' of the previous evening. Again, ITN 
avoided the basic issue of why; the airliner had been shot 
down and like BBC concentrated on reading the Soviet 
statement as an admission of guilt.
Good evening. The Soviet Union admitted tonight for the 
first time that it did shoot down the Korean airliner 
last week, and it came near to saying it was sorry.(3 
2200 6/ 9/ 83).
Balance was achieved by juxtaposing the Soviet claim with 
a straight denial by the United States government:
The statement, expressly by the Soviet government, was 
rejected by the American Embassy in Moscow as
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airliner*s flight had been terminated by the Soviet air 
defences, President Andropov may have reasserted his 
civilian control over the Soviet military who’ve been 
insisting they did nothing wrong. Mr Andropov was away 
on holiday when the airliner was brought down. He may 
also have responded to Mr Reagan*s mild speech last 
night which called for little more than a Soviet apology 
and compensation for the victims.(3 2200 6/9/83)
Later in the bulletin we are told:
White House officials are still studying the reports 
from Moscow but a spokesman said, *if itfs true, it will 
be about time too1. It*ll certainly be welcome news for 
President Reagan who throughout has tried to avert a 
full scale confrontation with Moscow in the hopes that 
the arms control negotiations with the Russians would 
not come to a grinding halt.
The implications of these comments are clear. The Soviet 
Union, having confessed its guilt, will have pleased 
President Reagan who has never sought a confrontation over 
the incident. At the same time, it is *too little, too late*. 
The presentation of the statements and opinions of the 
principal actors in the drama is principally determined by 
the assumption that one side is guilty of the accusations 
being made against it by the other side. The United States 
appears in the account as flexible, anxious to avoid 
conflict, prepared to forgive the crime which has been 
committed. President Reagan is portrayed as *trying to avert 
a full scale conflict* rather than as the Cold War ideologue 
which some felt the Korean airliner incident confirmed him to 
be. Soviet *guilt* was read into a succession of statements 
which claimed the opposite.
Television news covered subsequent Soviet inputs into the 
propaganda war by concentrating on its alleged refusal to 
apologise or compensate for the crime. Yet from September 1st
233
the Soviet Union repeatedly stressed its fregretf for the 
deaths of innocent people in the disaster, while refusing to 
accept responsibility. The distinction between these 
positions was not reflected in coverage.
On September 8th the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei 
Gromyko attended the Madrid Security Conference on Security 
and Cooperation. In the course of his speech to the 
conference he reiterated the Soviet position and stressed 
that "we have expressed regret over the loss of human lives” 
(English text from Soviet News, no.6190). Journalists 
disagreed.
Mr Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, showed no 
remorse. On the contrary when he spoke at the European 
Security Conference in Madrid he accused the United 
States of sending the plane across Soviet territory on a 
spying mission.(1 2100 7/9/83)
In his speech Mr Gromyko offered not a hint of regret or 
apology.(3 2200 7/9/83)
Mr Gromyko did express his governments regret, while 
blaming the tragedy on the actions of the United States 
intelligence services. The journalist excluded this from the 
account and contradicted Gromyko's accusations with 
statements by the British Foreign Secretary and the US 
Secretary of State.
Sir Geoffrey Howe told him !your explanation is still 
not credible1.(1 2100 7/9/83)
Journalist: Mr Schultz reacted angrily to what he!d 
heard.
George Schultz: I would have to say that from the very 
beginning we have heard nothing but falsehoods from the 
Soviet Union, and it is disappointing for me to sit in 
that hall at a conference that is dedicated to human 
rights, to truth, and hear the Foreign Minister of the
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It had become clear by this time that several aspects of 
the Soviet position were not falsehoods1. As we have seen, 
as early as September 4th the possibility that the Korean 
airliner had been mistaken for a US RC-135 spyplane had been 
made available as an explanation for the incident. If, as 
Seymour Hersch argued above, the US Administration already 
knew beyond doubt by September 9th that this explanation was 
the correct one, it is clear that the public in general (and 
television news journalists) did not. Only the possibility 
had been established. However, this might have been viewed as 
enough to justify qualification or even criticism of the 
dismissive statements of Western leaders about Soviet claims. 
With the exceptions of the counter-examples noted above, 
there were none. The assumed incredibility of Soviet claims 
appeared to render unnecessary their serious examination. The 
apparent consensus which had been established around the 
theme of Soviet barbarism meant that those who alleged it to 
be true did not have to substantiate their claims.
A notable feature of the propaganda war was the relative 
dearth of evidence produced by the US government in support 
of its account. The only piece of hard evidence used was the 
tape-recorded conversation between Soviet pilots and ground 
control. These tapes however, proved only that the airliner 
had been attacked and destroyed by the Soviet fighters. They 
did not prove the main thrust of the US position, that a 
deliberate act of murder had taken place. If anything, as 
Congressman Wright had observed, they lent support to the
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US account remained the favoured one on television news. 
Journalists showed zeal in reporting anything which appeared 
to confirm the 'cold-blooded murder1 scenario. As balance to 
the Gromyko speech on September 7th, ITN reported that:
The White House said it had further, almost irrefuteable 
evidence that the Soviet authorities knew the airliner 
was an unarmed civilian plane. The White House claims 
that it has further information which proves that the 
Russians knew full well that they were about to shoot 
down a civilian airliner. It's believed this evidence is 
contained in a series of yet to be released tape 
recordings of conversations between the Soviet jet 
fighters and their controller on the ground.(3 2200 
7/9/83)
Such evidence would, of course, have fundamentally 
weakened the Soviet position on the incident. However, as the 
correspondent went on to reveal in the next sentence, there 
was no new information available.
But tonight President Reagan's spokesman denied the 
report. One possible reason is that it!s a highly 
delicate issue because questions could be asked as to 
whether the Americans were using a spy plane to obtain 
this evidence.
The most detailed and 'media-conscious' presentation of 
the Soviet version came on September 9th at a special news 
conference staged in Moscow. The spy plane theory remained 
essentially the same as that first expounded on September 
2nd, but was further elaborated with diagrams, maps and 
specific allegations relating to the role played by the RC- 
135 aircraft.
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, this 
conference can be seen as something of a turning point for 
the Soviet authorities, both in relation to the Korean
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airline tragedy, and to their information policy as a whole. 
This was reflected in coverage, which emphasised the unusual 
staginess of the event.
Good evening. The Russians took an unusual step today in 
their attempts to explain why they shot down the Korean 
airliner. They rarely put their generals on display but 
today one of them was allowed to answer questions from 
Western journalists.(1 2100 10/9/83)
Then:
But the message was as defiant as ever.
ITN reported that:
The press conference lasting two hours is thought to 
have been unprecedented in the Soviet Union, both in 
allowing journalists to ask real questions and in the 
seniority of the Soviet spokesmen answering them.(3 2200 
10/9/83)
This was followed by the news that:
They were unrepentant.
The elaborate Soviet account of the flight of the Korean 
airliner, its deviation and rendezvous with an RC-135, the 
extent of its course deviation and the sensitivity of the 
military areas over which it flew, were dismissed by 
reference to a throwaway comment from a United States* 
source:
The United States remains unimpressed. Where*s the 
evidence, they*re asking tonight? The Soviet Union still 
owes the world answers.(1 2100 10/9/83)
Despite the confident tone of these comments, the United 
States had as yet produced no evidence for its a wn version of
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of their respective accounts. The United States denial of the 
Soviet account, entirely predictable within the context of a 
fierce propaganda war was favoured nonetheless by the space 
given it in the bulletin to balance and discredit the Soviet 
version. No comparable emphasis was ever put on the opposite 
situation:
*The Soviet Union remains unimpressed. Where*s the 
evidence, theyTre asking tonight? The United States 
still owes the world answers1.
Such an aggressive presentation, as inconceivable as it 
seems in the Soviet case, was routine for coverage of US 
statements.
Journalist: It was left to a State Department official 
to contemptuously dismiss today*s Soviet version of what 
happened.
US State Department official: The Soviet Union still 
owes the world answers and assurances that civil 
aviation will not be targeted in the future. It is 
interesting to note what the Soviets did not do today. 
They offered no evidence to support their assertion that 
the plane was on a reconnaisance mission. They offered 
no evidence to support the claim that they attempted to 
identify or force down the KAL plane.(1 2100 10/9/83)
ITN reported that:
at the State Department officials were discounting the 
latest claims from Moscow charging that the Russians 
were engaged in a cover-up.(3 2200 10/9/83)
Reports painted a picture of a Tdefiant message1 
Contemptuously dismissed* as a Cover-up*. One journalist 
returned to the theme of the Soviets Coming clean*. To most 
observers it was by now clear that the Soviets were not going 
to admit responsibility for the disaster, or accept Mr
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nevertheless chose to give exactly the opposite impression:
It’s taken the Russians nine days to agree with the 
outline of events originally presented by America.(3 
2200 10/9/83)
As the Moscow news conference was going on a memorial 
service for the victims of the incident was taking place in 
Washington, after which President Reagan made a public appeal 
for a national day of mourning to be held the following 
Sunday. The service, in which Soviet barbarism was again 
emphasised by the Bishop of Washington, served to further 
contextualise the Moscow news conference. The content of the 
Bishop of Washington!s speech neatly framed reports from 
Moscow, while in ITN!s bulletin they received headline 
status:
Journalist: Good evening. President Reagan has called on 
America to observe a national day of mourning for the 
dead in the Korean airliner. There have only been six 
days of mourning before: for the Kennedy brother, Martin 
Luther King, and three former Presidents.(3 2200 9/9/83)
Inside the massive portals of the national cathedral, 
gathered alongside President Reagan and his wife were a 
mixture of family mourners, government leaders and 
foreign diplomats. They heard the Bishop of Washington 
denounce Russia as an outlaw among nations.
Bishop of Washington: We have searched for some way to 
explain what has happened. We would like to find some 
means of justification, some possibility of getting the 
Soviet Union off the hook, so to speak. We have not been 
able to do so, nor have they offered any help. There is 
no way to justify the destruction of helpless innocent 
people.(1 2100 10/9/83)
Coverage of the Moscow news conference was consistent with 
the pattern for reporting Soviet statements in the Korean 
airline crisis. Balancing, framing, and contextualising 
Soviet propaganda1 in terms of an assumed consensus around
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the basic issue of fwhat happened1, the Soviet account was 
constructed as a less favoured one on the news. Ironically 
perhaps, one of the BBC's correspondents noted on September 
9th: "the Americans are sure they're winning the propaganda 
war". Given the nature of the coverage examined here, this 
hardly seems surprising.
The Moscow news conference of September 9th saw the end of 
the most intense phase of the propaganda war. The crisis 
remained in the news for another week, but there were no 
further revelations to come during the sample period.
We have argued that coverage of US and Soviet propaganda 
during this period was not impartial*. The evidence 
suggesting genuine Soviet confusion, or American 
responsibility in the tragedy was never seriously examined, 
nor was it used - with the exceptions of WheelerTs reports 
discussed above - to give legitimacy to the Soviet account.
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This section examines how the various theories about what 
befell KAL 007 was reported on the news. Although the US 
State Department never changed its position that the airliner 
had accidentally strayed into Soviet airspace there were, as 
we have seen, major question marks over the claim.First to 
point out these doubts were the Soviet authorities themselves 
in the TASS statement of September 2nd. That evening, BBC 
announced that it would: ’’report on why the Boeing went so 
far off course, and why it wasn’t warned”(1 2100 2/9/83). 
Later in the bulletin it was reported that:
Demands for explanations about how it happened have been 
directed at Moscow but, as Moscow’s pointed out, it’s 
not only the Russians who have to come up with some 
answers.
ITN commented that: ”Mr Reagan has some explaining of his 
own to do”(3 2200 2/9/83).
These reports reflected the view that there were valid 
doubts about the US version of events. But subsequent 
discussions sidestepped the implications of these opening 
remarks and assumed the correctness of the Americans’ 
account. The peculiarities ’pointed out by Moscow* were 
resolved by journalists without serious consideration of the 
central Soviet allegation that the Korean airliner had been 
involved in an intelligence mission. This account was beyond 
the parameters of legitimacy. The spy plane theory was 
referred to only in the context of ’what the Soviets say*,
i.e. as ’propaganda’. The failure to include the spy plane 
theory in their accounts of what m ight have happened 
reflected the journalists* refusal to grant the Soviet
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account credibility. The question of what happened to the 
Korean airliner was raised in four main evening bulletins 
throughout the sample period. None of these reports included 
the Soviet account in their speculation about the mystery of 
KAL 007. BBC’s report of September 2nd set out one of the 
problems in the US account:
If American and Japanese military authorities knew the 
Korean jet was out of bounds, why didn!t anyone tell the 
crew? American monitoring stations had listened to 
Russian air defence controllers scrambling the first 
interceptors two hours before the plane was shot down. 
Japanese controllers spotted the Russian fighters on 
their long-range military radar. There’s no doubt 
American forces based in Japan were getting the same 
picture. The aircraft called Tokyo with a routine 
request to climb eleven minutes before being destroyed. 
At that time it was well inside Russian airspace, with 
Sakoy Flaggers flying alongside, yet Tokyo control 
didn’t mention it to the captain.
What comes next was typical of the way in which 
journalists resolved the question of what happened. Excluding 
the possibility of a planned espionage mission, marginalising 
it to the realm of the incredible, journalists had no 
recourse but to speculate freely on the possible accidents 
that could have occurred. Accounting for the failure of the 
Japanese or US authorities to warn the airliner, when they 
had by their own admission monitored the entire flight, one 
journalist concluded:
It’s all beginning to point to a disastrous lack of 
communication between military and civilian authorities.
This could have been the case, although there was no more 
evidence to support this explanation than there was for the 
Soviet account. Indeed, US intelligence sources later 
revealed that communications in the region were extremely
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sophisticated, a fact made embarrassingly clear by the ease 
with which the entire incident was recorded by the US. 
Nevertheless, !a disastrous lack of communications^s 
introduced as an authoritative suggestion, and indeed the 
only one, while the possibility of a 'pre-planned mission1 is 
not raised. ITN's correspondent chose not to propose any 
specific theory on the subject:
The Americans now say that they have a very clear 
picture of how the Russians shot down the South Korean 
plane. But when did the Americans have that information? 
If they knew what was going on while it was happening 
why did they not intervene directly, perhaps using the 
Washington-Moscow hotline? It!s one of the many 
questions still surrounding the last hours of the South 
Korean plane.(3 2200 2/9/83)
The issue was again covered on September 16th:
The Japanese have released a tape recording of the last 
exchanges between the aircraft and Tokyo ground control. 
The pilot sounds calm, the flight appears to be 
proceeding as scheduled, then comes the realisation that 
something is wrong.
The recordings do nothing to clear up the mystery.
The Japanese air traffic controllers monitoring their 
radar screens should have realised the plane was off 
course and warned it. If the Russians did fire warning 
tracer shots the Korean aircrew should have seen them. 
But four minutes from disaster air traffic controller 
and pilot were chatting about a routine change of 
altitude.(1 2100 16/9/83)
This report concedes that the US account is not entirely 
satisfactory, but the Soviet explanation is again excluded 
from the available explanations for what happened.
The question of how the airliner had deviated so far from 
its course was also discussed, but within a similarly limited 
range of possibilities. The only explanations included on the 
news were those which assumed that the Korean flightTs course
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the possibility of an intentional *error*. The viewer was not 
given any background as to the actual likelihood of the 
various possibilities that w ere raised.
Why was the jet so far off course? The fact that the 
pilot thought he was on track suggests a wrong reading 
on the plane*s inertial navigation system. That could 
only happen if there*d been a mistake in setting the 
original coordinates for latitude and longitude. One 
degree equals sixty nautical miles, and any error would 
be compounded in the long haul across the Pacific. The 
routine check calls to Japanese trans-oceanic control 
reported the airliner as on a correct heading. It 
wouldn*t have been until the Jumbo came within radar 
range that the true position became clear.(1 2100 
2/9/83)
No indication was given of how unlikely such an error 
would have been. ITN constructed an experiment with a flight 
simulator and came up with an entirely different, if equally 
unsubstantiated scenario:
One possibility that*s being considered is a total 
electrical failure...This kind of problem has occurred 
before on passenger-carrying jets and tonight itfs being 
considered as an explanation for the Korean plane being 
so far off course.(3 2200 2/9/83)
There were many possible explanations as to why the 
aircraft had made such a disastrous error. fTotal electrical 
failure* was no less likely than the majority of those 
proposed. Of interest to us here is the fact that no 
explanation other than that of accidental error was 
considered in these accounts. The Soviet explanation, with 
its implications for the United States role in the incident, 
was excluded. News programmes on BBC2 and Channel 4 (with the 
exception noted above) reported these problems within the 
same basic assumption: that the spy-plane theory was not
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Stansfield Turner, a former Director of the CIA, who gave his 
opinion that the spyplane theory was a possibility, if an 
unlikely one:
Journalist: Admiral Turner, the Russians are now 
apparently saying that that plane, a civilian plane, 
could have been on some kind of reconnaisance flight. Is 
that possible?
Turner: Of course itfs possible. Any plane can conduct 
reconnaisance. I think itfs highly improbable. It’s a 
very ineffective and risky way to conduct intelligence.
Journalist: Is there any record at all, in your 
experience, of any country using civilian planes as a 
cover for intelligence-gathering?
Turner: Well, any intelligence officer has to answer 
that question with a ’no comment1... If the answer is 
yes and I say ’no comment* you*ll know what I*m trying 
to do.(4 1900 2/9/83)
Admiral Turner, while unable to confirm that the Korean 
airliner was spying, continued by stressing the circumstances 
surrounding the incident which might have made the Soviet 
Union ’overreact’.
Turner: ...without apologising for the Soviets, looking
at it from their point of view, this is the second 
instance when it’s a Korean airliner, a civilian 
airplane that has penetrated deeply into their country. 
So, with their normal paranoia you can understand their 
getting excited. That doesn’t justify the degree of 
their response, which was disproportionate to the 
threat.
Journalist: But you would say they had good reasons to 
be awfully suspicious?
Turner: I didn’t say good reasons. I say a paranoid 
person, having two instances like this by the same 
airplane, gets suspicious, easily in the Soviet Union.
Although Admiral Turner took the spyplane theory more 
seriously than other speakers in the sample his opinion was 
not reflected in Channel 4*s own appraisal of ’how it
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happened1:
It's still far from clear what really happened to Korean 
Airlines Flight 007.
Three theories were then introduced:
The first suggests a computer failure in the plane's 
navigational equipment, but 747s carry sophisticated 
navigational systems with three computers that 
continuously check each other. If the computers fail, a 
light warns the pilot. Human error in programming the 
navigation computers is much more likely... The 'Marie 
Celeste1 theory is also possible. It suggests that 
pressure of oxygen in the aircraft dropped suddenly, 
rendering crew and passengers unconscious and the plane 
out of control. The trouble with this theory is that the 
plane actually turned into Soviet airspace and didn't 
just drift rudderless into restricted zones. But the 
theory is attractive because it suggests an answer to 
the second major unanswered question. Why didn't the 
crew respond to warnings from the Russian jet buzzing 
it? If the crew were unconscious, they'd be unable to.
From 'computer failure* to 'Marie Celeste* these theories 
were as speculative as any proposed on main evening 
bulletins, though the journalist sought to present them as 
superior to the Soviet explanation:
The new Russian suggestion, that the plane was on a 
spying mission, sounds as amazing as science fiction.
No more amazing than the 'Marie Celeste* theory, it might 
be thought. News programmes generally failed to break away 
from the assumption that the Korean airliner had accidentally 
strayed into Soviet airspace.
As late as September 16th BBC2's Newsnight concluded after 
a lengthy report that there was "only one plausible 
explanation" for the flight of KAL 007, this being 
"navigational error". According to pilots who have flown the
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impossible. On this programme it was reported to be "a 
regular occurence”.
The inadequacy of the Soviet public relations machine, 
alluded to in the introduction to this chapter, cannot be 
held to account entirely for the fact that the Reagan 
Administration won the key issues in the propaganda war at 
the time when it most mattered. Given that the Soviet Union 
did not 'use* the Western media with the same facility as 
their protagonists in the propaganda war, they did 
nevertheless present a version of events which on the 
evidence available was no less credible than any other 
account making the news. Official Western accounts 
presented the Korean airline disaster as confirmation and 
vindication of the Soviet Threat. This framework was rarely 
challenged on the news, although evidence supporting the 
Soviet account was available as early as September 3rd. We 
have given examples of occasions as early as September 5th 
and 6th when the dominant framework was challenged, and these 
are extremely important to the overall picture, but they were 
far from being representative. One final counter-example 
further confirms that critical approaches to official US 
propaganda were available. The programme is Channel 4's 
Friday Alternative, now defunct. On September 17th it 
compared the response of the Reagan Administration to the 
Korean Airliner incident with the response of President Nixon 
ten years earlier to a similar tragedy:
Journalist: In the uproar over the tragedy of Flight 007 
the Soviet public image has taken a battering. President 
Reagan has lost no opportunity to shame the Russians.
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establishes one set of standards for itself and another 
for the rest of humankind*. In the diplomacy game moral 
outrage coupled with truth outpoint all opponents. But 
has US policy been consistent?
Ten years ago Israel shot down a Libyan airliner which
had strayed into its airspace. For the victims the
Israelis, unlike the Russians, offered compensation. But
their explanations for the events were strikingly 
similar. Both countries have emphasised similar criteria 
for shooting down a civilian airliner. But ten years ago 
US President Nixon simply expressed regret. There were 
no flags at half-mast, no sanctions, no change in US- 
Israeli relations. How can two such similar tragedies 
provoke two such different reactions? In the diplomacy 
game it all depends on who is in the firing 
line.
In this major international crisis with potentially 
dangerous consequences for Britain (as a host country for US 
nuclear weapons) broadcasting journalists on the whole showed 
themselves unwilling or unable to adopt a critical distance 
from the propaganda campaign mounted by one side against the 
other. At the time of writing it is clear that the United 
States*s account of the incident was based on ideology rather 
than facts, and that accusations of barbarism and murder 
directed at the USSR were politically-motivated.
On Newsnight of September 10th, 1986, Seymour Hersch 
warned that nour inability to back off and tell the truth 
about [the Korean Airline disaster] is very ominous...The 
lesson the Russians had better glean from this is that in a 
crisis we aren’t willing to tell the truth about what we 
know” .
The conclusion of this study is that at the time when it 
most mattered, the Reagan Administration’s largely 
propagandistic account of the disaster was rarely contested 
by British television journalists.
Notes.
1. R.W. Johnson's book about the incident, Shootdown: The 
Verd ict on K A L 00Z , was published by Chatto & Windus in May 
1986, and reviewed by Paul Foot in T.h.g. London Review nf 
Books, published on July 24th, 1986. Foot describes Johnson's 
exposition of the spy-plane theory as "a political expose of 
the highest order" and concedes that "when all the arguments 
pile up on one side of the scales, the rational mind 
hesitates... is it really possible that responsible people in 
a democracy could behave in such a reckless way?"
2. Broder argued, on behalf of his clients, that if the 
Soviet account was shown to correct:
There would be an investigation as to why there was a 
cover up of this which would exceed anything we saw in 
the Watergate era. It would be a disgraceful affair that 
our government from the very first day following the 
occurence denied all responsibility and then it turned 
out that they were responsible, that it was an espionage 
mission. There's no doubt in my mind that this would go 
on for years in an effort to get at the heart of this: 
whether our President was aware of it, what information 
he had, when he learned of it, and why he failed to 
disclose it to the American public.
Appendix 4.1. NewsniehtT September 6thr 198^.
Journalist: The people who still wonder how it was that the 
actor Ronald Reagan became President of the United States, 
and for those who wonder if he’ll be reelected if next year 
he runs for a second term, his speech last night provides the 
answer. America found in Reagan a leader with a simple 
comprehensible philosophy, and an exceptional ability to put 
his case across. He was always good at television. Last night 
he was matchless. Three years in office has made Reagan the 
master of his role. His popularity and his power have given 
his actor’s talent an edge that wasn’t there before. He was 
helped of course by the nature of the issue. A civil airliner 
packed with innocent people sent to their deaths by a Soviet 
missile. A simple case, he said, not merely of murder. As 
though it were a feature film he gave the tragedy a title - 
the Korean Airline Massacre, and he called it that five 
times.
Reagan: My fellow-Americans, I ’m coming before you tonight 
about the Korean airline massacre. The attack by the Soviet 
Union against 269 men, women and children aboard an unarmed 
Korean passenger plane. This crime against humanity must 
never be forgotten, here or throughout the world. Our prayers 
tonight are with the victims and their families in their time 
of terrible grief. Our hearts go out to them, to brave people 
like Kathryn McDonald, the wife of the congressman whose 
eloquence and composure on the day of her husband’s death 
moved us all. He will be sorely missed by all of us here in 
government. The parents of one slain couple wired me: ’our 
daughter and her husband died on Korean airline flight 007. 
Their deaths were the result of the Soviet Union violating 
every concept of human rights. The emotions of these parents, 
grief, shock, anger, are shared by civilised people 
everywhere. From around the world press accounts reflect an 
explosion of condemnation by people everywhere, but despite 
the savagery of their crime, the universal reaction against 
it and the evidence of their complicity the Soviets still 
refuse to tell the truth. They have persistently refused to 
admit that their pilot fired on the Korean aircraft. Indeed 
they’ve not even told their own people that a plane was shot 
down. They have spun a confused tale of tracking the plane by 
radar until it just mysteriously disappeared from their radar 
screens, that noone fired a shot of any kind.
Japanese ground sights recorded the intercepter plane’s radio 
transmissions, their conversations with their own ground 
control. We only have the voices from the pilots. The Soviet 
ground to air transmissions were not recorded. I t ’s plain 
however from the pilot’s words that he’s responding to orders 
and queuries from his own ground control. Here’s a brief 
segment of the tape which w e ’re going to play in its entirety 
to the United Nations Security Council tomorrow.
And make no mistake about it. This attack was not just 
against ourselves or the republic of Korea. This was the 
Soviet Union against the world and the moral precepts which 
guide human relations among people everywhere. It was an act 
of barbarism, born of a society which wantonly disregards
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to expand and dominate other nations. They deny the deed, but 
in their conflicting and misleading protestations the Soviets 
reveal that yes, shooting down a plane, even one full of 
innocent men, women, children and babies, is a part of their 
normal behaviour if that plane is in what they claim is their 
airspace. But we shouldn't be surprised by such inhuman 
brutality. Memories come back of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Poland, the gassing of villages in Afghanistan. If the 
massacre and their subsequent conduct is intended to 
intimidate they have failed in their purpose. From every 
corner of the globe the word is defiance in the face of this 
unspeakable act, and defiance of the system which excuses it 
and tries to cover it up.
With our horror and our sorrow there is a righteous and 
terrible anger. It would be easy to think in terms of 
vengeance, but that is not a proper answer. We want justice 
and action to see that this never happens again.
Journalist: At this point the President listed the measures
he hopes the world will take against the Soviet Union to see, 
as he put it that justice is done. The suspension of flights 
and the demand for compensation. He confirmed that his 
Secretary of State Mr Schultz will be meeting Mr Gromyko, if 
Mr Gromyko comes to that meeting, he said. He confirmed too 
that the Geneva arms talks will not be broken off. And 
lastly, speaking as a man w h o ’s seen his view of the world 
and the policies that spring from it resoundingly endorsed by 
this murderous attack Mr Reagan addressed himself to the 
opposition he's encountered in the Congress to increased 
military spending.
Reagan: The Congress will be facing key national security 
issues when it returns from recess. There has been legitimate 
difference of opinion on this subject I know, but I urge the 
members of that distinguished body to ponder long and hard 
the Soviets1 aggression as they consider the security and 
safety of our people, indeed all people who believe in 
freedom. Senator Henry Jackson, a wise and revered statesman 
and one who probably understood the Soviets as well as any 
American in history warned us, 'the greatest threat the 
United States now faces is posed by the Soviet Union1. 
Senator Jackson said 'if America main t a i n s  a strong 
deterrent, and only if it does, this nation will continue to 
be a leader in the crucial quest for enduring peace among 
nations 1.
The late senator made those statements in July on the Senate 
floor, speaking on behalf of the MX missile programme he 
considered vital to restore Americafs strategic parity with 
the Soviets. We are more determined than ever to reduce and 
if possible eliminate the threat hanging over mankind. We 
know it will be hard to make a nation that rules its own 
people through force to cease using force against the rest of 
the world, but we must try. This is not a role we sought. We 
preach no manifest destiny. But like Americans who began this 
country and brought forth this last best hope of mankind 
history has asked much of the americans of our time. Much we
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Let us have faith in Abraham Lincoln's words, that 'right 
makes might1 and in that faith let us to the end dare to our 
duty as we understand it. If we do, if we stand together and 
move forward with courage then history will record that some 
good did come from this monstrous wrong that we will carry 
with us for the rest of our lives. Thankyou, God bless you, 
and goodnight.
Journalist: President Reagan addressing the nation. Reactions 
here vary widely. From the left to the political centre there 
is clearly relief that the actions the President has called 
for are strictly limited. 'The White House avoids 
flamboyance* says the New York Times,, and from CBS, 'the 
speech of a statesman'. At the other end of the political 
spectrum, the far Right, it is being called a 'namby-pamby 
speech that won't wash with the American people because it is 
too soft' and that has been the reaction clearly anticipated 
by the President's aides. At a White House briefing they 
stressed that the restraint he showed doed not mean any 
softening in his attitude to the Russians, and in private 
conversations duly put into print today they added that the 
appearance of restraint was crucial to Mr Reagan for foreign 
and political reasons. Well restraint it seems is in the eye 
of the beholder. Perhaps it can be said that in this 
observer's view Mr Reagan came closer last night than John 
Kennedy, or Lyndon Johnson, or Richard Nixon ever did, to 
being a demagogue.
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Part III. Reporting the Nuclear Debate
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Chapter Five 
The Superpower Dialogue
Previous chapters have argued that the views of the US 
government tend to be privileged in relation to the Soviet 
view. The Korean Airline disaster was a special case, with 
unusual features, but this chapter argues that the tendency 
for television news to construct US views as a privileged 
account is also evident in the less explosive, but in many 
ways more important debate surrounding arms control.
The arms control negotiations took place partly in 
response to the development of the defence debate and to 
rising public concern about the arms race. The collapse of 
detente, the acceleration of the arms race, and apparent 
changes in NATO war-fighting strategy, produced a wave of 
popular opposition to nuclear weapons, as well as dissent in 
the ranks of NATO governments. This was a major factor 
inducing the Reagan Administration to open arms control 
dialogue with the Soviet Union. The dialogue, when it came, 
occupied the centre stage in international politics. The 
issues were complex, the figures and categories of weapon 
confusing even to seasoned observers, and televisions role 
in reporting and explaining the talks was crucial.
Ronald Reagan came to power in the United States at the 
head of a conservative coalition whose members took up key 
positions in his first Administration. They argued that the 
Soviet Union was a threatening, expansionary power and that 
it had established military superiority as a consequence of
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elected group arms control talks with the USSR were 
counterproductive to the aim of containing the Soviet Threat. 
Ronald Reagan's own record of opposition to nuclear arms 
control agreements made with the Soviet Union included the 
Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty, SALTs I and II[2], and his entry 
into arms control talks after 1980 was widely percieved as 
less the consequence of a belief in the intrinsic value of 
arms control than a political response to public concerns 
about the Administration's attitudes. Talbott notes that
by the end of 1981 political pressures... induced Reagan 
to offer an initiative on strategic weapons. But the 
prevailing approach in the Administration to arms 
control and defence policies still seems to be guided by 
[the following] rather remarkable proposition... If 
forced by political expediency to make proposals and 
engage in negotiations, the US must insist on drastic 
cutbacks in the most modern, potent Soviet weapons... no 
comparable reductions are required, or should be 
considered, in existing American forces (1982).
Soviet leaders, on the other hand, claimed to be sincerely 
interested in arms control because, they argued, they had no 
reason to pursue an arms race, and wished to reduce military 
expenditure and increase standards of living in their already 
hard-pressed economy. They would, they said, agree to any 
level of arms reduction compatible with the maintenance of 
'strategic parity* with the USA. The two sides thus 
approached arms control negotiations not only with 
conflicting estimates of their respective military strengths 
but with arguably different attitudes to the principle of 
arms control itself. This was the context in which 
negotiations took place after 1980.
Defence and disarmament news covered the dialogue
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extensively. This involved coverage of the arms control and 
disarmament initiatives that emerged periodically from both 
sides; attempts by both sides to go over the heads of normal 
diplomatic procedures and appeal directly through the media 
to the populations of the Western countries; and the efforts 
of each side respectively to blame the other for the evident 
failure of the arms control process. The following discussion 
examines some key events in this coverage from the Zero 
Option of November 1981 to the eve of the breakdown of the 
talks in 1983.
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On November 18th, 1981, in his National Press Club speech, 
the ’Zero Option* was unveiled before the world with the 
words of President Reagan that it would be, "like the first 
step on the moon, an historic step for mankind”. The Zero 
Option was to form the basis of the United States negotiating 
position at the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) talks with 
the Soviet Union in Geneva. It set out the United States* 
willingness to cancel its planned deployment of Cruise and 
Pershing II missiles (according to the dual-track decision of 
December 12th, 1979) if the Soviet Union would withdraw and 
dismantle its intermediate range theatre nuclear weapons in 
Europe: the SS-4, SS-5 and SS-20 missiles (this demand was 
later revised to include those theatre weapons stationed in 
Soviet Asia). The following discussion refers to coverage of 
the Zero Option on two main evening news bulletins of 
November 18th, 1981 (for the full text of the items see 
Appendix 5.1).
Western opinion on the Zero Option fell into two 
categories. Officially, it was a serious arms control 
proposal with a reasonable chance of success. However, an 
alternative view dismissed it as an exercise in public 
relations and ’’Alliance management" and therefore worthless 
in arms control terms. Three weeks before Ronald Reagan’s 
speech to the National Press Club, on October 28th, the New 
York Times reported that:
Many European officials would be disappointed if Moscow 
accepted the Zero Option approach... The adoption of the 
Zero Option at the beginning of the coming talks is a 
necessary public relations move. They hoped it w ould
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ranee US nuclear-tipped m issiles w ith the Russian SS- 
20s.
Some observers, including people close to the 
Administration, suggested that the Zero Option had been 
formulated because of growing concern amongst governments and 
public in the countries of the NATO alliance about President 
Reagans attitude to arms control. Dr William Kincaide, a 
prominent US defence analyst and consultant to the US 
government, said of the Zero Option on a BBC Horizon 
documentary that:
it seemed to strike a chord of sanity across Europe and 
the United States. Taken alone the proposal seemed 
equitable, but it ignored many critical factors in the 
balance of nuclear weapons in Europe. It took no account 
of aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons, nor of 
how the French and British nuclear forces were to be 
treated. And it made no sense whatsoever when the 
superpowers had set no limits on the number of their 
ICBMs. With all these other issues left out of the talks 
the Zero Option stood no chance. Nevertheless the 
proposal drew applause on both sides of the Atlantic, as 
it was meant to, for in the words of one official at the 
time, ’it’s not arms control we’re engaged in, it’s 
Alliance management*. One of the reasons for its 
rejection is that it was largely a public gesture.
The proposal began from the premise that Cruise and 
Pershing II missiles were a response to the existing Soviet 
SS-20s. The removal of this new Soviet threat (new in 
quantitative and qualitative terms, according to NATO) would 
thus remove the necessity for the United States to deploy its 
new weapons. If there were no land-based Soviet missiles in 
Europe, no American equivalents need be deployed. The term 
’Zero Option* was intended to signify the Administration’s 
goal of the complete abolition of this class of nuclear 
weapon in Europe.
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The Reagan Administration's estimate of the European 
theatre nuclear balance indicated massive Soviet superiority 
but excluded two major categories of nuclear weapon: the 
British and French nuclear forces and the United States 
forward-based systems on aircraft and at sea. Excluded from 
the INF talks under the terms of the Zero Option these 
weapons would have remained in operation after the Soviet 
Union had dismantled its entire theatre nuclear force. It was 
no secret that the Soviet leadership would not discount these 
weapons, and when indeed it rejected the Zero Option as a 
serious basis for negotiations few observers inside or out of 
the Reagan Administration were surprised. The Times on 
November 19th, 1981, reported the privately-expressed view of 
Reagan Administration officials nthat the chances of gaining 
Soviet acceptance were slim”. In an effort to secure 
maximum publicity the Reagan Administration paid for the 
National Press Club speech to be broadcast live by satellite 
to Western Europe.
Talbott notes that "the place and the time had been chosen 
to assure the maximum audience in Western Europe. He began 
speaking at 10 a.m. It was late afternoon across the 
Atlantic; Europeans coming home from work would be switching 
on their television sets. The US International Communication 
Agency paid for live satellite transmission to the European 
Broadcasting Union"(1983, p80).
In so far as the proposal received extensive television 
news coverage, the Administration's media strategy was 
conspicuously successful in Britain's case.
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The headlining item on BBCI's early evening bulletin, 
described the proposal as "significant for the reduction of 
nuclear and conventional arms in Europe", and "what the White 
House said it was, a message to the world". It was referred 
to as "the President's peace offensive", and "a demonstration 
to the European allies that the Administration is serious in 
its search for arms control". The correspondent reported 
President Reagan's view of the proposal as "a big offer, and 
he expected the Russians to take it seriously".
The only qualification to this interpretation of the 
proposal which this item reported was contained in a 
reference to the Soviet viewpoint. This, however, was 'made 
sense of* entirely within the terms set by the President. To 
counter the Soviet view that a rough equivalence already 
existed in intermediate-range weapons in Europe the President 
employed a bar chart which excluded from the European nuclear 
balance all British and French nuclear weapons, and all 
American forward-based systems. This graphic visual image of 
overwhelming Soviet superiority (see figure 5.1 ) received no 
contextualisation or qualification from the correspondent.
Correspondent: And the President countered the Soviet 
claim that a rough equivalence in these weapons exists.
Reagan: Red is the Soviet build-up, blue is our own, 
that is 1 975, and that is 1981.
Reference was made to the fact that the timing of the Zero 
Option was related to the rise of the peace movements in 
Europe, and to the bad press created by the Reagan 
Administration's "conflicting signals" on issues of war and 
peace. However, acknowledgment of the proposal's public
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relations function did not lead to a critical interpretation 
of its value as an arms control proposal.
Now the timing of this is all very important. The 
Administration had become deeply concerned about the 
peace movements in Europe, and the confusion created by 
the conflicting signals put out from here on European 
nuclear policy. The Administration now hopes that 
confusion is at an end and the Europeans have a clearer 
idea of United States arms control objectives, a policy 
to coalesce around and present a united and positive 
front to the Soviet Union.
On the one hand, we are told that the proposal is a 
demonstration of seriousness1, while on the other it is said 
to be a product of the Administrations deep concern1 about 
its image. These contradictory themes were not resolved.
Likely Soviet reaction to the proposal was contextualised 
by a reference to "Kremlin propagandists” and "the 
assiduously-cultivated Soviet peace-making image". There were 
no comparable references to 'White House propagandists1 or to 
the 'assiduously-cultivated peace-making image* of the Reagan 
Administration.
Bearing in mind Mr Brezhnev's talks in West Germany next 
week, plus the assiduously-cultivated Soviet peace­
making image, Kremlin propagandists are probably aware 
they can't afford any peremptory dismissal of the 
American proposals.
ITN's report on News at Ten differed in having to 
accomodate the fact of a Soviet rejection of the proposal.
The newscaster's introduction set out the main content of the 
proposal, referred to the Soviet interpretation of it as "a 
propaganda exercise" and then broadcast the relevant section 
of the Reagan speech.
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"Red is the Soviet build-up, blue is our own. That is 1975, 
and that is 1981" (1 17^0 18/11/81).
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public relations function of the proposal, reporting that the 
Zero Option was intended to counter what were described as 
the Presidents ’’unfortunate remarks about nuclear war in 
Europe”[3]. The statement that President Reagan ’’wasn’t 
allowed to answer any questions today” acknowledged the 
presence of criticism about his public stance. It was also 
noted that:
One reason for Mr Reagan’s statement today was to try 
and upstage Mr Brezhnev who is visiting West Germany 
next week, and who will present himself as the leader 
really seeking nuclear disarmament.
The other major reason for the Reagan statement was 
to try and counter the way the anti-nuclear movement in 
Europe has portrayed the Americans as the bad guys more 
so than the Russians.
The correspondent then reported ’speculation’ (from 
unnamed sources) that the effect of the anti-nuclear movement 
would be to help the Soviets ’spin out* the Geneva talks.
The peace rallies have delighted Moscow because they are 
seriously undermining the resolve of the West German 
government to have the NATO missiles on their soil. And 
its speculated the Soviets might try to spin out the 
Geneva talks in the hope that the NATO plans for new 
missiles might fall apart under democratic pressure. And 
then in the end Russia wouldn’t have to give up any of 
her missiles at all.
As in BBC’s account, ITN produced no critical ’reading’ of 
the Zero Option, although ITN’s account of the INF debate 
qualified Mr Reagan’s use of the bar chart with an 
acknowledgment that views on the nuclear balance in Europe 
"depend on what type of weapons you include”.
To the Russians it seems that President Reagan is asking 
them to remove about 1000 warheads while NATO keeps its 
forces as they are. The talks starting in a fortnight in 
Geneva are about nuclear weapons aimed at targets in
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illustrate his view of the massive Soviet nuclear 
advantage in Europe, an advantage the Russians deny.
The talks will be extremely complicated. NATO says 
the Russians have a big nuclear advantage with their SS 
20 missiles, but the Russians say there is a rough 
balance of nuclear forces in Europe. It all depends on 
what type of weapons you include, and the first big 
problem in the talks will be to find common ground. The 
Americans just want to talk about missiles, but the 
Russians want to include American aircraft which carry 
nuclear bombs.
While its *public relations1 background was reported, 
neither BBC nor ITN item contested the dominant definition of 
the Zero Option as a serious arms control proposal.
Coverage of the Zero Option was not an isolated example of 
television news1 approach to US proposals, as coverage of the 
START talks illustrates.
In the National Press Club speech President Reagan had 
announced a proposal to open negotiations with the Soviet 
Union on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. Unlike 
the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, said the President, the 
objective of these talks would be not merely to limit 
nuclear weapons but to reduce them.
On May 31st, 1982 the President announced that the 
negotiations would begin less than one month later, on June 
29th. Television news reports noted the political expediency 
of these talks for the President:
It was a speech quite clearly adjusted to the politics 
of his trip to Europe.(1 2100 31/5/82)
It was widely anticipated that President Reagan's intended 
'good-will* trip to Europe in June 1982 would meet with mass 
opposition from the peace movements. The new proposal was
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designed at least in part to head off this opposition, as 
television news reported.
It was a speech directed at a wider audience, in Western 
Europe particularly and intended to show the President 
to them as a friend of the Alliance and a spokesman for 
peace. There are strong fears that what should be an 
easy popularity-building trip for the President may be 
soured by the anti-nuclear movement in Europe.(1 2100 
31/5/82)
trying to defuse some of his critics from the anti- 
nuclear movement the President said his goal was peace. 
President Reagan pledged to do his utmost so that no 
other generation of young men will have to sacrifice 
their lives.(3 1300 31/5/82)
As in the INF talks, the proposals brought by each side to 
the START talks reflected very different views of the nuclear 
balance. Proceeding from its assumption of 'strategic parity' 
with the United States the Soviet Union advocated an 
immediate freeze on the development and deployment of all 
strategic nuclear weapons. The United States, concerned with 
what it argued to be a Soviet strategic superiority in land- 
based intercontinental missiles (ICBMs) proposed a reduction 
in sea and land-based missiles to 850 on each side, with a 
warhead limit of 5000. Of these only half could be land- 
based. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Eugene 
Rostow stated before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
on May 13th that this proposal gave "priority to the acute 
threat to peace and stability posed by the massive build-up
of Soviet ballistic missile forces, particularly ICBM
capabilities".
Like the Zero Option, there were two basic Western 
responses to the US START proposal. The official US view, as
expressed by Rostow on May 13th, stated that the proposal was
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"sound and equitable", a "practical, two-stage approach to 
strategic arms reduction". Alternatively it was viewed, not 
as a practical step towards arms reduction but further 
confirmation of the Reagan Administration's unwillingness to 
enter into arms control with the Soviet Union. According to 
this interpretation the proposal would ensure the failure of 
talks rather than their progress.
The strategic nuclear forces of the United States and the 
USSR differ qualitatively and in their structure1 (see 
Chapter 2). Soviet forces are concentrated on land, with a 
smaller proportion of sea-based systems and a virtual absence 
of air-launched weapons. The USA has a predominantly sea- 
based force with roughly equal proportions of its strength 
based on land and in the air. The US START proposal excluded 
the US bomber force, the significance of which can be seen in 
the fact that by 1984, according to an Observer report of 
Janury 5th, 1985, the US had 3,740 bomber-based strategic 
nuclear warheads, compared to 372 on the Soviet side. The 
potential for expansion of this arm of the US strategic 
triad1 led the USSR to demand its inclusion in estimates of 
the nuclear balance.
Of further importance from the Soviet point of view, the 
US proposal implied a drastic and far-reaching restructuring 
of the Soviet nuclear force without any corresponding 
concession from the United States. Had the Soviet Union 
accepted the demand that only half of its 5,000 permissible 
warheads could be deployed on land, it would have had to 
scrap all of its 1,398 land-based missiles, with the
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By contrast the US, with relatively few of its warheads on 
land would have been able to continue modernising its land 
based ICBMs with the new MX and Minuteman III systems, yet 
remain within the agreed warhead limit. The North Atlantic 
Assembly's Special Committee on Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 
concluded that:
Because of the differing force structures of the two 
sides,the proposal means greater reductions by the 
Soviet Union... the Soviet Union is required to make 
major concessions both in numbers and in land-based 
systems. This... is compounded by the absence of bombers 
and cruise missiles from the limitations, both of which 
represent areas of American advantage (Cartwright 
and Critchley, 1983, p31)[4].
Four news items covered the START talks as they commenced 
on June 29th, 1982. Three of these adopted the 
Administration's framework for interpreting the nuclear 
debate and assessing the value of the START proposal.
For example, journalists presented selective accounts of 
the nuclear balance which reinforced the logic of the 
Administration's proposal and assumed the basic legitimacy of 
the Administration's arms control objectives.
BBCI's main evening news included an account of "how the 
talks came about"(BBC1 2100 29/6/82), which made no reference 
to the political pressures on the President but simply 
repeated the official line on Soviet superiority.
The START talks are designed to replace Jimmy Carter's 
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, SALT II, which was 
agreed with Leonid Brezhnev three years ago. President 
Reagan and Congress refused to accept it on the grounds 
that Mr Carter had permitted the Russians to take 
advantage of him. Opponents pointed out that ten years 
ago the United States had slightly more warheads and
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Today they say the Soviet Union has a superiority of 
three to one.
One small but relevant detail was omitted from this 
account of the failure of SALT II. Those who opposed it 
argued that SALT II codified Soviet superiority in what they 
claimed were the most dangerous and destabilising weapons, 
land-based ICBMs. The Reagan Administration held to this view 
in the START talks, defending its focus on land-based ICBMs 
with the assertion that, as Rostow put it to the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, "the Soviets have a lead in this 
crucial area of approximately three to one".
The broadcaster!s account also refers to a "three to one" 
superiority, but in "warheads and intercontinental ballistic 
missiles", a significantly wider category than land-based 
ICBMs alone.
This is important because it was only in the latter, more 
restricted category that a Soviet superiority existed, offset 
by US superiority in the other legs of the so-called 
strategic triad1. The United States had more warheads 
overall, the Soviet Union more launchers; the US had more sea 
and air-launched weapons, the USSR superiority on land. The 
statement of a general three to one Soviet superiority was 
accounted for by reference to the SS-18 missile, claimed by 
the journalist to carry "up to 30" warheads.
The reason is the continued Russian production of heavy 
missiles such as the SS-18 which can carry up to 30 
independently targetable warheads. By contrast, the 
American Minuteman has only three warheads.
The statement that SS-18s carry 30 warheads is factually
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incorrect. They carry ten, as the US Defence Department 
points out when it states that MIRVed SS-18s carry "eight or 
ten reentry vehiclesIT( 1982, p56).
Furthermore, this account of the nuclear balance excluded 
all the categories of weapon which favoured the US and did 
not refer to factors such as the quality and technological 
sophistication of weapons, areas in which the United States 
leads the Soviet Union. The item went on to stress the degree 
of reduction in armaments proposed in the US START 
negotiating position.
So President Reagan's speech five weeks ago produced a 
new way of reducing arms. Instead of counting missiles 
he wants to count warheads... Such a plan would mean 
reducing the size of the American nuclear arsenal, in 
particular its bombers and Trident submarines. That 
would mean big savings for the defence budget. It would 
also mean economic relief for the Soviet Union.
This positive reading of START was qualified with a 
reference to its "many problems” of which only one was 
specifically mentioned: "the Russians demand that British and 
French weapons be included in any agreement”. This objection 
to the proposal was not developed.
The US proposal was also said to involve "reducing the 
nuclear arsenal”. However, it was not reported that the 
Reagan Administration’s attraction to counting warheads as 
opposed to delivery vehicles (missiles) stemmed from the 
increasing adoption of single-warhead missiles in the US 
strategic force. Previously, one could limit missiles but 
increase firepower by 'MIRVing' (putting more warheads onto 
each missile). The move towards single-warhead systems such
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to ensure that the number of missiles could be increased 
while the number of warheads was limited. The number of new 
warheads could still be increased by phasing out obsolete 
multi-warhead systems. Thus it could have been argued that 
the intention of the US START proposal was to limit Soviet 
systems while permitting the US to continue its own strategic 
programme. This point was crucial to an assessment of START.
The item was also incorrect in stating that "in 
particular, bombers" would be reduced under the terms of the 
US START proposal. Bombers and the cruise missiles they had 
the potential to carry were specifically excluded from the 
negotiations. That the US arsenal would be freducedT referred 
only to outdated nuclear systems. The Administration stressed 
publicly throughout these negotiations that planned 
modernisations of the US strategic force, such as MX and 
Minuteman III, would go ahead irrespective of agreements at 
Geneva.
In both ITN bulletins of June 29th the asymmetrical nature 
of the two sides* strategic nuclear forces was pointed out. 
References to Soviet superiority on land were balanced with 
references to US superiority at sea although there was no 
reference to the balance in the air, an area of major US 
advantage.
There!s an imbalance in the type of weapons each side 
has. The most accurate missiles are land-based. Russia 
has so many more of these than America, and the US fears 
her missiles could be destroyed on the ground. America 
has more of her weapons in submarines and because these 
ships can hide in the ocean and the missiles cannot 
easily be destroyed before firing Russia thinks this 
gives America an edge. 70% of Russian warheads are land-
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50% of American warheads are under the sea and only 20% 
of Russian ones are in submarines.(3 1300 29/6/82)
The START talks were said to have arisen because "the 
conclusions of the SALT talks are now considered out of 
date". The Reagan Administration considered SALT to be out of 
date, but many Western governments and defence analysts - and 
indeed the USSR - did not. In June 1985 pressure from NATO 
governments compelled the Reagan Administration to continue 
to observe the limitations of SALT II, with the result that a 
Poseidon nuclear submarine was scrapped. News at Ten reported 
that:
The old agreement limiting these weapons was called 
SALT, standing for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, but 
President Reagan thinks limitation is not enough, so he 
coined the word START for the new talks. The letters 
stand for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and substantial 
reductions are what the Americans say they want. (3 2200 
29/6/82)
There was no reference to the view that the US proposed 
"substantial reductions" only in the most powerful Soviet 
weapons, while permitting continued development and 
production of new US weapons. In the same passage the Soviet 
START proposal was inferred to be inferior to that of the US, 
and qualified in the following manner:
So far Russia has iust called for a freeze on weapons at 
existing levels and a freeze on new deployments.
The lunchtime bulletin also referred to the Soviet freeze 
proposal, and American rejection of it: "America says the 
freeze would preserve the Russian advantage, and doesnft want 
to stop development work on two new missiles". No comment was 
made on these justifications.
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These examples have been analysed in some detail because 
they show how the basic assumptions of the Reagan 
Administration in the superpower dialogue inform television 
news coverage. The simplifications and distortions of complex 
issues which they display, plus the throwaway attitude to 
Soviet proposals, are inadequate to a full understanding of 
the debate.
However, if these examples show a general acceptance by 
journalists of the Reagan Administration’s definition of the 
issues, an important counter-example illustrates the 
availability at this time of an alternative framework for 
making sense of START, and the fact that some television 
journalists are prepared to employ that framework in 
constructing accounts of the debate. The item, which appeared 
on Newsnight, contextualised US arms control policy in terms 
of President Reagan’s statements on the subject, and related 
the START talks to political pressures on the Administration 
as opposed to a genuine desire for arms control. By this 
method, which any television journalist might have adopted, 
the Reagan Administration’s arms control policy was ’made to 
mean’ in an entirely different way from that favoured by the 
majority of television news coverage.
A brief historical resume of the background to START (the 
failure of SALT II to check the arms race and the refusal of 
the US Congress to ratify the treaty) led the journalist to 
pose the following question:
How far is President Reagan consistent in agreeing to 
these talks, and how far have they been forced on a
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This question immediately constructs a framework for 
understanding US arms control policy which is absent from the 
other items referred to, and it is answered via Ronald 
Reagan’s own words on arms control, detente and related 
matters.
Journalist: According to Mr Reagan the rules of detente 
have allowed the Soviet Union to achieve clear nuclear 
superiority, an imbalance he was determined to reverse. 
Once in power Reagan took the position that America 
should not pursue arms control talks until the Soviet 
Union mended its aggressive ways.
Reagan: We must immediately start the rebuilding of our 
defence capability to the point that no nation on this 
earth will dare lift a hand against us.
Reagan: As long as they at the same time have openly and 
publicly declared that the only morality they realise is 
what will further their cause, meaning they reserve unto 
themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to 
cheat in order to attain that end, and that is moral, 
not immoral, and we operate on a different set of 
standards I think that when we do business with them, 
even in a detente, we keep that in mind.
The journalist noted the unpopularity of Reagan!s views, 
and that they had presented his Administration with a public 
relations problem. Political pressure had been applied by the 
NATO partners on the basis that "unless the White House 
reversed its position on arms control talks the Atlantic 
Alliance would suffer devastating damage". Further examples 
of Presidential opinion were employed to support the 
journalises argument that a public reversal in Reagan’s 
anti-arms control policy did not signify a change in his 
attitude to the Soviet Union.
Next, the journalist broke with the pattern of most 
coverage by reporting the view that negotiating with the
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Soviet Union for domestic political reasons was not the same 
thing as making realistic proposals.
Journalist: The Presidents critics here in Washington 
simply don't believe in his conversion to the cause of 
arms control. They say he was acting under pressure, 
both domestic and foreign. They think that if he'd 
resisted talking to the Russians about arms control much 
longer the Atlantic alliance would have come apart, as 
his former Secretary of State Alexander Haig apparently 
kept reminding him. But it's one thing to be willing to 
sit down with the Russians and quite another to make the 
concessions necessary if there's ever to be an arms 
control agreement, and on that the European governments 
who don't have a place at the table may have to keep up 
the pressure.
This item presented a major extension to the range of 
views reported in the majority of coverage: a critical 
reading of START which, in marked contrast to other coverage, 
became the preferred reading. US arms control policy was 
contextualised in terms of what was known in June 1982 about 
the Administration's attitudes. Official proclamations on the 
sincerity of the US START proposal were contrasted with 
official statements on the need for the United States to 
rearm. Making sense of START in this way was an available 
journalistic option, but it was not repeated in the sample.
The superpower dialogue continued into the General 
Election of 1983. A subsequent chapter will examine how 
television news covered the party political defence debate in 
the Election. Here, however, we will comment on coverage of 
major exchanges in the superpower dialogue which occurred 
during the campaign. These centred on two events: the 
resumption of the INF talks, and the announcement by 
President Reagan of a new START proposal.
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no progress had been made since their commencement in 1982. 
Channel 4 news defined the "the main sticking point" to be 
the 'Russian* view that "the independent nuclear forces of 
both Britain and France be included. The Americans have 
rejected that idea"(4 1900 17/5/83). It was not explained 
why, nor was there any coverage of possible American induced 
'sticking points'. Newsnight referred to "new Reagan and 
Andropov proposals"(2 Newsnight 17/5/83)C53, such as the 
Interim Zero Option of March 30th, 1983. As in previous 
examples, television news tended to reproduce the US position 
without criticism. News at Ten, for example, stated that:
the American negotiator has come to Geneva this time 
with a new mandate to negotiate on anv level of arms. 
reduction the Russians are prepared to consider.(3 2200 
17/5/83)
This assessment of the Interim Zero Option proposal was 
challenged by such as Strobe Talbott, who argues that "it did 
not change US [INF] policy in any significant respect"(see 
next chapter).
The new START initiative of June 8th - the day before 
polling - received extensive coverage. The image of the 
Administration's policies which emerged from this coverage is 
particularly interesting, given that people were going to 
vote the next day on arms control, among other election 
issues. The new US proposal was in its fundamentals no 
different to the earlier proposition of June 1982. Retaining 
the demand for a warhead limit of 5,000, it was less 
stringent on the missile limit of 850. It continued to omit 
from the terms of an agreement major categories of strategic
275
weapon in which the USA had a significant superiority. Some 
commentators observed that the new proposal would permit the 
USA to further increase its nuclear power with the 
development of the new Midgetman strategic missile. ITN's 
coverage reported that the proposal would n let America 
develop a new single-warhead missile"(3 2200 8/6/83). 
Nevertheless, coverage of the proposal on June 8th tended to 
suggest a flexible compromise.
Journalists define the new START proposal in positive 
terms. Channel 4 announced that it was:
designed to break the deadlock in the START talks (4 
1900 8/6/83)
and that it showed:
promising signs of greater flexibility from Washington.
News at Ten assured viewers that the proposal had been 
made:
in the hopes of getting the Soviets to negotiate... 
Flexibility is the new catchword.(3 2200 8/6/83)
In three items of coverage President Reagan's views were 
reported 16 times. Only two non-Reagan views were reported, 
both from Soviet sources. The first related to the original 
START proposal of June 1982: "the Russians rejected that 
outright [because] the vast majority of their missiles are 
land-based and most would have had to be scrapped"(3 2200 
8/6/83). A second reported statement by the Soviets "accused 
[President Reagan] of stalling".
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constructed a critical reading of the Administration's arms 
control objectives. This counter-example appeared on a 
Channel 4 bulletin of May 13th, which used the imminent 
reopening of the Geneva INF talks as an angle around which to 
present a report on the activities of the American Arms 
Control Agency (AACA). The fortunes of the AACA under the 
Reagan Administration were the starting point for a critical 
analysis of the seriousness of the latter's arms control 
objectives. Having explained that the AACA was an 
independent, advisory body within the US Government, set up 
in 1961 to assist in drafting the US-Soviet Test Ban Treaty, 
the correspondent turned to a recent controversy within the 
agency provoked by the appointment of Kenneth Adelman as 
Director.
He was viewed by some as a lightweight. The choice of Mr 
Adelman was seen as evidence that Mr Reagan had little 
interest in the Arms Control Agency. Questioned at his 
Senate confirmation hearings Mr Adelman seemed lacking 
in some of the necessary background information for the 
job.
Opinions on the significance of Adelman's appointment were 
sought from AACA officials (who assured the journalist that 
he was Ma man of wide experience and great interest in the 
field"), Eugene Rostow the previous Director, and Paul 
Warnke, a former US arms control negotiator. Warnke claimed 
that "for the President to appoint Mr Adelman confirmed the 
view of many Americans that he was not serious about arms 
control". The item concluded by reporting that
at one point it seemed as if President Reagan would 
disband the entire Arms Control Agency, but that won't 
happen now. Firstly, because the American Congress won't
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project the image of being very much in favour of 
verifiable arms control.
In reporting the view that the Reagan Administration's 
interest in arms reduction was image rather than substance, 
this item, like the Newsnight example of a year earlier 
quoted above, was exceptional, and again illustrative of the 
increased 'openness1 of minority audience news programmes to 
a wider range of views and assessments of the nuclear issues.
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US proposals are one side of the superpower dialogue. 
Soviet proposals are the other. From what has previously been 
said about television news coverage of the USSR, one can 
hypothesise that the Soviet case in the dialogue is likely to 
be subordinate in television news accounts, and this is 
indeed what the evidence of the nuclear freeze and no-first- 
use proposals suggests.
The first difference between coverage of US arms control 
proposals and those of the Soviet Union is quantitative. In 
contrast to the routinely headline-grabbing power of US 
proposals the Soviet case in the disarmament dialogue has a 
relatively low priority on the television news agenda and 
tends to be reported in brief items lacking in background or 
analysis. This can be explained only in part by the differing 
approaches to public relations and propaganda taken by the 
two sides.
But Soviet proposals are also reported within a 
qualitatively different set of a priori assumptions. The 
privileged access of US leaders in presenting their own 
proposals has its converse in their privileged access to 
dismiss Soviet ones. The Soviet case is not 'excluded', but 
the USSR does not take part in the superpower propaganda war 
as the equal partner in an impartial debate.
On television news during the sample period Soviet 
proposals tended to be 'made sense* of by reference to the 
views of Western leaders's, and in the absence of Soviet 
commentators. In one of the examples quoted above a
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journalist was heard to describe the Soviet position on 
strategic weapons as !just calling for a freeze1. The initial 
statement of the Soviet nuclear freeze initiative was 
contained in a speech made by Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow on 
May 18th, 1982. Brezhnev called for a moratorium on the 
development, production and deployment of all strategic 
nuclear weapons while the START talks were taking place.
Seven television news bulletins reported the Brezhnev freeze 
proposal. In five of these the US Government was reported as 
rejecting the proposal on the grounds that the Soviets had a 
strategic nuclear superiority. The following examples 
illustrate the contrast between typical coverage of a Soviet 
arms control proposal and that of US proposals examined in 
the previous section. Items began with an account of the 
Soviet proposal.
In the latest move in the disarmament dialogue between 
the Soviet Union and America President Brezhnev has said 
the two countries should stop deploying strategic 
nuclear weapons.(1 2100 18/5/82)
Followed by an account of the US rejection.
President Reagan rejected the idea but said he's ready 
to discuss reducing nuclear arms. The American Secretary 
of State Alexander Haig said the proposal would leave 
his country at a nuclear disadvantage but the Soviet 
willingness to negotiate was positive.
According to ITN:
President Brezhnev has said he'll put an immediate 
freeze on nuclear weapons if the United States does the 
same... The US President said tonight the speech 
indicated Mr Brezhnev was willing to hold talks on a new 
treaty to reduce nuclear weapons, but he couldn't give a 
date, though his Secretary of State Mr Haig reacted more 
cooly. He said an arms freeze would leave America at a 
nuclear disadvantage.(3 2200 18/5/82)
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Coverage generally took this form: a brief account of the 
proposal followed with reports of its rejection by the United 
States Government. The Reagan Administration, while 
cautiously 'welcoming* the freeze, rejected it on the grounds 
that it would perpetuate Soviet nuclear superiority. This 
logic was consistent with the Administration's own position 
on arms control but contradicted assessments of the strategic 
balance made by independent sources. And although this was 
the only reported opinion no bulletin developed its 
validity, or examined the possible significance of a nuclear 
freeze.
We noted earlier references to a possible "peremptory 
dismissal" of the US Zero Option by Soviet "propagandists".
No comparable interpretation was made by journalists of the 
US response to the freeze proposal. On the contrary, 
bulletins emphasised the 'welcome' extended by the President 
to the idea. ITN even implied that President Reagan had been 
enthusiastic by contrasting his response with that of 
Alexander Haig who had "reacted more cooly".
A little less than one month later, at the United Nations 
Second Special Session on Disarmament the USSR announced its 
adoption of a 'no-first use* policy - a commitment never to 
use nuclear weapons first. Support for the policy of no-first 
use came not only from the Soviet Union. There was a 
substantial body of opinion in favour of NATO adopting a 
similar stance, including present and former NATO leaders. 
From their point of view the policy was perceived as 
important for NATO's survival, as argued by former US Defence
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Secretary Robert McNamara.
The basic argument for a no-first-use policy can be 
stated in strictly military terms: that any other course 
involves unacceptable risks to the national life that 
military forces exist to defend (1983).
Television news reported the announcement, made on behalf 
of Leonid Brezhnev by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, 
in three news bulletins on June 15th. Coverage was sparse, 
even compared to that given the freeze proposal. Just how 
brief can be seen by a word count. News at Ten on ITN devoted 
U2 words to the story. Earlier in the month the same 
programme had used 73 words to cover a story about the wife 
of exiled Soviet chess player Victor Korchnoi. BBC1 reported 
the declaration in 58 words. It is not suggested that major 
significance can be drawn from the number of words devoted to 
a story, but these figures do reveal how little newsvalue was 
accreditted the !no-first use* declaration by BBC and ITV.
The Soviet Union today pledged that it would not be the 
first to use nuclear weapons. The promise came from the 
Soviet leader President Brezhnev in a message to a 
special UN session on disarment. Mr Brezhnev said that 
the Soviet Union wanted to do all in its power to 
deliver people from the threat of nuclear devastation.
(1 2100 15/6/8 2)
President Brezhnev has said that the Soviet Union will 
not be the first to use nuclear weapons. The promise was 
read out for him at the Special Session of the United 
Nations on Disarmament by the Soviet Foreign Minister,
Mr Andrei Gromyko. (3 2200 15/6/82)
News at Tenfs report was immediately followed by a report 
on the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. A Soviet 
arms control proposal was juxtaposed with a story about 
Soviet military aggression.
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From Afghanistan though there are reports of a big 
Soviet victory against guerrilla forces in the Panshar 
Valley sixty miles north east of the capital Kabul. The 
Panshar has long been the centre of resistance to Soviet 
occuptation.
The brevity of these items clearly contrasts with coverage 
of US arms control proposals.
It could be argued that one explanation for the relative 
lack of newsworthiness accorded Soviet proposals is the 
context in which they are made. Soviet proposals start off 
with a disadvantage (as Soviet statements did in the Korean 
Airline disaster) because speeches delivered in Russian at 
Party congresses and other official occasions are less 
attractive media events than President Reagan's statements, 
broadcast to Europe live by satellite with the White House 
paying the bills. Nevertheless, Moscow is a great deal closer 
to Britain than Washington, and coverage of Soviet statements 
is not impeded by special technical problems. Another 
possible explanation is the journalists1 apparent assumption 
that Soviet proposals are predictable propaganda exercises 
from Tpeace-loving propagandists1 in the Kremlin.
We refer to one final example. In September 1 983 the USSR 
announced that it would dismantle all of its SS-20s removed 
from the European theatre, rather than simply move them 
elsewhere in the Soviet Union. This offer was made in 
response to demands by President Reagan, after the Soviet 
Union had agreed to reduce its SS~20s to the level of British 
and French independent forces in Europe. One news bulletin 
reported the offer in the following terms:
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were not merely good intentions. Well, our defence 
correspondent says its merely another attempt to drive a 
wedge between America and Europe over Cruise and 
Pershing.(3 1740 20/9/83)
Talking about the press, Keeble has argued that "one 
subtle way in which Fleet Street discredits the Soviet Union 
is by describing its peace proposals as propaganda* whilst 
the West*s initiatives are presented as genuine'*(Curran et 
al, eds, 1986, p.53) We would suggest that this feature can 
also be observed in British television news.
This discussion of television news coverage of the 
superpower dialogue has included some of the most important 
initiatives made by both sides in the early 1980s: the Zero 
Option and START proposals from the United States; the 
nuclear freeze proposal and no-first-use declaration from the 
Soviet Union. The debate continues, and it is not argued that 
the dominant tendency to prefer* US accounts of the issues 
is a fixed one unamenable to change. The counter-examples 
discussed in this chapter show that the Reagan 
Administrations arms control policies can be and are 
criticised in some news accounts. During the sample period 
however, television news’ accounts of the superpower dialogue 
tended to reflect a priori assumptions about the credibility 
of the two sides.
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1. The Coalition for Peace ThroughvStrength, in its statement 
TAn Analysis of SALT II* (reproduced in the SALT Handbook) 
exemplify this position when they claim that as a result of 
SALT II the United States will nbe locked into strategic 
inferiority and overall military inferiority. The inbalance 
in both strategic and conventional military power has grown 
worse during the period of SALTn(p68l).
2. As the two sides entered another round of arms control 
talks in January 1985 (not covered in the sample) these 
attitudes continued to prevail in the second Reagan 
Administration as the comments of influential officials like 
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Perle made clear: "The 
sense that we and the Russians could compose our differences, 
reduce the treaty constraints, enter into agreements, 
treaties, reflecting a series of constraints, and then rely 
on compliance to produce a safer world, I donft agree with 
any of thatn(The Observer, January 6th, 1985).
3. A reference to the theory of limited nuclear war. Reagan's 
belief in the possibility of waging limited nuclear war in 
Europe had caused considerable alarm. He was the first 
American President to make it an openly-declared matter of 
policy that such a war could be fought in the European
f theatre1.
4. Two developments were important in this respect. Firstly, 
the B-2 bomber project was accelerated by the Reagan 
Administration when it entered office, and plans were got 
underway to develop a new generation of 'stealth* bomber. 
Secondly, the development of the air-launched Cruise missile 
greatly increased the potential of US aircraft to be used as 
strategic nuclear weapons platforms. The START proposal 
excluded Cruise missiles from its remit.
5. Reagan's new proposal was the Interim Zero Option of March 
30th, 1983. Andropov!s was an offer to reduce the number of 
warheads on SS-20s to the same number as British and French 
levels.
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Appendix 5.1. Main news coverage of the Zer.0. Optio n T Novemb er 
18th, 19..81,.
Newscaster to 
camera.
Vo*, still,
Cruise missile 
in flight, text, 
'United States - 
cancel 572 Cruise 
and Pershing 2 
missiles'.
Vo, still,
Soviet missiles, 
text, 'Soviet 
Union - remove 
SS-4, SS-5 and 
SS-20 missiles'.
Vo, still, US 
bomber, text,
'US proposals - 
reduction in 
strategic arms 
and forces, red­
uctions in con­
ventional forces, 
conference on 
risks of surprise 
attack.
Vo, film,
Reagan arriving 
at National 
Press Club.
Reagan to 
news conference.
BBC1 1740 18/11/81
Newscaster: President Reagan in his first 
major speech on foreign policy has made 
significant proposals to President 
Brezhnev for the reduction of nuclear and 
conventional arms in Europe. Mr Reagan 
says he sent a simple yet historic 
message to the Soviet President which, if 
it was accepted, would be like the first 
man on the moon, a giant step for 
mankind. The President told Mr Brezhnev 
he was prepared to cancel
America's 572 Cruise and Pershing 2 
missiles planned for Europe if the 
Russians
removed their SS-4s, SS-5s and SS-20 
missiles.
He said America would hold negotiations 
on reductions in strategic arms and 
forces, and that they would also discuss 
reductions in c o n v e n t i o n a l  f o r c e s  
reduction in strat maintained by the 
W a r s a w  Pact. And finally Mr Reagan 
proposed a conference forces, reduction 
to reduce the risks of a surprise attack 
in conventional by either side. Martin 
Bell reporting.
Crr: In form it was a speech to the
National Press Club but in substance what 
the White House said it was, a message to 
the world. In it the President set out 
the arms control proposals he had made in 
a letter to Mr Brezhnev including what Mr 
Reagan described as a big offer, and he 
e x p e c t e d  the R u s s i a n s  to ta k e  it 
seriously.
Reagan: The United States is prepared to 
cancel its deployment of Pershing 2 and 
ground-launched missiles if the Soviets 
will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 
missiles. This would be an historic step.
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Vo, film,
Reagan speaking.
Reagan to news 
conference.
Vo, film,
Reagan speaking.
Reagan to news 
conference.
Vo, film,
Reagan speaking.
Reagan to news 
conference.
Vo, film, 
Reagan being 
applauded.
Correspondent to 
camera.
Newscaster to 
camera.
substantially reduce the dread of nuclear 
war which hangs over the people of 
Europe. This, like the first footstep on 
the moon, would be a giant step for 
mankind.
Crr: And the President countered the
Soviet claim that a rough equivalence in 
these weapons exists.
Reagan: Red is the Soviet build-up, blue 
is our own, that is 1975, and that is 
1981.
Crr: On strategic weapons the President 
said he was looking for more than arms 
limitation.
Reagan: To symbolise this fundamental
change in direction we will call these 
negotiations START, strategic arms 
reduction talks.
Crr: The President finished by quoting 
President Kennedy, looking for a world 
where the strong should be just, the weak 
secure and the peace preserved.
Reagan: He didn't live to see that goal 
achieved. I invite all nations to join 
with America today in the quest for such 
a world.
Crr: This then was the Presidents peace 
offensive, a series of proposals to the 
Soviet Union and just as important, a 
demonstration to the European allies that 
the Administration is serious in its 
search for arms control.
Now the timing of this is all very 
important. The Administration had become 
d e e p l y  c o n c e r n e d  a b o u t  the p e a c e  
movements in Europe, and the confusion 
created by the conflicting signals put 
out from here on European nuclear policy. 
The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  now hopes that 
confusion is at an end and the Europeans 
have a clearer idea of United States arms 
control objectives, a policy to coalesce 
around and present a united and positive 
front to the Soviet Union.
Nc: In Mo s c o w  the A m e r i c a n  E m b a s s y
quickly released the full text of 
President Reagan's proposals and the US 
Ambassador Mr Hartman had talks with the 
Soviet Foreign Minister Mr Gromyko on
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Vo, still, 
Kremlin, inset 
correspondent.
international matters. The two sides meet 
in Geneva in 12 days time to discuss 
medium-range nuclear missiles. John Osman 
reports from Moscow.
Crr: President Reagan's offer of arms
reduction was the main subject of the 
talks between Mr Gromyko and the American 
ambassador. An Embassy spokesman told me 
that Mr Gromyko had been given a preview 
of Mr Reagan's speech and that the 
Foreign Minister had a substantial 
exchange with the ambassador which lasted 
over an hour. The Soviet news agency TASS 
however did not immediately report the 
Reagan proposals, probably a sign that 
top-level consideration was being given 
by the Kremlin to the precise handling of 
the Soviet reply. Bearing in min Mr 
Brezhnev's talks in West Germany next 
week, plus the assiduously-cultivated 
Soviet p e a c e - m a k i n g  image, K r e m l i n  
propagandists are probably aware they 
can't afford any peremptory dismissal of 
the American proposals.
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Newscaster to 
camera.
Reagan to news 
conference.
Correspondent to 
camera, backdrop 
still, US and 
Soviet missiles 
interlinking.
Vo, film, Reagan 
leaving National 
Press Club.
Correspondent to 
camera, backdrop 
still, US and 
Soviet missiles 
interlinking.
Vo, film,
Reagan speaking.
Nc: President Reagan told the Russians 
today he’ll scrap plans for new missiles 
in Europe if they!ll dismantle their 
medium-range SS-20s, SS-5s and SS-4s. But 
only a few hours later the Russians 
rejected his plan out of hand as a 
propaganda exercise. The missiles Mr 
Reagan says he’ll withdraw haven’t been 
deployed yet, but they’re wanted by NATO 
to cancel out what NATO says is a big 
Russian advantage in medium-range nuclear 
missiles in Europe.
Reagan: The United States is prepared to 
cancel its deployment of Pershing 2 and 
ground-launched missiles if the Soviets 
will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 
missiles. This would be an historic step. 
With Soviet agreement we could together 
substantially reduce the dread of nuclear 
war which hangs over the people of 
Europe. This, like the first footstep on 
the moon, would be a giant step for 
mankind.
Crr: President R e a g a n ’s speech was
arranged after his recent unfortunate 
remarks about nuclear war in Europe. The 
White House p r e s u m a b l y  thought it 
essential to get one clear defeinitive 
statement on America’s attitude to war 
and peace firmly on the record. The 
speech was broadcast live by satellite to 
Europe, with the White House picking up 
the bill.
It was interesting to note that since Mr 
Reagan’s recent faux pas have usually 
been in r e s p o n s e  to j o u r n a l i s t s ’ 
questions, today he wasn’t allowed to 
answer any.
Well the Russians are already opposed to 
the American plan. The official Soviet 
news agency TASS says the Kremlin would 
reject the offer out of hand. To the 
Russians it seems that President Reagan 
is asking them to remove about 1000 
warheads while NATO keeps its forces as 
they are.
The talks starting in a fortnight in 
Geneva are about nuclear weapons aimed at 
targets in Europe, and Mr Reagan used a 
coloured chart to illustrate his view of 
the massive Soviet nuclear advantage in 
Europe, an advantage the Russians deny.
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Vo, still,
SS-20 launching.
Vo, still, 
Polaris launch 
ing.
Vo, still,
US aircraft.
Vo, still, 
Reagan and 
Brezhnev.
Vo, film, 
anti-nuclear 
rallies.
* Voice-over.
The talks will be extremely complicated. 
NATO says the Russians have a big nuclear 
advantage with their SS-20 missiles,
but the Russians say there is a rough 
balance of nuclear forces in Europe. It 
all depends on what type of weapons you 
include, and the first big problem in the 
talks will be to find common ground. The 
Am ericans just want to talk about 
missiles, but the Russians want to 
include American aircraft which carry 
nuclear bombs.
Both the American and Soviet presidents 
have now declared their desire to reduce 
nuclear arms in Europe, but achieving it 
will not be easy.
One reason for Mr Reaganfs statement 
t o d a y  was to try and u p s t a g e  Mr 
Brezhnev who is visiting West Germany 
next week, and who will present himself 
as the leader really seeking nuclear 
disarmament.
The other major reason for the Reagan 
statement was to try and counter the way 
the anti-nuclear movement in Europe has 
portrayed the Americans as the bad guys 
more so than the Russians. The peace 
rallies have delighted Moscow because 
they are seriously u n d e r m i n i n g  the 
resolve of the West German government to 
have the NATO missiles on their soil. And 
its speculated the Soviets might try to 
spin out the Geneva talks in the hope 
that the NATO plans for new missiles 
might fall apart under d e m o c r a t i c  
pressure. And then in the end Russia 
w o u l d n ’t have to give up any of her 
missiles at all.
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Chapter Six 
Peace Movement News
The intensifying nuclear debate was further expressed in 
the bitter public dialogue which developed between Western 
governments and their own citizens.
The anti-nuclear protest movement constituted a visible 
and vocal opposition to dominant views on nuclear defence and 
was partly responsible for exerting the political pressures 
which led the Reagan Administration to enter arms control 
talks with the Soviet Union. While attempting to assuage 
popular concerns over peace with the Zero Option and START 
proposals Western governments also engaged the peace 
movements in a dialogue which paralleled that going on with 
the USSR. Television news coverage of that dialogue and the 
activies of the peace movements are the subjects of this 
chapter!! 1].
The discussion refers mainly to the two routine news 
samples of May 1st to June 30th, 1 982, and May 10th to June 
8th, 1983. 54 items of 'peace movement news1 were identified 
over these sample periods (see table 6.1).
The analysis also looks in detail at three days of news 
coverage over the Easter weekend of 1983, when CND activists 
and members of the Greenham Common peace camp demonstrated at 
the nuclear establishments in Burghfield, Aldermaston, and 
Greenham Common - Nuclear Valley, as it had become known to 
the peace movement.
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June 1982 and Mav 10th - June 8thT 1983.
CND blockade of RAF Upper Heyford, May 1983 10
CND protests at RAF Upper Heyford, May 1983 2
Anti-Reagan protests, June 1982 6
CND Hyde Park Rally, June 1982 4
New York Nuclear Freeze Rally, June 1982 4
UNSSDII protests, June 1982 7
Anti-MX protests in Washington, May 1983 1
IWDD* protests, May 1983 1
Anti-peace movement march, June 1983 1
Greenham women evicted, May 1983 4
Benn condemns Greenham violence, May 1983 1
END conference, Berlin 1983 1
Green MPs arrested in East Berlin 4
Vatican, Heime, Kent, May 1983 2
Comiso Peace Camp, May 1983 1
Anti-nuclear theatre, May 1982 1
The peace issue in East Germany, May 1983 1
Thatcher at the UNSSDII** 1
Total 54
* International Women's Day for Disarmament.
** Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament.
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Between 1979 and 1983 membership of the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament, the main anti-nuclear group in Britain, 
grew from 3,000 to 80,000[2]. It encompassed professional 
organisations such as Scientists Against Nuclear 
Extermination (SANE), Teachers for Peace, and hundreds of 
local groups. In June 1982 250,000 people took part in a 
march and rally at Hyde Park in London. In October 1983, 
again in London, a similar event involved an estimated 
400,000 people. The demonstration of Easter 1983, news 
coverage of which is discussed in this chapter, involved an 
estimated 70,000 people. In other NATO countries 
demonstrations were equally large. Internationally the peace 
movement became the major social protest movement of the 
post-war era, involving trade unions and members of all 
political parties. The nuclear issue was discussed at the 
Church of England Synod in 1983, in the form of *The Church 
and the Bomb Report1. Against this background peace movement 
news became a significant quantitative category on television 
news. The movement found itself on the news agenda. Peace 
movement events tended to be large and spectacular, and thus 
attractive to routine journalistic newsvalues. It was as a 
spectacular protest lobby that the anti-nuclear movement most 
frequently made news. 42 of the 54 items recorded over the 
routine sample period reported demonstrations and other forms 
of peace movement protest[3].
It was not uncommon during this period for peace movement 
events to command headlines. The demonstrations of Easter 
1983 headlined coverage on the day they took place.
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It was, said the organisers, the most moving and 
successful demonstration of all time in Britain. (1 2100 
1/4/83)
Supporters of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
started to pack up and leave Berkshire tonight after 
their mass demonstration against three key nuclear 
installations. CND say it was the most moving and 
hugely successful protest Britain has ever seen. (3 2200 
1/4/83) [full texts of the Easter 83 coverage are 
laid out, with photographs, in Appendix 6.1]
The CND rally of October 22nd 1 983 was the largest 
political demonstration ever held in Britain, with reliable 
estimates of 400,000 in attendance. It received headline 
coverage on main news bulletins for most of that day[4].
On the other hand, some large-scale peace movement events 
have been given surprisingly little coverage. Such an event 
was the American *freeze! movement rally in New York on June 
12th, 1982. BBC news reported that "it was billed as the 
biggest ever rally in the history of the United States. With 
the final figures not yet in itfs hard to know if it!s 
achieved that, but it is huge"(1 2115 12/6/82). On June 13th 
BBC reported that the protest had ended with "a gathering of 
half a million people in Central Park"(1 1330 13/6/82). The 
next day BBC's estimate of the numbers in attendance doubled: 
"almost a million people marched through the city"(2 1900 
14/6/82).
Despite the unprecedented size of this event it was not 
reported by ITN on any of its bulletins.
Coverage of peace movement demonstrations tended to 
reflect their generally non-violent, good-humoured character. 
BBC described a CND rally at Hyde Park in 1982 in the
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following terms.
Peace songs, more than twenty years old were learned by 
a new generation of protesters. The well-known [over a 
shot of GLC leader Ken Livingstone] and the not-so-well- 
known were there, thousands of them, a mixture of 
carnival and crusade. Three separate marches snaking 
through London en route for Hyde Park. A token counter­
demonstration was noticed but politely ignored by the 
marchers.(1 1730 6/6/82)
Coverage of the American freeze1 movement rally in New 
York in June 1982 was prefaced with the comment that "New 
York loves a parade".
And this was a parade. Led by some spectacular street 
theatre, masks, costumes, floats and streamers and the 
symbols of peace on stilts... It!s a peaceful 
demonstration, downright good-humoured, and has taken 
this city over.O 2115 12/6/82)
In coverage of the events of Easter 1983 journalists spoke 
of "the carnival spirit of the day".
There were demonstrators of all ages and a variety of 
life-styles. They were united by their opposition to 
nuclear weapons. For some it was clearly a family outing 
and even members of the women’s peace camp seemed in a 
holiday mood as they enjoyed a joke at the hands of the 
police.
The serious point of the demonstration didn’t prevent 
most of those taking part from having a good time. (1 
2100 1/4/83)
Of course, not all peace movement protests are, or could 
be represented as ’carnival’. Many involve much smaller 
numbers of people engaging in forms of civil disobedience and 
minor lawbreaking such as the blockading of nuclear bases, 
’die-ins’ and vigils. In June 1982 women peace activists 
"held what they called a ’die-in’ outside the Stock Exchange
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in London"(1 1740 6/6/82). It was reported that the early 
morning rushhour had been disrupted and that several arrests 
had been made, but "a number of people on their way to work 
helped to drag off some of the protesters". During the sample 
period television news frequently reported events at the 
Greenham Common peace camp[5], such as that on May 12th 1983 
when Newbury District Council successfully evicted the peace 
campers and confiscated their property to pay for legal 
costs.
Police and baillifs fought with women peace protesters 
today. The fighting broke out when the baillifs tried to 
seize cars and property to pay for the High Court 
eviction order... the peace women swarmed over the 
vehicles.(3 2200 12/5/83)
That same day, a protest of another kind took place in 
Berlin, scene of the 1983 European Nuclear Disarmament (END) 
conference. Four delegates to the conference from the west 
German Green Party (all members of the West German 
Parliament) crossed from East to West Berlin, erected a 
’Sword into Ploughshares’ flag, and were arrested by East 
German police. They were detained for four hours and then 
returned to West Berlin. Main evening bulletins reported the 
incident , intended as a protest against the attitudes of 
Warsaw Pact authorities to their own, ’unofficial’ peace 
movements.
Peace movement news, then, is primarily about spectacle, 
but it is not simply a question of the numbers involved in 
protest which attracts the journalists to these events and 
defines them as newsworthy. Some demonstrations, like that of 
Easter 1983, receive more coverage than others despite the
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fact that less people have participated. Clearly, if 70,000 
people turn out to form a human chain on a cold weekday this 
may have more newsvalue than the fact that 250,000 turn out 
to march on a warm summer weekend. Numbers gain newsvalue in 
particular contexts, combining with the form of the protest 
to constitute ’the event’. The Easter demonstrations were 
spectacular and made good pictures. Likewise, the blockades 
of Greenham Common by a few hundred women made news across 
the world. Indeed, it was through their exposure in the mass 
media that the relatively small-scale Greenham Common 
protests were made into international foci for the 
disarmament lobby. These too were spectacular events, but 
their newsworthiness went beyond ’the event’ itself. The 
newsworthiness of the peace movement during the sample period 
also related to the political environment in which they took 
place, and the reactions they engendered in high places.
The reactions of officialdom to social protest (of 
whatever kind) are a part of what has made the peace movement 
’news’. Political elites - the primary definers of news - 
have a privileged access to the media. But this can sometimes 
prove to be a double-edged sword. By defining ’problems* in 
the media opinion-leaders contribute to creating them as 
media issues. They put in motion a process of agenda-setting 
which, while reflecting the media’s structural relationship 
to dominant groups, also creates a space for oppositional 
views to be heard. Connell suggests that the range of 
definitions of issues which appear in the news is determined 
in "the struggle between contending political and economic 
forces'K 1980, p144). The British Government began in the
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early 1980s to show that it regarded the peace movement - CND 
and the Greenham Common women in particular - as a serious 
contender in the political struggle surrounding defence 
policy. As it did so the movement became news to an extent 
that might not otherwise have been the case.
Michael Heseltine*s suggestion in 1983 for an anti-CND 
advertising campaign funded by public money and costing £1 
million, condemned at the time by Labour and Alliance Members 
of Parliament as an abuse of Governments power and 
subsequently shelved, unwittingly gave CND headline publicity 
on television news. We might express the relation between the 
political establishment and CND's public profile - 
THeseltine!s Law*, as it were - in the following way: as key 
figures in the Government publicly condemned the peace 
movement the more newsworthy it became. Hall et al note that:
if the tendency towards ideological closure [in news 
media] is maintained by the way the different 
apparatuses are structurally linked so as to promote the 
dominant definitions of events, then the counter­
tendency must also depend on the existence of organised 
and articulate sources which generate counter­
definitions of the situation. This depends to some 
degree on whether the collectivity which generates 
counter-ideologies and explanations is a powerful 
counter-vailing force in society; whether it represents 
an organised majority or substantial minority; and 
whether or not it has a degree of legitimacy within the 
system or can win such a position through struggle 
(1978, p64).
In the defence and disarmament debate CND had won a 
position of limited legitimacy as "an organised and 
articulate source" of opposition to dominant definitions of 
defence and disarmament issues. It had become a "powerful, 
countervailing force in society".
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This was reflected not just in the appearance of peace 
movement news as a quantitative content category but in 
reportage which spoke directly of the seriousness, 
commitment, and political weight of the movement. In coverage 
of the Easter 1983 demos ITN spoke of "the challenge it posed 
to the Government"(3 2200 1/4/83), and "the seriousness of 
the issues". One journalist conceded that "critics might 
argue with their viewpoint, but surely not with their 
commitment", adding, "the sheer size of the rally will give 
added weight to those who are opposing the siting of new 
American missiles, not only in Britain but anywhere in 
Europe". BBC's coverage spoke of "the serious point of the 
demonstrations'^ 1 2100 1/4/83).
During the Second Special Session of the United Nations on 
Disarmament, BBC coverage of a demonstration involving 
several hundred people at the New York diplomatic missions of 
the five nuclear-armed UN members stressed that this was a 
"serious political protest and many of the people taking part 
will be back to try again just as soon as they are at liberty 
to do so"(1 1740 14/6/82)[6].
The presence of the peace movement on the news agenda in 
the early 1 980s was also reflected in coverage of the 1983 
General Election. In some 55 items of coverage of the defence 
debate in the election three were concerned with the 
participation of CND.
Although it did much to raise the nuclear debate to the 
status of a major national issue, and thus contributed to 
creating the conditions in which the 1983 election was
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fought, the British peace movement did not participate in the 
campaign directly. CND did not put candidates forward for 
election to Parliament but continued to act as a pressure 
group on the main participants, the political parties. CNDfs 
main strategy was to mobilise support for those candidates 
who most reflected the demands of the peace movement, as 
Newsnight on May 10th reported.
Journalist: The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament mean of 
course to play an active part in the election... but say 
theyfll do no more than guide people how to vote.
Bruce Kent: W e fll be saying to people, vote for the 
candidate who in your opinion is going to do the most 
for disarmament. The choice is up to the voter, not 
us.(2 Newsnight 10/5/83)
Peace movement tactics mainly comprised non-violent 
demonstrations. Specifically for the election they developed 
their own form of door-to-door canvassing - the Peace 
Canvass. CND!s budget for the campaign was £30,000, a tiny 
fraction of the funds at the disposal of the main political 
parties but the movements perceived potential to influence 
the result of the election nevertheless concerned some 
establishment commentators enough for them to cry ’foul*. The 
Times editorial of May 14th complained that
the planners of CND are concocting a whole range of 
obstructive, possibly illlegal, and certainly 
discriminating tactics with which to pursue their 
campaign... There is nothing more arrogant than the 
pressure group which believes that it is entitled to use 
any means to achieve its ends.
One item concerned this controversy, reporting that the 
Defence Secretary "can't stop CND campaigning but he is 
complaining about the way they do itn(2 Newsnight 18/5/83).
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candidates warning them that they were the targets of a 
centrally-coordinated *hard leftT assault on their seats. 
Conservative MPs in marginal seats accused the CND "of 
giving advice on election campaign tactics that went well 
beyond the activities of pressure groups to which we have all 
become accustomed". One Conservative candidate, Ray Whitney 
MP, warned on television news:
Let the whole British electorate understand by the 9th 
of June that there is this new party, this new element 
in British politics.(2 Newsnight 18/5/83)
Newsnight*s item on May 18th reported statements by 
Michael Heseltine, Ray Whitney and Bruce Kent. CND were 
followed *on the campaign trail* to the marginal constituency 
of Cambridgeshire, where the journalist concluded by noting 
the counterproductive impact of Conservative propaganda on 
CND*s fortunes.
What effect CND has on the vote has yet to be seen but 
the continuing attacks on them by Michael Heseltine has 
helped CND in its aim to make sure nuclear weapons 
remain a major election issue.
A third CND/election item reported a public debate in 
Manchester on June 2nd, where "tonight, for the first time in 
this election campaign standard bearers from both sides of 
the nuclear debate have confronted each other in public"(BBC2 
Newsnight 2/6/83). The item presented a debate between Bruce 
Kent and Winston Churchill MP, described as "the champion of 
the Tories* multilateralist policies", ending with the 
observation that "the mood, and perhaps sadly the message of 
the evening was that despite for once meeting and discussing
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During the sample examined here, television news reported 
the peace movement. The various elements of a spectacular 
protest movement - CND, the Greenham Common women, the 
American freeze movement and others - were regularly covered. 
Indeed, the quantity and quality of coverage was such that 
some identified a media 'bias' in favour of the anti-nuclear 
viewpoint.
Peace movement news in the British media as a whole was 
held to be responsible for what Roy Dean, Director of the 
Arms Control and disarmament Research Unit at the British 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, identified as "a loss of 
confidence in governments* security policies and feelings of 
frustration at the slow progress in the reduction of 
armaments by negotiation'^ 1983). Dean observed that:
There has been widespread media coverage of rallies in 
Western cities against nuclear weapons; these are 
portrayed as popular manifestations of opposition to the 
defence policies of Western governments. In Britain, for 
example, the activities of the anti-nuclear campaigners 
have been reported as domestic news items, with no 
assessments of their arguments and naturally no attempt 
to relate their activities to the current nuclear arms 
control talks.
One prominent broadcaster, Sir Alistair Burnett of ITN, 
argued that the organisation of large-scale demonstrations 
was a publicity tactic designed to manipulate the mass media, 
and gave his own view that as such they should not be be 
given "automatic credence and coverage". On February 3rd 1984 
Sir Alistair wrote to a critical viewer on the subject of 
news coverage of political demonstrations.
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attention of the media, without adding anything to the 
basic discussion of the issues. In the past television 
gave almost automatic credence and coverage, and this 
merely encouraged even more demonstrations. Now we try 
to be more discriminating in news programmes which 
attempt to give a balance of subjects for a wide variety 
of viewers.
On February 15th 1984, he added in a further letter that:
stage managed demonstrations which do not add to the 
debate of ideas may well be of interest to the 
organisers, but are going to be looked at with 
increasing care by the media. Some viewers and readers 
are getting restless about the uncritical coverage of 
such demonstrations.
Television news coverage has so some extent been 
"uncritical” of the peace movement[7l. The pattern of 
coverage in our sample supports Connell!s assertion that 
"while it can by no means be said that the media have 
operated as an advertising agency for CND and the other 
organised peace movements, neither have they operated 
explicitly and systematically against them"(1982, p.31). 
However, coverage of the peace movement cannot be seen in 
isolation from the broadcasters’ tendency to reinforce the 
core assumptions of the Soviet threat. The two phenomena.are 
frequently linked both by the defence establishment, as we 
will see in the next section, and by journalists themselves, 
as in the example from 1981 to which we previously referred .
The peace rallies have delighted Moscow because they are 
seriously undermining the resolve of the West German 
Government to have the NATO missiles on their soil. And 
it’s speculated the Soviets might try to spin out the 
Geneva talks in the hope that NATO plans for new 
missiles could fall apart under democratic pressure. And 
then Russia wouldn’t have to give up any of her missiles 
at all.(3 2200 18/1 1/81)
Furthermore, as Dean observes there has been very little
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’’assessment of their arguments” within peace movement news, 
we will not suggest that this is not a consequence of ’bias’ 
against the peace movement but rather of the grammar of 
television news, which tends to emphasise the spectacular 
aspects of events at the expense of explanatory themes. 
Essentially descriptive, peace movement news signals the 
existence of dissent but rarely develops the arguments put 
forward by the movement. Consequently, coverage has signified 
the existence of popular dissent from dominant views on the 
defence issue, but there has been little examination of the 
rationale which underlies it. From the context of his remarks 
quoted above it would appear that Dean regards this as a kind 
of media ’favouritism’, but from another perspective it could 
be seen as an inadequacy in coverage.
Background explanatory items are not completely absent 
from television news coverage of the peace movement, but they 
are largely confined to minority audience programming[8].
A third reason why the appearance of the peace movement on 
television news cannot be equated with a pro-peace movement 
’bias* relates to the privileged access enjoyed by dominant 
groups to counter the movement’s media-presence with 
’counter-propaganda’ of their own. Through skilful news 
management, and because of the media’s structured 
relationship to the powerful, dominant groups have the 
capacity to ’frame’ images of the peace movement with 
countering images. The importance of this privileged access, 
and the degree to which political elites have used it to 
counter the peace movement’s media presence with images of
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demonstrations of Easter 1983.
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The following discussion chiefly refers to evening 
bulletins on BBC1 (9 01 Clock News) and ITV (News at Ten) 
between March 30th and April 1st. The texts of these items 
with an outline of the accompanying visuals are reproduced in 
Appendix 6.1.
As we noted in the introduction to this chapter, Easter 
1983 was the occasion of a major British peace movement 
protest, focussed on the nuclear establishments at 
Burghfield, Aldermaston and Greenham Common. The first day of 
the protest, March 31st, involved the blockading of the 
Burghfield factory and Greenham Common air base. These 
blockades were the prelude to a larger event planned for 
April 1st, a 'human chain1 linking CND supporters by hand 
along a 14 mile route between the three nuclear 
establishments. Reported estimates of the numbers of people 
who took part in the human chain varied from 40,000 (the 
police) to 100,000 (CND). A later figure of 70,000 was 
generally accepted.
These demonstrations were one of the major peace movement 
events of recent years. Numerically larger demonstrations may 
have occurred before and after these protests, but this 
particular event took on a special significance which 
outweighed the numbers factor. Although it was not known 
then, the General Election was just over two months away. It 
was known by all that Cruise missiles would be coming to 
Britain that year, for these reasons Easter 1983 represented 
an important stage in the battle between the pro and anti- 
nuclear lobbies in Britain for the hearts and minds of public
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opinion.
Coverage of the demonstrations was discussed in the 
previous section. We noted that they were reported 
prominently in bulletins (the second item on March 31st, and 
headline coverage on April 1st); that correspondents reported 
the event in terms of the 'commitment* of the protesters, the 
'seriousness* of the issues, and the 'carnival', Tholiday 
mood* of the events. Of greater interest in this section is 
the manner in which the actions of the British and American 
governments in response to these events, while confirming 
that the European peace movements were regarded at that time 
by NATO leaders as a major political threat, shaped coverage 
over the Easter weekend. In a two-pronged "counter- 
propaganda” assault Western leaders attempted to contrast 
their own flexibility and sincerity - in the shape of a new 
arms proposal, unveiled as a major compromise - with harsh, 
threatening images of the USSR, particularly the images of 
!Russian spies1 and the Berlin Wall.
There were three stages in the campaign. First, on the eve 
of the demonstrations, a major US arms control proposal was 
announced (the Interim Zero Option of March 30th). Second, 
the British Government chose the first day of the Easter 
demonstrations, March 31st, to expel three Soviet diplomats 
from the London embassy on charges of spying. And third, also 
on March 31st, the Defence Secretary paid an official visit 
to the Berlin Wall, drawing attention to the Soviet presence 
in Eastern Europe. With the full resources of the British and 
American governments behind them, these three events competed
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with the peace protests for newstime.
Over the three days of the sample period as a whole, there 
were 74 reported statements on main evening bulletins (see 
table 6.2). 46 of these came from official Western sources: 
statements by President Reagan were reported 12 times, as 
were those of Michael Heseltine, the Defence Secretary. Next 
in frequency of access came the Prime Minister, with 9 
reported statements, and there were a further 13 statements 
from other official Western sources.
By contrast there were three reported statements from 
Soviet sources, and 22 from representatives or supporters of 
CND (a full list of reported statements is produced in 
Appendix 6.2).
The 'interim' Zero Option, President Reagan’s main 
contribution to the Easter counter-propaganda battle with the 
European peace movement, was announced on March 30th, the day 
before the peace movement protests were scheduled to begin. 
According to NATO Secretary-General Joseph Luns in the Times 
this timing was "not unconnected" with the Easter 
demonstrations. As with the earlier proposal of November 
1981, satellite communications broadcast the President's 
speech to Western Europe in time for the main news 
programmes, and it received headline coverage on main news 
bulletins that evening.
Viewers of ITN were informed that the President had 
"offered a comprom ise to the Soviet Union today on nuclear 
weapons in Europe"(3 2200 30/3/83). BBC reported that "zero- 
zero remains the ultimate objective - no medium-range
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missiles at all on either side, but the Presidents message 
today was that he'd be w i lling to settle for w h at he could 
get rather than end up with no agreem ent at all!l( 1 2100 
30/3/83). UN's correspondent defined the 'meaning' of the 
Reagan speech in the following terms:
President Reagan's speech means that the American 
negotiator has been let off the leash of the Zero Option 
and will have much more flexible ideas to discuss.
The flexibility of the proposal was questionable, however. 
It adhered to the basic principles, if not the detail of the 
original Zero Option. Where the latter had proposed (see 
previous chapter) that the USSR give up all of its existing 
medium range nuclear weapons in Europe in return for no 
future deployment of American Cruise and Pershing II missiles 
the new proposal suggested a reduced deployment of 300 or so 
new American weapons in return for the removal of 300 or so 
Soviet ones. It "did not change the essence of US policy in 
any significant respect"(Talbott, 1985, p 181).
Given the continued exclusion of British, French and US 
forward based systems from the European nuclear balance many 
commentators argued that its main function, like the Zero 
Option before it, was not to achieve an arms control 
agreement with the USSR but to create a positive image of the 
Reagan Administration's arms control policy on the eve of 
what were anticipated to be major anti-nuclear protests 
throughout Western Europe.
Indeed, journalists reported the 'public relations' 
dimension of the proposal.
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labie 6.2
Reported Statements in defence and disarmament newsr Easter
BBC ITN Total
Prime Minister 4 5 9
Defence Secretary 6 6 12
President Reagan 5 7 12
The Americans/
America 2 3 5
Foreign Office 1 2 3
Foreign Secretary 1 1
European leaders/
Western governments 1 1 2
CND 10 12 22
Michael Foot(Labour) 1 1
Burghfield Workers 2 2
Police 3 1 4
Moscow/Soviet 2 1 3
commentators
37 37 74
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correspondent, was "European public opinion, an attempt to 
convince the Europeans of the flexibility of America's 
position". ITN reported that the proposal was "very much a 
gesture towards Europe". BBC suggested that "the Americans 
are still giving nothing on some important points... the 
compromise, such as it is, is a fairly unyielding one and 
designed to impress the Europeans rather than the Russians in 
the first place". ITN predicted that "Russia is certain to 
find little that's acceptable in the proposal".
Fourteen statements in favour of the proposal were 
reported. These included lengthy excerpts from President 
Reagan's speech, journalists1 own accounts of the speech, and 
the views of numerous official sources. "Western governments, 
including Britain, welcomed the proposal", reported BBC. "The 
Foreign Office urges the Russians to consider the offer with 
the utmost seriousness and to respond positively". "The 
Foreign Secretary", reported ITN, "said the American offer 
had Britain's whole-hearted support".
balancing* the fourteen reported statements in favour of 
the proposal, only two critical opinions were reported. Both 
of these came at the end of ITNfs item. The sources for these 
critical comments were Bruce Kent, General Secretary of CND, 
and commentators on the Soviet newspaper Izvestia, reported 
together at the end.
Monsignor Bruce Kent, the CND Chairman, said Russia was 
unlikely to accept the Reagan plan as a serious starting 
point for negotiations. He said it gave a distorted view 
of the European nuclear balance because it concentrated 
on land-based missiles. There!s no official Russian 
reaction yet, but a commentary on the plan in the
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it. Izvestia said President Reagan was engaged in farce 
while trying to appear flexible.
BBC news reported critical comments.
In the next two days of coverage a further three critical 
statements were reported: two of these were by Soviet 
sources, and one came from the Chairperson of CND, Joan 
Ruddock. Over the three days of the sample as a whole a total 
of 24 statements about the Interim Zero Option were reported, 
of which 19 were favourable.
While definitions of the proposal as flexible and 
compromising were contested at times, by journalists 
themselves and CND or Soviet sources, the Interim Zero Option 
pre-empted coverage of the Easter demonstrations with 
headline coverage of a President Tdeeply-disappointedf at the 
Soviet rejection of the original Zero Option, but "willing to 
settle for what he can get rather than end up with no 
agreement at all".
The Administration's ability to shape coverage in this way 
at a key moment in the propaganda war with the European peace 
movement is a consequence of the media!s structured 
relationship to dominant groups - a relationship which 
permits offical views to command headlines and score 
relatively easy propaganda points.
The British Government entered the propaganda war on March 
31st, the first day of the peace movement protests, choosing 
that day to expel three Soviet diplomats from the London 
Embassy for Activities incompatible with status1. At the
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troops on the border between East and West Germany, on what 
was openly declared to be an ’’Easter counter-propaganda 
exercise”. The effect of these interventions on the structure 
of news that evening can be seen in the following headlines 
from BBCVs main bulletin.
Three Russians expelled from Britain tonight for spying.
Thousands of peace campaigners gather in what they call 
Nuclear Valley.
Mr. Heseltine says our missiles keep the Soviets behind 
the Wall.
ITN’s bulletin was structured in exactly the same way, 
with news about the peace movement sandwiched between 
officially-sponsored images of the Soviet threat.
Spies of course, are sometimes discovered working from 
embassies in foreign countries. But official allegations of 
’activities incompatible with status’ are often the 
justification for what are essentially political acts. In the 
propaganda war one side often attacks the other by making 
life difficult for its diplomats. Diplomatic expulsions are 
effective propaganda tools because reporting of the facts can 
be restricted on the grounds of national security.
Journalists may receive little or no elaboration from their 
unnamed official sources of the ’crimes* allegedly committed. 
The events of March 31st appeared to be in this category. No 
information was provided by the Government to substantiate 
the charge that spying had taken place (at the very least, 
none was reported by journalists), as BBC’s correspondent 
noted: ’’Whitehall has been particularly tight-lipped about
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There was one reference to a possible link between the 
expulsions and the events going on that day in Nuclear 
Valley.
It seems to be more than a coincidence that the Russians 
are being thrown out on the very day Mrs Thatcher and Mr 
Heseltine are denouncing the Russians as part of their 
criticism of the Easter anti-nuclear demonstrations.(3 
2200 31/3/83).
However, the validity of the allegations was generally 
taken for granted on the news. Journalists assumed the 
truthfulness of information from ’tight-lipped* official 
sources, and that spying had occurred. Reports were 
accompanied with ’Soviet threat’ graphics depicting the Union 
Jack being consumed by a hammer and sickle (see figure 6.1). 
Statements by unnamed ’intelligence sources’, such as the 
claim that the majority of Soviet diplomats in Britain (the 
figure given was 60%) were ’involved in intelligence work’, 
were presented as ’factual* background.
In future there will be 43 Russian diplomats and 105 
civilians allowed to base themselves here. Intelligence 
sources reckon that at least 60% of those are involved 
in intelligence work to a greater or lesser degree.(1 
2100 31/3/83).
Items on both channels contained interviews with the 
individuals concerned. These proceeded from the assumption of 
’guilty as charged*.
Igor Titov talked about his expulsion behind a table 
laid with caviar and sandwiches, sheltered by his wife 
and by his occupation as a journalist. His column in the 
Russian New Times magazine now exposed as the cover 
for a s^X... in add ition ia Mr. TitovT tonight’s 
announcement named two spies who worked at the Soviet 
Embassy.(3 2200 31/3/83)
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F i e u r e  6 . 1 .
"In future there will be 43 Russian diplomats and 105 
civilians allowed to base themselves here. Intelligence 
sources reckon that at least 60% of those are involved in 
intelligence work to a greater or lesser degree"(1 2100 
31/3/83)
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had been reported, as was apparent from journalists1 accounts 
of what they had done. In the absence of any hard factual 
information, these were entirely speculative.
Mr PrimakovTs diplomatic title would appear to be a 
cover for an officer in the KGB.(3 2200 31/3/83)
This strongly suggests that British counter-intelligence 
has an actual list of spies, possibly provided by the 
Russian who defected to Britain last June from Iran.O 
2100 31/3/83)
With these images of the Soviet threat fresh in mind, 
viewers of both BBC and ITN bulletins were now taken to 
Berkshire and the CND events, but before film reports from 
correspondents at the scene of the demonstrations, both 
bulletins reported the comments of the Prime Minister - the 
first in a series of official statements linking the peace 
movement to the Soviet threat, the Berlin Wall, or both.
Mrs Thatcher has already reacted sharply to the 
demonstration. They'd be better off linking hands around 
the Berlin Wall, she said.(1 2100 31/3/83)
Mrs Thatcher agreed with the Tory backbencher who said 
the protesters were blinkered and dangerous even if 
sincere. (3 2200 31/3/83)
Film reports of the demonstrations followed, before 
coverage returned once again to the Prime Minister.
The demonstrations prompted some anger in the House of 
Commons. The Prime Minister agreed with the Conservative 
backbencher who called the women of Greenham Common 
blinkered and dangerous. (1 2100 31/3/83)
The Prime Minister told the Commons that it would make 
far more sense for the peace women to go and link hands 
around the Berlin Wall. (3 2200 31/3/83)
Both bulletins broadcast the following section of Mrs
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Thatcher's speech.
Thatcher: It would make far more sense for those women 
to go and link hands around the Berlin Wall. If by doing 
so they managed to get the Soviets to take it down, to 
remove the guns, the dogs and the mines there to kill 
those who attempt to escape to freedom they would be 
doing something.
In BBC's report Mrs Thatcher continued:
If they do not succeed in taking it down they will prove 
that [their] freedom and the freedom of all people in 
this country still needs to be defended.
BBC also reported a statement by Labour Leader Michael 
Foot, which "defended the women saying that they believed the 
deployment of Cruise missiles would make arms limitation more 
difficult". The views of Mrs Thatcher and her Defence 
Secretary were reported 21 times over the sample period, 
but this was the only reported statement by a member of the 
established political opposition.
The Defence Secretary's main role in the counter­
propaganda campaign was to be filmed at the Berlin Wall. Both 
bulletins followed reports of the Prime Minister's views on 
the subject of the Berlin Wall with coverage of the Defence 
Secretary's visit there, the purpose of which was openly 
declared. As Mr Heseltine put it:
It reinforces the point that we are here to defend the 
peace and freedom of the West. This is the point where 
the marching has to stop.
Outside broadcast units accompanied the Defence Secretary 
to Berlin, where he inspected British troops and explained to 
ITN's correspondent that "over there, where the real threat 
is, there won't be any marches". BBC's report set the scene
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in the following way.
The border and wall ringing West Berlin stretches for a 
hundred miles, so it was here that Michael Heseltine 
came in what he freely acknowledged was an Easter 
counter-propaganda exercise. The East German border 
guards were out in force in their watchtowers and beside 
the perimeter fence. On this side it is patrolled by the 
men of the Royal Irish Rangers. The force here is a 
trip-wire, easily overwhelmed by the 95,000 Russian and 
East German troops based in the 20-mile ring around the 
city.(BBC1 2100 31/3/83)
In Chapter 3 above we noted the differential language used 
to describe the military forces of East and West in Berlin. 
Western forces ’assured and protected1 the West German 
population against ’the Russians who ruled on the other 
side*. Similarly here, East German soldiers are ’’out in 
force”. British soldiers are merely ’’patrolling”. Western 
forces are ’’easily overwhelmed” by the Soviet army which is 
kept in check only by the ’’tripwire” of British forces. Over 
film of Heseltine inspecting the Royal Irish Rangers a 
correspondent noted:
Just to emphasise the nature of the enemy one of the 
fusiliers was sporting a Russian uniform.
Significantly, BBC2’s News Review, a weekly digest of news 
broadcast on a Sunday, chose to highlight the same scene:
’’One man wore a Russian uniform to show who the real enemy 
was" (2 1825 3/4/83).
In these reports assumptions about the reality of the 
Soviet threat are built into the commentary, taken for 
granted not only by the conservative politicians who 
originate this definition of the problem, but by the 
journalists who are reporting the debate.
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Substantial parts of these items comprised of interviews 
with Mr Heseltine. These were deferential, functioning 
mainly as cues for him to expound on his preferred themes. On 
BBC he was asked only one question: "what purpose had this 
visit served?” To which he replied:
It reinforces the point that anyone who holds my job 
knows. That we are here to defend the peace and freedom 
of the West. There!s going to be a lot of protest in the 
West in the course of the next couple of days. There 
will be marching, protests, and this is the point where 
the marching has to stop. There won't be any protests 
over there, You've only got to stand here to understand 
why. The interesting thing is that the very success of 
the promises the various governments of the NATO 
alliance have pursued for 37 years has not only kept our 
freedom but has kept the freedom of the people to march 
and protest. That's one of the privileges of a free and 
democratic society.
The interview* ended at this point, with no attempt by 
the journalist to represent competing views on the themes of 
freedom and NATO's role in keeping it, or on any of the 
statements made by the Defence Secretary. On the contrary, 
these comments were contextualised with references to ”the 
nature of the enemy” and Warsaw Pact troops ”out in force” to 
"easily overwhelm” the British "tripwire”.
ITNTs correspondent did present Mr Heseltine with one 
alternative to the official view on the Cruise issue, though 
taking care to emphasise that it was not Mr Heseltine's 
underlying view of the Soviet threat being challenged, but 
his response to it. The interview as a whole was conducted in 
the same deferential style as BBCI's, but this question 
represents the only occasion over the three-day period when 
any journalist challenged Government policy.
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Journalist: Now there are many people in Britain who 
would share your views on the Soviet system but still 
believe that Cruise should be opposed because they are 
an unnecessary addition to NATOTs nuclear arsenal.
To which Mr Heseltine replied:
I'm rather closer to the Russian SS-20 missiles than the 
people in Britain. You see they already deployed that 
particular class of nuclear weapon in the Soviet Union 
facing us. They’ve got 350 missiles with over a thousand 
warheads, and two-thirds of them are actually facing 
Western Europe. What we’ve said is if they!ll take them 
away we won’t deploy and that would be the best option.
On this note the interview ended. Both BBC and ITN 
concluded their reports with coverage of the visit by Mr 
Heseltine to Checkpoint Charlie.
Then the Defence Secretary went to the Berlin Wall to 
leave flowers which he had dedicated to those who sought 
freedom and who died for it. (3/2200 31/3/83)
We can contrast the interviewing style adopted in both of 
these examples to that seen in an appearance by Joan Ruddock, 
CND Chairperson, on BBC2's Newsnight of March 31st. On this 
occasion the journalist forcefully presented the opposing 
side of the argument, playing ’devil’s advocate' with the 
interviewee’s position. The example illustrates that when 
representatives of oppositional viewpoints gain access to 
television news, their views tend to be presented within the 
terms of the debate pre-established by the primary definers 
of the issue. They must respond, as Hall et al put it, ”to 
privileged definitions” of the problem (1978, p64) already 
established. As his starting point for the interview with 
Joan Ruddock the journalist chose a comment made earlier in 
the day by Margaret Thatcher to the effect that the women of
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Journalist: Well Joan Ruddock, I'd like to ask you first 
about the Government remarks today about the Berlin 
Wall. Now, when Mrs Thatcher said it would make more 
sense for you to be linking hands around the Berlin Wall 
she argued that if you couldn't persuade the Soviets to 
take the Wall down that would remind you of the freedom 
which we enjoy, which the people behind the Wall donTt 
enjoy, a freedom which still has to be defended. How do 
you reply to that argument?
Joan Ruddock: I am very conscious of the fact that 
people have died on the Berlin Wall, and I really feel 
that the Prime Minister and indeed the Minister for 
Defence should not be using the Berlin Wall, as I see 
it, in a cheap propaganda trick, because I see it as 
nothing more than that.Cjournalist attempts to 
interrupt] If she is to suggest that in fact we should 
have that sort of situation in Britain, if that is what 
she is saying, that we should not have the freedom to 
demonstrate - I canrt see the point she is making. If 
she is saying there is a problem in Eastern Europe, that 
it is a divided continent then she finds an echo in our 
sentiments. We have always opposed the Soviet regime vis 
a vis Eastern Europe and indeed we want to bring back 
real peace and detente in Europe, and the best way to do 
that is through disarmament.
Although at this point in the interview Ruddock has 
clearly given a lengthy answer to the question about the 
Berlin Wall, stating that "we [CND] have always opposed the 
Soviet regime vis a vis Eastern Europe", the journalist 
presses the subject further, again putting Mrs ThatcherTs 
views (in an expanded version of what he assumes her to have 
meant) about freedom, democracy and what 'the people behind 
the Wall are doing to menace us*.
Journalist: Her real point really, I think, is that we 
enjoy freedom here to debate and to demonstrate at 
Greenham Common and other places, the people behind the 
Wall do not enjoy that freedom and the people behind the 
Berlin Wall might want to menace our freedom and that 
the best way of keeping that menace at bay is by being 
properly defended.
A willingness to criticise and question the participants
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necessary element in good journalism. But journalists appear 
less likely to criticise those whose views remain within the 
dominant explanatory framework than those who are outside it. 
As Schlesinger et al have noted, in television journalism 
’’the aggressive style is most apparent when the witness is 
putting an alternative or oppositional view”(1983, p41). In 
news coverage of the nuclear debate examined here, 
representatives of the dominant position such as Mr Heseltine 
were never challenged on the news as Joan Ruddock was in the 
above example. Indeed, to illustrate the availability of 
alternative interviewing styles for representatives of the 
dominant viewpoint we must move temporarily out of the news 
format. This example, in which Mr Heseltine is interviewed 
critically, accompanied the screening on December 10th, 1983 
of the American Broadcasting Corporation’s film about a 
hypothetical nuclear war, The Dav After.
The live studio debate which took place after The Day;
After was the first time Mr Heseltine had appeared as Defence 
Minister on the same programme as a representative of the 
British peace movement (again Joan Ruddock). Refusing to 
engage in direct debate with Ruddock he was interviewed live 
before the debate proper began in order, as he put it, to 
’balance the film1. In the course of his interview Mr 
Heseltine was attacked on the grounds that he would not take 
part in the full debate, and for his alleged intolerance of 
criticism of the governments nuclear defence policy. It 
represents a relatively rare example of a style in which, as 
Schlesinger et al put it, journalists ’’choose the role of
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a perspective which incorporates alternative or even 
oppositional elements'^ 1983, p.40).
In the first part of the interview the Defence Secretary 
had condemned The Dav After as propaganda*. As the interview 
was nearing its end Mr Heseltine was challenged on his 
refusal to debate the issues with a representative of CND.
Journalist: Thankyou very much. I*m afraid that I can*t 
help contrasting your interview with us tonight with the 
fact that you would not take part in the subsequent 
debate.
Heseltine: Well can I just answer that point? I think 
that that film has a message of propaganda and I think 
it is critically important therefore that I should have 
the chance to answer it, and I do not believe I would be 
doing that adequately if I was set in the context where 
I was being balanced within itself. I wanted, and I 
believe rightly, to balance the film.
Journalist: But I must just repeat the point: it is 
surely very authoritarian to suggest that it is 
propaganda if one questions defence policy and suggests 
that the present defence policy might not succeed?
Heseltine: I don*t believe it is authoritarian. When I 
was faced with the decision that you put to me - do I 
think people should watch the film - I said I thought 
they should. Now that is encouraging debate but when the 
film is shown I believe there should be a real debate 
and that is why I asked for the opportunity to comment 
upon it, so there would be a balance to the discussion. 
If I hadn*t had such a chance I believe there would have 
been an unbalanced discussion and I think that would be 
wrong and not in the highest keeping of the democratic 
tradition, so I thankyou for giving me the opportunity 
to respond.
Journalist: If somebody made a film about an 
international crisis in which the deterrent was a 
success and did work, would that be unbalanced?
Heseltine: But constantly people are, and constantly 
there are the opportunities to discuss these matters.
Journalist: But you don*t say they*re unbalanced.(The
Dav After Debate, ITV 10/12/83).
The style of this interview constrains the Defence
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Secretary from setting the terms of the debate. His opinions 
of those opposing nuclear defence are referred to as 
’’authoritarian". His use of the term "propaganda" to dismiss 
the ABC film is criticised. His basic assumptions about the 
defence issue are contested. The deferential interviewing 
style extended by journalists towards the Defence Secretary 
at Easter is here replaced with a detached, critical 
journalism as the journalist distances himself from the 
dominant interpretative framework and acknowledges the 
existence of a credible opposing view. There is nothing 
intrinsic to television news which could be seen as 
preventing the adoption of such styles ’routinely’.
Finally on March 31st, both bulletins reported President 
Reagan’s views on his own anti-nuclear lobby, the American 
freeze movement. In a speech given in California Mr Reagan, 
like Mrs Thatcher and Mr Heseltine, drew links between the 
Soviet military build-up, Soviet nuclear superiority, and the 
activities of the anti-nuclear movement. Like Mrs Thatcher 
and Mr Heseltine, his views were not qualified. BBC’s report, 
broadcast before the speech had actually been made, noted 
that:
President Reagan is expected to launch another attack on 
the Soviet military build-up in a speech in Los Angeles 
in half an hour’s time. It’s thought he’ll criticise the 
nuclear freeze movement for undermining arms control 
negotiations.
An hour later, after the speech had been made, ITN 
confirmed the essence of BBC’s speculation.
President Reagan attacked his own nuclear freeze 
movement. He said a freeze would pull the rug from under
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benefit the Russians who had more nuclear weapons. If we 
appear to be divided, the President said, they'll dig in 
their heels.
On April 1st, official sources were again reported warning 
about the Soviet threat. Coverage of the demonstrations that 
day was followed on both channels by reports of a news 
conference by the Defence Secretary, returned from Berlin 
with what the BBC called "a warning for the peace movement”. 
According to ITN:
Journalist: The Defence Secretary said the anti-nuclear 
demonstrators were going down a naive and reckless road. 
He said it would be an unforgiveable gamble for the West 
to do what they advocated. The Soviet Union would use 
force ruthlessly wherever it thought it could win.
Heseltine: So I have got the simplest of messages for 
those who marched today. You do so in freedom and that 
freedom is your right and I am charged with its defence, 
however much I may deplore the inconvenience and the 
cost you impose on the majority of us who donft share 
your views. But donTt believe for one moment that we 
will risk that freedom,our freedom as well as yours, by 
following you along a naive and reckless road.
BBC news transmitted the same section of Mr Heseltine!s 
statement.
This discussion has attempted to show how coverage of the 
peace protests of Easter 83 was 'framed* by a sequence of 
officially-generated stories emphasising the Soviet threat. A 
weekend of defence and disarmament news which had opened with 
a flexible1 and Compromising1 arms control proposal from 
the Reagan Administration closed with images of the Truthless 
force1 of the USSR and the 'naivety and recklessness1 of the 
peace movement. This feature of coverage was not primarily a 
consequence of a conscious media 'bias', but of the
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society.
Whether openly declared as Counter-propaganda* (the 
Berlin Wall visit) or not (the diplomatic expulsions), the 
routine structure of access to official sources enabled them 
to intervene in images of 'peace1 with 'balancing* images of 
the 'enemy*. Coverage on BBC and ITN shgowed a remarkable 
degree of uniformity in presenting this 'counter-propaganda*.
It cannot be assumed that images of the Soviet threat 
which dominated coverage at Easter 1983 successfully 
constructed a preferred reading of the peace movement 
protests as "at best misguided, at worst dangerous and 
subversive"(3 2200 1/4/83), but clearly, television news is a 
major arena within which official attempts to do so are 
organised.
We will end this chapter with a postscript. In 1 984 the 
peace movement began to decline in newsvalue. On November 
26th that year The Guardian reported that:
some papers have not mentioned CND for months. Now there 
is no interest in Fleet Street. CND's national 
conference at Sheffield was not even staffed by most 
national newspapers, even though the organisation is one 
of the most active in Britain.
Keeble notes that "since the 1983 election the peace 
movement has been effectively ignored by the media"(Curran et 
al, eds, 1986, p.56). One possible explanation for this is 
that 'Heseltine's Law* began to operate in reverse. Britain's 
political leaders apparently became aware of the relationship 
between their own attacks on CND and public interest in the
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article further noted that:
the Defence Secretary no longer flies to the Berlin Wall 
to divert attention from CND demonstrations, he simply 
stays quiet and hopes they will not be reported.
Television coverage of one large demonstration lends some 
support to the view that the Conservative Governments 
revised strategy of ignoring CND rather than attempting to 
counter its activities with public relations stunts of its 
own (such as those discussed above) coincided with the 
falling away of media interest in the peace movement. On 
October 27th 1984 20,000 people attended a demonstration at 
Barrow-in-Furness to protest against the Trident submarine 
system (Barrow houses the Vickers shipyard where the 
submarines will be constructed). ITN*s main evening bulletin 
covered the demonstration in 35 words, mainly in the context 
of another newsworthy story at that time, the famine in 
Ethiopia.
The CND leader Monsignor Bruce Kent told 20,000 
demonstrators at an anti-nuclear rally in Barrow-in- 
Furness that the arms race was an insult when millions 
were starving in Ethiopia. Trident submarines are to be 
built at Barrow-in-Furness.(3 2215 27/10/84)
BBCVs main evening bulletin did not cover the event at 
all. A systematic analysis of the reasons for the 
declining newsworthiness of the peace movement are beyond the 
scope of this thesis. It does however, seem possible to 
conclude that the agenda-setting role of the establishment, 
which has contributed to making the peace movement a media 
issue, can also work to exclude Tpeacef.
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1. For discussions of peace movement news in the British 
press see Connell, in Aubrey (ed), 1983, and 'Portraying the 
Peace Movement* by Richard Keeble, in Curran et al (eds), 
1986.
2. For a brief history of CND's development since the 1950s 
see The CND Stony, (Minnion and Bolsover, eds, 1983).
3. The twelve items of peace movement news in the routine 
sample which were not concerned with protests of one kind or 
another took a range of themes, all reflecting the growth of 
the nuclear debate at this time. For example, in May 83, 
there was coverage of a dispute within the Catholic Church 
about attitudes to CND.
The Vatican has disowned an attack by its envoy in 
London against Monsignor Bruce Kent, leader of the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Earlier this week 
Archbishop Bruno Heim accused CND members of being 
'blinkered idiots or consicously sharing Soviet 
ideology'. The Vatican said the Archbishop's comments 
were strictly personal and were without official 
backing. (4 1900 20/5/83)
4. Interestingly, ITN reported this event in the context 
of a MARPLAN poll which appeared that day in the Guardian 
newspaper:
Question 1. Should Britain abandon nuclear weapons no 
matter what other countries do or maintain our current 
nuclear capability, or improve it by spending more money 
on nuclear weapons?
%
Abandon 16
Maintain 63
Improve 14
Question 2. Do you approve or disapprove of the 
government's decision to allow the Americans to base 
Cruise missiles on British soil?
Approve 37
Disapprove 48
Question 3. Do you approve or disapprove of the 
Government's decision to purchase for about £5 billion 
the Trident nuclear missile system to replace the 
Polaris fleet?
Approve 26
Disapprove 50
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ITN reported:
An opinion poll today shows that few er than one j.n six 
supports unilateral disarmament, though iust under half 
of those polled say they reject Cruise missiles on 
British soil.(3 1800 22/10/83)
Opinion polls, as all political parties know, can be 
interpreted to mean different things. This account could have 
reported that the largest proportion of those polled rejected 
Cruise (48%), instead of "less than half", or that the 
largest proportion of those polled disapproved of Trident 
(50%). While the journalist considers it necessary to report 
that "fewer than one in six" supported Britainfs unilateral 
nuclear disarmament he fails to balance this by noting that 
an even smaller minority (14%) supported any increase in 
Britain's nuclear capability (such as the purchase of 
Trident), or, to put it another way, that 86% disagreed with 
the Government on defence.
5. For a detailed analysis of coverage of the Greenham Common 
protests, see War and Peace News by the Glasgow University 
Media Group.
6. Connell notes the use of "concessionary" terms such as 
"well meaning, well intentioned and idealistic" in media 
coverage of the October 1981 CND demonstrations (see Aubrey 
et al, 1982, p29.)
7. Although one example was found during the sample period of 
what might be called 'criticism by association'. In June 1982 
ITN covered a demonstration organised by the Reagan Reception 
Committee to mark the President's visit to Britain. At this 
time the Falklands War was still being fought. Argentina was 
'the enemy'. In this context the following example of linkage 
was significant.
The fall-out van was supposed to encourage the anti-bomb 
and anti-Reagan elements. Just ahead of them were 
supporters of Argentina over the Falklands.(3 2200 
7/6/82)
The juxtaposition of "anti-bomb elements" with "supporters 
of Argentina over the Falklands" transfers the negative image 
of the latter group to the former - the peace movement, which 
at no time during the Falklands war supported Argentina or 
was linked to groups which did.
8. The END conference of May 1983 referred to above was 
covered in a Channel 4 news item of May 10th. Reporting that 
"the debate on defence and disarmament is clearly going to be 
one of the major issues of the election campaign" (which had 
been announced the previous day) the item explained the 
background to the conference and interviewed some of the 
delegates. A follow-up item examined how the nuclear theme 
was being reflected in the arts.
A Newsnight item of May 12th used the END conference in 
Berlin as the starting point for an examination of "the
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cityn(2 Newsnight 12/5/83). The item presented a rare account 
of how the peace issue is understood by unofficial and 
official movements in Eastern Europe.
In East Berlin the struggle for peace is inseparable 
from the march towards socialism. The stronger socialism 
is, so goes the argument, the more secure is peace.
Peace therefore depends on military strength, and on 
conscription into a highly-politicised national army.
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Appendix 6.1 Main evening, bulletins, BBC.1 and ITV - 3.0 th 
March, 31st March, 1st April.
1 2 1 0 0 3 0/3 / 8 3
Newscaster: The Defence Chiefs of the
Soviet Union are meeting tonight in the 
Kre m l i n  to give their verdict on 
President Reagan's new plan to limit 
nuclear weapons. So far there's been no 
official reaction but Moscow looks 
certain to reject the American offer. 
That offer was made by President Reagan 
this afternoon. No longer was he 
insisting on the Zero Option - that all 
Russian medium-range missiles should be 
withdrawn in return for cancelling the 
deployment of
Cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe - 
instead he proposed a half-way stage in 
which the two superpowers would aim for 
equal numbers on both sides. From 
Washington Martin Bell.
Correspondent: The President summoned the 
ambassadors of the NATO countries to the 
White House, first to a briefing in the 
Cabinet room, then to a formal speech in 
the East room, but his real audience was 
European public opinion, an
attempt to convince the Europeans of the 
flexibility of America's position. Zero- 
Zero remains the ultimate objective - no 
medium-range missiles at all on either 
side, but the President’s message today 
was that he’d be willing to settle for 
what he can get rather than end up with 
no agreement at all.
Reagan: When it comes to intermediate
nuclear missiles in Europe, it would be 
better to have none than to have some. 
But if there must be some it is better to 
have few than to have many. If the 
Soviets will not now agree to the total 
elimination of these weapons, I’d hope 
that they'd at least agree join us in an
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substantially reduce these forces to 
equal levels on both sides. To this end 
Ambassador Paul Nitze has informed his 
Soviet counterpart that we are prepared 
to negotiate an interim agreement in 
w h i c h  the U n i t e d  S t a t e s  w o u l d  
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  reduce its planned 
deployment of Pershing II and ground- 
launched Cruise missiles, provided the 
Soviet Union reduce the number of its 
warheads on longer-range INF missiles to 
an equal level on a global basis.
Crr : And the President spoke of his
c o n f i d e n c e  in success at Geneva. 
Afterwards there were handshakes for the 
NATO ambassadors but the Americans are 
still giving nothing on some important 
points, like their refusal to include 
British and French missiles in the total 
negotiating package.
And the Americans insist their Cruise and 
Pershing missiles are not just bargaining 
counters but real weapons which will be 
deployed in Europe by the end of the year 
if there’s no agreement in Geneva. The 
compromise, such as it is, is a fairly 
unyielding one and designed to impress 
the Europeans rather than the Russians in 
the first place.
Nc: The proposal has been warmly
welcomed tonight by Western Governments, 
including Britain. The Foreign Office 
statement says there’s been the closest 
consultation between the allies about the 
idea, and it urges the Russians to 
consider the offer with the utmost 
seriousness and to respond positively.
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Nc: Good evening. President Reagan
offered a compromise to the Soviet Union 
today on nuclear missiles in Europe. In 
what amounted to an admission that his 
Zero Option isn’t going to get anywhere 
he said he would cut the number of Cruise 
and Pershing missiles to be deployed in 
Europe if the Soviets would dismantle 
some of the SS-20s already in place. Each 
side he said would have the same number 
of warheads. The President at the White 
House said no nuclear weapons in Europe 
would be best. He said his offer of that, 
the Zero Option, was still on the table 
and the Soviet Union’s rejection of it 
was a deep disappointment to him.
Reagan: But I do not intend to let this 
shadow that has been cast over the Geneva 
negotiations further darken our search 
for peace. When it comes to intermediate 
nuclear missiles in Europe, it would be 
better to have none than to have some. 
But if there must be some it is better to 
have few than to have many. If the 
Soviets will not now agree to the total 
elimination of these weapons, I’d hope 
that they’d at least agree join us in an 
i n t e r i m  a g r e e m e n t  t h a t  w o u l d  
substantially reduce these forces to 
equal levels on both sides. To this end 
Ambassador Paul Nitze has informed his 
Soviet counterpart that we are prepared 
to negotiate an interim agreement in 
w h i c h  the U n i t e d  S t a t e s  w o u l d  
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  reduce its planned 
deployment of Pershing II and ground- 
launched Cruise missiles, provided the 
Soviet Union reduce the number of its 
warheads on longer-range INF missiles to 
an equal level on a global basis.
Nc: The President said the Soviets had 
launched a propaganda campaign to try to 
divide the America from its allies and 
the allies from each other. But this he 
said was a NATO initiative which the 
Allies have significantly helped to 
shape, and the closest p o s s i b l e  
consultation would go on.
Reagan: This process is a model for how 
an alliance of free and democratic 
nations can and must work together on 
critical issues. It is the source of our 
unity and gives us a strength that no-one
333
confidence in the eventual success of our 
efforts in Geneva to create a safer, 
safer world for all the earth’s people. 
Thankyou very much.
Crr: President Reagan’s speech was very
much a gesture towards Europe. Many 
Europeans had felt America was ignoring 
their wishes but on this issue at least 
Mr Reagan took considerable trouble to 
consult by writing to European leaders 
like Mrs Thatcher. And they have all 
approved his new approach. European 
public opinion will be tested again this 
weekend by the size of the anti-Cruise 
missile demonstrations scheduled in 
several countries.
Russia has some 1,000 SS-20 missiles 
warheads in Europe and Asia and America 
plans to station 572 Cruise and Pershing 
missile warheads in Western Europe. 
America is still insisting that in any 
compromise settlement the warhead figures 
for each side must be equal. A figure of 
300 has been speculated but Russian cuts 
would have to be much deeper than 
American ones.
America is still insisting that the eo.ual 
level should be global, the sme number of 
American intermediate-range warheads in 
Europe as Russia has facing both Europe 
and Asia. This is because Russian SS-20s 
are mobile and America fears they could 
be easily moved from Asia to Europe.
America is also firmly rejecting Russia’s 
d e m a n d  that B r i t i s h  and F r e n c h  
independent missiles should be counted in 
the balance. They must be excluded 
America says. Russia is certain to find 
little that is acceptable in the new 
proposal. Mr Reagan’s speech means the 
American negotiator has been let off the 
leash of the Zero Option and will have 
much more flexible ideas to discuss.
Nc: The Foreign Secretary Mr Pym urged 
the Soviet Union to consider the American 
offer with the utmost seriousness and 
respond positively when the negotiations 
resume in Geneva on May 17th. He said the 
American offer had Britain’s w h o l e ­
hearted support.
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Monsignor Bruce Kent, the CND Chairman, 
said Russia was unlikely to accept the 
Reagan plan as a serious starting point 
for negotiations. He said it gave a 
distorted view of the European nuclear 
balance because it concentrated on land- 
based missiles.
There’s no official Russian reaction yet, 
but a commentary on the plan in the 
Government newspaper Izvestia said 
nothing would come of it. Izvestia said 
President Reagan was engaged in farce 
while trying to appear flexible.
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Nc: The British Government tonight
ordered the expulsion of three Russians, 
apparently for spying. Two of them are 
diplomats, the third operates as a 
journalist. All three are being expelled 
for activities incompatible with their 
status, a diplomatic nicety generally 
assumed to mean espionage.
I
The most senior of the three is General 
Primakov on the left, the assistant air 
attache at the Soviet Embassy. He’s been 
given seven days to leave. Ivanov, a 
second secretary, is presently out of the 
country and won’t be allowed to return.
The third man, Igor Titov describes 
himself as London correspondent for a 
Soviet foreign policy magazine. He too 
has been given a week to get out of the 
country. Here is our d i p l o m a t i c  
correspondent Keith Graves.
Crr: Five Soviet citizens have now been 
expelled in as many months. The Foreign 
Office doesn’t actually use the word spy, 
they are sent packing for indulging in 
activities incompatible with their 
status, a euphemism for spying. Whitehall 
has been particularly tight-lipped about 
just what these activities were, though I 
understand they have nothing to do with 
the recent spate of recent spy cases 
involving amongst other places the tope 
secret Government communications centre 
at Cheltenham. It is perhaps no 
coincidence that since the revelations of 
the past year about just how leaky our 
secret intelligence community has been, 
followed by outrage from Mrs Thatcher and 
an order to her intelligence chiefs to 
get their act together there has been 
this relatively steady s t r e a m  of 
expulsion s.
First came Caption Anatoly Zotov, a 
Soviet naval attache ordered out before 
Christmas, a jovial extrovert and a 
popular figure on the London diplomatic 
circuit. He’d been trying to recruit 
British service personnel he met in the
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In January Vladimir Chernov, a translator 
with the International Wheat Council got 
his marching orders. Itfs still not clear 
what he'd been up to.
Colonel Primakov, the most senior on 
paper at least of tonight's expulsions 
has been here s i n c e  June 1980, 
accompanied by his wife. Again his 
diplomatic title would appear to be a 
cover for an officer in the KGB. Igor 
Titov who lives with his wife and two 
children in West London describes himself 
as a correspondent for New Times, a 
Soviet political magazine. He has worked 
here before for five years in the 1970s 
and he came back just a year ago. His 
English is almost perfect and unlike the 
other two diplomats he is much freer to 
travel around the country. Last year for 
example he attended the major political 
party conferences. Tonight, sitting with 
his wife and children in his flat, he 
said that the spy allegations were 
outrageous nonsense.
Titov: Well I think it is absolutely
ridiculous, it came to me absolutely 
unexpected. I really cannot know what it 
is about.
Crr: The Foreign Office says you have 
been engaging in unacceptable activities.
Titov: I am absolutely not. I have been 
in Germany this year. I have been here 
quite a while.
Crr: Have you done any spying for your 
Government?
Titov: Absolutely not.
Crr: Have you done any spying for anybody 
el se?
Titov: Absolutely not.
Crr: What are you going to do about these 
charges?
Titov: Well we don’t have any right to 
appeal against the decision of the 
Foreign Office so, well, I am actually 
leaving.
Crr: Well Mr Titov added that if Mrs
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called provocation, that’s what she’ll 
get, he said, and he’s probably right. If 
past form is anything to go by two 
British diplomats will soon be told to 
leave Moscow by the Kremlin. None of 
those accused of spying tonight will be 
replaced in London. Since the mass 
expulsion of Russians by the British 
Government in 1971 the ceiling of 
Russians allowed to work here is lowered 
each time one is ordered out. In future 
there will be 43 Russian diplomats and 
105 civilians allowed to base themselves 
here. Intelligence sources reckon that at 
least 60% of those are involved in 
intelligence work to a greater or lesser 
degree.
Nc: Thousands of demonstrators are
gathering tonight for what they say is 
the biggest peace protest Britain has 
ever seen. The Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament is hoping that as many as
4 0,0 0 0  w i l l  join in an E a s t e r  
demonstration in what they call Nuclear 
Valley. The protest began today with 
blockades of two sites.
Greenham Common where Cruise missiles 
will be deployed later this year and the 
Royal Ordinance factory at Burghfield 
where most of Britain’s nuclear weapons 
are made. Tomorrow CND wants to link the 
two with a fourteen mile human chain that 
will also take in the atomic weapons 
research establishment at Aldermaston.
Mrs Thatcher has already reacted sharply 
to the demonstration. They’d be better 
off linking hands around the Berlin Wall 
she said. Peter Gould reports from 
Berkshire.
Crr: 6 a.m. and the blockade begins at
Burghfield as demonstrators sit on the 
road and sing peace songs, a dawn chorus 
which helped one policeman stay warm. The 
police were on hand to ensure that the 
workers at the factory, which assembles 
nuclear warheads, wereable to enter the 
premises freely.
Burghfield worker: I think it’s a
diabolical liberty that one can’t get to 
work when one wants to, so, you know, so 
what reason have you of stopping a person 
going to work?
Crr: The demonstrators claimed that some 
employees did stay away today, but others 
were clearly determined to report for 
work as usual, regardless of the 
obstacles in their path. And for those 
arriving on foot quiet words of advice 
from the police.
Policeman: My advice would be to go in, 
one at a time...
Burghfield worker: You’d prefer me not to 
earn money, just because yo u ’re not 
earning money.
Crr: Fourteen miles away at Greenham
Common a similar blockade was under way 
with members of the women’s peace camps 
staging their now-familiar demonstration 
outside all seven of the entrances to the 
American base. By tomorrow thousands more 
are expected to join them.
Bruce Kent: The object is not just to
mass the numbers but really to show 
people these Cruise missiles here and we 
have the research centre at Aldermaston 
and we have the bomb factory. This is 
what I call nuclear valley and we are 
warning people that with the first strike 
weapons and the first use weapons coming 
that this country is drifting towards 
nuclear war.
Crr: As the demonstrators gathered today 
police on horseback were ready to control 
the growing crowd. So far however there 
has been no arrests, although some 
protestors have been carried away to 
allow vehicles in and out of the base. 
And tonight hundreds more CND supporters 
have been converging on Greenham Common 
in readiness for tomorrow’s human chain.
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anger in the House of Commons. The Prime 
Minister agreed with the Conservative 
backbencher who called the women of 
Greenham Common blinkered and dangerous.
Prime Minister: It would make far more 
sense for those women to go and link 
hands around the Berlin Wall. If by doing 
so they managed to persuade the Soviets 
to take it down, to remove the guns, the 
dogs and the mines there to kill those 
who attempt to escape to freedom they 
would be doing something. If they do not 
succeed in persuading the Soviets to take 
it down they will prove that the freedom 
of the Greenham Common women and the 
freedom of all people in this country 
still needs to be defended.
NC: But Labour Leader Michael Foot 
defended the women saying that they 
believed the deployment of Cruise 
missiles would make arms limitation more 
difficult. After the arguments the leader 
of the House John Biffen said the matter 
should be the subject of a full-scale 
debate.
Large anti-nuclear demonstrations are 
also expected in several West German 
cities over Easter. The Defence Secretary 
Mr Michael Heseltine who is in Berlin 
visiting British forces said they were 
the real peace campaigners in Western 
Europe. Our Defence Correspondent 
Christopher Wain reports.
Crr: The border and wall ringing West
Berlin stretches for a hundred miles, so 
it is here that Michael Heseltine came in 
what he freely acknowledged was an Easter 
counter-propaganda exercise.
The East German border guards were out in 
force in their watchtowers and beside the 
perimeter fence. On this side it is 
patrolled by men of the Royal Irish 
Rangers. The force here is a trip-wire,
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and East German troops based in the 20- 
mile ring around the city, so much of the 
training is street fighting and house 
clearance practised in the British Army’s 
fighting city.
And just to emphasise the nature of the 
enemy one of the fusiliers was sporting a 
Russian uniform.
Then it was back to the Wall, laying a 
wreath for those who died trying to get 
across. And then a final view of the 
scene near the Brandenberg gate. What 
purpose had this visit served?
Michael Heseltine: It reinforces the
point that anyone who holds my job knows. 
That we are here to defend the peace and 
freedom of the West. There’s going to be 
a lot of protest in the West in the 
course of the next couple of days, there 
will be marching, protests, and this is 
the point where the marching has to stop. 
There won’t be any marching or protests 
over there, you’ve only got to stand here 
to understand why. The interesting thing 
is that the very success of the promises 
of the various governments of the NATO 
Alliance have pursued for 37 years has 
not only kept our freedom but has kept 
the freedom of the people to march and 
protest. That’s one of the privileges of 
a free and democratic society.
Nc: NATO has formally endorsed President
Reagan’s latest proposal for limiting 
nuclear missiles. But there is still no 
official reaction from the Soviet Union. 
Moscow has called it an old idea in a new 
wrapping. The Americans have suggested 
that the two sides have an e a, u a 1 number 
of missiles instead of insisting on their 
Zero Option.
The S o v i e t  l e a d e r s h i p  has been 
commemorating the death of Karl Marx 
rather than commenting on the proposal.
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plan has been criticised by Soviet 
commentators for excluding British and 
French nuclear weapons and only covering 
land-based missiles. The Soviet Union has 
said these would have to be taken into 
consideration in any new agreement.
President Reagan is expected to launch 
another attack on the Soviet military 
build-up in a speech in Los Angeles in 
half an hour’s time. It’s thought he’ll 
criticise the nuclear freeze movement for 
undermining arms control negotiations.
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Nc: Britain is expelling three more
Russians for spying. Two are diplomats, 
the third is a journalist. The Foreign 
Office has told Colonel Primakov, an 
assistant air attache and a Mr Igor 
Titov, a magazine correspondent to leave 
the country within seven days. The other 
man, a Mr Sergei Ivanov, a second 
secretary at the Soviet Embassy is 
already abroad and will not be allowed to 
return.
Crr: This is the third time Britain has 
expelled Russians for spying in the last 
four months. The Soviet Embassy wouldn't 
c o m m e n t  tonight but Mr Titov the 
journalist said he thought his expulsion 
was an early April Fools joke and the 
spying allegations were absolute rubbish.
Igor Titov talked about his expulsion 
behind a table laid with caviar and 
sandwiches, sheltered by his wife and by 
his occupation a a journalist. It was his 
second tour in London as a foreign 
correspondent for a news magazine which 
gave him complete freedom to travel. His 
column in the Russian New Times magazine 
is now exposed as the cover for a spy.
Titov: I t ’s ridiculous, absolutely
ridiculous because, well, you could just 
as well accuse anybody for anything, but 
to accuse a journalist for spying, I 
think it is absolutely ridiculous.
Crr: Why do you think the Government say
that your presence in Britain is 
unacceptable?
Titov: Well if it is unacceptable for the 
Foreign Office, well I can just pack and 
leave, that's all,
Crr: You have seven days to leave. Do you 
intend to do so?
Titov: Well I will of course, and I
consider the whole thing a pure political 
provocation on the part of the Government 
with Mrs Thatcher at the head of it.
Crr: Two other Soviet diplomats have been 
expelled at the same time for equal 
spying or unacceptable activities. Do 
you suggest that you alone are the only 
innocent among them?
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Titov: Well the thing is I only heard it 
on the news, that some other, you know, 
had been expelled but as far as I ’m 
concerned,and I can speak only for me, 
but I’m quite sure that all the people 
who are being spies, I don’t know how 
many of them, as yet, but I think it’s 
absolutely ridiculous.
Crr: So three times in four months the
head of the Soviet Embassy in London has 
been called by the Foreign Office and 
told that Russians are being thrown out 
for spying. Five of them in all since 
December, which strongly suggests that 
British counter-intelligence has an 
actual list of counter-spies, possibly 
provided by the Russian who defected to 
Britain last June from the Soviet Embassy 
in Iran. In addition to Mr Titov, 
tonight’s announcement named two spies 
who worked at the Soviet Embassy in 
London.
One of them, Mr Ivanov who has already 
left Britain and is barred from 
reenter ing was the very diplomat who 
proved so noncommittal when ITN reporter 
Keith Hatfield called at the Soviet 
Embassy last December in connection with 
another spy scandal.
Ivanov: My name is Ivanov, I am second
secretary
Crr: And your first name is?
Ivanov: Ivanov.
Crr: And this is the man Keith Hatfield 
was inquiring after, Captain Anatoly 
Zotov the naval attache. Later reports 
said that he was trying to set up a spy 
ring in Britain before being expelled 
last December.
And in January this year, another 
Russian, Vladimir Chernov, who held semi- 
diplomatic status as a translator at the 
International Wheat Council was also 
thrown out for spying.
Now when Captain Zotov was expelled there 
was considerable criticism over the way 
the Soviet Embassy here was able to 
u p s t a g e  the o f f i c i a l  B r i t i s h  
announcement. Well that certainly didn’t 
happen today, and indeed it seemed to be
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are being thrown out on the very day Mrs 
Thatcher and Mr Heseltine are denouncing 
the Russians as part of their criticisms 
of the E a s t e r  a n t i - n u c l e a r  
demonstrations.
Nc: And CND say their Easter weekend
protests which started today will be the 
biggest of their kind ever seen in 
Britain. Today they effectively prevented 
work at the Burghfield Royal Ordinance 
factory near Reading where nuclear 
warheads for BritainTs Polaris submarines 
are made. Police kept open Greenham 
Common air base near Newbury where Cruise 
missiles are to be based. There were 
scuffles tonight as Greenham peace women 
tried to stop workers on the base from 
leaving. Tomorrow CND hopes to get 40,000 
people out to form a human chain along 
t h e  f o u r t e e n  m i l e s
between Greenham and Burghfield by way of 
Aldermaston the atomic weapons research 
establishment. In the Commons, Mrs 
T h a t c h e r  a g r e e d  w i t h  the T o r y  
backbencher who said the protestors were 
blinkered and dangerous even if sincere.
Crr: The demonstrations began at dawn
with CND supporters blockading the gates 
of the warheads factory at Burghfield and 
the missile site at Greenham Common.
At Greenham the police soon made it clear 
that they were not going to allow work at 
the base to be disrupted. More than 200 
uniformed officers using a carefully- 
rehearsed plan swamped the gates at the 
site, then opened up a route to allow 
through buses carrying more than 1,000 
workers. The demonstrators were also 
shown that there was more than one way to 
ferry in personnel needed to keep a 
mi l i t a r y  base on full alert. The 
outwitted Greenham peace campaigners 
brought in reinforcements in an attempt 
to prevent the workers leaving the site. 
But again the police were there to open a 
way for the convoy to leave.
By contrast at the weapons factory at 
Burghfield only the occasional worker 
chose to run the gauntlet and the plant 
was effectively closed for the day. This 
is one of the few who got in. CND 
described their day as a triumph and 
aware that the eyes of the world were on 
them had this to say about President
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Joan Ruddock: Well I think when he makes 
this sort of gesture he has made on talks 
again or on offering a new deal he is 
trying to head off the European peace 
movements. He has known as we have for a 
very long time that we planned these 
demonstrations and I think it’s a way of 
trying to diffuse them, but he will not 
succeed because they are not realistic 
offers and they fall very far short of 
the demands of the peace movement, which 
is no nuclear weapons at all in Europe.
Crr: Tonight CND supporters continued to
arrive in Berkshire for t o m o r r o w ’s 
symbolic linking of hands in a fourteen 
mile human chain from the bombs factory 
in Burghfield to the missiles site in 
Greenham Common. Norman Rees, News At 
Ten, Berkshire.
Nc: The Prime Minister told the Commons 
that it would make far more sense for the 
peace women to go and link hands around 
the Berlin Wall. As she spoke her Defence 
Secretary Mr Heseltine was at the Berlin 
Wall saying that was where the real peace 
makers were. First, Mrs Thatcher.
Prime Minister: It would make far more 
sense for those women to go and link 
hands around the Berlin Wall. If by doing 
so they managed to persuade the Soviets 
to take it down, to remove the guns, the 
dogs and the mines there to kill those 
who attempt to escape to freedom they 
would be doing something.
Crr: The visible signs of the Soviets’
control of Eastern Europe was just what 
Mr Heseltine had come to Berlin to see 
and to emphasise. East German guards 
studied his arrival and he peered back at 
them from a watchtower. He studied the 
dogs guarding the 100 mile-long border 
and then became another picutre in an 
East German intelligence file. Mr 
Heseltine was visiting British troops in 
Berlin.
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peace keepers are and I thought if I was 
here it would help people to see those 
protest marches at home in a clearer 
focus. You see they are free to march, to 
protest, over there where the real threat 
is there won’t be any protests, there 
won’t be any marches.
Crr: Now there are many people in Britain 
who would share your views on the Soviet 
system but still believe that Cruise 
should be opposed because they are an 
unnecessary addition to NATO’s nuclear 
arsenal.
Michael Heseltine: I’m rather closer to 
the Russian SS-20 missiles than the 
people in Britain. You see they already 
deployed that particular class of nuclear 
weapon in the Soviet Union facing us. 
They’ve got 350 missiles with over a 
thousnad warheads, and two-thirds of them 
are actually facing Western Europe. What 
we’ve said is if they’ll take them away 
we won’t deploy and that would be the 
best option.
Crr: Then the Defence Secretary went to 
the Berlin Wall to leave flowers which he 
had dedicated to those who sought freedom 
and who died for it. Geoffrey Archer, 
News At Ten, Berlin.
Nc: President Reagan attacked his own
country’s nuclear freeze movement which 
calls for a halt in any more increases in 
both American and Russian weapons. He 
said a freeze would
pull the rug from under the American 
negotiators at disarmament talks and 
benefit the Russians who had more nuclear 
weapons. If we appear to be divided, the 
President said, they’ll dig in their 
heels.
If  we appear divided... 
they win dig in their heels’
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Nc: It was, said the organisers, the most 
moving and successful demonstration of 
all time in Britain. According to the 
Defence Minister Mr Heseltine it was 
misguided and naive. Either way tens of 
thousands of people stood shoulder to 
shoulder along what the protesters call 
Nuclear Valley in Berkshire. 80,000 
according to CND. The police reckoned 
40,000. The only incident came when 
nearly 200 demonstrators scaled the 
p e r i m e t e r  f e n c e  at G r e e n h a m  
Common air base and were stopped by the 
police. From Greenham the protesters 
stood out in a symbolic human chain for 
fourteen miles past Aldermaston and on to 
the n u c l e a r  w e a p o n s  f a c t o r y  at 
Burghfield. Peter Goulde reports.
Crr: They came to Berkshire in their
thousands, as army of CND supporters from 
all over Britain. They quickly filled the 
narrow country roads leading to the 
nuclear bases. Most arrived in fleets of 
coaches and all of them were convinced of 
the value of their protests.
Protestor: It will achieve national and I 
hope world-wide press, and I hope that we 
can put our points of view forward.
Protestor: We are going into a new
lunatic age and somebody has to stand up 
and be counted and I thought I must be 
there to be counted with them.
Crr: There were demonstrators of all ages
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united by their opposition to nuclear 
weapons. For some it was clearly a family 
outing and even members of the womens' 
peace camp seemed in a holiday mood as 
they enjoyed a joke at the expense of the 
police.
But the mood became more serious with the 
formation of the human chain in what's 
become known as nuclear valley. It 
stretched fourteen miles from Greenham 
C o m m o n  to the weapons factory at 
Burghfield and also included the 
Aldermaston research centre.
The symbolic joining of hands was the 
reason they'd come here and the line was 
unbroken.
But up above, someone clearly had doubts 
about the exercise.
One thing was certain. This demonstration 
was being reported around the world.
And at Greenham Common, women protestors 
picked this moment to try to break 
through the main gate and by sheer weight 
of numbers they nearly succeeded. Some 
were able to climb over the security 
fence despite the barbed wire but they 
didn’t get very far on the other side. 
187 women were arrested and after being 
caught they were escorted off the 
premises.
But there was no trouble anywhere else, 
and the s e r i o u s  p o i n t  of the 
demonstration didn’t prevent most of 
those taking part from having a good 
time.
The day came to a peaceful end when many 
of those who'd formed the human chain 
gathered for a rally near Aldermaston. 
The police estimated that 40,000 people 
took part in today's demonstrations but 
CND disagreed. Their estimates varied but 
they thought the real figure was nearer
100,000 and they were satisfied because 
they had been able to complete their 
symbolic human chain. Whatever the exact 
figures their General Secretary Monsignor 
Bruce Kent was delighted with the turn 
out. It was one of the lar g e s t
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ever held in this country and it was 
peaceful.
Chief Constable, Thames Valley Police: Oh 
I am delighted with the way things have 
gone over the last few days. We achieved 
what we set out to do. I think it’s been 
a very peaceful organisation. We havenTt 
had any need whatsoever to recourse to 
mass arrest. We have achieved our 
intentions, we have achieved it 
peacefully, yes I’m very satisfied.
Crr: And for this evening the only
problem seemed to be finding a bus home. 
Some of today’s demonstrators will be on 
their way north tonight, heading for the 
peace rallies to be held in Glasgow and 
Faslane during the weekend.
Nc: In West Germany four days of peace 
demonstrations have started. About 15,000 
people took part in anti-nuclear marches 
to protest about the siting of American 
Cruise and Pershing missiles. From 
G e r m a n y  our Defence Correspondent 
Christopher Wain reports.
Crr: About a thousand demonstrators from
Hamburg arrived in the sleepy village of 
Kelighusen soon after midday. Then they 
set out for a nearby barracks.
Li 1akronkazerna is at first sight is a 
perfectly ordinary German camp standing 
just outside the village but according to 
the protestors just behind the fence 70 
American GIs are guarding warheads for 
tactical nuclear weapons. So this Easter 
this is one of the places on the list for 
blockade.
At Kelighusen the mood was good humoured. 
The problem will come when the gates need, 
to be opened and the singing has to stop.
Nc: In Bavaria there was trouble outside
another American Army camp believed by 
demonstrators to be earmarked for 
Pershing II rockets. Police carried away 
100 demonstrators, but there were 
scuffles when one was bitten by a police 
dog. The police sprayed disabling fluid 
on the crowd to force them back.
The Defence S e cretary Mr Mic h a e l  
Heseltine, just back from Berlin, called 
today’s demonstrations naive and had a
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warning for the peace movement.
Michael Heseltine: So I have got the
simplest of messages for those who 
marched today. You do so in freedom and 
that freedom is your right and I am 
charged with its defence, however much I 
may deplore the inconvenience and the 
cost you impose on the majority of us who 
donTt share your views. But don't believe 
for one moment that we will risk that 
freedom, our freedom as well as yours, by 
following you along a naive and reckless 
road.
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Nc: Supporters of the Campaign for
Nuclear Disarmament started to pack up 
and leave Berkshire tonight after their 
mass demonstration against three key 
nuclear installations. CND say it was the 
most moving and hugely successful protest 
Britain has seen with 80,000 men, women 
and children joining in. Police say the 
figure was nearer 40,000.
The campaigners lined the 14 mile way 
from Greenham Common air base which is 
being prepared for Cruise missiles to the 
Royal Ordinance factory at Burghfield 
where nuclear warheads for Britain’s 
Polaris submarines are made.
Crr: The t u r n o u t  e x c e e d e d  all
expectations. From early morning roads 
leading to Berkshire’s so-called nuclear 
valley filled with coaches bringing peace 
campaigners fom all over the country. It 
was one of the m o s t  a m b i t i o u s  
demonstrations CND had organised and 
officials were angry at the Government’s 
attempts to denigrate it.
Michael Pentz: Last night Mrs Thatcher 
and Mr Heseltine hit, unbelievable as it 
may seem, a new low, a low of
trivialising the issue that is bringing 
thousands of people on to this damp 
common and on these damp streets today. I 
think that their use of the propaganda 
s t u n t  of the B e r l i n  W a l l  w as 
hypocritical, cowardly and cheapjack.
Crr: At Greenham Common the blockade of 
the air base continued. Some militant 
women campaigners succeeded once again in 
scaling the perimeter fence.
All together 187 people were detained for 
trespassing during the day by Ministry of 
Defence security guards.
Along the 14 mile route between Greenham 
and Burghfield there was often confusion. 
Some demonstrators abandoned their 
position early thinking the link-up was 
already over. CND stewards asked them to 
return.
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hardly seemed to matter. Then, just after 
2 O’clock officials reckoned the human 
chain was complete. Tens of thousands of 
people had turned out, often the roads 
w e r e  l i n e d  on b o t h  s i d e s  
and the mood was euphoric. It’s doubtful 
t h o u g h  t h a t  t h e  o r g a n i s e r s  
achieved their full objective of one 
single, coherent link-up. But the 
symbolic gesture had been fully made. 
Weapons factory, nuclear research 
establishment and missile bases were 
joined together by a chain of people 
committed to the removal of them all.
For the demonstrators it was a long day. 
They had travelled all night to get here. 
Critics might argue with their viewpoint, 
but surely not with their commitment.
Protestor: We’re ordinary British people
who feel strongly that we want a peaceful 
future, and w e ’re not going to get it 
with nuclear weapons on our territories.
Protestor: Well we hope that it’ll make 
people think about the nuclear weapons 
issue more seriously perhaps than some of 
them have done so far.
Protestor: To show exactly what we feel 
about these nuclear weapons, and why 
we’re here, and that’s why I’m here, and 
my daughter, because I want a tomorrow’s 
world for her. It’s quite simple.
Crr: Mrs Thatcher says you should be
linking arms around the Berlin Wall 
rather than here.
Protestor: Mrs Thatcher should be doing 
something for peace instead of telling us 
what we should be doing. What’s she done 
for peace?
Crr: The demonstration ended with a rally 
on Padworth common, close to Aldermaston. 
CND leaders were clearly delighted with
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to the Government.
Joan Ruddock: This has been the most
moving, imaginative and I think hugely 
succesful demonstration of all time in 
Britain. We have demonstrated again that 
we oppose the manufacture of nuclear 
weapons and the deployment of nuclear 
weapons, and research into any future 
nuclear weapons. We will have none of it.
Crr: If nothing else the demonstration
brought a touch of colour and humour to 
the Berkshire countryside today, but that 
did little to obscure the seriousness of 
the issues. Mrs Thatcher has made no 
secret of her distaste for this weekend’s 
protests, nor her belief, shared by 
President Reagan, that these people are 
at best misguided, at worst dangerous and 
subversive. The Prime Minister was 
herself the target of many demonstrators 
today who said the movement was too 
strong to be ignored. And the sheer size 
of the rally will give added weight to 
those who are opposed to the siting of 
new American missiles, not only in 
Britain, but anywhere in Europe.Norman 
Rees, News At Ten at the CND rally in 
Berkshire.
Nc: The Defence Secretary Mr Michael
Heseltine who’s just returned from a 
visit to the Berlin Wall said the anti- 
nuclear demonstrators were going down a 
naive and reckless road. He said it would 
be an unforgiveable gamble for the West 
to do what they advocated. The Soviet 
Union would use force ruthlessly where it 
thought it could win.
Michael Heseltine: So I have got the
simplest of messages for those who 
marched today. You do so in freedom and 
that freedom is your right and I am 
charged with its defence, however much I 
may deplore the inconvenience and the 
cost you impose on the majority of us who 
don’t share your views. But don’t believe 
for one moment that we will risk that 
freedom, our freedom as well as yours, by 
following you along a naive and reckless 
road.
{NEWS] MICflmflESELTINE MP
at TEN; D efence Secretary
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anti-nuclear and peace demonstrations 
today.
There were scuffles at an American base 
at Neu-Ulm in the South, one of the 
fifteen bases being blockaded.
Two demonstrators were hurt. One was 
bitten by a police dog as police cleared 
the main gate. Tear gas was fired and one 
woman was arrested.
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Appendix 6.2 Reported statements in defence and disarmament 
news T Easter 1 Q83.
On the Peace Movement
The Prime Minister
1) Mrs Thatcher has already reacted sharply to the 
demonstration. They’d be better off linking hands around the 
Berlin Wall she said.O 2100 31/3/83)
2) The Prime Minister agreed with the Conservative 
backbencher who called the women of Greenham Common 
blinkered and dangerous.(1 2100 31/3/83)
3) Prime Minister: It would make far more sense for those 
women to go and link hands around the Berlin Wall. If by 
doing so they managed to persuade the Soviets to take it 
down, to remove the guns, the dogs and the mines there to 
kill those who attempt to escape to freedom they would be 
doing something. If they do not succeed in persuading the 
Soviets to take it down they will prove that the freedom of 
the Greenham Common women and the freedom of all people in 
this country still needs to be defended.(1 2100 31/3/83)
4) Mrs Thatcher agreed with the Tory backbencher who said the 
protestors were blinkered and dangerous even if sincere.(3 
2200 31/3/83)
5) The Prime Minister told the Commons that it would make 
far more sense for the peace women to go and link hands 
around the Berlin Wall.(3 2200 31/3/83)
6) Prime Minister: It would make far more sense for those 
women to go and link hands around the Berlin Wall. If by 
doing so they managed to persuade the Soviets to take it 
down, to remove the guns, the dogs and the mines there to 
kill those who attempt to escape to freedom they would be 
doing something.(3 2200 31/3/83)
7) Mrs Thatcher says [the protesters] should be linking arms 
around the Berlin Wall rather than here.(3 2200 1/4/83)
8) Mrs Thatcher has made no secret of her distaste for this 
weekend’s protests, nor her belief that these people are at 
best misguided, at worst dangerous and subversive.(3 2200 
1/4/83)
The Defence Secretary
1) The Defence Secretary Mr Michael Heseltine who is in 
Berlin visiting British forces said they were the real peace 
campaigners in Western Europe.(1 2100 31/3/83)
2) Michael Heseltine freely acknowledged [his visit to the 
Berlin Wall] was an Easter counter-propaganda exercise.(1 
2100 31/3/83)
3) Michael Heseltine: [the visit] reinforces the point
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defend the peace and freedom of the West. There’s going 
to be a lot of protest in the West in the course of the 
next couple of days, there will be marching, protests, 
and this is the point where the marching has to stop.
There won’t be any marching or protests over there, you’ve 
only got to stand here to understand why. The interesting 
thing is that the very success of the promises of the 
various governments of the NATO Alliance have pursued for 37 
years has not only kept our freedom but has kept the freedom 
of the people to march and protest. That’s one of the 
privileges of a free and democratic society.(1 2100 31/3/83)
4) According to the Defence Minister Mr Michael Heseltine, 
[the demonstration] was naive and misguided.(1 2100 1/4/83)
5) The Defence Secretary Mr Michael Heseltine, just back 
from Berlin, called today’s demonstrations naive and had a 
warning for the peace movement.(1 2100 1 1/4/83)
6) Michael Heseltine: So I have got the simplest of messages 
for those who marched today. You do so in freedom and that 
freedom is your right and I am charged with its defence, 
however much I may deplore the inconvenience and the cost you 
impose on the majority of us who don’t share your views. But 
don’t believe for one moment that we will risk that freedom, 
our freedom as well as yours, by following you along a naive 
and reckless road.(1 2100 1/4/83)
7) Defence Secretary Mr Heseltine was at the Berlin Wall 
saying that was where the real peace makers were.(3 2200 
31/3/83)
8) Michael Heseltine: This is where the real peace keepers 
are and I thought if I was here it would help people to see 
those protest marches at home in a clearer focus. You see 
they are free to march, to protest, over there where the real 
threat is there won’t be any protests, there won’t be any 
marches.(3 2200 31/3/83)
9) Michael Heseltine: I’m rather closer to the Russian SS-20 
missiles than the people in Britain. You see they already 
deployed that particular class of nuclear weapon in the 
Soviet Union facing us. They’ve got 350 missiles with over a 
thousand warheads, and two-thirds of them are actually facing 
Western Europe. What we’ve said is if they’ll take them away 
we won’t deploy and that would be the best option.(3 2200 
31/3/83)
10) The Defence Secretary Mr Michael Heseltine who’s just 
returned from a visit to the Berlin Wall said the anti- 
nuclear demonstrators were going down a naive and reckless 
road. He said it would be an unforgiveable gamble for the 
West to do what they advocated. The Soviet Union would use 
force ruthlessly where it thought it could win.(3 2200 
1/4/83)
11) Michael Heseltine: So I have got the simplest of messages 
for those who marched today. You do so in freedom and that
357
however much I may deplore the inconvenience and the cost you 
impose on the majority of us who don't share your views. But 
don’t believe for one moment that we will risk that freedom, 
our freedom as well as yours, by following you along a naive 
and reckless road.(3 2200 1/4/83)
The Prime Minister and the Defence Secretary
1) Mrs Thatcher and Mr Heseltine are denouncing the Russians 
as part of their criticisms of the Easter anti-nuclear 
demonstrations.(3 2200 31/3/83)
President Reagan and the Prime Minister
1)President Reagan shares [the Prime Minister’s belief] that 
these people are at best misguided, at worst dangerous and 
subversive.(3 2200 1/4/83)
President Reagan
1) President Reagan attacked his own country’s nuclear freeze 
movement which calls for a halt in any more increases in both 
American and Russian weapons. He said a freeze would pull the 
rug from under the American negotiators at disarmament talks 
and benefit the Russians who had more nuclear weapons. If we 
appear to be divided, the President said, they’ll dig in 
their heels.(3 2200 31/3/83)
3) President Reagan is expected to launch another attack on 
the Soviet military build-up in a speech in Los Angeles in 
half an hour’s time. It’s thought he’ll criticise the nuclear 
freeze movement for undermining arms control negotiations.(1 
2100 31/3/83)
The Police
1) The police reckoned 40,000.(1 2100 1/4/83)
2) The police estimated that 40,000 took part in today’s 
demonstration.(1 2100 1/4/83)
3) Police say the figure was nearer 40,000.(3 2200 1/4/83)
4) Chief Constable, Thames Valley Police: Oh I am delighted 
with the way things have gone over the last few days. We 
achieved what we set out to do. I think it’s been a very 
peaceful organisation. We haven’t had any need whatsoever to 
recourse to mass arrest. We have achieved our intentions, we 
have achieved it peacefully, yes I’m very satisfied.(1 2100 
1/4/83)
Burghfield workers
1) I think it’s a diabolical liberty that 
one can’t get to work when one wants to, so, you know, so 
what reason have you of stopping a person going to work?(1 
2100 31/3/83)
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2) Burghfield worker: YouTd [CND] prefer me not to earn 
money, just because you’re not earning money.(1 2100 31/3/83)
CND
1) Thousands of demonstrators say [it] is the biggest peace 
protest Britain has ever seen. (1 2100 31/3/83)
2) The demonstrators claimed that some employees did stay 
away today.(1 2100 31/3/83)
3) Bruce Kent: The object is not just to mass the numbers but 
really to show people these Cruise missiles here and we have 
the research centre at Aldermaston and we have the bomb 
factory. This is what I call nuclear valley and we are 
warning people that with the first strike weapons and the 
first use weapons coming that this country is drifting 
towards nuclear war.(1 2100 31/3/83)
4) It was, said the organisers, the most moving and hugely 
successful demonstration of all time in Britain.(1 2100 
1/4/83)
5) 80,000, according to CND.(1 2100 1/4/83)
6) Protestor: It will achieve national and I hope world-wide 
press, and I hope that we can put our points of view 
forward.(1 2100 1/4/83)
7) Protestor: We are going into a new lunatic age and 
somebody has to stand up and be counted and I thought I must 
be there to be counted with them.(1 2100 1/4/83)
8) CND disagreed [with the police]. Their estimates varied 
but they thought the figure was nearer 100,000 and they were 
satisfied because they had been able to complete their 
symbolic human chain.(1 2100 1/4/83)
9) General Secretary Monsignor Bruce Kent was delighted with 
the turn out.(1 2100 1/4/83)
10) CND say their Easter weekend protests which started today 
will be the biggest of their kind ever seen in Britain.(3 
2200 31/3/83)
11) CND say it was the most moving and hugely successful 
protest Britain has seen with 80,000 men, women and children 
joining in.(3 2200 1/4/83)
12) Officials were angry at the government’s attempts to
denigrate it.(3 2200 1/4/83)
13) Michael Pentz: Last night Mrs Thatcher and Mr Heseltine
hit, unbelievable as it may seem, a new low, a low of
trivialising the issue that is bringing thousands of people 
on to this damp common and on these damp streets today. I 
think that their use of the propaganda stunt of the Berlin 
Wall was hypocritical, cowardly and cheapjack.(3 2200 1/4/83)
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14) Protestor: We ’re ordinary British people who feel strongly 
that we want a peaceful future, and we’re not going to get it 
with nuclear weapons on our territories.(3 2200 1/4/83)
15) Protestor: Well we hope that it’ll make people think about 
the nuclear weapons issue more seriously perhaps than some of 
them have done so far.(3 2200 1/4/83)
16) Protestor: To show exactly what we feel about these 
nuclear weapons, and why we’re here, and that’s why I’m here, 
and my daughter, because I want a tomorrow’s world for her. 
It’s quite simple.(3 2200 1/4/83)
17) Protestor: Mrs Thatcher should be doing something for 
peace instead of telling us what we should be doing. What’s 
she done for peace? (3 2200 1/4/83)
18) CND leaders were clearly delighted with the response and 
the challenge it posed to the Government.(3 2200 1/4/83)
19) Joan Ruddock: This has been the most moving, imaginative 
and I think hugely succesful demonstration of all time in 
Britain. We have demonstrated again that we oppose the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons and the deployment of nuclear 
weapons, and research into any future nuclear weapons. We 
will have none of it.(3 2200 1/4/83)
20) Many demonstrators today said the movement was too strong 
to be ignored.(3 2200 1/4/83)
The Leader of the Labour Party
1) Labour Leader Michael Foot defended the women saying that 
they believed the deployment of Cruise missiles would make 
arms limitation more difficult.(1 2100 31/3/83)
3 6 0
President Reagan
1) President Reagan proposed a half-way stage in which the 
two superpowers would aim for equal numbers on both sides.(1 
2100 30/3/83)
2) The President’s message was that he’d be willing to settle 
for what he can get rather than end up with no agreement at 
all.(1 2100 30/3/83)
3) President Reagan: When it comes to intermediate nuclear 
missiles in Europe, it would be better to have none than to 
have some. But if there must be some it is better to have 
few than to have If the Soviets will not now agree to the 
total elimination of these weapons, I’d hope that they’d at 
least agree join us in an interim agreement that would 
substantially reduce these forces to equal levels on both 
sides. To this end Ambassador Paul Nitze has informed his 
Soviet counterpart that we are prepared to negotiate an 
interim agreement in which the United States would 
substantially reduce its planned deployment of Pershing II 
and ground-launched Cruise missiles, provided the Soviet 
Union reduce the number of its warheads on longer-range INF 
missiles to an equal level on a global basis.(1 2100 30/3/83)
4) The President spoke of his confidence in success at 
Geneva. (1 2100 30/3/83)
5) The President, said he would cut the number of Cruise and 
Pershing missiles to be deployed in Europe if the Soviets 
dismantle some of the SS-20s already in place.(3 2200 
30/3/83)
6) The President said no nuclear weapons in Europe would be 
best. He said his offer of that, the Zero Option, was still 
on the table and the Soviet Union’s rejection of it was a 
deep disappointment to him.(3 2200 30/3/83)
7) President Reagan: But I do not intend to let this shadow 
that has been cast over the Geneva negotiations further 
darken our search for peace. When it comes to intermediate 
nuclear missiles in Europe, it would be better to have none 
than to have some. But if there must be some it is better to 
have few than to have many. If the Soviets will not now agree 
to the total elimination of these weapons, I’d hope that 
they’d at least agree join us in an interim agreement that 
would substantially reduce these forces to equal levels on 
both sides. To this end Ambassador Paul Nitze has informed 
his Soviet counterpart that we are prepared to negotiate an 
interim agreement in which the United States would 
substantially reduce its planned deployment of Pershing II 
and ground-launched Cruise missiles, provided the Soviet 
Union reduce the number of its warheads on longer-range INF 
missiles to an equal level on a global basis.(3 2200 30/3/83)
8) The President said the Soviets had launched a propaganda 
campaign to try and divide America from its allies and the
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initiative which the allies had significantly helped to 
shape, and the closest possible consultation would go on.(3 
2200 30/3/83)
9) President Reagan: This process is a model for how an 
alliance of free and democratic nations can and must work 
together on critical issues. It is the source of our unity 
and gives us a strength that no-one could hope to match and 
it gives me great confidence in the eventual success of our 
efforts in Geneva to create a safer, safer world for all the 
earth’s people. Thankyou very much.
America/ Americans
1) The Americans insist their Cruise and Pershing missiles 
are not just bargaining counters but real weapons which will 
be deployed in Europe by the end of the year if there’s no 
agreement in Geneva. (1 2100 30/3/83)
2) America is still insisting that in any compromise 
settlement the warhead figure for each side must be equal.(3 
2200 30/3/83)
3) America is still insisting that the equal level should be 
global, the same number of American intermediate range 
warheads in Europe as Russia has facing both Europe and 
Asia.(3 2200 30/3/83)
4) America is firmly rejecting Russia’s demand that British 
and French independent missiles should be counted in the 
balance. They must be excluded America says.(3 2200 30/3/83)
5) The Americans have suggested that the two sides have an 
equal number of missiles instead of insisting on their Zero 
Option.(1 2100 31/3/83)
Western governments/European leaders/NATO
1) The proposal has been warmly welcomed tonight by Western 
governments, including Britain.(1 2100 30/3/83)
2) NATO has formally endorsed President Reagan’s latest 
proposal for limiting nuclear missiles.(1 2100 31/3/83)
3) European leaders like Mrs Thatcher have all approved his 
new approach.(3 2200 30/3/83)
The Foreign Office/Foreign Secretary
1) The Foreign Office says there’s been the closest 
consultation between the allies about the idea, and it urges 
the Russians to consider the offer with the utmost 
seriousness and to respond positively.(1 2100 30/3/83)
2) The Foreign Secretary Mr Pym urged the Soviet Union to 
consider the American offer with the utmost seriousness and 
respond positively.(3 2200 30/3/83)
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BritainTs whole-hearted support. 
CND
1) Monsignor Bruce Kent, the CND Chairman, said Russia was 
unlikely to accept the Reagan plan as a serious starting 
point for negotiations. He said it gave a distorted view of 
the European nuclear balance because it concentrated on land- 
based missiles.(3 2200 30/3/83)
2) Joan Ruddock: Well I think when [President Reagan makes 
this sort of gesture he has made on talks again or on 
offering a new deal he is trying to head off the European 
peace movements. He has known as we have for a very long time 
that we planned these demonstrations and I thin kit's a way 
of trying to defuse them, but he will not succeed because 
they are not realistic offers and they fall very far short of 
the demands of the peace movement, which is no nuclear 
weapons at all in Europe.(3 2200 31/3/83)
Soviet sources
1) A commentary in the government newspaper Izvestia said 
nothing would come of it. Izvestia said President Reagan was 
engaged in farce while trying to appear flexible. (3 2200 
30/3/83)
2) Moscow has called it an old idea in a new wrapping. (1 
2100 31/3/83)
3) The plan has been criticised by Soviet commentators for 
excluding British and French weapons and only covering land- 
based missiles. The Soviet Union has said these would have to 
be taken into account in any new agreement.(1 2100 31/3/83)
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Chapter Seven
The Nuclear Election.
There will be no more important subject for the next 
four and a half weeks and beyond. (The Prime Minister on 
defence policy, the House of Commons, May 10th, 1983)
We turn, finally, to party politics, the third 'axis1 on 
which the nuclear debate was conducted, and in particular to 
the moment of its greatest intensity - the 1983 General 
Election, when as the arguments about pro and anti-nuclear, 
Cruise and Pershing, Trident and Polaris, crystallised into a 
set of relatively clear electoral choices and were, for 
Britain, resolved until the late 1980s.
The normal rules of broadcasting journalism are suspended 
during coverage of an election campaign. The general 
requirement of "due impartiality" is replaced by a more 
precise formula of equal time for the major protagonists in 
the campaign. This chapter is not concerned with the 
application of this formal rule (which would have been a 
massive project requiring strict monitoring of the whole 
coverage over the relevant period) - or even primarily with 
the verification of 'bias' in news coverage of the different 
participants. Rather, given that the Nuclear Election 
coincided with the research period, it focusses on the 
question of news input and how this factor shapes images of 
the nuclear debate which appear on television. The discussion 
examines how the representatives of the political parties 
used television in the Nuclear Election, and to a lesser 
extent, how television journalists presented these respective 
policies to the electorate. It is the study of a propaganda 
war between the political parties, in which television news
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election coverage, but aims to describe the main features of 
the campaign as they appeared through the 'window' of 
television.
The significance of such a study lies in the fact that in 
the modern industrialised world election campaigns are 
largely media campaigns, and in particular television 
campaigns. It is no exaggeration to say that elections can be 
won or lost in front of the television camera. In their 
introduction to an analysis of television coverage of the 
1983 European Parliamentary elections, Blumler et al suggest 
that election campaigns:
live or die, gather momentum or falter, via the heavy 
and insistent stream of messages that are prepared for 
delivery during them to all quarters of the body 
politic. It is through campaign communication that 
impulses to participate are energised, issues are 
defined, and choices for voting decisions are conveyed 
(1983, p.4).
Television is not the only means of delivery of these 
messages, and it has not made redundant other forms of 
electioneering, but it is the most potent channel of 
communication open to politicians and parties. Gunter et al 
estimate that during the 1983 General Election an average of
7.8 million people watched BBC 9 0’ Clock News every day and
5.8 million watched News at Ten on ITV (1984, p.5). "To a 
large degree", Anthony Smith has noted, "television coverage 
is the electoral campaign" (quoted in Ranney, 1983).
This is not merely the view of academics with a 
professional interest in asserting the sociological 
importance of mass communication. The participants in
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elections are keenly aware of the need to ’project1 on 
television. In US Presidential elections it is now taken for 
granted that the candidate’s media image is of extraordinary 
importance to the result. If the effects of media coverage on 
the results of British elections are more complex than in the 
American system, with the latter’s emphasis on the individual 
candidate, British politicians are by no means insensitive to 
the power of the medium[1].
The importance of election news on television is a factor 
of the size of its audiences, but in addition, as a ’media 
adviser’ for the Republican Party in the United States 
expresses it, ’’television has a believability factor that 
almost no other medium has. When people are asked what do 
they believe most, the first thing they believe is television 
news”[2].
Television’s general ’believability’, and here in Britain 
its privileged status as a relatively objective news medium 
combines with.its mass audience to make it a key element in 
the British electoral process. In the professional ideology 
of broadcasting journalism it is through television and radio 
that the issues of an election are aired in the most fair and 
balanced manner. Television is the ’neutral* mediator between 
politicians and electorate in a society where the majority of 
the press openly support the Conservative Party. Viewers 
largely subscribe to this view, Gunter et al finding that 70% 
of viewers thought television coverage of the 1983 election 
had ’’generally been fair to all parties and candidates”
(1984, p.16).
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This chapter analyses television news coverage of the 1983 
General Election with respect to the defence issue. The 
discussion refers to a sample of news recorded during the 
period May 10th to June 8th 1 983, which included the main 
evening bulletins on BBC1, ITV, BBC2 and Channel 4. A total 
of 82 news programmes were recorded, comprising approximately 
60 hours of newstime. Within the content category of election 
news, 55 items reported the defence issue.
Three of these reported on the participation of CND (see 
chapter 6 above), and two were background* items. In the 
remaining 50 items of coverage of the party political debate 
the views of 27 separate sources were reported in a total of 
174 statements (see table 7.1). These ranged from statements 
by party leaders and principal spokespersons, to quotations 
from manifestos, campaign committees, and *party 
strategists’. The views of the Conservative Party on defence 
were reported in 28 items, those of the Labour Party in 25, 
and those of the Alliance in 19. Enoch Powell’s controversial 
speech in support of unilateralism was reported in two items, 
and two items reported the results of opinion polls on 
defence policy.
The coverage contained three types of item. Firstly, 
reports of statements and counter statements made in the 
course of a day’s campaigning. Secondly, longer items 
containing interviews, and thirdly, structured debates 
between the parties. In the sample, 44 items were in the 
first category, five were in the second, and there was one 
broadcast debate. Party political broadcasts are excluded
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1983 General Election defence debate.
Source BBC ITN total
Thatcher 12 17 29
Foot 11 18 29
Heseltine 8 6 14
Healey 10 16 26
Owen 9 12 21
Silkin 2 3 5
Heffer 1 1
Pym 2 2
Joseph 1 1
Willis 1 2 3
Jenkins 4 4
Callaghan 5 5
Benn 4 4
Mortimer 1 4 5
Golding 1 1
Hattersley 1 1 2
Lab Manif. 4 2 6
Con Manif. 1 2 3
All Manif. 1 1 2
Lab Cam Comm. 2 2
Tribune 2 2
Mullin 1 1
Powell 3 3
Steel 1 1
Lab’s opponents 1 1
Conservatives 1 1
Labour strategists. 1 1
Totals 64 110 174
Table 7.2. Results of the General ElectionT June 9thr 1983, 
Conservative Labour Alliance Others
Seats 397 209 23 21
% share of
votes 42 28 26 5
Votes cast 12,991,377 8,437,120 7,775,048
% shift
since 1979 -1.9 -9.7 +11.5
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control of the broadcasters.
There were two unique features about the 1983 General 
Election. Firstly, in 1983 for the first time, the 'serious1 
participants in a General Election - those with a chance of 
winning political power - disagreed fundamentally on the 
issue of Britain's national security. The bi-partisan 
consensus around which the Labour and Conservative parties 
had conducted defence policy since 1945 had been shattered. 
Secondly, it involved the participation of a third major 
party, the Social Democratic and Liberal Party Alliance, a 
factor of no small importance to the eventual outcome. For 
both these reasons, the electorate of 1983 was confronted 
with an unprecedented range of choices on the defence issue, 
which took on a unique importance as a campaign theme.
Labour entered the campaign as the first major party in 
electoral history to be offering complete unilateral nuclear 
disarmament as a manifesto commitment. Labour's programme 
advocated a completely non-nuclear defence policy for Britain 
including the cancellation of plans for Cruise and Trident, 
the removal of United States1 nuclear weapons and bases from 
British territory, and the phasing out of Britain's own 
nuclear weapons such as the Polaris submarine system. All 
this was to be implemented within the lifetime of a single 
Parliament.
The Liberal-SDP Alliance supported the deployment of 
Cruise missiles at Greenham Common. It agreed with Labour 
however, that the Trident programme should be cancelled and,
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Alliance differed from the Conservatives in proposing that 
Polaris should be included in the Geneva negotiations between 
the United States and the USSR.
The Conservative Party fought the election as upholders of 
the nuclear 'consensus*. They were committed to an expansion 
of Britain's own nuclear force with Trident, and to NATO's 
dual-track policy, including Britain's acceptance of American 
Cruise missiles. They rejected the view that Britain's 
nuclear weapons should be counted in negotiations between the 
USSR and the USA on arms control.
These were the contours of a debate whose outcome would 
shape British defence policy into the late 1980s.
The anti-nuclear protests of the previous Easter had 
signalled public opposition to defence policy on a scale 
never previously seen. Obstacles were anticipated all over 
Europe to the implementation of NATO's 'dual-track' policy. 
The first Cruise missiles were six months away from 
deployment at Greenham Common. The label of 'the Nuclear 
Election' which some commentators applied to the campaign 
reflected the centrality of the defence issue within it.
Mrs Thatcher herself "put defence at the top of her 
agenda" after she declared in the House of Commons that there 
"would be no more important issue"[3]. Michael Foot in turn 
identified defence as "the supreme issue" for the Labour 
Party[4]. On 14 days of the 21-day television news sample on 
which the following account is based defence appeared as a 
theme in one context or another, and was rivalled in
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importance only by the issue of unemployment.
There was another notable characteristic of the 1983 
General Election as it related to the defence debate. On the 
one hand the defence issue, perhaps more than any other, 
proved to be an electoral liability for the Labour Party. On 
the other, even towards the end of the election campaign 
opinion polls were recording something which had long been 
evident in Britain: public opposition to major elements of 
the Conservative Party’s nuclear defence policy and 
corresponding support for a substantial part of Labour’s 
unilateralist programme. On May 26th, at the height of the 
Labour Party’s internal crisis over defence, ITN was 
reporting the results of a MARPLAN poll that ”a majority of 
voters still oppose Cruise and Trident, 54% in each case"(3 
2200 26/5/83). The same poll recorded that 45% of voters 
considered the Conservatives (who supported Cruise and 
Trident) to have a better policy than either Labour (who 
opposed both) or the Alliance (who supported Cruise but 
opposed Trident). This, the journalist suggested, ’’would seem 
to indicate that while the majority don’t want Britain to 
abandon existing nuclear weapons unilaterally, they also 
don’t want to add to the nuclear weapons on British 
territory” .
When the votes had been counted on June 9th the 
Conservatives emerged as clear winners (see table 7.2). Their 
vote was almost 2% down on the election of May 1 979 but a 9% 
swing from Labour to the Alliance split the opposition and 
increased Margaret Thatcher’s majority in the House of
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Election convincingly, and an analysis of the respective 
inputs of the three main contenders to television news 
coverage of the campaign provides some clues as to why.
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The date of the 1983 General Election was announced by 
Margaret Thatcher on May 9th, and electioneering began the 
next day. On defence, the Conservatives took the initiative, 
setting the pace of the campaign and the agenda for public 
debate during the first week. They set about denouncing 
Labour as ’extremist1, ’irresponsible1, and ’dangerous*, and 
although they did not begin to campaign ’officially* until 
May 20th, dominated television news in the first week with a 
series of interventions in which these themes were 
elaborated. Of 21 defence-related election news items in the 
first week, 13 contained Conservative denunciations of Labour 
and the anti-nuclear lobby. One event in particular, the 
Scottish Conservative Party Conference, was used by the 
Government as a platform from which to launch dramatic and 
widely publicised attacks on Labour.
The battle began on May 10th. That day in the House of 
Commons the Prime Minister demonstrated that she was prepared 
to confront the defence issue head on.
By calling the election when she did the Prime Minister 
had effectively prevented a long-awaited two-day debate on 
defence and disarmament, prompting the accusation from 
Michael Foot that she had ’run away’ from the issue.
Foot: If the Right Honourable Lady was so anxious to 
debate these matters why did she cut and run and abandon 
that debate? If we had had our way that matter would 
have been debated in the House today. It was the Right 
Honourable Lady and her Government who ran away from it.
To this the Prime Minister replied that she was ’’only too 
delighted to discuss defence”, and that she herself regarded
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it as the most important issue in the coming campaign. 
Election news that evening was dominated by these exchanges. 
From this ITN inferred that "Mrs Thatcher is going to 
concentrate her attacks on Labour’s defence policy"(3 2200 
10/5/83). Newsnight noted that "in the Commons Mrs Thatcher 
picks up Labour’s gauntlet on defence"(2 Newsnight 10/5/83).
A flavour of Conservative tactics in the coming campaign was 
provided in accounts of the rest of Mrs Thatcher’s speech.
She had attacked Labour’s defence policies as "misguided and 
naive"(4 1900 10/5/83). They would "bring rejoicing only in 
the Kremlin"[5].
These early exchanges also showed how important to the 
Conservative campaign would be the theme of the Soviet 
threat. In 14 of the 27 items in which Conservative views on 
defence were reported, the Soviet Union appeared as a reason, 
either for supporting the Conservative Party’s nuclear build­
up, or for rejecting the Labour Party’s proposed phasing out 
of British nuclear weapons. The British people were warned of 
the consequences if "our sworn enemies" had nuclear weapons 
and Britain did not. In one memorable statement, Defence 
Secretary Heseltine doubted Michael Foot’s ability "to defend 
us from the ravages of a feather duster, let alone the 
menacing imperialism of Soviet ambition". The election 
campaign of 1983 confirmed the centrality of images of the 
Soviet Union to the defence and disarmament debate.
On May 11th, for example, the Prime Minister appeared on 
the Jimmy Young radio show.In the course of her interview, 
which was reported on three of the four sampled bulletins
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Conservative victory. Otherwise, she argued, the USSR would 
not negotiate seriously at the Geneva talks.
Thatcher: I think that they would not come forward with 
disarmament proposals while there was an election in 
Germany. You know there was a similar issue between the 
two sides there and Chancellor Kohl won, and that was 
the first battle of getting two-sided disarmament. Now 
we've got another battle, because we are the really 
other big nation in Europe - Italy is also a staunch 
member of NATO. Now [the Soviets] are hoping to goodness 
that they can keep all their nuclear weapons and by 
various arguments, various devices, fool us into giving 
up ours.(4 1900 1 1/5/83)
On BBC2 she was reported as having taken a "fundamental 
swipe at Labour’s unilateralism".
Thatcher: If you really hate nuclear weapons, as I do, 
you do not have one-sided disarmament, throw out all the 
American bases and leave all the weapons in the hands of 
sworn enemies.(2 2245 11/5/83)
News at Ten emphasised the Prime Minister’s claim that:
the Russians were a big reason for calling the election 
early. Speaking in a voice made husky by a cold she said 
Russia wanted to see who won before concentrating on 
disarmament negotiations.(3 2200 10/5/83)
Two days into the campaign defence, and the Soviet threat, 
was thus established as a major election issue on television 
news. Furthermore, Mrs Thatcher was demonstrating her 
absolute faith in the correctness of her policies and her 
readiness to engage in battle with the Labour Party on the 
issue.
Chosen to put Labour's case on defence was Denis Healey, 
foreign affairs spokesman for the Labour Party[6]. Replying 
to her comments on the Jimmy Young Show he turned the Prime
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the German elections, and now the British, as an excuse for 
not reaching arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. 
He speculated that following the British election the 
forthcoming Italian elections would be employed in a similar 
way by the pro-nuclear lobby, and concluded:
Healey: My impression is that neither she nor President 
Reagan have the slightest interest in reaching agreement 
with the Russians on stopping the nuclear arms race.(3 
2200 1/5/83)
The next salvo of the campaign was launched at the 
Scottish Conservative Party conference, which began on May 
12th in Perth. In a major speech Defence Secretary Michael 
Heseltine attacked Labour for proposing the "most dangerous 
gamble the British people have ever been invited to take".
ITN reported gravely from the conference hall that there were 
"no smiles at Michael Heseltine's warning"(3 2200 12/5/83).
Michael Heseltine: Current Labour policies are in 
striking contrast to the moderate and sensible policies 
that have been pursued by post-war Labour governments. 
The truth is that it is the Labour Party itself which 
has changed. They propose to cast aside the political 
consensus on defence which has existed in this country 
for forty years as part of the price we are expected to 
pay for their evermore transparent lurch to left-wing 
policies.
Channel 4 news reported Mr HeseltineTs reference to Labour 
policies as "naive, destabilising and dangerous... they might 
tempt the Russians towards military adventurism in Europe"(4 
1900 1/5/83). On BBC news the Defence Secretary accused 
Labour of Abandoning the consensus1 that had, he said, kept 
the peace: "and I believe that by abandoning that consensus 
they are gambling with our freedom". These remarks were
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desperately needed a halt to all nuclear weapons development 
and deployments 1 2100 12/5/83). ITN broadcast a statement by 
Healey which addressed the specific issue of Britain’s 
independent nuclear deterrent. Polaris should be included in 
the superpower talks, he said, because:
the minute you start arguing, as Mr Pym and Mr Heseltine 
have been doing in recent weeks, that no country can be 
secure without its own independent strategic striking 
force, then you begin to waken the sleeping giants in 
Germany and Italy and many other countries.(3 2200 
12/5/83).
On Friday 13th the conference was addressed on the subject 
of defence first by Francis Pym, the Foreign Secretary[71, 
and then by the Prime Minister herself who reiterated the 
themes of the preceding days in a rousing and passionate 
speech which was covered in all bulletins, with the exception 
of BBCI’s 9 O’Clock News[8]. ITN emphasised that during the 
speech Mrs Thatcher had ’’reserved her most withering fire for 
the unilateral disarmers, contrasting the protesters of 
Greenham Common with the brave young men of the Armed Forces 
who recaptured the Falklands”(3 2200 11/5/83).
Thatcher: What do they want? First, this Labour Party 
wants us to abandon our own independent nuclear 
deterrent, a deterrent which has kept the peace for 
nearly 40 years, a deterrent which has been endorsed by 
every Labour leader - Attlee, Gaitskell, Wilson and 
Callaghan. Remember Gaitskell’s ’fight, fight, and fight 
again’ speech. Remember Bevan said, 'do not send me 
naked into the conference chamber. Endorsed by all of 
those, but not this Labour Party. They want us to 
abandon our weapons without a corresponding reduction 
from the Soviet Union. Abandon ours and leave them in 
the hands of our sworn enemies. Someone asked Mr 
Andropov whether he would disarm one-sidedly, or 
unilaterally as we call it. He replied, ’we are not a 
naive people’. Well, our opposition is proposing to have 
one-sided disarmament. It will not do and it must not 
happen.
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notice to quit on every American nuclear base in 
Britain. Many of them are part of the NATO alliance and 
part of the NATO defence. Not exactly the reaction of a 
reliable ally and a true friend. How does such an 
attitude recognise the tremendous contribution made by 
the United States forces to the defence of a free 
Europe?
If a hostile government was tempted to pursue its 
demands by armed aggression, which example would be more 
likely to make it pause? The renunciation of the means 
of national self-defence, which the banners at Faslane 
and Greenham call for, or the swift and sure response of 
our young men in the South Atlantic just a year ago? To 
be sure of freedom you need to be resolute and 
courageous in its defence, and have the means to do so. 
That is why on June 9th we will ask the people of 
Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom to treat the 
nation*s defence as the first call on the nation*s 
resources... Mr Andropov and the Soviet Union are not 
going to negotiate seriously or put proposals on the 
table if they think thereTs any chance of the Labour 
Party being returned to power.
Thus it was the Conservatives who prioritised the defence 
issue in the first week of the campaign, focussing attention 
on Labour. The sights and sounds of the Prime Minister and 
the Defence Secretary addressing their own party faithful in 
sympathetic surroundings, with stirring references to 
Vanishing the dark, divisive clouds of marxist socialism* 
made potent political spectacle. If Mrs Thatcher*s decision 
to call the election on Monday May 9th was unrelated to the 
Scottish Conservative Conference it was certainly a *happy 
coincidence*, given its potential as a media event. This 
timing provided the Conservatives with a platform by means of 
which, with the aid of the Jimmy Young show on May 11th, they 
dominated the defence debate on three of the four campaigning 
days available that week.
However, if Conservative dominance in the first week of 
the campaign was partly the result of a skilful use of the 
media by the Conservative Party, it was also due to the
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comparative weakness of LabourTs input to the defence debate. 
Labours initial line of attack amounted to Mr FootTs 
accusation on May 10th that the Tories had ncut and run" for 
an early election because they were afraid to confront Labour 
on defence. Given the obvious enthusiasm with which Mrs 
Thatcher tackled the issue Foot’s line of attack rang hollow. 
And while the Tories launched a fresh initiative on defence 
every day, this was Michael Foot’s only contribution to the 
defence debate during the first week. If television news 
revealed anyone to be reluctant to debate the defence issue, 
it was Labour.
Denis Healey’s suggestion on the 11th that Mrs Thatcher 
was ’not interested’ in arms control represented the most 
direct assault on the substance of Conservative policy during 
that first week. But Healey’s remarks thereafter tended to 
lack the populist rhetorical flare of Thatcher and Heseltine 
whose simple and emotive language was ideal for a television 
campaign, both evocative and easy to comprehend in a 30- 
second news item. In addition he was handicapped by a 
reluctance to spell out in clear terms what unilateralism was 
and why Labour felt it necessary because, as soon became 
clear, he himself did not accept the policy.
This aspect of coverage, to which we shall return, was a 
self-inflicted wound for the Labour Party, but it also became 
clear in the first week that journalists were adopting a more 
critical approach to Labour’s defence policy than to those of 
the other two parties. Television news coverage of the debate 
played a role in amplifying what would become Labour’s
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The party manifestoes were published on May 11th (Labour), 
May 12th (the Alliance), and May I8th(the Conservatives). An 
analysis of television news coverage reveals some significant 
variations in approach.
When the Conservative Party manifesto was published on May 
18th it received no critical coverage or sustained analysis 
of its defence proposals. On Channel 4 for example, it was 
reported only that it attacked Labour. There was no reference 
to, or analysis of Conservative defence policy.
Labour’s non-nuclear defence policy also comes under 
attack in the Manifesto. It’s condemned as ’reckless and 
naive1. The Conservatives warn, ’Soviet nuclear strength 
continues to grow1 - so - ’we will not gamble with our 
defence*.(4 1900 1 8/5/83)
News at Ten reported Tory warnings about the Soviet 
Threat, with a brief summary of Conservative defence policy,
The Manifesto warns that Soviet nuclear strength 
continues to grow. The Conservatives would maintain 
Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent and if the 
Geneva talks fail deploy the Cruise missile by the end 
of the year. But they would continue to support all 
realistic efforts to reach arms control agreements.(3 
2200 18/5/83)
Newsnight reported Conservative policy on Cruise and on 
Britain’s own nuclear force, noting the party’s view that 
’’Britain must have an independent nuclear contribution”(2 
Newsnight 18/5/83).
These were the only references to Conservative defence 
policy in television news coverage of the party’s manifesto, 
or in any other coverage. Defence was apparently perceived by
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Conservative policy. Indeed it was not referred to at all in 
BBCI’s coverage, in which the issue of trade union reform was 
seen as by far the most newsworthy aspect of future Tory 
plans. Cecil Parkinson, Conservative Party Chairman and the 
only Tory leader to be interviewed on evening bulletins that 
day, was not questioned on defence. At no point before, 
during or after May 18th did television journalists 
scrutinise Tory defence policy (with the exception of a 
special debate between the three parties on Newsnight of May 
16th discussed below).
As for the Alliance, there was known to be substantial 
disagreement between the SDP and the Liberals on defence, 
although the Alliance leadership maintained a public front of 
unity.
Alliance defence policy had to cope with a divergence of 
opinion between the Liberals, who had voted at their annual 
conference to reject Cruise and cancel Trident, and the 
Social Democrats who agreed with the cancellation of Trident 
but supported the deployment of Cruise. A potentially 
dangerous split was averted when the Liberal Leader David 
Steel unilaterally overturned the Liberals’ conference 
decision on Cruise and came into line behind the SDP on the 
issue. The Alliance Manifesto was published on May 12th. As 
with the Tories relatively little attention was paid by 
television journalists to defence although the fact that 
Alliance manifesto commitments on defence represented a 
compromise was noted.
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Liberal unilateralist and right-wing refugees from the 
Labour Party.(4 1900 12/5/83)
Inevitably, the Liberals and Social Democrats have had 
to compromise on defence. There's a firm commitment to 
cancel Trident missiles, but there's no mention of 
stopping the deployment of Cruise missiles as some 
Liberals would like.(1 2100 12/5/83)
In interviews with Alliance leaders Shirley Williams and 
Roy Jenkins defence policy was raised but not emphasised as 
the major aspect of the Manifesto. The only note of criticism 
directed at Alliance policy on television news during the 
sample period related to Alliance ambiguities on Cruise and 
was addressed to Shirley Williams.
Couldn't you have spelt it out a little more clearly, 
what your intentions are on this vital matter?(2 
Newsnight 12/5/83)
The subject of Alliance defence policy was not returned to 
after May 12th.
For Labour, the media interrogation of defence policy 
began on May 11th. That day the National Executive Committee 
of the Labour Party met and agreed on the contents of the 
manifesto. In the evening Labour representatives appeared on 
two bulletins to discuss their policies.
Labour's manifesto was quickly identified as problematic 
and the defence theme in particular rigorously dissected. 
Channel 4 news was first in with a description of the 
manifesto as "just a balancing act"(4 1900 11/5/83). The 
first question put to Denis Healey, Labour's representative 
on the programme, asked if it was not a "sign of the problem 
of reconciling opinions within the party that you've had to
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defence?” Healey replied that precision was not necessarily a 
bad thing in an election manifesto: "we’re saying precisely 
what we intend to do and it's because it's so precise that 
it's so long". With her next question the interviewer then 
suggested that, (contrary to the implication of her opening 
question), the manifesto wasn't precise at all.
Journalist: You say it's precise but would a vote for 
Labour mean unilateral or multilateral disarmament?
Healey: It will mean some unilateral measures like 
ending the Trident programme and stopping the purely 
American Cruise missiles from being based in Britain but 
it will also mean multilateral negotiations about the 
Polaris force and that's something as you know which the 
Russians have already asked for and the last Labour 
Government planned to do.
Journalist: But doesn't there come a point where the two 
are incompatible? What happens for example if, during 
the negotiations you talk about with our allies they say 
'no, we don't want you to close down US bases?'
Healey: Well there of course we'll have to make a choice 
but I've been discussing this with leading American 
experts and their view, like mine, is that it's very 
unlikely the Americans will need their submarine base at 
Holy Loch once they get their Trident submarines into 
service because that'll be based in the United States. 
And Mrs Thatcher told Jimmy Young this morning... that 
the American bombers based in Britain are clapped out 
and obsolescent.
Journalist: But do you really think that NATO can do 
without American bases of any kind in this country?
Healey: Not of any kind, of course not, but of nuclear 
bases I think that's quite possible.
In a second interview, conducted by Newsnight on May 11th, 
this time with Eric Heffer, Vice-Chairman of the Labour Party 
attention again turned quickly to defence policy. The 
journalist in this case chose to make an interpretation of 
what Labour's policy "must" imply.
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defence programme within the lifetime of a Labour 
Government. Now the chances are that that could mean 
considering leaving NATO within that because NATO is not 
going to cease having a non-nuclear defence policy in 
that time, is it?
Heffer: No, we haven't said we would leave NATO.
Journalist: No, what I'm saying is that the implication 
m u st be if you want to have a non-nuclear defence 
programme.(2 Newsnight 11/5/83).
Such a combative approach is not of itself the object of 
criticism, particularly in the context of a major public 
debate. The point is that it was not applied to the defence
policies of the other two parties, except in the context of
the special Newsnight debate discussed below where the
policies of all three parties were compared.
Coverage of the Conservative manifesto, for example, made 
no examination of the claim that the Conservative Party would 
"continue to support all realistic efforts to reach an arms 
control agreement". This major claim, with its implication 
that the Conservatives had previously supported such efforts 
was unchallenged, nor was it related to the Tories' other 
stated obective of increasing Britain's nuclear force with 
the Trident system. There were no questions put to 
Conservative spokespersons about the 'incompatibility* or 
'irreconcileability' of these policy goals, or statements 
about what the implications of such policies "must be" for 
arms control.
Yet Conservative plans for expanding Britain's nuclear 
arsenal were no less radical and, by the evidence of opinion 
polls, no more popular than Labour's intention to reduce it. 
In an interview on Newsnight of May 24th the official Labour
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Party defence spokesman John Silkin attempted, 
unsuccessfully, to encourage a critical analysis of Tory and 
Alliance defence policies.
Journalist: When you say that the party is still 
committed within the space of the next government, 
assuming it gets a fair number of years, to go 
completely non-nuclear including abandoning Polaris, is 
that correct?
Silkin: Well what one would hope, and this is a very 
interesting point, I think itTs a significant point, it 
shows where the Alliance has fallen down and where the 
government has fallen down too. What we are in fact 
assuming is that we will have negotiated a deal with the 
Russians, who are very keen to do a deal on Polaris. Now 
nowhere did I hear Mrs Thatcher or Mr Heseltine on the 
one hand, or Dr Owen talking for the Alliance on the 
other, say that they would be prepared to negotiate 
Polaris if the Russians give us sufficient nuclear 
weapons in return. They!re not prepared to do it. They 
may talk about multilateral nuclear disarmament but 
they're not prepared to bring it into practice.
Journalist: But while we are on the specific subject of 
LabourTs nuclear, or rather non-nuclear -
Silkin: Yes, but youTve got to examine [the three 
parties] together on this.
Journalist: Indeed that's correct but I can't ask you 
for clarification about their policies. Well I could -
Silkin: You can ask me the questions I raise on them, 
and I do raise those questions. If they're so keen on 
multilateral disarmament why aren't they prepared to 
back us on putting Polaris into the negotiations?
Despite variations in the approaches of journalists to the 
defence programmes of the three parties it is not suggested 
here that media criticism was responsible for the electoral 
disaster which eventually befell Labour. Early coverage 
showed that the most serious problem faced by the Labour 
leadership was a difficulty in expressing Labourfs own 
defence policy, as some leading party activists recognised.
On May 26th, when the Labour Party was in full retreat on
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the defence issue, Channel 4 news interviewed Chris Mullin, 
editor of Tribune, on the content of an editorial attacking 
the Labour leadership on precisely these grounds. The 
offending editorial had observed that "the rift between Mr 
Foot on the one hand, and Messrs Hattersley, Healey and Shore 
on the other has distracted attention away from the real 
reasons for LabourTs opposition to nuclear weapons...no 
wonder the public is confused about Labours defence policy 
when half the shadow cabinet doesn’t seem to understand it 
either" .
Despite being accused by the interviewer of "rubbing salt 
in the wounds" Mr Mullin posed the following question: "why 
are the Labour leaders not putting forward the real reasons 
for wanting to get rid of Britain’s nuclear weapons? They 
haven’t so far been argued by most of Labour’s leaders".(4 
1900 26/5/83) He argued further that "it appears, so far, 
that most members of the Shadow Cabinet don’t understand 
[Labour’s defence policy],and one feels that if the nation 
has the actual arguments put to them people would understand 
it a great deal better".
In his first Channel 4 interview Mr Healey’s argument for 
removing American nuclear bases from Britain relied 
exclusively on the claim that "it’s very likely that our 
allies do not believe that it’s essential for us to have 
American nuclear bases in Britain". When the journalist 
suggested to him that Labour’s traditional working class vote 
would desert the party because "people will think that you’re 
committed to leaving the country undefended" Healey replied
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would never allow anyone with whom he was connected to do 
anything ’’which threatened the defence of our country”. These 
arguments were used to the exclusion of any positive reasons 
for getting rid of nuclear weapons and bases.
In the first week of the campaign (and subsequently) Mr 
Healey and the Labour leadership in general did not shift the 
ground on which the Conservatives were conducting the defence 
debate. They rarely challenged an agenda, set by the Tories 
and shared in its essentials by the Alliance, which took as 
given the reality of the ’Soviet threat’ and the 
effectiveness against that threat of forty years of nuclear 
deterrence. In his Channel 4 interview Mr Healey gave his 
view that "we have a rough balance between Russia and the 
West at the moment", but despite the centrality of the Soviet 
threat concept to the nuclear debate he never again raised 
the issue. Only one other Labour representative was reported 
engaging in a critique of the concept of the Soviet threat. 
This was Tony Benn, whose campaign speech of May 26th was 
reported by Channel 4 news.
Journalist: In a speech a short while ago Mr Tony Benn 
accused the Tories of trying to impose a mood of fear on 
the country.
Benn: I’m talking about the ways in which they try to 
persuade people that if it wasn’t for Mr Heseltine and 
Trident the Russians would be in Liverpool by June 9th. 
Now do you honestly believe that the Russian people - 
who lost 22 million dead in the last world war - do you 
honestly believe that they have already got plans to 
move into Poland, take over East Germany, take over West 
Germany, move into France, take over Italy, go to 
Belgium, come to England, deal with Ken Livingstone, 
move to Liverpool and restore the Lord Mayor or whatever 
they think to do? Do you imagine that’s what they’re 
going to do?(4 1900 26/5/83)[93
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The Conservatives, as already noted, clearly understood 
the importance to their own campaign of asserting the Soviet 
threat, referring to it explicitly in 13 of the 28 items in 
which their views on defence were reported. Throughout the 
campaign the Soviet threat remained the most important 
legitimising device underlying the Conservative Party’s 
defence policy.
By contrast, apart from the examples referred to above, no 
other Labour Party figure addressed the issue of the ’Soviet 
threat’ in television news coverage. While proposing to break 
with a well-established bi-partisan policy Labour was locked 
into a debate conducted within the terms of the pro-nuclear 
lobby and in which its views were presented almost 
exclusively by a well-known former member of that lobby. This 
had important consequences for Labour’s television 
presentation, as became increasingly apparent in the second 
week of the campaign.
Apart from the publication of the Tory manifesto on May 
18th the second week of the campaign was relatively quiet on 
the defence front. From a television point of view the major 
event was an extended Newsnight debate on the evening of May 
16th. The participants were Michael Heseltine the Defence 
Secretary, David Owen, Deputy-leader of the SDP, and Denis 
Healey. Mr Healey’s comments in this interview are 
particularly significant as they were the beginning of the 
’scandal’ which erupted eight days later on May 24th.
The discussion was introduced with a resume of the nuclear 
debate. It was noted that the women protesters of Greenham
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Common had "made sure that one of the key issues in the 
election would be nuclear weapons. They had developed n a new 
language of protest, a new style of politics". Then the 
debate began with a question directed to Mr Heseltine.
Journalist: The charge commonly made against the Tories 
is that their defence posture is aggressive in rhetoric, 
needlessly dependent on Mr Reagan and the United States, 
and increases the nuclear armoury in an unnecessary way. 
How would you answer that charge?(2 Newsnight 16/5/83)
Mr Heseltine replied that noone who had followed the 
debate "could possibly make it". Nuclear deterrence had kept 
the peace for "the longest period of contemporary history in 
Europe". The continued presence of a Soviet Threat 
necessitated a nuclear defence. He added that the Labour 
Party, not the Tories, had broken with the consensus, and 
suggested that Mr Healey himself was one of "the few" within 
the Party who disagreed with LabourTs defence programme.
Heseltine:The only reason I know why anyone now wants to 
change [the consensus] is because the Labour Party has 
gone way to the left, leaving behind a very small number 
of people at the top of the Labour Party, including 
Denis Healey, defending a position himself that the 
Labour Party’s no longer prepared to defend.
In the first moments of this debate attention was thus 
focussed on Labour. As the debate continued both Mr Heseltine 
and Mr Owen returned to this theme: Healey was a 
multilateralist, like them.
Heseltine: The real world is that you [Healey] have been 
left behind by the Left of the Labour Party, and 
everybody knows it. I think the real world is that two 
years ago Denis Healey was saying something absolutely 
contradictory to what he’s saying today, and everybody 
knows it. The fact is the Labour Party has gone left, 
and we know that Denis Healey’s policies have been left 
behind.
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Owen: When [Healey] was Chancellor of the Exchequer in 
1978, when he had all the other pressures on 
expenditure, he agreed with me and Jim Callaghan, we 
increased the defence budget. We agreed to follow the 
NATO 3% per year real terms increase. It was right then 
and it's right now.
Healey was reminded that he had been a key member of pro- 
nuclear Labour Governments. Mr Heseltine accused him of being 
party to the original decision to deploy Cruise in Britain. 
Healey's ability to counter these accusations was hampered by 
the fact that they were in many respects true. In replying to 
Heseltine's point about Cruise he was forced to concede that 
while a member of Jim Callaghan's Cabinet he had supported 
the modernisation of NATO's medium-range nuclear force but 
that no decision had been taken as to the precise form of 
deployment.
Healey:... a joint communique [of May 19791 said 
explicitly they [the then Labour Government] had not 
decided, even on principle, on whether to modernise 
nuclear weapons, and if so, how.
Heseltine: That is categorically untrue. They said it 
was necessary to modernise the weapons, but they did not 
say what weapons.
Owen: We certainly agreed to do something to 
modernise...Where Denis is right is no decision was 
taken as to the form of deployment.
Heseltine: What Denis is now doing is trying to defend a 
party policy which has moved away from his own 
convictions and his own experiences as Secretary of 
Defence.
This 'defence debate' can be seen as a paradigm for the 
Nuclear Election as a whole. In effect it became an assault 
on Labour’s integrity. Mr Healey's preferred public image as 
elder statesman was worked against, rather than for Labour's 
non-nuclear defence policy. In the course of a debate which
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Conservatives (one which he repeated three times) was to 
suggest that money spent on nuclear weapons was depriving 
"the 2nd Paratroop Regiment, the heroes of Goose Green", who 
were "having to buy with their own money the protective 
equipment they need because they're not satisfied with that 
provided by Mr Heseltine". Without disputing the validity of 
this point if it were true it was far from being the crux of 
the nuclear debate, as Mr Heseltine pointed out in reply. The 
effectiveness of Healey's point was further eroded when David 
Owen pointed out Labour's manifesto commitment to reduce 
conventional as well as nuclear defence spending.
Owen: There's no use talking about what Mrs Thatcher's
done for the Navy. [What Labour] would have to do to the
Navy would make her [cuts] look like a picnic.
The section of the debate that caused the deeper 
controversy however, was that in which Mr Healey explained 
Labour's own policy. His presentation of Labour's non-nuclear 
defence programme, in combination with other statements made 
by himself and the Labour leadership team in the following 
days, would eventually be fanned by the mass media and the 
opposition parties into the event of the election. We recall 
that in the Channel 4 interview of May 11th, Healey had 
stated that Polaris would be entered into "multilateral 
negotiations" with the USSR. Here, when questioned on the 
future of Polaris under a Labour Government he asserted that 
its phasing out would be conditional on Soviet concessions.
In short, the Labour Party would not necessarily implement a 
non-nuclear defence policy within the lifetime of a 
Parliament.
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Journalist: Could you explain...given that you will have
a non-nuclear defence policy at the end of the lifetime 
of one Labour government, that would mean that the 
unilateral commitment takes precedence over the 
multilateral one, I mean that is absolute, isn’t it?
Healey: Mr Callaghan’s group of ministers decided before 
the last General Election to put the Polaris force into 
the disarmament negotiations and that implied a 
readiness to give it up i£ w£ got adequate concessions 
from the Soviet UnionT and that is still our position.
With this statement the foremost Labour spokesman on 
defence set in motion a process of public declaration and 
counter-declaration by party leaders attempting to set the 
record straight. As this process gathered momentum the 
substantive issues of the debate seemed to lose their 
relevance for journalists and receded into the background. 
Media attention focussed increasingly on the leadership’s 
inability to present a coherent defence policy.
Before examining coverage of this phase of the campaign in 
detail it is worth noting that at least one rationale for a 
non-nuclear defence policy was presented and covered on the 
news. Ironically, the author of this view was the Right-wing 
’bogeyman1 of British politics - Enoch Powell, who on this 
issue found himself on the same side as the Labour Party. 
Indeed, Powell’s critique of the concept of ’nuclear 
deterrence’ ,reported three times in the sample, was arguably 
the most effective and direct to be made during the entire 
campaign. His speech, an extract from which is given in 
Chapter 2 above, was covered in the following way:
Mr Enoch Powell has sided with Labour over nuclear 
weapons, though he stopped short of repeating his advice 
in 1974 to vote Labour. Mr Powell spoke tonight of the 
transparent absurdity of nuclear deterrence. He said
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and the Soviets could destroy every vestige of life on 
these islands several times over.Mr Powell said for 
Britain to use nuclear weapons in these circumstances 
would be worse than suicide, it would be genocide and 
the extinction of our race. He said it would be insanity 
to call nuclear weapons defence.(3 2200 31/5/83)
Back on the campaign trail, following the Newsnight debate 
of May 16th, Labour had begun a slide into confusion and 
contradiction. Over the next few days the Conservatives and 
the Alliance began to use Denis HealeyTs contradictory 
statements in order to undermine the credibility of Labour's 
defence policy, shifting from attacking the content of 
Labour's policy to mocking its presentation.
On May 17th the main defence story of the day was that 
Labour "didn't want to start talking about defence, which is 
an issue that could work both ways for the party, until next 
week"(4 1900 17/5/83). The context of this item was a 
statement made by Denis Healey who, it was reported, had "got 
out of his difficulties with unilateralism by putting the 
emphasis on no-first use of nuclear weapons". Mr Healey was 
reported as arguing for a change in NATO policy which would 
enable the alliance to "deter a massive Soviet conventional 
attack without requiring to threaten the first use of nuclear 
weapons". BBC1 reported that "today Denis Healey seemed to 
equate Labour's non-nuclear policy with the no-first use of 
nuclear weapons"(1 2100 17/5/83). Curiously, News at Ten's 
presentation of the same story implied that a major split had 
occured.
Labour is committed to a non-nuclear defence policy for 
Britain, but Mr Healey said it was unrealistic for the 
West to dispose of its nuclear weapons while the 
Russians retain theirs.(3 2200 17/5//83)
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Labour’s programme proposed only that Britain should give 
up its nuclear weapons, not NATO or the West as a whole.
ITN’s account inferred that Labour was proposing for the West 
to give up its nuclear arms, while ’the Russians’ retained 
theirs, and that Healey was opposed to this policy. His 
actual statement was broadcast on BBC1, from which it can be 
seen that this was not the content of his remarks.
CND, like the Labour Party, concedes that it is not 
possible for the West as a whole to get rid of nuclear 
weapons so long as the Soviet Union has them, and that 
is a matter for multilateral negotiation.
News at Ten also reported an attack on Labour by David Owen.
He called Labour’s defence policy nonsense. He said 
Labour was the party of verbal elastoplast. They 
couldn’t even stitch up their splits and divisions.
On Hay 18th BBC reported an attack along similar lines by 
Michael Heseltine.
He cannot rewrite the Labour Party manifesto in speech 
after speech, or in television programme after 
television programme. If he believes in the Labour Party 
manifesto then he should stand up and fight for it. He 
cannot turn himself into the fastest moving target in 
post-war defence history, and retain a shred of 
credibility. (1 2100 18/5/83)
With hindsight and the aid of a video recorder we can see 
that the seeds of Labour’s defence problem were sown as early 
as May 11th. But the party had a few more days of uneasy calm 
on the defence front before the ’’splits and divisions” 
alleged by David Owen finally overtook them.
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Their leaders are at odds, their manif e s t o  is in 
shreds.(Roy Jenkins, 27/5/83)
On May 24th Labour's confusion over defence developed into 
what Michael Heseltine described as a "scandal”. The previous 
day press and television journalists had arrived at Labour's 
regular morning press conference asking for clarification on 
conflicting signals coming from the Labour leadership, such 
as Roy Hattersley's statement on BBC's Question Time that "if 
there was no reciprocation from the other side of the Iron 
Curtain then a Labour Government would have to think about 
Polaris again".
That day there were a number of press articles on the 
apparent split. Foot, it was reported, had reaffirmed the 
commitment to a non-nuclear policy before the end of a single 
Parliament. Healey nevertheless maintained the position, as 
the Guardian reported on May 23rd, that "if the Russians do 
not respond Polaris should not be scrapped". Now, in response 
to what looked like open conflict between the Leader and 
Deputy Leader television news promoted the dispute to 
headline status. In that evening's news defence came to the 
centre of the election stage, if not quite in the way Labour 
had anticipated.
Defence has been brewing up as an issue since the 
beginning of the campaign and today in an attempt to 
confront it Labour itself was forced onto the 
defensive... the underlying difference over defence 
between Mr Foot and Mr Healey which the manifesto is 
supposed to bridge has again been exposed in the last 
few days...Mr Healey has stretched Labour's nuclear 
defence policy to include the possibility of retaining 
Polaris if arms reduction negotiations fail.(4 1900 
24/5/83).
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Channel 4 news on May 24th conducted a major interview 
with Michael Foot in which he was reported to have made it 
clear that "at the end of a Labour Parliament Britain would 
have no Cruise, no Trident, no Polaris". He also made a major 
clarifying statement during a speech in Birmingham which was 
covered on all bulletins. In this speech he committed Labour 
to putting Polaris into the superpower negotiations with the 
aim of reducing nuclear weapons on all sides. Phasing out 
Polaris, he said, would be "part of that process". Mr Healey, 
however, was reported on the same programme as saying that 
"we will review our commitment [to give up] the Polaris force 
[if the Russians make no concessions]". In evening bulletins 
Healey was repeatedly quoted apparently contradicting the 
Labour manifesto, and Michael Foot:
Healey: we want to put the Polaris force which we 
already have into negotiations with the Russians so that 
we don't get rid of that unless the Russians get rid of 
their weapons aimed at us, and that seems to me common 
sense.(1 2100 24/5/83)
If in fact the Russians break the promise they've made 
to cut their missiles aimed at us when we’re negotiating 
with them as theyTve asked us to do, that'll be a new 
situation and we'll have to consider it when it comes.(3 
2200 24/5/83).
The confusion engendered by these remarks was compounded 
by Mr Foot's reluctance to assert his authority and commit 
himself one way or the other on Polaris. His response to 
valid questioning was evasive and defensive.
Journalist: Mr Foot, can I ask you, would a Labour 
government get rid of Polaris even if the Russians did 
not cut their forces?
Foot: What I want you to do is to study this statement 
carefully -
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Journalist: I have.
Foot: - well, to study the whole of our manifesto and 
you will see that we propose to proceed stage by stage. 
We are going to establish a non-nuclear defence policy 
for this country, we are going to start off by having a, 
seeking to give British backing to the nuclear freeze, 
we think it’s quite wrong that the British Government 
should have rejected that policy and we can move stage 
by stage to the non-nuclear defence policy.(3 2200 
24/5/83).
On the one hand, LabourTs leaders presented a muddled and 
confused image of what their policy was, and on the other Mr 
Foot appeared unable to assert his authority. The resulting 
assault by Labour’s opponents added the leadership1 issue to 
the defence issue[10]. It was argued that Healeyfs statements 
refuting unilateralism, coming as they did from such an 
experienced elder statesman showed how extreme LabourTs 
policy was. LabourTs opponents also alleged that Foot’s 
performance had destroyed his credibility as a serious 
candidate for Prime Minister. Charges of extremism were 
combined with increasingly personal attacks on Mr Foot.
Thatcher: I would not accuse them of lacking clarity in 
the manifesto. They may well be trying to retreat from 
it now but [unilateral nuclear disarmament] is what they 
have put in their manifesto...If they were to get in, 
this is what the left would claim they had a mandate to 
do.(4 1900 24/5/83)
Heseltine: Quite frankly, Mr Foot has lost control. In 
the public gaze is Denis Healey, the man that Michael 
Foot beat for the leadership but who wouldn’t now lie 
down. In the shadows, there wait Mr FootTs left-wing 
masters. Labourfs new' elite, the extremists to whom he 
owes the leadership of the Labour Party, and in the 
middle is the yawning gap of Michael FootTs credibility. 
I wouldnTt trust him to defend us from the ravages of a 
feather duster, let alone the menacing imperialism of 
Soviet ambition.(3 2200 24/5/83)
David Owen: The trouble is, that he’s been rumbled. 
Michael Foot’s been rumbled, and the trouble is that the 
left are not prepared to allow Healeyspeak to continue 
to be the acceptable face of the defence policy that
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all beginning to realise that Michael Foot and Denis 
Healey have been playing about with the nation’s 
defences.(3 2200 24/5/83)
On May 24th, the media spotlight was turned on a party 
whose leaders were apparently at odds, unable to agree on the 
defence policy which they claimed to uphold. Election news on 
May 24th showed the Labour Party to be in ’’disarray” over 
defence. The crisis intensified on May 25th when former Prime 
Minister Jim Callaghan spoke out in favour of the 
Reagan/Thatcher position at the Geneva talks, and against 
Labour’s own defence policy. Callaghan’s speech was widely 
reported, coming as it did from such an authoritative former 
member of the defence establishment. It also provided a neat 
follow-up story to the events of May 24th, and ensured that 
Labour’s problems would be headline news for another day.
The next day, May 26th, Labour’s ’defence problem’ again 
stole the headlines. So grave was Labour’s own assessment of 
its public image that at the morning press conference of May 
26th the party’s General Secretary Jim Mortimer had decided 
it was necessary to reaffirm Michael Foot’s leadership. 
However, a statement intended to strengthen Foot’s position 
further weakened it in the eyes of television journalists. 
Channel 4 described Mortimer’s statement as a ’’classic own 
goal” which had ’’raised the issue of Michael Foot’s 
leadership right in the middle of the campaign”(4 1900 
26/5/83). Other bulletins agreed with this interpretation.
Meanwhile, the propaganda war continued. David Owen 
received major coverage with an attack on Michael Foot’s 
alleged unfitness to govern. Michael Foot, he argued, was a
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’’gentle, kind person” but ’’totally unable to grapple with the 
whole complexity of nuclear weapons and nuclear issues...That 
man is not fit to be Prime Minister”. Owen justified this 
accusation by recalling that as a member of the Labour 
Cabinet Michael Foot had refused to support nuclear defence. 
Margaret Thatcher was in the news, speaking to Conservatives 
in Harrogate.
Some of the Labour leaders know their policy’s wrong. 
That’s what the r o w ’s about...But it’s all here in the 
Labour manifesto, and they voted for it. We’re told it 
took a mere four and a half hours for the so-called 
moderates to give up a vital part of our country’s 
defences.(3 2200 26/5/83)
That Labour was ’gambling with Britain’s defences’ became 
a major theme of the opposition parties’ propaganda.
The development of the election defence debate in the 
directions shown here meant that television coverage of the 
Nuclear Election largely bypassed the substantive issues of 
the nuclear debate, except where these concerned Labour’s 
Polaris policy, and concentrated on the Labour leadership 
dispute. It is not suggested that this was a deliberate or 
conscious exclusion of those issues by the journalists. 
Partly, it was the byproduct of normal election journalism in 
which, as Jimmy Carter once put it, ’’the peripheral aspects 
become the headlines, but the basic essence of what you stand 
for and what you hope to accomplish is never reported”! 11 ].
Secondly, it was the consequence of Labour’s inadequate 
news input to the news process. The policies appeared as 
incoherent and contradictory in their presentation, which 
generally avoided the central issues of whv Britain’s defence
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should be non-nuclear.
In the 1983 campaign, in the area of defence policy, the 
peripheral aspects’ concerning the Labour leadership 
eclipsed the defence debate as such. The debate about the 
relative worth of Labour, Tory, and Alliance policies was 
superceded by a debate on the various interpretations of 
Labour’s policy conducted by the Labour leadership itself. In 
this sense the nuclear debate was not or lost in 1 983, it was 
never really engaged.
Figure 7.1. Labour’s defence policy in the 1983 General 
Election T as seen bv the Daily MailT Mav 23rd.
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1. In the spring of 1985 the Granada company produced a 
series of television programmes called, appropriately enough, 
Television. One of these, The Selling of the PresidentT 
examined the role of television in the electoral process of 
modern democracies. Academics such as Professor Ivor Crewe, 
and politicians such as Edward Heath, Harold Wilson and 
Richard Nixon, each expressed the view that of all the mass 
media available to an election campaign television was the 
most effective. Whether it is effective in reality is not so 
important for the purposes of this discussion as the fact 
that most politicians perceive it to be so.
2. Robert Goodman, Media Advisor, Republican Party, on 
Granada's The Selling of the President.
3. As reported on Channel 4 news, May 10th, 1983.
4. At a speech in Liverpool on May 17th Michael Foot 
proclaimed: nWhat the Conservatives headed by the Prime 
Minister are showing in this election is their unfitness to 
be in charge of the defence policy of Great Britain at such a 
time as this. What we’ve got the chance of at this election, 
on this supreme issue, is to push those ignorant barbarians 
out of the way and get on with the job of saving this country 
on a proper basisn(reported on News at Ten, May 17th, 1983).
5. The context of these remarks was a letter sent by the 
Labour Party leadership to the Soviet Government asking the 
latter what its reponse would be to Britain’s nuclear 
disarmament. The Conservative MP Harvey Proctor had asked the 
Prime Minister is ’’she agreed that the Soviet response would 
be to accept the Labour Party’s naivety in this matter and 
continue with nuclear weapons and, in addition, increase its 
nuclear capability?” (HansardT Vol 42, p732). Mrs Thatcher 
replied: ”1 agree that the Opposition’s defence policy is the 
most misguided and naive ever put before the British people. 
It puts in doubt our security and the defence of our 
traditional way of life. I hope that it will be firmly 
rejected. As regards the letter to Mr Andropov, I notice that 
it was Mr Andropov who was reported as saying, ’Let noone 
expect unilateral disarmament from us. We are not a naive 
people'” .
6. Although Denis Healey appears to have been delegated the 
responsibility of speaking for Labour on defence during the
1 983 campaign, it was in fact John Silkin who was the party’s 
defence spokesman. During the sample Silkin’s views on 
defence were reported only five times, while those of Denis 
Healey received coverage on 26 occasions. This was somewhat 
unfortunate for Labour, in the light of subsequent events 
since, as Silkin revealed in an interview on Newsnight, he if 
not Healey was fully committed to the manifesto commitment of 
phasing Polaris out within the lifetime of a Parliament.
7. Pym stated that ’’Labour has done a somersault. They have 
decided on defence what amounts to surrender. They are wrong, 
and dangerously wrong. They put at risk our very security”.(4
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8. BBC’s 9 O’ Clock news covered Mrs Thatcher’s speech but 
not her statements on defence. That BBC news producers were 
aware of a possible tendency to ’bias’ in coverage of the 
Scottish Conservative Conference was revealed in a Guardian 
article by Dennis Barker of May 14th, 1983: "The fact that 
the Scottish Tory Party Conference is on at the moment is not 
the BBC’s fault and it may not be possible to balance Mrs 
Thatcher there”.
9. Tony Benn was also reported on May 20th, when he attacked 
the Defence Secretary in what was described as his ’’first 
major speech of the campaign”: ”Mr Heseltine has no idea how 
to cope with the Greenham Common women. At one stage he was 
thought to believe that if he gave a million pounds to 
Saatchi and Saatchi that would cancel out the Greenham Common 
women but I don’t know what he was going to spend it on - 
appear on television with a big missile and say ’Use Trident, 
the best detergent, or deterrent that you could find’. They 
do not know how to cope with a voice for peace and a 
testimony for peace by people not standing for Parliament but 
who are concerned with the issue”(4 1900 20/5/83).
10. Cockerell et all suggest that Michael Foot was the 
Conservative Party’s greatest ’’negative asset” in the 
campaign (1983, p.214), but clearly, the confusion and 
incoherence was not his alone.
11. New York Times Book Review T June 19th, 1977.
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Concluding Remarks.
This study set out to examine how the defence and 
disarmament debate which dominated British political life in 
the early 1980s was covered on television news. It has 
analysed coverage of the debates which took place on defence 
and disarmament issues between the West and the Soviet Union; 
between Western political leaders and the anti-nuclear 
protest movement; and between the political parties at the 
1983 General Election. It was also centrally concerned with 
the theme which underlies all of these debates: images of the 
Soviet Union. The study sought to establish, mainly through 
large-scale content analysis, that television news did not 
construct na merely factual account” of the defence and 
disarmament debate, but one in which certain perspectives 
were dominant.
It was argued that television’s image of the Soviet Union 
tends to reinforce the logic of a pro-nuclear position, 
because it is a negative, threatening image. The need for a 
nuclear deterrent is very much tied to the alleged existence 
of a Soviet threat. Television news, it was argued, 
reinforces the concept of the Soviet threat in much of its 
coverage, and tends to reproduce a number of stereotypes of 
the USSR which have roots in conservative ideology. In this 
sense, they are not ’neutral' or 'impartial' images.
Subsequently, it was argued that in television news 
coverage of specific exchanges between East and West, such as 
occurred during the Korean airliner crisis or in the arms 
control talks, the Soviet view of events tended to be
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constructed as a less credible, less truthful account than 
that of the United States government.
Our study of the domestic political debate between the 
Thatcher government and the peace movements noted that the 
activities of the latter were widely reported on television 
news, but that this was qualified by the ’counter-propaganda1 
of the defence establishment, such as Mr Heseltine’s Berlin 
Wall visit of Easter 1983. During the sample period, it was 
argued, the views of the respective ’propagandists’ in the 
East-West debate were not reported ’impartially’.
The analysis of the Nuclear Election noted significant 
variations in the approaches taken by journalists to the 
defence policies of the three parties, but concentrated 
mainly on the way in which the respective parties employed 
the news media. It was argued that the Labour Party was 
unable to present a coherent, consistent non-nuclear defence 
policy. The study also confirmed, in the campaigning tactics 
of the Conservative Party, just how important the idea of the 
Soviet threat is to dominant views on defence.
These then were the observed features of coverage, along 
the three ’axes’ which we identified in Chapter 1. But in 
addition to describing the coverage the study also declared 
its intention to to relate these features to factors involved 
in the social process of news production. These factors can 
be summarised under three headings: 1) the attitudes and 
assumptions of the news producers; 2) the set of constraints 
on the news-gathering process, particularly in relation to 
coverage of the Soviet Union, and 3) the approaches to news
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management and news input adopted by the various participants 
in the debate.
The first of these factors affected coverage on a number 
of levels. In news coverage of the Soviet Union, it was 
argued that ’’ideological bias”, to use the phrase of one 
Moscow correspondent, was evident in the language employed by 
some journalists. Such terms as ’’garrison state”, ’’empire”, 
’’dictator” and ’’puppet” are not ’neutral’, it was suggested. 
They reveal underlying journalistic assumptions about the 
nature of the USSR, and reinforce the validity of defence 
policies premised on the notion that the Soviet Union, as Mrs 
Thatcher put it, is ’’our sworn enemy”. Journalistic attitudes 
were reflected in the tendency to depict the negative aspects 
of Soviet/socialist life, and to omit from coverage 
information which might construct a more positive image of 
the USSR than dominant views portray. Attitudes were evident 
too, in the way that journalists frequently made sense of US 
and Soviet positions, in such contexts as the arms control 
talks. US proposals tended to appear as sincere and genuine, 
while those of the USSR were marginalised as, on one notable 
occasion, ’’attempts to drive a wedge” between the NATO 
allies.
Because of the special nature of election broadcasting, 
the study avoided making major claims about coverage of the 
party political debate. It was noted however, that there was 
a tendency in the early stages of the campaign for 
journalists to challenge Labour’s defence policy with a 
vigour and a consistency absent in coverage of the other
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envisaged a massive unilateral increase in Britain’s nuclear 
weaponry, as radical in its own way as Labour’s proposed 
disarmament. The radicalism of both policies was not in 
doubt, but only Labour’s was interpreted as such in the 
sample.
At the level of routine journalistic practices, attitudes 
and assumptions about which are the most authoritative and 
credible sources of comment on defence and disarmament issues 
were evident in the structure of access. Establishment 
sources enjoyed a privileged, largely uncritical access in 
coverage of debates involving the USSR on the one hand, and 
the peace movements on the other. The assumptions of these 
primary definers were rarely contested by journalists.
We say rarely, because throughout this study evidence has 
been found to refute the view of a simple or straightforward 
media ’bias’ in coverage of these crucial issues. The 
attitudes and assumptions argued to be present in much of the 
coverage were by no means evident in all of it. A number of 
’counter-examples’ to what were identified as tendencies in 
coverage were discussed. The ’’currently dominant” notion of 
the Soviet threat was the critical focus of an item in 
October 1983, on the eve of the Cruise and Pershing II 
deployments. In June 1982 and May 1983 news items explicitly 
challenged the sincerity of the Reagan Administration’s arms 
control policies by contrasting its words with its deeds. The 
dominant US definition of the Korean airliner crisis as an 
example of ’Russian barbarism’, ’preferred’ in the great 
proportion of television news coverage, was contested on a
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nanarui or news items during tne crisis itseii, ana in 
several items in the period following the crisis.
As we go through these counter-examples, however, it 
becomes clear that they are concentrated almost exclusively 
in minority-audience news programming. Not only does the 
minority-audience format present lengthier and more detailed 
coverage of complex issues in general, but it permits a wider 
range of views to be accessed as seriousT credible views.
When Soviet commentators are accessed on television news, it 
is these programmes on which they appear. The same is true, 
with few exceptions, for !dissidentT establishment sources 
such as Admiral Noel Gaylor. These programmes are, to use 
Schlesinger’s phrase, "relatively open" spaces within 
television news. To a limited extent, British broadcasting 
does Negotiate1 with viewpoints in competition with dominant 
ones: a negotiation which, as Hartley puts it, "is no sham" 
(1984, p.62).
A second factor with important effects on defence and 
disarmament news was argued to be the set of constraints 
which face journalists in the news-gathering process. Given 
that images of the Soviet Union ’frame1 the nuclear debate, 
the study tried to show how the work of the journalists who 
produce these images might be affected by the constraints put 
in their way by the Soviet authorities. These constraints, we 
have suggested, contribute to a pattern of coverage of the 
Soviet Union which highlights the themes of dissidence and 
dissent, and neglects or omits what one journalist called 
"the unknown factor" of Soviet life. The interview data used
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'ideological biases’ against the USSR and desire to redress 
them, but find their attempts to do so frustrated in a 
variety of ways. If some journalists are ’biased* against the 
USSR and share the assumptions of currently dominant groups, 
others find the range of images of the USSR which they can 
produce limited by the actions of the Soviet authorities.
A related point emerges when we consider the third factor 
involved in shaping coverage: news management and news input. 
We have argued that television news tends to favour 
establishment sources in constructing accounts of issues: 
that establishment views are privileged as a consequence of 
routine journalistic practices. During the sample period, 
however, this structural 'bias’ was complemented by the 
different approaches of the competing sides to news 
management. On the one hand the United States used the media 
with consummate skill. With the Zero Option and Interim Zero 
Option proposals the Administration 'fed' its viewpoint into 
the Western European mass media system with the help of live 
satellite transmissions. By satisfying the broadcasters’ 
hunger for pictures and spectacle the Administration gained 
maximum exposure for its views. In the Korean airliner crisis 
the Administration went public immediately, seizing the 
propaganda initiative and ensuring that its account of the 
event dominated the media, including British television news, 
in the first crucial weeks.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, tended to treat the 
techniques of news management with suspicion and disdain, in 
the long-held belief of its dominant groups that any
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information given to the Western media would be used against 
it. Exemplified during the first few days of the Korean 
airliner crisis, this policy created an ’information gap’ 
which the Reagan Administration was only too happy to fill.
This factor, combined with the constraints referred to 
above, leads us to the conclusion that negative 'images of 
the enemy’ on British television, and the features of 
coverage of the defence and disarmament/ East-West debate 
which have been noted in this study, are not accountable 
solely by reference to the ideological or structual 'biases’ 
of journalists. 'Bias’ ±s a valid explanation, but not a 
sufficient one. The Soviet approach to Western journalism,to 
news management and news input, is also important, as can be 
seen most clearly in the new Soviet approach to summitry. The 
Soviets have a certain capacity, should they choose to employ 
it, for shaping the coverage which they receive in the West. 
Journalists are not mere puppets of the powerful. They apply 
rules and practices which, if they produce form of news 
structurally subordinated to dominant viewpoints in general, 
nevertheless creates spaces for competing viewpoints, 
including the Soviet one, to be represented with a reasonable 
degree of fairness. Images of the Soviet Union in defence and 
disarmament news are shaped by Soviet attitudes as well as 
those of the journalists. Indeed, as the defence and 
disarmament debate continues into the late 1980s, the Soviets 
under a new leadership appear to have learnt this lesson. Now 
they adopt news management techniques which compare with 
those of the Reagan Administration in their appreciation of 
what Western journalists require and in the opinion of some
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journalists, as we have shown, the presentation of the Soviet 
viewpoint in the West has already begun to benefit from the 
new information policy.
The negative effect on coverage of bad news management 
and news input was seen in another way during the 1983 
Election, when the Labour Party found itself on the defensive 
over issues which were peripheral to the nuclear debate. 
Choosing not to tackle the issue of the Soviet threat, and 
presenting an incoherent, contradictory image of its policy 
on Polaris, the party never looked like winning support for 
its views.
Skilful news management will not cancel out the effects of 
journalists* attitudes and assumptions, but it can provide 
those journalists who aspire to a more Objective* coverage 
of the issues with better raw material to work with.
Television news remains a major source of information for 
the British people about the complex issues involved in the 
continuing defence and disarmament debate. It will continue 
to contribute to the outlining of what Ranney calls "the 
framework in which we behave politically" (1983, p6). In that 
context, the conclusions of this study raise questions about 
the freedom and availability of information which are no less 
pertinent today than they were when the research began.
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